Dr Sarah Marsden
Well, good afternoon, and a very warm welcome to this panel on The Evolving Threat of Radicalization. My name’s Dr Sarah Marsden. I’m a Senior Lecturer at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrew’s in Scotland and I’ll be chairing the panel today. It is a great pleasure to see so many people join us and also to be joined by such an esteemed panel to discuss the question of radicalization. Before we get started, I’ll go over a few housekeeping points, offer a few words of context, before introducing our panel, and then I’ll hand over to our speakers.
The first thing to say is that the event will be on the record, and it’s also being recorded, and will be made available to the Chatham House members via their YouTube channel. The second point is to emphasise that we really welcome your active participation in the session. Throughout the panel, you can ask questions using the Q&A function, which you’ll be able to see at the bottom of the Zoom slide, and when we get to the Q&A session, I might invite you to unmute and ask your question directly. However, if you would prefer that I read out the question on your behalf, that’s also fine, just indicate that when you submit your question. The chat function will also be open for you to share observations or comments with the rest of the group. The questions themselves do need to be posted in the Q&A box, just so that I can see them.
So, the format for the panel today is going to involve hopefully three speakers offering opening remarks on the topic of The Evolving Threat of Radicalization, before we go into a slightly wider panel discussion. After that, we’re going to open up the session to questions from the floor, but you can pose questions throughout the session, whilst our speakers are presenting. And it does seem very apposite that we are asking questions of radicalization today, it is now a little over 20 years on from 9/11, which was really the event that precipitated the development and the popularisation, if you like, of the radicalization concept. And, given the events from yesterday in Liverpool, the threat from terrorism of course remains with us, and that means the questions about how and why people become persuaded about the need for violence remain an ongoing concern, for society, for policymakers, for academics.
And that means that I’m absolutely delighted to welcome three experts to share their views on The Evolving Threat of Radicalization, and to explore whether the world is better prepared to combat terrorism than it was 20 years ago, when 9/11 first occurred. So we do have hopefully three speakers, Devorah Margolin, Tom Wilson, and, all being well, Nasra Ayub. Nasra is having a few connection problems, we’re hoping that she’ll be able to join us, so for now, I’m pleased to be able to introduce our three speakers, and with luck, Nasra will be able to join us very soon.
So, our first speaker will be Devorah Margolin, who is the Director of Strategic Initiatives and a Senior Fellow at the Program on Extremism at The George Washington University. Devorah’s also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and a PhD Candidate in the Department for War Studies in the UK at King’s College, London. Devorah’s work focuses on terrorism, from a wide range of perspectives. It includes work on terrorism governance, terrorism financing, the role of propaganda, as well as countering violent extremism, and the role of women in violent extremism. Devorah’s the Project Manager for The ISIS Files Project and a Senior Investigator with the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center. Devorah’s published widely, both academically, but also in the media, providing regular commentary to outlets including The LA Times, The Telegraph, and The New York Times, amongst others. Her co-edited book, Jihadist Terror: New Threats, New Responses, was published in 2019, and, Devorah, it really is a pleasure to have you join us today from the States.
Tom Wilson is our second contributor, and Tom’s a Senior Fellow at the Counter Extremism Group, which is a think tank that helps Politicians, the public, and the media understand the threat from extremism. Tom’s work focuses on the study of terrorist networks in Western countries, Islamist activism, as well as the means by which liberal democracies might best respond to the influence and impact of extremism. Prior to joining the Counter Extremism Group, Tom was the Head of the Security and Extremism Unit at Policy Exchange, and he’s often called on to provide expert insight into extremism to a range of media outlets, including The New York Times, The Telegraph, The Independent, The Spectator, and others. Tom, welcome, it’s a pleasure to have you with us.
And in the hope that Nasra will be able to join us, I will offer some introductory remarks to welcome her and to introduce her to you. Nasra Ayub is an Activist and a Youth Worker at the youth-led charity Integrate UK. Nasra delivers workshops and training on extremism, FGM, honour-based violence, and has represented Integrate, as well as furthering the public and political debate across these agenda at different global fora, engaging with world leaders, national governments, UK Prime Ministers, as well as celebrity activists including Emma Watson. And Nasra’s contributed to a wide range of media, from Dazed, to the i Paper, and the BBC. Her work’s been widely recognised, and in 2020, Nasra was awarded the prestigious Diana Award for her work on ending violence against women and girls, and she was one of the women the BBC described as being a modern-day suffragette, so you can see why I’m so keen that Nasra is able to join us.
For now, I think we’ll move into our opening remarks, as I say, with the hope that Nasra will be able to come online, so, Tom, Devorah, we’ll offer around five minutes of introductory remarks around the question of radicalization, then we’ll open it up into a wider panel discussion. So, Devorah, if I may, I’ll hand over to you first, and then we’ll hear from Tom and, with luck, Nasra.
Devorah Margolin
Thank you so much, Dr Marsden. Thank you for having me here today. When we were asked to speak about this event, we were asked understanding – how has our understanding of radicalization since 9/11 evolved, and are we better prepared today than we were 20 years ago? And I think it’s important to begin by talking about how our understanding and research on violent extremism, for the better or the worse, is affected by world events.
Here in the United States, we’ve been pulled between both foreign and domestic threats. In the 1960s and 70s, we had skyjackings driven by nationalists and far left ideologies, in the 90s the Oklahoma City bombings and anti-government movements, in 2000s, we had the 9/11 events and violent Islamist groups. And these acts of terrorism have been carried out by a diverse set of actors, adhering to a melting pot of ideologies, but here in the United States, 9/11 changed things, and there was an intense shift to focus on violent Islamist ideologies, even with the Department of Homeland Security created in the wake of the events.
