French elections 2022

Alice Billon-Galland

Welcome, everyone. My name is Alice Billon-Galland. I’m a Research Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, and I’m very happy to welcome you all today for this Chatham House members’ event, during which we will analyse and discuss the results of the French Presidential election.

As most of you know, five years after Emmanuel Macron won the Presidency on his first attempt, he has, again, managed to defeat his rival candidates, having secured the 2022 election last Sunday. President Macron has been re-elected, with over 58% of the vote, beating his far-right opponent, Marine Le Pen, a second time. But despite this victory, France finds itself divided after the election and it will need to find a way to unite its citizens from across the political spectrum in order to weather the challenges that will arise in the coming months and years, first of which will be the legislative elections in June.

So, today, we’ll aim for a very broad ranging discussions on various aspects of the election result, using it as a bit of a starting point for a broader debate and discussion on the state of French politics and French democracy, what to expect for the next five years and how it will impact Europe and, in particular, of course, the United Kingdom.

So, to discuss this we’re very lucky to be joined by an all-star French panel today. Our first speaker is Alexandre Holroyd, who is a member of the National Assembly of France, representing the third constituency of French residents overseas, which includes French citizens established here in the United Kingdom. Alexandre is a member of President Marcon’s La République En Marche Party.

Our second speaker is Professor Hélène Landemore, who is a Professor of Political Science at Yale University, currently a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University and also an Associate Fellow with us in the Europe Programme at Chatham House. Hélène’s expertise is in political and democratic theory and, among other things, she is currently conducting research on the state of the French democratic system.

And finally, last, but not least, our third speaker is Martin Quencez, who is the Deputy Director of the German Marshall Fund in Paris and Martin is an expert of European and transatlantic security issues and in particular, French foreign and defence policies.

So, today’s event will last about an hour and will be held on the record. It is being recorded and you can tweet using the hashtag #CHEvents. So, first, we’ll hear some opening remarks from our panellists and then, I will ask them a few questions, before opening the floor to all of you in the audience. You can submit questions for the event using the Q&A function and as always, we will be very happy for you to be involved, ask questions, comments, etc. So, let’s begin with you, Alexandre. Could you maybe tell us a little bit more about what to expect from the second term of President Macron, domestically, but also vis-à-vis Europe? And what do you see as opportunities, challenges ahead for the government, including for the upcoming legislative elections?

Alexandre Holroyd

Good afternoon to all of you and thank you very much for having me, Alice, for this panel, for this gripping event, just on the back of the Presidential election. I have to say that this is the first time that I discovered the Chatham House home music, and it has been quite an experience. I want to thank you for that, as well.

More seriously, obviously, it’s quite interesting how quickly the political debate goes. We’ve obviously been in the core of a Presidential election for the better part of the last nine months, with different candidates, obviously, starting at different points, but the Presidential election has been rumbling on for nine months. And then, overnight, obviously, as somebody’s elected, it suddenly moves the public debate to the next big theme.

And if I look at the five years which are opening, and I will come back to it at the end, there’s obviously a huge caveat, which is the parliamentary election, because in the French system, for the President to be able to put in – to enforce his programme, he needs a parliamentary majority on which to rely. I’m sure some of the academics here will be able to give a much clearer description of how the French power works, but essentially, lots of domestic powers swing to the Prime Minister were it to be a different majority in the House.

So, I’ll come back to the parliamentary election in a minute, but assuming that the President is able to choose his priorities and to enforce his priorities in the next five years, I think he’s made it very clear that there will be, the way I’d see it, four key domestic priorities. The first one will be climate change and sustainability. He has now said, just before the end of the campaign, that this will become front and centre of all the government’s action and all the government’s policy and this will be directly, actually, the responsibility of the Prime Minister, which will be the first time in France that the Prime Minister has this overarching responsibility. And one had – what a – one has to keep in mind that in France, the Prime Minister is where all the decisions and all the decisions between ministries, are arbitrated, are chosen. So, it – this is a – it’s a fundamental change in the perspective that we approach that issue. He’s also said that the Prime Minister will be seconded by a couple of Senior Ministers in charge of different elements of climate change and sustainability, but this, I think, will be a core element of the policy platform in the coming years.

The second one, which is more a continuity of what we’ve been doing for the past five years, is trying to protect and to enhance purchasing power in France and fighting unemployment. We have finished the mandate of the five years and we’re arriving at a term of my parliamentary mandate in five years, and we’ve achieved, for the first time in my lifetime, a goal, which has been a central goal of all policymakers in France, which has been to reduce unemployment. As far as I can remember, unemployment has been the top priority of the French, essentially, since the end of the 90s and we’ve had very significant structural unemployment. This has been going down for, now, four years in a row. The numbers who come out a couple of days ago are still pushing in that direction. And it also concerns nearly every category of workers, including young voters, so we’ll continue that effort of competitiveness and protection of purchasing power and favourising investment in the economy, to try and achieve what the President has sent out as a goal, which is fully employment by the end of the next term.

Third key priority, absolutely central subject, is education and schooling, and the President’s been very clear that he wants to look at education very seriously, try and engage a reform. Try and create more freedoms in the education system in France, notably for schools, so schools can have more liberty within the system, in the French system, to reinforce mathematics and computer coding in French, to better pay and better incentivise Teachers and staff and the Education Ministry, so to do a quite a structural reform of the education system in France.

And finally, and this is obviously a very brief overview, but this is what I’ve been charged to do, is healthcare, with – if I summarise it in two big, big chunks. One chunk is to ensure access to healthcare across the country. We have a significant problem in France with what we call medical desserts, areas where healthcare access is limited, all different types of healthcare. And the second one is something which we’ve already engaged in, which is reinforcing public hospital on the back of the crisis and, obviously, a number of problems which have come out of the crisis. So, I think that’s a fourth key priority for the term ahead.

