The future of the Russia–China relationship

Ben Bland

[Pause] Good evening, everyone. To all the people here, thanks for joining us in person and, also, everyone online, wherever you are, thanks for being here. My name is Ben Bland. I’m the Director of the Asia-Pacific Programme here at Chatham House, and it’s my pleasure to welcome you all here for this discussion on the China-Russia relationship, one of the most important bilateral relationships anywhere in the world right now. It’s nearly one year since Russia invaded Ukraine and I think it’s fair to say that China continues to provide a vital diplomatic shield of Vladimir Putin and Russia.

Much has been made of the so-called ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, or Putin and Xi, and we’ll discuss that distinction later, and we want to go really deeper into the question of what lies behind their relationship, what it means for the world and where this authoritarian axis, dynamic duo, whatever you want to call them, where this partnership is heading. And we’re really lucky to have with us three top Chatham House experts, which is a real pleasure.

Joining us virtually is Annette Bohr, who is an Associate Fellow in our Russia and Eurasia Programme. We also have Michael Cox next to me, who is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and an Associate Fellow in our US and Americas Programme, and he tells me author of a forthcoming book, only partially ironically called ‘Comrades’ about Mr Putin and Mr Xi Jinping. Last, but not least, we have my colleague, Yu Jie, who’s our Senior China Fellow, and if you want to know more about our speakers, you can read all their full bios online.

Before we begin, a brief reminder that this event is taking place at Chatham House, but is not under the Chatham House Rule. It is on the record and it’s being livestreamed across the world on the many tech platforms that help us with these things and take all our data, as well, so thanks for that. I’m going to leave 20 minutes or so for questions at the end, from everyone here and online, so get your thinking caps on. I’ll ask you to raise your hand later in the room and online, if you can start putting your questions in the Q&A box on Zoom, I will either ask you to unmute and ask your question or read it out for you. If you don’t want to read it out yourself, let us know.

Right, into the meat of the subject and I’m going to start with Annette, who’s really kindly – can’t be with us tonight, but is joining us down the line. She can’t be here in person. So, we’re nearly one year into the invasion and many people, sort of, see the China-Russia relationship through the lens of Russia’s invasion and China’s, sort of, tacit support, or explicit support, for Russia. So, where does this relationship stand now, one year after the invasion, Annette, and what do you see as the main challenges facing the China-Russia relationship and the opportunities for those two countries and their leaders?

Annette Bohr

Right, well, thank you, Ben. First of all, good evening, everyone, it’s a pleasure to take part today in this conversation. Yeah, as we approach the war’s one year anniversary, I think we can say that the Sino-Russia relationship has strengthened overall, if we’re measuring, according to trade volumes, diplomatic meetings and the number of joint military exercises. But there are also areas where it’s noticeably weakened, such as the fast-growing asymmetry between the two powers, for example.

Russia and China’s partnership has always had its drivers and limitations and I think what we’re seeing now is an acceleration of several trends that were in place before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some of which have yielded opportunities for Beijing, while others have produced some clear challenges. And if we look at some of those opportunities, a main point of convergence is that the two powers have extremely complementary economies. Russia has a lot of natural resources, but lacks capital and infrastructure and since the onset of the war, China has been purchasing these natural resources at bargain basement prices and has gained an even firmer hand than it had before in trade negotiations.

Now, Russian leaders like to emphasise the unprecedented strategic co-operation between the two countries. In reality, though, this co-operation makes Moscow increasingly dependent on Beijing and contributes to an asymmetry that was already pronounced before the war. I mean, Russia’s economy was only one tenth out of China’s and the gap continues to widen. And Russia can’t rely on China to buy up all the fossil fuel exports it can no longer sell to the West. I think this is a really important point, especially gas, as the physical infrastructure linging – linking westward pipelines with those heading East to China, simply doesn’t exist, and it will take years to build and at a very high cost. You know, exports of oil, LNG and coal have gone up, however.

And if we look more closely at this asymmetry, one of the biggest problems Moscow is currently facing is the management of its foreign trade transactions. Russian authorities have tried barter deals, cash payments and other schemes, including Haberler. Recent work done by the Economist, [Alexandra Prokopenko – 06:51], shows that efforts have now clearly shifted to cryptocurrencies and payments in RNB. So, what this means is that the Russian economy is swapping its dollar dependence for reliance on RNB, and its reserves and payments will be influenced by the policies of the Chinese Communist Party. Now, this is yet another great development for China.