Research has evolved and it moved many of the conversations away from earlier studies on root causes, and lead to more nuanced conversations about cognitive openings that lead to radicalization. Since 9/11, we’ve seen a flourishing of violent Islamist movements. While pre 9/11, we had groups like the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda, in the last 20 years, we’ve seen more brands of violent Islamist ideologies take root and spread. Not only – no longer do we have centralised organisations, but groups have affiliates who buy into their ideology and merge with local conflicts and grievances. For example, one only needs to look at the Islamic state movement’s evolution from Al-Qaeda in Iraq to now becoming its own umbrella organisation, or groups like Al-Shabaab, having claimed allegiance to Al-Qaeda, but having members splinter off and pledge allegiance to the Islamic State.
In the ensuing 20 years since 9/11, we’ve learned more about these movements, how they operate, recruit, and why people are attracted to them, but that being said, there’s also limits to this. Research and policy, and as a result funding, have heavily focused on violent Islamist ideologies. There were many criticisms of this hyperfocus on one ideology, some of them very legitimate, with questions about the protections of civil liberties. Furthermore, by prioritising one ideology, security and policy turned, or ignored, or turned a blind eye to the rise of far-right and anti-government movements here in the US, in some cases, even diverting funding away from offices here that studied them.
Just like 9/11 changed the way we study extremism, January 6 has changed how we talk about and think about extremism in the US. It sped up a shift that’s already been in the work for a few years here in the US, and today, the Department of Homeland Security states the greatest immediate threat is from far-right extremism and disinformation. But that’s not to say that violent Islamist ideology is not a threat, but what you’re seeing right now is resurgence of racially and ethnically-motivated violent extremism, organised militia movements, and acceleration of movements that want to provoke societal collapse through mass violence.
But we shouldn’t completely avoid and pivot away from studying violent Islamist movements. What we are facing today is a fractured threat. There is more threats today than ever before. The resurgence of the Taliban has shown us that the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda’s long wait game is paying off. We also shouldn’t underestimate the Islamic State brand. The loss of territory has hit the organisation, but it’s not the end of the ideology or the group. The ideology and the immediacy of their ideology is extremely appealing still.
And I think the world today is more dangerous than it was 20 years ago. We have more threats, and those threats are fractured, but I also think we have more tools today than we did 20 years ago. We have hard-earned experiences over the last 20 years, and lessons learned, both good and bad. For example, I will say that in the last 20 years, we’ve not only thought more about ideologies involved in violent extremism cognitive openings, but also how issues such as gender affect radicalisation, in group dynamics, and leaving a violent extremism.
We’ve seen an increasing number of women involved in violent extremism, from auxiliary to combat, and even leadership roles, and we’ve started to ask some really important questions. When we start thinking about women, how are their experiences different, how have different ideologies conceptualised women’s roles? And today we’ve learned even more, gender is not just about women. We know that extremist movements conceptualise – conceptualisation of gender and gender roles affect both men and women in these movements. It can be used as a radicalizing factor for both, it can help us understand how groups recruit and retain members, and it affects disengagement from these movements.
I will close my short opening remarks by stating I think it’s very important to acknowledge that policy here in the United States is different than the UK. While the UK has worked to highlight key to engagement to counter violent extremism, here in the US, the focus has mostly been on counterterrorism, and has been carried out by police and security communities. The difference in this approach has really come about due to US free speech laws and our definitions of terrorism.
Finally, I will say that I am cautiously optimistic. We have a lot of tools in our toolbelt, and in order to ensure we tackle this issue properly, we need to ensure that we look at and understand the diversity of extremist ideologies, and why people are attracted to them, how they recruit, and gender dynamics within this group. Thank you.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks, Devorah, there were some really wide-ranging and helpful remarks to kick off our session, thinking both longitudinally, in terms of what has happened over the last 20 years, but also reflecting on the contemporary movement and how that’s been informed and evolved over time, so thank you sincerely for that.
Okay, Tom, I’ll hand over to you now.
Tom Wilson
Great, thank you very much. Thank you so much for having me. Well, I’m going to talk about the situation here in the UK and Britain, and policy in Britain, because that’s what I’m familiar with when it comes to the work of counter radicalization, and I particularly want to speak about how we think about ideology and how ideology is being treated currently in counter radicalization policy.
I think in terms of the question that we’re here to discuss today, I would say certainly the UK is in a very stronger position than it was 20 years ago, and that the reason it’s in a stronger position is because of the Prevent strategy, which has, of course, gone through several iterations and is currently under review again. But I think it’s important to say that for all the strengths that we now enjoy, that we shouldn’t let that distract ourselves from the fact that we are some way from where we could be and that I do see some problems potentially on the horizon, in terms of implementation of the policy.
And essentially, that relates to the current direction of travel, both among, say, theorists of radicalization, but also particularly in terms of policymakers and practitioners in the public sector, and I would describe that as being a shift in which our approach is becoming perhaps paradoxically both too broad, but also too narrow. And I think that this has in part come about because of the enthusiasm within which – with which, sort of, what could be described as the sociopsychological approach has been taken up by policymakers to some degree, and of course that’s an approach which, at the individual level, focuses on issues such as the domestic setting, certainly mental health issues potentially for individuals, and then on the societal level, things about issues of deprivation, and other social ills, and how all of these things can accumulatively serve as drivers into radicalization.
And I’m not, for a moment, discounting the fact that these are clearly important and hugely significant factors that genuinely can make individuals that much more likely to become involved in terrorism. But my contention is that it’s now looking as though – in the way in which it’s being adopted at policy level and then being implemented by practitioners, as though there’s, sort of, two major problems I see coming down the line. And first of all is the question of to what extent those of us who are interested in counterterrorism and counterterrorism practitioners actually can deal with some of these social issues, to what degree is it our business to be involved in those? And if it is our business, to what degree can we – what can we do about questions of mental health or, say, economic disadvantage, given that these are outside of our area of expertise?