Looking to the EU relationship and to the priorities at EU level, I think the clue is in the title. For those of you who have looked at the ceremony just after the election, the President arrived at his first speech accompanied by the 9th Symphony of Beethoven, the Hymn of Fra – the Hymn of Europe. It was the case five years ago. It was very unclear that it would be the case again. I think it gives a clear indication that the in – very pro-European President and very reformist European President that we’ve had for five years, will continue to be so in the next five years.

It also is quite remarkable that if you look at the three blocs which come out of the Presidential election, essentially, this bloc headed by the President is now the only remaining seriously pro-European bloc. If you look at the three first candidates coming out of the Presidential election, on the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon has been a very, very sceptical European for decades now, and has a very conflictual programme, in terms of Europe. He, essentially, wants to destroy the supremacy of European Law, which essentially, is pretty close to what a Brexiter would’ve done in the UK and would eventually lead to the destruction of Europe quasi-systemat – quasi-logically. And, obviously, on the far-right, Marine Le Pen has always carried an anti-European agenda.

So, the President has made it very clear, within his first moments after the election, that he would continue to carry the European agenda forward, and I think if you look at what the priorities at European level are, there’s a very clear clue, which is the French Presidency, which is still ongoing, where France and the President have out – have, sort of, set out what they consider should be the key priorities for the coming years. Articulated around a logo, which is “Recovery, strength and sense of belonging,” which sounds better in France – in French than it does in English. It’s – it doesn’t make as much sense in English, ‘cause in French it rhymes, the three of them, but it doesn’t in English.

But the recovery part, the key being, obviously, fundamentally bettering European Union economic governance, creating a new growth model at European level, investing in a transition, investing in key industries, through programmes such as the ones we have on battery. Then, strengthening and building European defence, then defending the core values of Europe. Obviously, the core values of Europe are called democratic values of Europe, who are challenged from outside Europe, but also, objectively, from inside Europe, in certain cases. And finally, being – having a Europe which is effective at protecting its citizens and, for instance, in the digital sphere, recently – only recently, with the DSA, at European level.

I think this agenda, which was set out in the Sorbonne speech, sometimes met with quite a significant amount of scorn across Europe, has now moved, really, to the forefront of European policymakers on the back of the Ukrainian crisis and the President will try to make sure that it continues to push, or at least will be a force to push that forward in the coming years.

You’ve asked me to say a few words about the relationship with the UK, which is a fundamental relationship. It’s been a core foreign policy relationship of France, both in terms of intelligence and in terms of foreign policy, also in industrial corporation in past decades. It’s undeniably gone through a slightly more difficult period recently, but the President has always been very clear at every stage that he wants to maintain and to reinforce that relationship.

I think that there’s two elements here, which have to change, for that relationship to go deeper. The first one is that there has to be an acceptance that there are two relationships. There’s a relationship between London and Brussels and everything which is Brussels will be negotiated in Brussels and that includes everything related to Brexit, to renegotiate the withdrawal agreement, to the future relationship, to trade worries. This is the relationship between Brussels and London. And then, there is the relationship between Paris and London and that relationship can be furthered at bilateral level and there are lots of shared challenges and, actually, we have lots of similar capacities to try and address those shared challenges and find shared values.

President was very clear when we came to Sandhurst and signed the Sandhurst Agreement with Theresa May, that he wants that agenda to continue. It – this – the first element is that difference has to be made between the bilateral relationship with Brussels, bilateral relationship with Paris, and the second element has to be there has to be some real effort to create more trust between the leadership of France and the UK, because that has been severely hampered, in recent months, and I think severely hampered for quite clear reasons, is that there is not always a desire, which is matched to have that close of a relationship and that constructive a relationship. And I think that could change now that the perspective of five years – of a few – of a nor – another rela – another five years of President Macron is clearly ahead of us.

Finally, the parliamentary election, and I’m realise I’m very, very long, so I’m going to be very short, I’m not going to make predictions. I’m a Politician, I’m going to run in those elections, probably, and so, I have to be very clear. I think that the election, if you’re a Politician, you run and you try and convince every person you come across that, you know, you – the vision that you have for France, the political message that you’re carrying is the one that should be enforced at national level. It’s – I leave it to Analysts to decide what are the odds and what they think about how this will turn out. My role here will be, because I’m absolutely convinced that the better future for France lies in giving a majority to the President to be able to enforce this agenda that I’ve just mentioned, will be to advocate for it in the following seven weeks.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Alexandre, for outlining so clearly the priorities of the government in lots of different fields. I think we may come back to the UK question later, because famously – and you’ve been very diplomatic, but indeed, the very difficult relation, even personally between Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson, is part of the issue here. And I think some of us in the call are also looking at British politics and to see whether a change could also come from this side of the Channel. We’ll get back into that later.

Héléne, what do you make of the election result, including the level of voter turnout, maybe a long-term shift to the right? To you, as a sort of, scholar of French democracy and of democratic institutions, what is the state of French democracy and what will you be looking for over the next month and next years?

Professor Hélène Landemore

Well, first, thank you for having me. I am not – I don’t consider myself a specialist of a French democracy, but more of a theorist of democracy in general. But I do have, you know, being a French native, some views about the state of French democracy, which I think is pretty terrible. So, what do I make of the election results?

So, on the one hand, it’s not terribly surprising, Macron won by a, you know, enough points that, you know, there’s no question there. It – we’re not in a – in the situation like what happened in, you know, in the US, where people questioned the legitimacy of the result. He had a lot of advantages, he had – he was an incumbent. He was – he managed the pandemic and a war at Europe’s doors, somewhat competently on the whole, despite what critics say. So, in fact, he was relatively confident he would win, otherwise he would have campaigned longer. He barely campaigned at all, actually.