And if I just turn briefly to some of the challenges now, for China. As far as Beijing is concerned, Russia is a country in decline and ready to take risks, but China is much more risk averse and also averse to Moscow’s military adventuricism – adventurism. Xi wants to revise the international rules, for sure, but unlike Putin, he’s not ready to entirely scupper the system that allowed China to achieve great power status. Beijing has over $3 trillion in reserves, places in accounts and securities in the West, and it’s included in very complicated supply chains. It has risen and prospered within the current global order and while Beijing would like to reform it, Moscow seeks to destroy it utterly.

And it’s this disjoint between Moscow’s aspirations and its ability to achieve them that primarily fuels its high-risk foreign policy strategy. Moscow’s tendency to punch above its weight, it can sometimes serve Beijing’s purposes, to be sure, but Russia’s current pariah status means that it is now a less influential and a less valuable ally in international fora and in the joint quest to revise the US-led unilateral – unipolar order. And that’s a key common goal.

And I think I’ll just – one last point, and that’s on the economic front. Russia’s war has led to supply chain disruptions, large-scale cancellations of Chinese export orders. This has resulted in major losses for Chinese firms and, also, logistical challenges, that undermine the Belt & Road Initiative, and of course, there are reputational risks for Beijing. The perception that the Chinese Government is an enabler and perhaps even a supporter of Russian aggression, has caused some countries to scrutinise their ties with Beijing and has made it more difficult for China to promote projects or investments. So, now we are seeing China trying to court back some of its key trade partners. So, I’ll leave it there for now and perhaps later in the discussion, I can give a few thoughts about the future of the relationship and where I see it heading.

Ben Bland

Thanks, Annette. I’m going to, sort of, go backwards in time now and ask Yu Jie first about some of the recent past and then, Mick, maybe further back, ‘cause I think it’s important to understand, sort of, where we’re going. Yu Jie, I mean, what’s the recent history of this relationship and when did it start to warm up and why? I think it only really caught Western attention with the invasion of Ukraine, but something was going on with Xi and Putin before the invasion. So, maybe you can tell us a bit about that.

Dr Yu Jie

Sure. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, really delighted to see many of you come to Chatham House physically, again, and also, I’m so delighted to share the stage with my old mentor from London School of Economics. So, really delighted to be with you again, and Mick.

Now, Ben, to answer your question, when this relationship really got that sense of bromance, or warmup, and I would say really back to the time of 20 – and 2012/2013, Xi Jinping paid the first – you know, his foreign trip, including South Africa and, of course, Russia, as well. I think it’s really, as we could say, really recent ten years from – let’s go back ten years ago, really, this bilateral relationship got really warmed up. Now, through different strands of this bilateral relationship, obviously, on the one hand, you have the trade, but that’s only the smaller part, but I think much bigger part in here is on the military and is on diplomatic rhetoric.

So, I think Beijing is really acutely aware that since of the so-called partnership between China and Russia, that what really Russia – China does want – not want to leave the impression is that Russia has already been a junior partner with Beijing, but on the other hand, Beijing will give it sufficient diplomatic rhetoric support and to show that the two countries are actually on equal term. So, that is just one strand of this bilateral relationship.

Now, second strand in here, while we’re talking about trade and economics, frankly, I think it’s very little, because I have been looking into the trade numbers in the past 12 years or so. Now, it seems to be that China is always ranking the number one trading partner with Russia and Russia is ranking – always numbered at 17 or number 18 trading partner with Beijing. So, obviously, the economic asymmetry between the soo – two side has been quite obvious.

But I think what’s really bonded them together, it is not on that sense of see each other eye-to-eye or share the common values, but rather it’s the common interest, that sense of resentment towards a so-called hegemony headed by United States and therefore, determine the international order. And that seems to be really bonded these two countries together. But, of course, on the other hand, we’ve also experienced that within Beijing in the past few years, the diplomatic gravity of the centre has been really shifted from the so-called US-led diplomacy under Yang Jiechi and then, gradually, eluded into more Russia-led and Russia centred foreign policy, led by the then Foreign Minister Wang Yi of that time. So, we have seen that shift on the personal favour and also personal taste, at the same time, as well.