But the second problem, and this is perhaps the one which I think is more significant, is that although these two approaches, the sociopsychological one and the one that looks more at ideology, are certainly not mutually exclusive, I think, if anything, then can complement each other, it is the case that for policymakers, perhaps particularly Civil Servants, people in the public sector, that once you bring in these other vulnerabilities, these other factors, they tend to get seized upon. And ideology, encountering ideology, can become deemphasised, which perhaps isn’t surprising because personal factors are that much more tangible for people working in public sector and for policymakers, issues of mental health. These are questions that are very familiar to people who are used to doing other types of safeguarding work, and as Prevent is being sold as a safeguarding strategy after all, to people in the public sector.
But the – my question would be that, taken to its logical conclusion or taken to its extreme perhaps, where this leads you, and it seems to me that you would find yourself in a situation where the study of terrorism becomes little more than perhaps a minor branch of criminology, and the work of practitioners becomes essentially indistinguishable from the work of Social Workers. And that what that would mean is, through the deemphasising of the degree to which we counter extremist ideology, that we don’t look to confront the powerful ideas, the radical world views, that inspire and justify and legitimise people to do extreme things in the name of causes that, for their adherence, give them meaning and that are the most noble causes conceivable, and that instead, ideology becomes seen at best, sort of, a set of grievances that are merely an outlet for people’s underlying personal issues.
And our approach to trying to counter extremist ideology therefore becomes abstract, it becomes about values such as seeking to promote tolerance, encountering hate, which are undoubtedly worthwhile things to be doing. But it means that what we potentially neglect doing is engaging with very specific extreme ideas, and the specific movements and ideologs that are involved in radicalizing individuals. So, those are the two problems that I see coming up for us to confront in policy and I’m happy to discuss more about the specifics in the discussion.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Tom. Well, sadly, it looks as though Nasra hasn’t been able to join us, so what we’re going to do is move to our panel discussions, so Tom, Devorah, you’ve got more opportunities to share your thoughts and to discuss with one another. And those presentations from both of you really raised some of the key issues that we’ve faced in relation to radicalization research and policy in practice over the last few decades. First in terms of where we look for the explanatory power, what – by what means do we try and explain these processes, and through that method, understanding how best to respond in relation to policy and practice, and you both spoke in different ways about the differing focus of these efforts. And one of the particular points that you raised in different ways was the role of ideology and how we might best think about that, and, oh, I’m delighted to hear that Nasra has just indeed joined us. Ah, Nasra. Okay, I can see you, can you hear me okay?
Nasra Ayub
Yes. Sorry, I’ve had technical difficulties. I’m really sorry I’m late, but I’m here now.
Devorah Margolin
Not to worry. That is absolutely wonderful. We have introduced you to great fanfare so I’m absolutely delighted that you have been able to join us. Sadly, you have missed Devorah and Tom’s opening remarks, but hopefully we’ll catch you up when we get to the discussion, but that does mean that you aren’t too late to offer your own perspectives. So, for now, I’m delighted to be able to hand over the floor to yourself for perhaps five minutes of reflections on the questions that we’ve been exploring in relation to radicalization. So, Nasra, over to you.
Nasra Ayub
Thank you so much, and thank you for having me, as well, and, again, apologies for being a little bit late, I’m really happy to be here. So, I think my, kind of, talk was going to be on looking at the work that we’ve been doing as an organisation, Integrate UK, around trying to look at radicalization, but in the lens of grooming, and grooming of young people, and the online space and what that looks like.
So I’m just going to quickly talk about – a little bit about, like, where did our – where the background was of the work that we started, and it was a few year – about – around five, six years ago, where in Bristol, a young girl named Yusra left the UK to, kind of, join ISIS in Syria. And this was a massive shockwave for Bristol, as, again, it was something that we didn’t think would happen so close to home, where one of our young people would go, and especially with the, kind of – the fact that she was an A* student and she was quite quiet, and, like, there was no, kind of, incline or what we would assume to be some form of factors as to why she would go and leave.
So, this, kind of, led to a lot of conversation around, okay, our young people are at risk, and we don’t know what this risk looks like, in terms of radicalization, and I think the worst thing about it as well was how the media was impacting the conversation and the, kind of, portrayal of young people, especially those that were coming from Black and Asian minority ethnic backgrounds, and how they were being perceived in the media. And this kind of perception was looking at them as criminals, looking at them ‘terrorists’, rather than, actually, there is something starkly wrong with what is happening that young kids under the age of 18, who are under the duty of care of, you know, adults, are going to Syria and they’re going in great numbers. But what we saw was that they were being portrayed on the front page of newspapers, no safeguarding, no, kind of, inc – like, consideration for the fact that they were kids, as, kind of, their mugshots on there, and pictures of them at the airport.
So this led to us coming up with a resource, a film – a short film called Twin Track, and the whole point of this Twin Track film was, you know, to, kind of, convey the frustration and the, kind of, concerns we had around how grooming of young people online to be radicalized was being basically treated. And this film showed two, kind of, streams of young people, one white girl, and another Black Muslim girl, who wore a hijab, and their, kind of, journeys of being groomed to be – one was to basically be radicalized and go to Syria, and the other was being groomed to sell drugs and was being gifted with material things and threatened and that kind of element of grooming to, kind of, get her to do things that she otherwise would not do, which is sell drugs. And the whole point of this video was to, kind of, show young – kind of, young people and the UK, kind of, hold on, like, grooming to be radicalized online is not that much different in terms of the process as being groomed for other things, and looking at how do we treat other forms of grooming compared to grooming to be radicalized. So, this was very, very interesting, and, kind of, started the conversation around we need to start looking at young people as victims rather than as perpetrators and as criminals.