So, on one hand it’s, like, you know, replaying of the last elections, not terribly surprising outcome. What’s perhaps more surprising is that it’s truly a triumph, in a way, for the apparent losers and, indeed, the far-right and the far-left, because they are at levels that are unseen. And when the father or Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen, won against Chirac in 2002, it was by, like – he won by 80%, over 80%. I mean, she’s at 42%. This is completely, you know, surprising in a – I mean, we should be – we should really ask ourselves how is that possible?

Meanwhile, the abstention is still very high. In fact, even in terms of the public that the second present – the Presidential debate between Marine Le Pen and Macron drew, it was not that high. It was less high than during the previous, sort of, duel five years ago and so, there’s a sense, to me, that the French public is exhausted. That the institutions are exhausted, that this model, this Fifth Republic, is at the end of its life, because it simply does – no longer works as it was intended to work. You know, you see that the historic mass parties are dead, the Socialist Party is dead, the Republicans are dead.

So, you end up with the angry extremes. On the one hand, on the far-left, you have a party that want a Sixth Republic, it’s done with that one. On the other you have a party that just don’t want it – doesn’t want anymore Europe, or much less of it, or want to change certain fundamental things, constitutionally, even. And in the middle, you have a quarter of the population that supports Macron. So, it’s just the, sort of, like, centre-right that has still enough, but that is least detested, if you will, that manages to win the day, but that’s just not inspiring.

It doesn’t feel like a triumph for the winner, and, in fact, Macron did not really celebrate his victory. He gave a very short speech, everybody remarked on that. It was a speech that was remarkably concise, coming from him, and an admission, in fact, that most people voted for him as a sort of, a distant, you know, second best. And that, kind of, always the case, but in this situation, it felt even more so.

So, to me, what that means is that the system needs to be reconfigured, and I sense that Macron himself knows that. He said a number of things that indicate that he knows he cannot continue, especially because it’s his last mandate, you know, going business as usual, if you want. So, first, we noticed that he came to the Champ Mars accompanied and not the lone, sort of, vertical Jupiter like figure to the victory speech. He came with his wife, he came with the children of his, you know, of his staff, apparently. They were, you know, symbolically diverse and it was also a nod to the youth that’s been sacrificed during this pandemic. So, I think, indeed, putting education and the future of the youth and ecology, which is a central concern of theirs, for – you know, front and centre, I think it’s a sign that, okay, the priority has got to be different this time around. Because the youth has really sacrificed a lot for the older generations in this pandemic.

He also said things in the – his very speech that seems to indicate a sense that something needs to be re-founded. He said that he’s going to work on a “collective invention,” or “we need,” it was a we, actually, “a collectively invention of a re-founded method for the next five years for something better, in the service of our nation.” I paraphrase a little bit, but the key phrases are “collective invention of a re-founded method.” So, it’s got to be something he doesn’t do alone, but does with other people. That was a slogan of his campaign as well, “All of us together with you.” And it needs to be a re-founded method which suggests that we’re going to have to talk about constitutional reform again, that’s that what – that’s how I read it.

And there are lots of people, including myself, that are actually trying to encourage the government to think of something quite fundamental, like a Citizens’ Assembly on Democratic Renewal. Like, the idea that, you know, the processes do not work anymore, even, you know, like the way this Presidential debate functions. The reason why people are so uninterested anymore it’s because it’s always the same thing. It’s two people scoring points and the format, actually, not that I want to defend Marine Le Pen, but does play in favour of the énarque who knows the figures, who knows how to, you know, rhetorically bind his adversary in a knot, right?

And does that – is that a quality that we want? Does that guarantee good governance, at the end of the day? Shouldn’t we talk about, you know, larger visions for society, rather than inflection points and whether or not, you know, this or that measure is going to have this or that – it became very technical and, of course, Macron is very good on the technicalities, but it deprives the rest of us of a real conversation about the – you know, the future, right? So, I’m hoping that he’s aware of it and he’s going to – you know, if, you know, if he goes by this reinvention, the collective reinvention, we might see an evolution in the – in future, you know, democratic France, then might not take the form of a Sixth Republic, but at least I think it needs to have some structural reform.

And if you think about it, who else could have done that? I think that Macron came as a revolutionary figure. He changed the methods of the political game. He brought in very young people, people who are not in politics before. He was abroad in this business side, had been more absent from politics and from French politics. That didn’t always play out well, actually, for him, but he really brought, sort of, modernism to his understanding of how to rule France. And that, interestingly, also, was a sort of, pragmatic position, because it went out the window when the pandemic hit. So, he has a plasticity to him that make him – makes him go from neoliberal, sort of, economic views, to socialism overnight, if the situation demands it.

So, I’m hoping, you know, that could hint at a true change, which, in a way, is really fundamentally needed. And in particular, the change that I am most sceptical of, given how the result of the Citizens’ Convention for Climate were, you know, taken into account, is this idea that we’re going to be an ecological democracy now, overnight. That I am – I really, you know, would like to believe that. I am sceptical, based on past record, but that’s also something that needs to happen. That’s also where – you know, it was so striking, again, during the presidential debate, that you had a question from the Journalists. The Journalists themselves do not think ecological issues matter. They were like, “Oh, well, by the way, let’s talk about ecology and the environment because the youth care about it.” It was only brought on the table because the youth cares about it. Well, we should all care about it. It’s no longer like the last, you know, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change makes it very clear, it’s not a – it’s for all of us, as it’s going to be a problem very, very, very soon. It already is a problem.