Now, thirdly, let’s look into the so-called ‘no limit’ relationship, no limit partnership, which has been taking such a sensation after this Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine. But interestingly enough, I mean, lunchtime Ben and I discussed, “What will do this? We could try to say something new or something ground-breaking.” It’s not something really ground-breaking, but actually, if you look into the past record, the no limit partnership between China and Russia was indicated by Wang Yi himself on the 2nd of January 2021. So, I think well before the Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine, and that sense of co-ordination between Beijing and Moscow largely exist.

But that co-ordination, it has not necessarily come – you know, it’s a full co-ordination as such, but I think it’s also a co-ordination that will come with the substantial flaws, because ultimately, China and Russia are very different kind of international power and international player. On the one hand, Russia is very much a 19th Century very strong geopolitical power that exert its influence by territorial conquest, as what we have experienced in the last 12 months. However, on the other hand, China seems to be more interested into entangle itself into global economic system and to brand itself into a completely different kind of power.

So, the – essentially, the world view of both countries are very different. So, that, I would say to go further on this, it seems to be we’re going to bring more problems, rather than co-ordination, between the two.

Ben Bland

Okay, thanks for that, Yu Jie, and it’s interesting what you say about the ‘no limits’ language, ‘cause it did capture so much attention here and it was interpreted as a sense that, you know, nothing is off the table, meaning that they can do so much more together. Whereas it’s actually, as you’re suggesting, quite generic diplomatic language and in some sense, is…

Dr Yu Jie

Just to follow on that. Actually, quite interestingly, I was reading the interviews was given by the Chinese Ambassador to the EU, recently at the South China Morning Post, and he’s also said, “Oh, China can have no limit relationship with any country, including the EU, as well.” So, I thought, like, that seems to be the term, seems to be the buzzword of the day in Beijing those days.

Ben Bland

There’s certainly no need to talk about the US-China relationship. I think, yeah, at the moment, should…

Dr Yu Jie

Hardly no problem.

Professor Michael Cox

Yeah, keep going.

Ben Bland

Yeah, so, Mick, I want to – I will come to you next and, sort of, go back…

Professor Michael Cox

Sure.

Ben Bland

…in history, ‘cause I want to understand a bit more about the longer arc of China-Russia relations and see, sort of, how we got to where we are today. And if you look back in history, what has normally brought these two great powers together and, also, importantly, I guess, what has tended to drive them apart at different points in their modern history?

Professor Michael Cox

Okay, thanks for that impossible question. How far do you want to go back? I was – I’ve been doing a lot of history, in terms – I started in history, I went to IR, and I’ve gone back to history, it’s so much more interesting. I’ll start with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, for the specialists out there, and you’ve got – I could then take you through various treaties of Aigun, Peking and the various Manchurian adventures of Russia, and the Chinese Eastern Railway and many, many other things. But clearly, this relationship has a very long – has got a very long trail, going – and this history is important for the present, too. Memory doesn’t go away, identity doesn’t go away, and I note that a lot of Chinese museums, which I’ve been looking out online, at least in English, these tell a certain different story of friend – than friendship, in terms of the Russia-China relationship, going right back.

And there’s a wonderful conversation with – between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev – can you remember Gorbachev, by the way? And Deng Xiaoping. And this was this marvellous meeting, a very important meeting, by the way, in May 1989 in Beijing. Now, of course, outside the door Tiananmen was going on and all the focus then was on Tiananmen and what was going to happen, understandably so. But the debate and discussion went on between the old man, Deng Xiaoping, he was very unhealthy at that stage, but still had his marbles around him, and Gorbachev. And Gorbachev said, “Well, comrade” he used the word comrade, he said, “Comrade, we’ve just got to forget about the past,” and Deng said, “No, no, no, no, no, no, before we can move forward to the future, we need to get back to the past.” So, this was a way that China, kind of, wanted to use the past, obviously, to put China – put Russia in a very bad light, you know, “We’ve got to move from the past to the future.”