So once we, kind of, put this together, then the next, kind of, mission was to start changing mindsets and start changing, you know, the conversation and the narrative that was happening in the media. So we went around schools, colleges, and we even advised David Cameron when he was Prime Minister at the time on his counterterrorism strategy to, kind of, look at, you know, how can we change, again, the narrative? And it was very interesting and very stark to see the debates that were happening inside classrooms, the debates that was happening inside colleges with young people, especially young people who had not come across let’s say, for example, Muslims, or Black kids, or Brown kids, and how they portrayed, you know, being the form of radicalization, and the grooming.
So once we showed them this video, we had a conversation and we had a debate about, okay, what should happen? What does this look like to you guys, or what does this mean to you? And there was a lot of conversation and a lot of debate around if the Muslim Black girl was a criminal or a victim. And, again, it was – for me, it was fascinating to see, at the beginning of the conversation and at the beginning of the session, an hour, we had all these kids and these young people saying, “Yes, put them all in jail, they’re all terrorists, yes, yes, yes,” all of this. And then we’d show them the video and we had a discussion around, you know, racism and a racialised approach that has been taken towards, you know, radicalization and the grooming of young people, and what this looks like in comparison to being groomed to sell drugs, being groomed to sell – to do other things, and the fact that all of these, you know, victims are people who are under the age of 18 and are at the care of, you know, the government, the state, the – you know, those that they are in – who are responsible for them. And, again, I’ve seen them, at the end of these sessions, and looking at them and saying, “Okay, what do you guys thinks now?” and it’s like, “They’re victims. Oh, okay.”
You know, it’s fascinating, and one hour of changing these young people’s mindsets, and I think that was a very, very important, kind of, notion for us. And I think what we found from that was that, you know, if we want to tackle radicalization, because, again, it is a massive threat now, and as we’re seeing that a lot of young people are being radicalized or are threatened by radicalization, in terms of right-wing extremism, in terms of, like, you know, neo-Nazi rhetoric and those kind of things, and, you know, being radicalized to – in terms of racism and being racist and those kind of things. So what we’re seeing is that we need to do more preventative work rather than, you know, looking at reactory work or looking at interventions. We need to look at how can we prevent young people from falling into these traps, falling into, you know, being radicalized online, and a lot of that has to do with spotting the signs of what it looks like to be radicalized or what that could look like, and that is an ongoing conversation.
And, again, we see the – kind of, the difference, lastly, in regards to how – in terms of how race is a massive, massive factor, into how radicalization is taken, like, in terms of – and what – how we react to it because, again, more recently, we’ve seen Shamima Begum having her citizenship revoked. We see, in terms of the fact that, you know, people said that even though she was 15 when she left the UK, that, you know, she’s still, like, responsible for what happened to her and that she doesn’t deserve to come back to the UK, compared to Harry Morgan, who was a White – he was a White teenager who was looking at – in terms of neo-Nazi rhetoric and was spreading that. It was – yeah, so we see that – kind of, that racial difference, but, yeah, so I think that’s where I want to end it, is looking at this – yeah, the racial element and the gender aspect of radicalization. So, yeah, thank you.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks so much, Nasra, and thanks for such an eloquent presentation, despite the fact that you had some issues, sort of, joining us at the start, you raised some really, really important issues there about gender, about intersectionality, about ethnicity and religion, which are all really central to this debate. So sincere thanks, and it’s great to see you.
Also raised some really interesting questions which, kind of, complement, but also, sort of, offer a different perspective on that question about causation, so what is it that actually causes young people or older people to engage in extremism? Tom spoke powerfully about the role of ideology, and Devorah spoke broadly about the – kind of, the way that research and policy and practice have developed a broader understanding that takes account of different factors, and, Nasra, you there spoke about the different kinds of influences that act on people. And it’d be good really now just to open up our discussion to the – our panellists, to start thinking more about that question of causation.
So perhaps starting with the question of ideology that Tom spoke so powerfully about, Devorah, you, sort of, mentioned the question of ideology and perhaps suggested how we’ve maybe moved a – away a little bit from that, I don’t want to, kind of, speak for you, but it would be good now to just unpack that a little bit more, to think about that role of ideology and how we might understand it. And while we’re doing that, colleagues, participants on the call, do keep putting your questions in the chat – in the Q&A box, rather. Devorah, I don’t know whether you want to respond to some of the…
Devorah Margolin
Yeah.
Dr Sarah Marsden
…that.
Devorah Margolin
Absolutely. I think – I teach a course on homegrown radicalisation at Georgetown and we talk about this a lot, and I think I, kind of, take a little bit of approach between Tom and Nasra. You know, I think that there are definitely tools that we have in our toolbelt that work across ideologies, but I do believe ideology is an important factor that we do need to look at. It’s about the messaging that is being fed to people, how they receive that messaging, the framing of the worldview that people look through.
You know, when a organisation is recruiting, they think about that messaging very clearly. We can ev – you know, we can look at the propaganda that is created across ideologies, but how they frame that world into the ingroup and the outgroup. And I think that framing of ingroup and outgroup is very important for understanding the radicalization process, who is going to be radicalized by specific ideologies, who those ideologies will appeal to, the gender rhetoric within that, some racial aspects, as well. We – you know, if you look at the Islamic State’s recruitment efforts, there’s a lot of gendered rhetoric, but there’s also the whole idea of, “In the West you face racism, so come here and be part of this perfect world.”
I mean, so I think it’s really important to look at that and also, on the far-right side, we look at the recruitment. There’s, again, gendered aspects in that recruitments, there’s ideas of hypermasculinity and femininity that come into play in this recruitment, and also it’s, again, a lens to understand everything that is wrong with the world and how to make it right. I do think if you overfocus on ideology, you’re going to be looking for – you’re going to miss some of these, I would say, sociopsychological drivers or things that would make people more aware of certain cognitive openings to be attracted to ideologies, and so I think there does need to be a mix of the focus on ideology and the sociopsychological drivers.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks, Devorah, that’s really helpful. Tom, I don’t know if you’ve got anything that you want to just respond to there.