So, I think that, basically, France is exhausted, like a lot of other democracies. It made the choice not to go for an extremist, which is excellent, but now things need to change radically if we want to, you know, continue and not fall in the arms of the next authoritarian populist that comes along.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Héléne, and I think what you said about the triumph of the apparent loser is also something that’s been picked up in the foreign press and media quite a bit. And I think there is a question about how long – for how long this whole République current can last and what will happen in the next election, especially as, obviously, President Macron cannot run anymore, and we may want to get back to that later.

Martin, we’re now turning to another type of questions that are more foreign security defence issues, which obviously have been on the forefront of the election debate, or the campaign, which is quite an oddity, ‘cause obviously, usually, we don’t really talk about foreign policy that much during Presidential campaigns. But with the war in Ukraine, it, sort of, took centre stage and we ended up talking about, you know, who was supporting Putin, how, NATO, etc., all these questions, sort of, centre stage, at least before the first round.

So, according to you, what will be the priorities of the re-elected President Macron in foreign and defence policies, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine? And what do you think partners expect from France, or should expect from France, going forward?

Martin Quencez

Yeah, well, thanks a lot, Alice. Very happy to be part of this discussion today. I’m not sure I’d say that foreign policy was so much at the centre of the campaign, to be honest. I’d say that if you look at the priorities, looking at the polls, throughout the campaign, purchasing power was the number one priority of the electors. And even at the very beginning of March, with the Ukraine war being, you know, covered intensely by the French media, Ukraine was never the top point priority. What we saw is that, between the two rounds, people were close to Macron, kind of, use this idea that a vote for Marine Le Pen was a vote for Vladimir Putin and this may have, you know, played a certain role, especially in the centre-left, to convince some people to go vote on the second round and, sort of, stop the possibility of a Le Pen Presidency.

But beyond that, Marine Le Pen has shifted so much, in terms of rhetoric about Russia, between the rounds. I mean, if you listen to what she said during the debate, there’s, basically, no more difference between what she advocates and what, sort of, mainstream right-wing party would advocates vis-à-vis Russia. The only real difference right now between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron on the situation in Ukraine is that she opposes all form of energy embargo, but she supports – you know, she said that she supports military aid to the Ukraine, she supports any kind of humanitarian measure. Even on immigration, on taking over refugees to France, she seems to have – changes her view. So, there was so much that was a part of a normalisation of a discourse that it was hard for Emmanuel Macron to really use that card on – during the two rounds.

This being said, I want to look at what Macron’s second mandate could mean for French foreign policy. I’ll discuss a couple of points, maybe leaving aside the French-UK relationship, because I think Alexandre’s perhaps better placed to discuss it, but looking at a list of issues. One thing is, obviously, we should expect a lot of continuity. I mean, like, you know, Politicians not necessarily change that much and when they win elections, even less so. So, I think if you have to think about Macron in the world during the next five years, it’s, kind of like, Macron unleashed. He doesn’t have to be re-elected and his, sort of, instincts about the world remain the same. He believes in European sovereignty, he believes, he said it himself, that there’s no better way for France to defend its interest at the global level than to use Europe. Because he thinks that we are in a, sort of, global competition with other big powers and that France alone, with a market of 70 – 66 million inhabitants, is not big enough to compete in this environment. Europe is there to protect our national interests and they are, in his views, French national interests and European interests that, sort of, coincide on most subject issues.

He also talks about a European sovereignty, for that matter, something that Marine Le Pen, during the debate, sort of, criticised, saying that “There could only be a sovereignty if there’s a people and there’s a French people, but there’s no European people.” This is, sort of, an interesting issue when you think about her – their two visions of the world.

The second thing is that he will continue to be mostly pragmatic. He’s not someone who is ideological about EU institutions. Despite the fact that he’s fundamentally pro-EU, he is very much into a whatever works approach. We’ve seen, over the past five years, a use of ad hoc frameworks of co-operation, whenever the EU 27 wouldn’t deliver. And if you hear, actually, some of the criticisms that you hear from French partners in Europe, a lot of them would say that Macron’s approach to the European project puts the EU 27 in a kind of, a dangerous position, that – the idea that we should find a compromise of 27, an inclusion, including all partners to take major decisions. This is something that Macron has very much, sort of, confronted during his first mandate. He is someone who believes in this multi-speed Europe and someone who believes in, sort of, a pragmatic approach to inclusion into European projects.

And the last piece of his European vision is that he still believes that the Franco-German relationship is the main engine for European reform, something that you might find, sort of, paradoxical, because he’s, kind of, like, a young leader who’s been thinking about how to reinvent Europe, but yet, he very much believes in this Franco-German relationship. It’s, kind of like, a Mitterrand style of thinking about Europe, as the best way to push for reform and, in fact, he said that at the very first time he talks to the French Ambassadors. You have this annual meeting too between the President and the Ambassadors and in 2017, in summer 2017, he said that – it is usually French Presidents do Franco-German and after two or three years, they figure out it doesn’t work out so well, so then they try to do things with Rome or with Warsaw. And he said, “I will not do this. I will continue on a Franco-German approach to European reform,” and I think this is something that will continue in the next five years.

Also, continuity at the transatlantic level. We’ve had a major, major crisis between the US and France last September, with the signature of the AUKUS deal, something that Macron has, sort of, managed to turn into a victory, or so that’s how they present it, with a joint communication between President Macron and President Biden later, during the fall. With the US, sort of, getting as close to apologising as you can possibly get and also sending all kind of messages that were seen positively in Paris, in favour of European defence co-operation, in favour of co-operating with France in the Indo-Pacific and confirming – reaffirming the US support for French operations in the Sahel.