Now, the reason I say that is in terms of where this relationship comes from, it comes from a very deep and dark place, and that very deep and dark place was the Sino-Soviet split between 1960 and the mid-1980s. It’s very difficult – ‘cause I’ve studied this history quite a lot, an old cohort Historian and all the rest of it. You can’t really grasp how appalling that relationship became, and it became a war. By the late 1970s, Russia and China had about two million troops along the most militarised border in the world and one of the most dangerous borders in the world. There was no trade, there was no diplomatic relationship. There was deep ideological hatred and even personal side, and very, very difficult to get out of that. And I start at that point, but I think to understand how this relationship was evolved, you’ve got to understand how bad it became in that period, from the 60s, through the 70s, even so difficult even getting to the point.

And in a way, if we’re going to, kind of, give somebody a little bit of praise, ‘cause he doesn’t get a lot these days, it’s Gorbachev himself. He, kind of, opened up this door to Deng Xiaoping and Deng Xiaoping was prepared to walk through it. That famous speech of Gorbachev’s at Vladivostok in 1986, and then you had the 1989 meeting and then, going beyond that, even when the USSR collapses, when Russia becomes Russia, you still maintain the dynamic of that relationship through the 90s, with Jiang Zemin and, of course, Boris Yeltsin.

So, the relationship itself, it seems to me, has depth, and let me just – I always say this thing about borders. We don’t talk about borders enough. That was a very, very dangerous, long border, 4,000 – well, whatever kilometres it was, I don’t know, I mean, it keeps moving. I’ve seen the numbers move all over the place.

Dr Yu Jie

It’s [inaudible – 18:59] kilometres.

Professor Michael Cox

Oh, you know it better than I.

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, full stop.

Professor Michael Cox

You’ve walked along it, obviously.

Dr Yu Jie

Of course.

Professor Michael Cox

I wouldn’t swim along that Amur River, by the way, it looks very polluted. But, you know, if you can solve that border problem, the demi – that’s a very huge gain, that’s a huge gain. You don’t want to go back to that, and I think that does keep – that’s a secure basis of this relationship. Now, I – and forget about all the no limits stuff, that’s a huge secure basis to have been – to deodorise that. As I always say, you have two million troops on those borders, now you’ve got four bridges going across the Amur River. Now, how much trade goes across there, Cherry? I don’t know and frankly, I don’t care, but the essence of it is that it’s transformed that relationship. That’s the first thing to say.

The second thing I’d say is I think that some of the essence of the relationship, which we do often associate with Xi and with Putin, I think was already beginning to take shape. If you even look at the 2001 Treaty of Neighborliness and Friendship, you can see certain aspects there already, which are beginning to form the relationship between the two around two fundamental things, and I agree entirely with Cherry, first about the United States.

In 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed a document in – for multipolarity and against unipolarity, 1997. Also, within that same document, there’s a discussion about NATO, long before the 4th of February communique. And within that, too, the Article 9 there, you can see what I’ve been doing for the last two years, it’s a bit sad, but this is what I’ve been doing, and this – and Article 9 of that almost contains a, kind of, a joint military guarantee to each other. It’s not Article 5, but it’s there, it’s there in essence. It’s a big vaguer than Article 5.

So, what I’m really trying to respond very quickly on this and using history, in a sense, as a weapon, to, kind of, remind us of too much presentism in the current debate. This relationship did not begin on the 4th of February. This relationship is not just defined, either, by the Ukraine War. It’s defined by a much longer trajectory of a, kind of, way of seeing the world differently to the West, differently to the United States. It’s not a liberal vision of the world. It’s a very different kind of vision to the world.

The final point I’d say is – I’ve written about this too much, frankly, and I’ve been talking about this too much for a very, very long time, and I’m now writing a book on this. I take the view, and I share the – some of the scepticism expressed by the other two speakers, but it seems to me we’ve got to ask ourselves a question and try and answer it. Through thick and thin, President Xi has stuck with Putin through this war. You know, I mean, everything that Russia has done may go fundamentally, fundamentally against China’s worldview, but Xi has stuck there. You know, I mean, he’s stuck – he’s stood by his man, to use a phrase, and I think this is really quite significant, because in the end, it’s Xi who’s determining this. It’s Xi who’s making these key decisions and there’s Putin on the other side, and I’ve not seen any degree of wanting to distance themselves. Xi, to put it rather bluntly, has not got buyer’s remorse, he’s not got buyer’s remorse. He may get it at one time in the future, but I’m fairly sceptical that he will.