Tom Wilson
Well, I actually – I, sort of, ran out of time before getting onto something else to do with this question of radicalization that I had hoped to speak about, and in a way it was nice because Nasra spoke about individuals who are vulnerable to being radicalised by others and she spoke about these people being victims, which I think raises the question of if they are victims then who are they victims of? And this is an important part that perhaps is missing of our discussion about radicalization and ideology, which is sometimes it feels a little bit like the focus on individuals who perhaps are being helped through Prevent and so their radicalization has somehow happened to be abstract, as though they encounter this ideology of perhaps, sort of, just floating around online or who knows from where it came from. And it, to some degree, misses out the conversation about the people who actually are responsible, and I think do have a moral responsibility for having radicalized them.
In some cases, this will be people who are clearly committing offences, you could deal with through existing counterterrorism legislation, sometimes they’re people overseas, but I also think that there’s a whole cohort of people who are not breaking the law, as it currently stands, but who nevertheless do have a role in radicalizing, in promoting extremist ideology. And it seems to me that one part that is still missing from our policy approach is what do you do about disrupting the individual’s and the network’s movements that are responsible for promoting extremist ideology? The ideology does not proliferate itself, it only exists through individuals, through actual human beings.
And of course, under Cameron and then, for a while, under Theresa May, there was an attempt at putting together a bill, a counter extremism bill, that was considered to be pretty illiberal and to be an infringe on free speech. I know that Sara Khan, in, sort of, the closing days of her time leading the Counter Extremism Commission, also Mr Mark Rowley put together some proposals, but it does seem to me that that’s an important missing piece, to not only focus on vulnerabilities of the individual who might become radicalised, but also to think about the radicalizers, the ideologs, and the ones who sit just below the attack offence level, and how do you disrupt them essentially?
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks, Tom, that’s really interesting, and perhaps I’ll invite Nasra to just reflect on some of the ways in which it sounds like your work has been trying to develop resilience in the people who are the target of those narratives. And in particular the role of the online space, so the extent to which the online context provides the opportunity for the kind of propaganda that Devorah spoke about, and the opportunities that that provides, as you say, for people to exist slightly beneath the offending threshold, if you like.
Nasra, I don’t know what your thoughts are really, in terms of the role of the online space, how you see that changing, perhaps, and some of the efforts that you might have seen to try and counteract what goes on in that space.
Nasra Ayub
Sure. I think the online space is – I think is a massive – I guess an impact on how young people, especially – we see this a lot, how they interact with information and how they interact with where they get their information. And I think sometimes we see that with the online space, that people use social media, in terms of getting the access to information that may not be accurate, may be false, may – and it’s very, very, very easy to, kind of, alter reality and what actually is the correct form of, kind of, information.
And I think, secondly, too, that I think globalisation is another thing that we need to look at and how easy it is to create networks, how easy it is to, kind of, feel like you belong in a space or belong somewhere, in an online space, especially if you are, a) a child who is vulnerable, lonely, or, again, isolated because of the pandemic. Now, there’s a massive risk where – you know, when it comes to the pandemic and how young people are not interacting with each other physically, where the online space takes much more of a stronger precedent over what young people interact with, and I think from this we see that the online space is very hard to, kind of, control, very hard to, kind of, say, you know, to young people like this, “The information that you’re getting is wrong,” or, “You can’t interact with this person or that person.” It’s very normal, in terms of, again, how they interact with the online space.
I mean, I think that’s why we see that a lot of young people can be at risk of being groomed to radicalize, kind of thing, because, again, it’s very, very easy to target young people of different ages, it’s very easy to, kind of, see from – especially – and I think another thing is how young people are very open with, you know, discussions about mental health, discussions around what they’re going through, discussions around, you know, being able to have these conversations. It’s very easy to, kind of, target, very easy to see who’s vulnerable online, and very easy for young people to be impressionable, especially if they don’t have the information or the, kind of – the equipment to protect themselves.
And I think that’s where we try and, kind of, fit in is that, you know, if we start to, kind of, have this conversation with young people around, like, you know, protecting themselves and protecting them from, you know, the reality of what’s happening online and what that could lead to, it, kind of, has some form of positive impact. Because, you know, there is one side of it where we look at the perpetrators and we look at those that are targeted and we work on that, but we also need to, kind of, protect young people and get them to protect themselves, unfortunately, because it is a real threat. And it’s getting even more and more worse because we see the media, kind of, playing up to a lot of this hatred and there’s a lot of hater, kind of like, rhetoric, which again, a lot of people are taken in, so there’s a future here for young people to, kind of, protect them.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks so much, Nasra, and you raised some really important questions there about, sort of, how to think about responses and how the media process, also the mediatisation of these issues, is a really important part of the conversation. And it goes to something else that each of you have touched on in different ways, and this is the balance between how to protect civil liberties, so – and how to protect freedom of speech. So in the case of the online space, how do you monitor or regulate what should appear or what could appear in the online context, but also, more generally, what should be accessible to people and how to balance off that question of freedom of speech, civil liberties, in the context of countering violent extremism. Devorah, you, sort of, have – you made mention of that and I wonder if I could invite you to just reflect a bit more on perhaps how that debate has evolved and where you see where we are at the moment, in terms of that balance between civil liberties, freedom of speech, versus countering violent extremism.
Devorah Margolin
Yeah, absolutely, and I will speak from the American perspective, which is quite different, and I really need to emphasise that for everyone across the pond, is that, you know, here in the United States, you need to be pretty far down the line of planning to get on the radar. Saying hateful things is not enough to make it into our system, unfortunately, we are quite a large company, and you – country, and you’re allowed to say what you want against people who you do not like. But you must be inciting violence or be down the process of executing violence in order to really make it into our system.