On France and the Indo-Pacific, again, continuity. Well, we have, you know, we have national interests in the region, 1½ million inhabitants there, about ¾ of the French exclusive economic zone is in the Indo-Pacific. That won’t change and France will remain, I think, in Europe, with the UK, well, something that, Alice, you’ve worked on more specifically, the, kind of, leader in thinking about the European approach to the region.

This being said, and I’ll finish here, Macron still needs to reinvent himself on a couple of things. One is that the situation in Europe has changed. We have a war in Europe. We have a change in the balance of power, I’d say, inside European institution and inside NATO, with countries in Central Europe and in the Baltic States who have gained, also, in credibility and influence, given the fact that they have warned, for many, many years, that something like this could happen, while other countries, especially in Western Europe, were much more sceptical. This will have impact at a political level. And, also, Macron will have to adapt its approach to Berlin, given the changes in Berlin. Now, we haven’t really – yet really understood what the shift in German defence policy truly mean for Europe and for the bilateral relationship, but this will necessitate a rethinking of how we work with the German on this.

Second point, they – the main implication of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that the US has massively increased its parti – it’s contribution to European security. And if some, you know, were thinking – and this was part of, kind of like, the Macron narrative that the US was, sort of, moving away from Europe, well, clearly, what we have seen over the past three months has, sort of, changed the situation. And we’ll see how the narrative around European sovereignty will have to be adapted to a situation when, clearly, the US is not going anywhere. In fact, it has never had – been so present in Europe since the Cold War.

Finally, relationship with Russia. I think that right now, obviously, the situation is such that there is no more discussion about European security with Russia, you know, taking into account Russian concern about its own security is the only way to think about European security. The whole idea behind the 2019 rapprochement initiative, this is gone. But in the longer-term, when the situation will evolve, also, in Ukraine, it’s hard to see exactly how France will have – will adapt its message on engaging with Moscow, while, at the same time, staying a credible ally for Central and Eastern European countries.

I’ll stop here, but happy to take questions.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Martin. I think we’ll have some questions about more foreign policy and security aspects, including one which I find fascinating and which, again, hasn’t really been part of the discussion, which is what’s happened in the Sahel and the, sort of, withdrawal of French forces from there. Which I think us Analysts are looking at, but hasn’t really been part of the discussion, in terms of what France wants to do in – especially in Africa, which is a continent that matters for France, particularly.

So, just a question to the three of you before opening up to everyone. I was really interested by this idea of a triumph for the losers and something that is discussed a lot in French media, but a little bit less in foreign press, is this idea of a third round and that – a rhetoric around the fact that, you know, we had two rounds in the Presidential election and now this legislative election would be a third round. Or that a third round could be, you know, protests in the street that would, sort of, turn into almost a popular opposition to the government.

So, I’d like to know, the three of you coming from very different angles on this, what do you make of this third round rhetoric? What do you make of this idea that President Macron, immediately elected, then becomes almost put in a difficult position, in terms of the politics, a very fragmented framework, and almost expecting some type of popular discontent, maybe another gilet jaune over the coming years? So, what do you make of this third round rhetoric, do you think it’s credible or do you think we’ll see very different things happening? Should we do the reverse, Martin, then Hélène and then Alexandre?

Martin Quencez

Oh, okay, I can certainly – I mean, I think this is, kind of, fair game. You know, this is part of the campaign. The campaign for the parliamentary election starts on the very night of the result of the Presidential election. We’ve had, as it was mentioned before, two parties, two party leaders, who consider that despite losing the Presidential election, they have gained some sort of a political momentum and they can build on this for the parliamentary election. You have to remember that the National Front, the party of Marine Le Pen, doesn’t even have a parliamentary group right now, right? I mean, like, they were already in the second round five years ago. They don’t even have the minimum amount of MPs to have a parliamentary group at the National Assembly. So, there’s a lot at stake here for La France Insoumise, for Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

It’s also a situation where, I mean, with 22% in the first round and all other left-wing parties below 5%, there is a situation where, clearly, you can pretend for leadership in the left, and you know, this whole idea of Jean-Luc Mélenchon saying, “Well, vote for me as Prime Minister,” is obviously something a bit strange, because that’s not how the parliamentary election works. But this is part of the campaign, and I would find it politically, potentially, an interesting idea.

The issue, which you just mentioned, is that if, indeed, the Presidential party En Marche, gets a majority at – in June at the National Assembly, what will these two other parties do? And I think it was ‘til yesterday one of the, kind of, senior MPs of the left party, of La France Insoumise, mentioned the fact that even if they lose at the parliamentary election in June, they will continue the fight in the streets. So, clearly, there is this idea that whatever the result is, there won’t be, sort of, an expectation that, you know, for a certain time, the President and his party should, you know, implement their reform and their projects.

So, there will be contestation of the result whatever happens and this is what may be a bit difficult to deal with, but I am a bit surprised of how much of a big deal we make of this. We – this is the very first time when someone is re-elected while having a majority at the parliament. This is something that, obviously, will trigger a very specific campaign for the, what, 49 days that we have until the legislative election.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you, Martin. Hélène? Hélène, you’re on mute.

Professor Hélène Landemore

Yes, sorry, this idea of a third round in French politics, I think we’re really a country where a lot, you know, takes place on the street. We, you know, we are notorious for our strikes and our demonstrations and I think Macron fully expects social movements, again, in the fall. I think that’s why he wisely, you know, sent out this idea of, “With you, together, all of us,” because he’s already gone through the, soc – you know, the social protests around the fuel tax in 2018 and that was, I think, a defining moment for him. He realised you cannot govern against your own people.