Ben Bland

Okay. I mean, on that point, just to come to you, Yu Jie, I mean, I think when Xi Jinping discussed Ukraine with Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, when he was visiting Beijing in November, he did, sort of, say something along the lines of “Relevant parties,” whoever they are, “should oppose the threat and use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.” I mean, was this some sort of signal of disquiet with Putin? I think that’s how a lot of people in Europe wanted to interpret it. I guess Mick’s saying you don’t really buy that, but what’s your sense? Do you think there is an element of buyer’s remorse about how things have gone, from Chinese perspective?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I think there’s a very strong sense of ambivalence and, also, awkwardness. I mean, the word ‘awkwardness’, which I think really capture the essence of this – China’s position right now. On the one hand, what Russia has been doing is very much against China’s own, the so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence.” One – the first one is the national integrity – territorial integrity of a country, which not – should not be inroaded. So, I mean, that’s for one, that’s going to put China in a awkward position.

Now, second awkwardness, as Mick suggested, really coming to these long borders, that long border is equivalent the West of entire European continent. If China cannot handle Russia well and that will probably serve as perhaps the biggest national threat for Beijing. So, I think that’s also the reason why prompted – Xi Jinping has not really change much on this position. Now, what he wanted to do, it is he really want to put the daylight between himself and Putin, but how successful that could be, and so far, we have seen very movement happen around that area.

So, one thing is, for many of you, like, China-wonks or China-watchers, who may have read the party literature, party documents, I mean, I’ve gone through, again, the 20th Party Congress political report.

Ben Bland

Wow.

Dr Yu Jie

And one of the element in here is that Xi Jinping removed the so-called “crafting the new type of great power relationship.” So, great powers was in China’s diplomatic literature, usually referring to the powers and China’s relationship with the West, with the EU, with United States, but also including Russia, as well. So, if Beijing decided to drop that term and that is also signifying his relationship with Russia will change, but that change will not be something fundamental, because as I said, because of there’s a border issue and because of this – the common hatred, common resentment, against the United States, and that won’t change.

So, I think China must really consider what kind of return on investment they can really get from this bilateral relationship and frankly, so far, I think it’s very little. And Xi – if Xi Jinping’s priority for 2023, it is about having the Chinese economy quick rebound, he can’t counting on international power state to rebound his own domestic economy. He has to count on United States and EU to help with the economic recovery. So, I think that’s a very immediate question, immediate challenge, he will have to answer.

Ben Bland

Annette, I want to come to you on some of the Russian perspective of how important has China’s, so, enabling, I think was the term you used, or support, been throughout this difficult period for Russia? Because the sense is maybe China hasn’t got that much out of it, but how important for Putin and for Russia has China’s backing been, and this relationship been, in the last year?

Annette Bohr

Well, I want to say that in line with what the other two speakers have said, China has no intention of dropping Moscow as a partner. There are way too many upsides to the relationship to Beijing and so, those of us who – or those observers who think, well, you know, perhaps China is becoming a bit disillusioned with Moscow’s military adventurism, you know, it’s lack of military prowess is a bit embarrassing, I’m afraid, you know, this is just magical thinking. It’s – these upsides include peace on the joint 4,000km border, as both Cherry and Michael have discussed.

Trade, military co-operation will resume and so on. Beijing has been very careful to comply with the Western-led sanctions in order to avoid occurring – incurring secondary sanctions. Now, herein, we come to your question, Ben. Compliance with sanctions is not tantamount to the withdrawal of economic support. There’s much going on under the radar. A recent report by the Wall Street Journal found that China was using the less traceable schemes and bilateral transactions with Russia to sidestep some sanctions protocols, such as when Chinese state-owned defence companies send equipment and technology, these dual-use goods, to sanction defence companies, Russian defence companies, that is. Now, Beijing will continue to buy discounted Russian energy, very important for Russia, but it will not be a major financial backer and it will be hardnosed about its investments in Russia, and it certainly does not want to generate any sort of economic dependency on Russia.