And I would say almost that is part of why ideologies are still important and interesting in the United States to study ‘cause it’s, kind of, the understanding, if we see people quoting manifestoes of anti-government movements, we understand that there are certain signs that we could be looking for. You know, I think Tom mentioned that – certain counterterrorism laws that were coming into place in the UK, and I remember those were – when I was in the UK and doing my PhD and my PhD looks at propaganda and there was a question of, oh my God, am I going to have to stop my PhD because I can’t look at propaganda because all of a sudden they’ve banned looking at propaganda? And then there was more nuance put into it, and so I think, you know, there’s a very fine line between freedom of speech, looking at propaganda, or looking at information produced by terrorist organisations, isn’t necessarily a radicalizing factor, and I think that, you know, we have a very hard time here in the United States, and I think there’s been a lot of discussions.
You know, Facebook has been the centre of these discussions, some may argue rightfully so, some may argue that they get an unfair hit and that is really a collective responsibility and a government responsibility. But, you know, we look at the events of January 6th and what happened, and almost all the cases that have been brought have been brought about due to people posting their activities, their illegal activities, on social media, or sharing things in chat groups, which were then posted onto social media. And so the online space is extremely important to monitor, it’s extremely vital for our understanding of these networks and the connections between people, and, you know, I think Tom really hit on it, too. It’s not just the ideologs, but it’s the amplifiers, right, these people who share this information, who create these networks, are finding a safe space in the online sphere, and how can we make sure that individuals, adults, as well as minors, aren’t, kind of, falling into this while also maintaining freedom of speech and protecting civil liberties?
I was speaking to a colleague about this, and, you know, I think that there was a lot of lessons learned about how going into Muslim communities after 9/11 and talking about the problems with ideology or recruitment wasn’t handled very well. And we’re now facing anti-government movements that do not believe in the US Government or the authority of the US Government, and we need to take certain lessons we learned, in these last 20 years, to understand how if we send our police into these communities to talk about this, it’s not going to end well. It is going to be another Ruby Rich type of situation, and it’s not going to end the way we think it does, and so there is a need to protect civil liberties, protect freedom of speech, but also engage with these communities, perhaps not through a government-facing outlook.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks, Devorah, some really wide-ranging and helpful perspectives on how that debate has evolved and perhaps some of the lessons that have been learned, but also some of the points that we continue to need underlining in order to make sure that responses to extremism aren’t counterproductive, and that they are mindful of those issues that have emerged over the recent – over recent years, in relation to going into particular community settings and the negative impacts that that can promote.
Okay, well, I’m pleased now to be able to open the floor to our questions from our participants more broadly. You’ve all offered some really fascinating perspectives and I can see quite a number of questions have already come in, so do please keep posting your questions, hopefully we’ll get through them all, apologies if we don’t quite get there.
But I think just to, sort of, step off that point about how to respond and counter radicalization, Sophie Davies has asked a question, and Sophie, I don’t know if you’re happy to read out your question, and it’d be good to hear from you, in relation to this point about how to best address and understand the impact of counter radicalization strategies, and perhaps I can invite Nasra to think about your work and how you’ve tried to engage in this space, and perhaps Tom, from a, sort of, a policy point of view. So, Sophie, I don’t know if you’re happy to articulate your question. If so, go ahead.
Sophie Davies
Yes, I hope you can hear me.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Perfectly, yes.
Sophie Davies
That’s great. Good evening, everyone. Thank you very much so far for all of the really interesting comments, I’ve really enjoyed everything. I wanted to ask the panellists about a topic that I can’t deny I’m about to write an essay on, so I’d love some feedback. I’ve got a bit of a cheat code here, which I’m very grateful to use, and I wanted to ask about different feedback relating to measuring the success of counter radicalization efforts. I think the situation I’m personally most aware of is a situation in the UK, in regards to Prevent and CONTEST, and the counterterrorism policy efforts that we have. I wanted to ask, I think ‘cause it’s a very broad question, I’m aware of that, how different people would define that success, I think it’s a really tricky one to navigate, and whether it is possible to navigate that line between identifying, you know, the correct level of security and how this impacts personal liberties, yeah, that success can be in relation to stigma, in terms of engaging with different communities, or how we can, if ever, acknowledge the kind of impact that these policies can have? I was just wondering if anyone had any feedback there. Thank you very much.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks so much, Sophie, and all credit to you to taking the opportunity to help with your coursework. So, Tom, perhaps if I come to you first to offer that perhaps a broader perspective on the way that this question’s been operationalised in the – perhaps in the UK context, and then Nasra, just a reflection, if I may, on how you understand the success of the sort of work that you do? So, to Tom first, if that’s okay?
Tom Wilson
Sure. I mean, in terms of measuring success and thinking about Prevent, I would say there’s probably – well, I can say very little because of where we know so little, because there isn’t an awful lot of transparency about success. There was an interesting story in – I think it was Fiona Hamilton who wrote about it in The Times in around 2018, a story about supposedly an internal I think government assessment of some of the counter radicalization programmes that were being funded through them suggested that a very high proportion of them were not effective or that some of them might even have been somehow counterproductive.
Equally, when you – obviously there have been a lot of negative stories recently in the wake of Fishmongers’ Hall about deradicalization efforts rather than just counter radicalization, people who have already offended and gone to prison, and certainly, if you think of assessments by people like Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Counterterrorism Legislation, also somebody like Christopher Dean, who helped put together one of the programmes on counter radicalization, or deradicalization, rather, in prisons. He was quite open about saying, because, for ethical reasons, you can’t have a cohort of people that you exclude from going through the process, measuring in any kind of scientific way, whether or not or how impactful these programmes really are, is very difficult, and he has, sort of, essentially said, “Well, we can never really be certain.”