Even if you know better and you have the right tools, like a carbon tax, you just cannot win that game, at least not in France, actually. Because comparing with the UK, I was shocked here, I’ve been living in Oxford for the past three months, and on April 1st the cost of energy went up by 50% here. No-one commented, there was no protest on the streets. I mean, it’s really remarkable. It’s almost unthinkable as a French person. You know, like, if you tried that in France, good luck, and in fact, that’s why we have this fiscal, whatever it’s called, energy shield that has prevented, you know, the prices of energy to go up as much in France, because the government knows this would never fly. That’s why we have less inflation. That’s why we have all these things that are meant to protect, and I think it’s a good thing, the people that are most directly affected by this geopolitical changes and factors.

So, yes, I think there will be a third round and I think the – you know, you have two ways to address a third round. It’s like either you repress and you use via violence and Police forces, and there’s only so far you can go before you take an authoritarian turn, and it doesn’t always work. Or you go the other route, which is a route that Macron also took in December 2018, you say, “Well, let’s talk and listen and see what we can figure out.” And then, you know, some people will say, “Well, he was just dithering, and it was a strategic manoeuvre to gain time,” and all that. But at the end of the day, we got a great national debate, we got a Citizens’ Assembly out of it. It was two years where the country at least talked to each other, or some parts of it talked to each other and there were proposals that came out of this Citizens’ Convention in particular, which were, for the most part, not implemented, but that were really prescient, especially in the face of the energy crisis we’re now facing.

So, I’m hoping that, you know, if there’s a third round, the pre-emptive move to minimise it will be to say look, let’s do more of this. Let’s do more of this, but let’s empower those Citizens’ Assemblies so that their proposals are actually taken seriously, which they were not in the past. So, that’s how I see that this could play out.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Hélène. Alexandre?

Alexandre Holroyd

Well, I mean, I think I’m going to slightly challenge some of the – you know, which have been said. I agree with Martin, I think that, yes, there were reports that it’s a victory for the losers of the election and it’s a remarkable political feat to have portrayed it like that. The truth is, this is a historic victory for the President. It’s the first time an outgoing President in the Fifth Republics gets re-elected without a [mother tongue]. The last time a President ran a campaign, he ended up – for an outgoing President, he ended up below 20% in the first round and actually, after five years of power, with a war in Ukraine, rising energy prices, three years of – two years of confinement, in and out and a social crisis, the President was chosen again by 30% of the electorate, more or less.

So, I think the idea that this is a great victory for those who have lost is for the birds. What this has done, and I agree with Martin, it has ordered an attention of – a sense of pre-eminence on the left and on the right, which is that Jean-Luc Mélenchon, in particular, has now come out as the leader of the left amongst the left. And Marine Le Pen, who was challenged at some point by Éric Zemmour very briefly, as re-established pre-eminence on the far-right. But this victory, make no mistake, is absolutely historic by French standards in the Fifth Republic, absolutely historic. So, I would caution this idea that this is a great victory from the – for the opposition.

The second thing is, I think there is to be a change of method and the President’s been very clear, but this is about accompanying difficult reforms with civil society, with partners, social partners, with business representative, with union representatives. It isn’t really about trying to recreate artificial parties that, on the left or on the right, would have a predetermined role. I don’t believe that Politicians choose that. I believe that electors choose that. And there I disagree, I mean, in one remark which was made, there was a remark that the debate had been very technical and there was no challenge of vision. I think it’s hard to deny that in this election, between the three vision, which were first, second and third, there are three very different visions of France, its future, its relationship with the world, its relationship with Europe. Very, very different visions, which were offered to electors, and they chose, as our constitution dictates, in two rounds, which of those visions they would share.

And I think that, do you know, to have a sense of where things stand, you have to compare with other democracies. The truth is that turnout has been going out – down in France for decades, as it has in the UK, in the US, in Italy and so, the problem of adhesion to democracy is larger than our borders. And the truth is that in most of those parliamentary regimes, big parties, think of the Conservatives or the Labour Party in the UK, are coalitions of people who could have remarkably different views about omission. And the Labour Party, I think, were – the two former leaders of the Labour Party in the UK are iconic of you can have a party with very, very different views and sets of views about where society should go.

So, there is a challenge of French democracy. The challenge of French democracy is how do you associate more people in the course of reforming the country, so that you don’t have such strong responses in the streets, but the challenge is less about the democ – system. I hear a lot of people arguing that “We should quote the parliamentary election mid-term of a Presidential election,” and the key argument they give me, generally, is, “This is how it’s done in the US.” I’m not sure the US is an example where there is massive adhesion to the policies of Washington in the country, nor an example of very, very effective policymaking. It, essentially, creates a system where the Presidency, or the capability to actually achieve policy, is limited to, generally, two years.

So, I’m a bit cautious about, sort of, the talk of decline of democracy, not compared to other – self-observing France, while not comparing to the outcomes in other countries. I think the key thing in France is to manage to have a more dialogue around pushing through important reforms and those, obviously, will come. So, that’s the change of method.

And then, there’s one point I’d like to challenge very significantly and that’s the Convention on Climate. I mean, I was part of the committee who examined the bill that came out of the Convention on Challenge and, actually, the vast majorities of the proposal made were adopted. They were amended by Parliament, and I think that’s the concept of a parliamentary democracy. They were proposed by an institution, they were put forward to Parliament and they were amended for very good reasons, that some of them would cause the kind of uproar that you – that was mentioned when you were talking about energy prices, very clearly.