And I just want to say in this regard that I think there are really few very salient points for Western policymakers here to keep in mind. First, when we see Macron and other Politicians hope against hope that China will use its influence to act as mediator with Moscow, again, we’re delving into this realm of magical or wishful thinking. From Beijing’s vantage point, Washington is asking China to help it fight China’s friend, so that it can then better concentrate on fighting China. This is clearly not something Beijing is going to do, and it knows that even if it were to – even if Xi Jinping were to throw Putin to the wolves, all of the problems between the US and China would still remain.

Also, we hear reports that Chinese officials have been intimating to their Western counterparts that they are using their good relations to make sure Putin doesn’t go nuclear in Ukraine. But we’ve seen no real evidence to back up this claim, especially insofar as there are high reputational – I mean, the only evidence really, is other than Beijing having its own interest in maintaining a nuclear taboo, because there are high reputational costs, of course, in terms of aligning with a power that engages in nuclear warfare.

And second, for a strategic planner, the prospect of a joint Chinese-Russian front is a nightmare and congressional reports have specified that the US might struggle to win if forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously. So, from this point of view, the 5-6% of the total US defence spending on supporting Ukraine, concomitantly degrading Russia’s conventional defence capability, is an incredibly sound investment and Beijing and Moscow have often used the spectre of co-ordinated action, particularly in the military sphere, to spook Western policymakers. And such threats, you know, they just aren’t so credible at the moment, when Moscow is otherwise occupied, so that’s a rather positive implication for the West at this point.

But having said that, I think it’s really far too early to dismiss Russia as an inconsiderable, or even a secondary, threat. Its landmass, proven reserves of natural gas and nuclear stockpiles are all the world’s largest and further underscores its geopolitical importance, and the more Moscow loses, the more it delves into adventurism.

Ben Bland

Right, yeah. On – I just want to push a bit further on what China maybe has to gain from this relationship and Yu Jie, I’m going to come to you on this first. I mean, I think everyone said it’s about neutralising the Russian threat on China’s border and annoying Americans, something we all love to do, of course. But there must be more to it than that. You know, does – I mean, China and Russia are collaborating, for example, on building this wide body passenger aircraft. There are certain things that the Russian military can do in technology, aircraft engines and other things, that maybe the Chinese can’t. Presumably, the Russians know a lot about how the American military operates. I mean, there must be some more, sort of, pragmatic areas of economic, or technological, or sort of, military, industrial co-operation that China can benefit from Russia, beyond just the, sort of, negative questions of annoying America and neutralising the threat at the border.

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I mean, let’s put the military aside, because Russia, for one, is always suspicious of China’s purpose of using military equipments anyway and even when China build its first aircraft carriers, is actually from Ukraine. It did not really come from Russia. So, that – for one, the military co-operation, I think, let’s wait and see. But I think what, really, China want to get out of this is, firstly, while we’re talking about the so-called Indo-Pacific, we’re talking about the likely military escalation across Taiwan Strait and that China was hoping Russia will be able to, not offer military support, but more nominal support when it come to the international state.

Now, secondly, as I said earlier, China-Russia are very different players on international politics and China wants to exert its influence and also revise the international global governance agenda across UN-led agencies. And China was really much hoping that Russia would be able to be one of the core supporters for China to achieve its own strategic ambition with the United Nations, but also with other multilateral platforms.

Now, thirdly, I mean, in terms of benefit for the Chinese economy will only be the short-term – very short-term benefit that China will be able to access to those lower priced primary materials, but however, China’s largest oil suppliers is not Russia, it’s Saudi Arabia.

So, I think it’s – again, when I look really – if we do a balance sheet on here, I mean, if I’m speaking from a common point of view, I’ve seen a lot of red. I don’t really see many black in here.

Professor Michael Cox

Okay, let me come in on Russia for – and as an old – I am an old Sovietologist. You won’t meet many of us now. Most are dead or went on to study another country and then got that one wrong, as well.

Dr Yu Jie

Fact.

Professor Michael Cox

And during the Cold War, of which I have a long, long memory, fond and otherwise, we – many people sat around and really overestimated Rus – Soviet power, worst case analysis. I understand why, but they did. That, in part, is why nobody, kind of, anticipated the possibility that it might go under, ‘cause they thought it was a major threat to the world, which in some ways it was, but in many ways it wasn’t.