So, what little we know is not that encouraging. Nevertheless, I – if you speak to people directly, if you speak to prepared practitioners, they will tell you about as much as they can tell you about individual cases that they know of, and which they are genuinely very convinced of the difference that they have been able to make. So, I think there’s reasons to be confident, and certainly things like the Channel protests, I think it’s on the issue of programmes, that – again, that deal with ideology I think is the bit we’re really not great at, the ideology stuff, and then the deradicalization in prisons where it looks as though there are still problems, and we haven’t seen – I don’t think, we haven’t seen convincing assessments of that.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Tom. Nasra.
Nasra Ayub
Yeah, I think just to, kind of, go on on that point, I think, yeah, I think it’s very difficult again to measure success, and I think for us, how we see it is looking at evaluation of the confidence and the knowledge that young people have around, kind of, spotting the signs and the risks of radicalization and grooming. But I think there’s a long way to go, in terms of making structural impact, in terms of making institutional change, in regards to deradicalization efforts and also preventing radicalization, just in regards to the fact that we’re dealing with, you know – with structural issues such as, again, the impact of racism, the impact of, you know, the media, and that – their role, and, kind of, the why young people are being, kind of, at risk of radicalization. So I think there’s a long way to go in terms of measuring success, and also accessing and gaining success, in regards to tackling radicalization, but I think we are a very, very long way away from doing that.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks so much, Nasra, some really thoughtful perspectives on the difficulties associated with evaluating programmes, and certainly for external actors to try and understand what’s going on within certainly government-led programmes can also raise challenges there.
Just to pick up that point about broader, kind of, structural influences on radicalization, I’d like to invite Audrey Wells, if that’s okay, to pose your question, and perhaps this is something that, Devorah, I might move to you first. Audrey, if you’re happy to answer your que – to raise your question yourself, I shall hand over to you.
Audrey Wells
Yes, thank you. How far does the USA see its foreign policy in the Middle East related to 9/11 in particular, and Islamic extremism generally?
Dr Sarah Marsden
So, if I can just check in with you there, Audrey, essentially do – is the question relating to how you see – how does the US see its role in, sort of, provoking or…
Audrey Wells
Yes.
Dr Sarah Marsden
…prompting?
Audrey Wells
Perhaps ‘cause Osama bin Laden did say that is the reason the support for Israel, to the detriment of the Palestinians, and also the US presence in certain countries, and it’s not difficult to point out for Muslims to feel enraged sometimes about the policies of certain Western countries, and this may be a factor.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks so much, Audrey, and I think, I mean, it’s such a – sort of, a broad question, and I wonder whether, Devorah, it’s possible to, sort of, perhaps reflect on the evolving nature of that debate and the way that that’s been shaped over recent years in relation to the extent to which states are willing to consider their role in these processes?
Devorah Margolin
Yeah, I can only speak from somebody who watches from the outside, I can’t speak on behalf of the US government. I am not a government official, I am an academic, but I will say it’s been – you know, I think that the events of 9/11 pivoted certain aspects of US policy, obviously going into Afghanistan and Iraq, and the policies in those countries. But I think it’s also interesting to look at US policy towards Saudi Arabia hasn’t necessarily pivoted since 9/11, there’s always a bigger strategic, kind of, balance of power that the US has tried to play with. And so I do definitely think there are clear implications of the events of 9/11 regarding US policy, but I think that, you know, US policy in the Middle East has played into larger US policy on power issues previously related to Russia and now China, and so I think we would be remiss to say it’s solely due to one event, but I think there are a lot of factors that are at play.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Devorah. I don’t know whether, Tom, maybe you’ve got some reflections in relation to the UK context and how that debate might have evolved.
Tom Wilson
Relating to policy and…?
Dr Sarah Marsden
Foreign policy and its role.
Tom Wilson
Foreign policy. Well, I mean, actually, you know, one thing that’s really interesting about this whole issue of grievance and radicalization of policy is that I think it is true that certainly in the first decade following 9/11 is that we were talking very much about foreign policy, and particularly in Islamist extremism. What’s so interesting now is actually what we are looking a lot more at is the domestic policy as an issue of radicalization, so you’re talking about issues to do with certainly some things that have come up around France, in France, that’s a domestic issue to do with questions of cartoons and free speech and blasphemy, if you think in the UK of discussions around the teaching of relationships and same-sex relationships and transgender issues in schools is causing a huge amount of fury, the Batley cartoon issue, the questions around Islamophobia, and indeed, actually, counterterrorism policy itself has become an issue of grievance that’s used within these communities.
And I also think it’s interesting that on the issue of, sort of – of people feeling enraged, you – and using this as an excuse for terrorism, I think that on the far-right, that my sense is the same level of rage that is felt in sections that the Islamists can play on around foreign policy is actually used, or in the past on foreign policy, but on – now, on the far right, around particularly domestic policies around questions to do with immigration and multiculturalism, I’m sure Devorah could also speak in America, that the right seems to have developed similar levels of rage and conspiracies to justify violence. So I think that what I’m trying to say is that extremists across the spectrum will use policies of government, foreign and domestic, to justify extreme acts and that generally, as much as possible, policymakers should try not to be swayed by extremists or people who would use violence in response to those things.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Tom, and you raised the point there about that growing threat from the far-right and the way that both the threats evolved but also our understanding has tried to take account of that broader perspective. So I’m going to invite, if that’s okay, Tim Wilson, to ask his questions, which offers a slightly – perhaps from a broader historical point of view, about the role and the potential efforts to respond to ideologies which change over time, so, Tim, over to you.