And so, parliamentarians who, you know, every week go and see their constituents and, eventually, after five years, have to seek re-election or be booted out, have a responsibility to address and have the kind of responsibility that means that they should have a say in which policies are implemented. Again, about 70% of the proposals were adopted, amended, but adopted. So, I think those tools are very effective, but I think we should be a bit careful of saying that those tools will, essentially, be a replacement of parliamentary legitimacy. I just, I personally believe that – and if I look at the democracies, which I see in my constituency, Denmark and Sweden, who are able to build consensus, it goes for a certain sense of parliamentary democracy.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Alexandre. We have a really interesting debate on that, and I want to give Hélène and Martin a chance to, sort of, weigh in, as well. But I do want to bring some questions from the audience, so I’ll just read a couple of questions and the three of you maybe take notes, think about it and then, you can get back to both the debate and, also, the questions.

A few things about, I think, the state of French politics. First of all, “What is the likelihood of a cohabitation, a divided government?” “Would it be possible for La République En Marche to be a minority government and what would mean, what would that look like?” Some question, as well, about the L’Union de Droit, “Is it possible for the far-right party to unite and to bring the, sort of, left [inaudible – 49:25] Republican with them, sort of like, a big right-wing agenda?” And then, also, questions about “the future of La République En Marche after 2027,” the party itself. And then, an interesting question about whether “President Macron lost the left-wing voters because the left became Euro sceptic, it is now following more of a Mélenchon lead, being sceptical vis-à-vis the EU, which then makes it difficult to, sort of, rally around the very pro-EU Macron message.” So, if we can try and address those points, and maybe going to Hélène first, and then Martin and Alexandre.

Professor Hélène Landemore

Sorry, I got stuck on the discussion of the convention, so I’d just like to address that point. I think that, you know, there are several ways to evaluate the impact of this convention. The government will, of course, tell you they implemented 70% or more, but I think more impartial sources estimate between ten and 25% of the proposals were really implemented more or less undiluted. And that’s the real question, right? Because in – at the end, the goal was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% of the 1990 levels by a certain date. The current Climate Bill doesn’t allow for that and so – okay. So, there’s a question of, you know, what do you pick and choose from this – from the proposals of these conventions, particularly the one that would have had the greatest chance of achieving really big, you know, reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was the mandatory energy retrofitting of public and private housing, and that one was just not implemented.

So, all I’m saying is that if we continue looking at the use of these paths and deliberate mechanisms as supplement to the system, well, they tend to be co-opted, side-lined, diluted and so, I’m not saying we should replace elected parliaments with such bodies, but I think we need to institutionalise and perhaps constitutionalise the role in such a way that they really have an impact. Because otherwise, we’ll never measure up to the urgency of the moment, and when you say, “Oh, Parliamentarians have a responsibility over the electorate,” yeah, but their electorate often turns out to be a very small fraction of the larger population. Whereas if you look at who’s supported mandatory housing renovation, 74% of the population was in favour of the particular measure. In fact, out of 149 proposals that came out of the convention, a majority was in favour of each and every one of them, except one, the one that wanted to reduce the speed limit on highways.

So, how come, you know, you get a convention that really mirrors the larger public, produces radical proposals, but also reasonable ones that are supported by majority of people, that somehow, when you pass those proposals through the parliamentary, you know, machinery and the government, there’s only a few left and they make no difference, or very, you know, a very symbolic difference for now. Isn’t there something deeply wrong with the system? Why don’t we acknowledge that?

And then, I agree with you that, sure, I think the situation of France is not as dire as that of the US. I think the US is in much worse situation. But still, I think we – in order to progress, we have to, you know, acknowledge the crisis we’re in. I’ll stop there.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Héléne. Martin, maybe some of the questions around L’Union de Droit…

Martin Quencez

Yeah.

Alice Billon-Galland

…the democratic challenge, etc.

Martin Quencez

On the democratic challenge and to maybe also answer what Alexandre said, I think there’s one big legacy of the Macron years is that he’s killed both the two traditional parties that have run France for 60 years, right, between 58 and 2017. So, we are now in a situation when you do have one, sort of, party or government in the centre and two parties that are not necessarily acceptable, according to certain standards of political acceptability, and that creates quite a challenge for our democratic system. Because this is a – I mean, this is still a party that is – that gets the support from Nicolas Sarkozy to [inaudible - 53:54].

So, it is now we have this kind of party that has taken over all the political forces of what we used to call government parties, or mainstream parties, and have only left the two, sort of, extreme right, extreme left, as the only democratic opposition. I think this is quite a problem for our democracy and that leaves very little margin of manoeuvre for an alternants – alternative in five years. So, that would be my take on why I’m a bit concerned about this.

On the Union de Droit, so this idea that perhaps after this election, the different right-wing movements in France could, sort of, unite and be one bloc. Traditionally, we tend to consider that after the Revolution, that you had, like, three types of right-wing movements in France, one that is, sort of, contra – counter-revolutionary one, the, kind of, Joseph de Miastre tradition. There is one that is a liberal economic – liberal-right, and there is the Bonapartist tradition.

This is the great idea of Éric Zemmour. I don’t think Éric Zemmour really ran to become President. He ran because he wants to become the, kind of, ideological axis of the right in the future, saying that “If the right can – wants to govern again, there needs to be this unity between these two trends. This means concretely that” – that is why, by the way, he’s so obsessed with the Algerian War and the Second World War. Something it was a bit bizarre, I think, for foreign observers to see a Presidential candidate going over and over about these two moments in our history. I think these are the two moments in modern history where the – when the French right could’ve had a schism. In the Second World War, obviously, between Vichy and the Gaullist movement and in – during the Algerian War, between again, the Gaullist movement and the OIS.