Then, we get the 1990s and that great period of Katastroika, which defines Putinism quite a lot, by the way, what happened in the 1990s. In fact, if you want to understand Putin, go back to his KGB, but go back to the 1990s, collapse of the USSR and a total disaster on the economic front, which of course, was, in part, down to Western economic policies adopted, not only, but a fact – it was a factor, it was a factor. And then, we were told, “Russia’s now in steep decline” and then, I suddenly saw Russian GDP rise after 2000/2001. I thought that’s a very strange way of declining. Then I saw Russian living standards going up. I said, “That’s very odd for a declining country, you know.”

And then, I saw Russia acting in the Middle East, I said, “That doesn’t look like the actions of a declining country.” And then, I started counting their warheads and I said, “If that’s decline, that really doesn’t sound like decline.” And then, Russia started modernising its military and then, lo and behold, I then discovered something else, which I’d known for 30 years, which is that Russia is one of the largest oil and gas suppliers and it has one of the biggest gas and oil fields, which gives it a place at the high table of energy, today and in the past, and even more so today.

So, I want to make this point about Russia. You’re quite right, Cherry. I mean, you compare it to China, I mean, come on, there’s no comparison. Compare it to the United States, there’s even less comparison. Well, people keep telling me, “It’s the size of Texas.” I don’t know if the Texans know they’re the size of Russia, but don’t let them know, okay. Okay, that’s fine, but that doesn’t get us to where we want to get to, to think about Russian power and that – this is where I think Xi has made a calculation. That Russia can still bring an enormous amount to the table, whatever the limits of Russian power are, in terms of energy, in terms of military, in terms of foreign policy experience, in terms of alliances. By the way, Russia has not declined in Africa, it is not declining in South America, you know. It’s been very active in the Middle East. I mean, who kept Assad in power, other than the Russians?

So, I think we’ve got to be very careful and I think Xi has made this calculation. Look, if I’m looking around the world with whom I can have some kind of whatever you want to call it, quasi alliance, whatever you want to call it, if I look around the world of the regime which is, kind of, authoritarian, kind of likes us, is getting on with us, has resentments against the West and the United States, like us, and has quite a lot of capabilities as well, then I’ve only got one country I can identify. It ain’t going to be North Korea, you know, it’s going to be Russia, and I think that still sits very deeply, Cherry, in my view, on this one, within.

So, I think we’ve got to, kind of – okay, I get all your points about the embarrassment with the relationship and, you know, I mean, who wants to team up with a trigger happy Putin? It’s not the easiest relationship to be in. I mean, he’s not made it easy for China, I accept all that, but still, in that calculation of power, you’ve got one who you can work with and who, basically, shares a similar worldview, not entirely on all issues of economics, I agree with that. But nonetheless, if you, kind of, take a worldview, their view is, “I don’t like the liberal world order, like the Americans and generally speaking, don’t like the West. And if they’re [inaudible – 36:23] I’m with China, and I think that’s the way I, kind of, view it, yeah.

Ben Bland

Okay.

Annette Bohr

Ben, and if I could just chime in here on the hydrocarbons question.

Ben Bland

Hmmm.

Annette Bohr

Yeah?

Ben Bland

Sure. Go for it, with the hydrocarbon.

Annette Bohr

Yeah, and the point that Cherry made about oil and gas, I think is just incredibly important. I don’t think people realise the degree to which China has made sure that Russia is not its only supplier of non-renewable energy. I mean, it keeps such a diversified basket, it is something like 23 LNG suppliers. China deals with Iraq, Iran, Qatar. It’s developing energy relations with some African states. And Russia’s very much in the buyers’ market, where China is able to dictate the terms and price.

Not only that, again something I think that isn’t that well-known is that China really can own – you know, just to put this in perspective, China imported only 16½bcm of natural gas from Russia in 2021 via its Power of Siberia 1 pipeline, and this should rise to 38bcm by the mid-2020s. But that’s nothing compared to the 175bcm that was imported annually by Europe, and even if they were to build Power of Siberia 2 and if it were to be commissioned, and this is still uncertain, that would just add another 50bcm. Now, that’s in terms of gas.

But you asked before what China really can get from the relationship. Well, I mean, there’s a lot, we’ve discussed that, but I think not enough has been said, actually, about military co-operation. Sino-Russian defence co-operation will resume at some point and while China will not bail out Russia militarily as the war plays out, it will likely seek to deepen its military co-operation with Moscow in the long-term in the specific areas where it thinks Russia still has superior capabilities, and there are those, aero defence technology. And behind the US, Russia has one of the best submarine base strike capabilities in the world and Russia can help China modernise and expand its nuclear arsenal.