Tim Wilson
Thanks very much, Sarah, thanks everyone for excellent presentations, a pleasure to put a face to a name and in Tom’s case, I always hope that people will see his excellent work and think that I’ve written it, as another T Wilson. My point is really a very unfocused one, which is simply we know historically that ide – the appeal of militant ideologies ebbs, it fa – it seems to fade of its own accord, or it has in the past, and, you know, far-left groups in the 70s, 80s, or anarchists back in the early 20th Century. If that is still so, how does it affect our decision-making calculus, how ambitious should we be to try and combat these ideologies? Is it a question of infinitely valuable initiatives, anti-grooming or whatever, that may stop an is – in – you know, may rescue individuals, but don’t actually structurally – are not structurally able to, sort of, eradicate the problem, or how does it affect the way we see it? Or, and this seems to be a, kind of, semi-submerged assumption here, is it actually the rise of the internet society, the network society, has actually changed that, and that, you know, these things will just carry on bubbling for the foreseeable future because the fundamental dynamics of many communication is so different? Apologies for a rambling set of incoherent thoughts.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Tim. Just, sort of, pulling some of those threads out, it’ll be good to hear from Nasra about how you see that, sort of, evolving threat land – in terms of the online space and the role, the extent to which the far-right are making their presence more felt. But also perhaps, again, if I can go to Tom to just offer a broader reflection maybe first on that question about how – given the ebb and flow of militant ideologies, how does that suggest we might then respond to them?
Tom Wilson
Did you – sorry, do you want me to start on that one?
Dr Sarah Marsden
Yes, sorry, Tom, I beg your pardon.
Tom Wilson
Okay.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Tom, I’ll go to you, and then Nasra from a – sort of, a more grassroots perspective, really just trying to reflect on the changing nature of the ideologies that people are encountering and what then that suggests about how we might best respond.
Tom Wilson
My sense is that as the best thing that can happen is that extremist ideologies ultimately become invalidated and that they no longer become powerful or inspiring ideas for people because they no longer seem true, and that that’s – obviously, it’s a much longer theological thing that’s going to happen with Islamism, but on the far-right you have to convince people that ethnocentric and ethnically pure societies are not desirable things, that what they envisage is not desirable, and it’s – it – that their conspiracies have no grounding in truth.
And that’s what I think our counter ideology work should really focus on, less on values, that our attempt so far from what programmes I’ve been able to see look as though they focus an awful lot on essentially saying, “Well, what extremists believe is really unpleasant,” whereas our worldview is actually – is ethical and moral. But this doesn’t really hold much sway for people who are – believe in fundamental questions of truth, and that for extremists it’s being able to claim absolute truth, whether that’s political or religious, that is so powerful. And I think that, on the far right, we’re a little bit better at calling out things such as, sort of, the – you know, talking about the white genocide myth, we will happily attach the word “myth” to it, I think we have to get much better at basically fighting, having this as a battle, about claims to truth rather than just values. And my hope would be that if you can do that, then you can take away the power and the energy of these ideologies that make them meaningful to people.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Tom. Nasra, I don’t know whether you’ve got some thoughts from your, sort of, experience about how these processes playout, particularly in the online space, Tim mentioned grooming there, and we have had another comment from Jeremy Ross about the role of grooming and, sort of, trying to, sort of, see, I suppose, the relationships between the way that broader ideologies are mediated through the online space and how you see those ideologies shifting perhaps.
Nasra Ayub
Yeah, I think, as we know about there, with right-wing, like, extremism, it’s – you know, it’s constantly on the rise, at a fast pace, as well, and I think, again, seeing it online, when there is conversation and there is a, kind of, discourse around the – kind of, the consequence of engaging in right-wing extremism, this has a massive impact on whether people will engage with it or not. Because I think once – a lot of, again, young people are seeing that, you know, the – where right-wing extremism comes from or the ideologies that are, you know, kind of, embedded within that and they’re not – when people are engaging with it, that they’re not actually being – they’re not getting into trouble, or, like, it’s not – you know, it’s not something that has as much of a, kind of – a hard impact as other forms of extremism, for example Islamist extremism kind of thing. I think we see with that it becomes very easy for young people to, kind of, engage with it, especially when a lot of that comes from reaction to other forms of, like, campaigning or activism, so for example, a lot of quote unquote rage comes from – when it comes from right-wing extremism is, you know, this reaction to racism and reaction to the Black Lives Matter movement, for example, and how people are thinking that, you know, their race or whatever is at threat.
And, again, it’s very easy to enlist other, kind of like, young people to, kind of, engage with this and, kind of, feel that ‘rage’ and just use that as a justification to put up their own rhetoric and to, kind of, engage with it online in a lot of spaces because, again, there is no, kind of, how do I put it? There’s no – there is no way where it’s being controlled or there is no, kind of, impact of this – the consequences of these rhetorics being put out there. So I think it’s, kind of going to – personally, I think it’s going to continue to, kind of, being on the rise and, again, how the media online facilitates that is something that, unless it’s, kind of, targeted, it will continue to happen.
Dr Sarah Marsden
Thanks very much, Nasra. We are coming to the last minute of our session and our time together today, so unfortunately, apologies to those who’ve raised questions that we aren’t going to be able to get to. I hope you’ll agree that it’s been a really fascinating discussion. There is so much more to explore around the question of radicalization, and our panellists have raised some really important questions about both structural factors, as well as individual level processes that we need to take account of, and questions fundamentally about ideology and values.
As I say, fascinating range of insights, they will continue to play out, and there is much more research to do, and there is much more policy work to engage with, and it’s wonderful to hear different perspectives from the US, from the UK context, as well as from Nasra, from that grassroots understanding as a young person trying to understand and respond to these dynamics. So, it is a sinc – with sincere thanks that I thank Devorah Margolin, Tom Wilson, and Nasra Ayub for your contributions, and thank you sincerely to our audience, as well, for your very insightful questions. It’s been wonderful hearing from you.
A final reminder that the panel has been recorded so you can, if you would like, catch up on YouTube, on the Chatham House YouTube channel, if you’ve missed anything, but for now, unfortunately, we do have to close, but the conversation, of course, will go on. Sincere thanks again to our panellists and to our audience, and hopefully we will meet again. Thank you. Bye.