So, he wants to, sort of, address this trauma of the right so that there could be this unity between these different movements. I think that the problem right now is that I was a bit surprised at Marine Le Pen’s reaction after the defeat, saying, “Well, you’ll see me in five years.” She doesn’t want to leave. She will continue on a position that will make it very difficult for all the other right-wing movements to coalesce and join her and that is why I think we’ll have to see if this is possible and I think that the great project of Éric Zemmour has been put on hold because of the result.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Martin. We have four minutes left, so Alexandre, your turn to wrap it up. I think you probably want to react to a lot of things that were said. If you can also touch on two questions, which we had in the chat, the first one about the future of that La République En Marche, including without President Macron being able to run as President, and also about what the President and the party can do to, sort of, revitalise the moderate political forces. Alongside what Martin has said, in terms of the fragmentation of the political spectrum and the two traditional party having been, basically, obliterated. So, if you could address these two in the next two/three minutes, that’d be wonderful.

Alexandre Holroyd

Very ambitious. So, just to – we’re now going to – Hèlène and I, I think we have to have a very long discussion about the scripting subject. We’re not going to agree, and could I just point out that this government has put in the largest retrofitting programme this country has ever known. 700,000 houses were retrofitted last year and that €12 billion were spent on it, which is more than the previous government did over five years. But we will have the discussion somewhere else. I agree, we’re not going to settle this issue, but I’m looking forward to it.

I just want to take one question that you’ve mentioned, which, sort of, struck my ear, which was, “Has Macron lost the left because of his pro-Europeanism and because the left would’ve become anti-European?” Now, the first thing I’d like to challenge is I don’t think President Macron has lost the left. I think there is a huge part of the social democratic vote in France who still votes and votes very happily for President Macron. Actually, most of my colleagues are Social Democrats. Most of the Government Ministers are Social Democrats. Most of them come from the Socialist Party. So, I’d like to challenge this idea that the President, for some reason, has become a President to the right. It’s not true. The basis of the electorate in France is halfway between the Social Democrats and halfway – and actually, the scores of the Presidency in the first round, if you analyse them, go to that.

I’d also like to challenge the idea that the left is anti-European in France, because while Jean-Luc Mélenchon is clearly anti-European, in my perspective, I think that it’s a ver – it’s a big shortcut to say that everybody of the 22% who voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon are full of support for his programme. I think he benefitted hugely from the concept, what we call the concept of useful voting, which is that he might’ve been the only person in a capacity to challenge Marine Le Pen in the second round, to be able to go in front of Marine Le Pen in the second round.

If I look at the Greens, or at least of Yannick Jadot, because the Greens have different stands, they’re pro-European, in a different way, but it’s – I think it’s undeniable that they’re pro-European. And yet, if I look at my constituency, I think a lot of the people who feel very close to the Greens will have voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon for strategic voting reasons. So, I’d like to challenge this idea that this is a monolotic bloc that fully supports Jean-Luc Mélenchon, his programme. I just think – and I think in the parliamentary election, we’ll see if that turns out to be true, but it – I’m not sure it’s as clearcut as this.

As for the future of La République En Marche, the truth is I think this is a problem for tomorrow. This is a question for tomorrow. The challenge that we now have ahead of us is having the means to put in place its new method to continue to reform France. And again, I find it fascinating that in this discussion we haven’t mentioned the word ‘unemployment’, because since I was born, unemployment was the first, the second and the third issue of France. We have had 10% unemployment and just to be clear, those are families where sometimes for three generations, they have been in structural unemployment. This has been a social catastrophe for France. One of the big reasons why we have such an extreme vote is that for 30 years, we have had 10% unemployment and actually, this mandate has challenged that. This mandate has finally put, or is putting, an end to it.

It is a fundamental change in our politics and the consequences of having had, unlike most other democracies, such structurally high unemployment for such a length of time, which is for generations in a row, often, very concentrated in certain areas of France, incidentally, those who vote heavily for Marine Le Pen these days. It shows you the damage that kind – that kind – the kind of policies, which were put forward and which failed to address issues have, in the long-term. And so, I think this is a very important matter. We live in great democracies, which means the day you solve, or you are trying to – you get close to solving an issue, everybody forgets it immediately. But the truth is this is a fundamental change in our system.

Now, I’m told that I have to conclude, so I will just say that the parliamentary election in France is not a third round of the Presidential election, but it is a fundamental part of being able to enforce policy. So, I don’t believe at all the third round of the Presidential election. People vote differently, the election system is different, you vote for candidates, they’re spread around the country, it’s a two round system. So, there are lots of political caveats to what will happen. I am absolutely sure that the scores for everybody in the Presidential will not become – equate – like, perfectly equate to what turns out for every candidate. If not, I mean, we just give up on the parliamentary election, if that’s what you’re convinced of. No, so, this isn’t going to happen, but, however, everything is open and it’s up to those three very different visions of France to articulate a vision, which is acceptable to gain the adhesion of 577 constituencies across the country and the world.

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you very much, Alexandre, and thank you so much to our three speakers for what I think was a really fascinating discussion about French politics. It’s more the type of discussion we have, actually, in France, rather than outside of France, which I think is a good sign, sort of, looking at lots of different aspects and it seems to me that it’s clear to everyone we’ve scratched the surface. If we were at Chatham House, we would then move on to have a drink and continue the conversation, which we should do soon. But if you’re interested in those topics, do stay in touch and follow the work that we’re doing within the Europe Programme, we’re working on democracy in Europe, we’re working on France and also some of the foreign and defence issues that Macron has outlined.

But again, thank you very much to our three speakers. It’s just the beginning of this discussion and so, keep an eye on the legislative elections in June and French politics going forward. Thank you very much and see you very soon.

Professor Hélène Landemore

Bye.

Alexandre Holroyd

Thanks.

Martin Quencez

Bye, bye.