China, if I’m – and here, Michael can correct me, I believe has not fought a war since invading Vietnam in 1979. So, there’s not a lot…

Professor Michael Cox

That’s right, August.

Annette Bohr

…of recent experience. And Chinese troops are said to learn much from training with their Russian counterparts.

Professor Michael Cox

Can I just add one quick point there? I mean, you used the word ‘resume’ military operat – I’m not sure those military – combined military operations has ever stopped through 2022, have there?

Ben Bland

Yeah.

Professor Michael Cox

I mean, I think there’s been two at least throughout the period. So, yeah, I mean, China is not…

Annette Bohr

You’re right.

Professor Michael Cox

…directly supporting, but nonetheless, these military – the Vostok and various -and in 2-21 I think there were two or three of them. But anyway, just to add a point.

Ben Bland

Okay, just a final question, really, for you, Yu Jie, then. What do you think, from a Chinese perspective, it would take to, sort of, step away from Russia? ‘Cause the sense I’m getting from the other speakers is that, you know, it – you know, there is actually a lot that’s driving them together, but you know, but will it be, you know, Putin launching a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine? Is there a – you know, what do you think is feasible that would drive these two apart, or is this just the world we have to live with, with you know, a P5 where China and Russia stand together, disrupting, you know, the world order that we want and a very complex set of affairs for a long time to come?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, nuclear question, obviously, is one of very key one, because this very much go against China’s own principle, firstly and secondly, China will be acting as a – will be the – subject to the victim, as a, you know, potential victim of one of those. So, I think the – entertaining these ideas of deployment of nuclear weapon and that would really prompt Beijing to change its mind, and that’s part of the reason why Xi Jinping said at G20 and agreed with United States, you know, shouldn’t let the countries deploy their nuclear weapons or even entertain this idea.

But I think, on the other hand, I mean, I also tend to agree with the other two speakers in here. What we considered, we’re talking about China or China’s foreign policy, the fundamental priority in here is how to secure its border and how to present a more stable external environment. I mean, considering the country really share 14 different borders with 14 different countries and has not really been something very easy to vanish for China, anyway. So, I think, irrespective how messy and how dysfunctional, this bilateral relationship can go forward and I think Beijing will still tried its best to hold it, but not necessarily ready to walk away, because to walked away and China will look like, also, being alone, by itself.

Professor Michael Cox

It would also very quickly be a defeat for Xi himself, because how many meetings have we had now between the two Presidents, what four – we’re up to 40. It’s not just…

Dr Yu Jie

34.

Professor Michael Cox

…personal. I know that it’s structural and many other things, ideological. Regime maintenance is also part of this, regime preservation is part of it. But this seems to me that Xi has invested so much into this particular relationship himself, that a defeat for Putin may be seen clearly as a defeat for himself.

Dr Yu Jie

He has invested so much.

Professor Michael Cox

Hmmm.

Dr Yu Jie

But then, he might have to realise perhaps his association with Moscow may be one day…

Professor Michael Cox

One day.

Dr Yu Jie

…to bring some sense of societal instability inside China.

Professor Michael Cox

Hmmm.

Dr Yu Jie

And I think that would also prompt him to walk away.

Professor Michael Cox

And that’s quite possible.

Ben Bland

So, I’m ready to go for questions from the floor, so if people want to just put their hands up and I will come to you, and yeah, just, yeah, do tell us who you are and any affiliations.

Professor Michael Cox

Use the microphone.

Ben Bland

Yeah, thanks.

Melania Parzonka

Hello, I’m Melania, I actually work for Chatham House with the Russia and Eurasia Programme, and I just wanted to ask a question that’s been bothering for me a while and I was waiting for a good opportunity to pose it to someone knowledgeable. Because Biden, I think back in September last year, reiterated that – his commitment to send the US Army in case Taiwan gets invaded, and I was – sorry, I just wanted to – I was actually – generally, I was curious about it, because how does it differ from situation in the Ukraine? And what are the, kind of, pre-existing security commitments that the US has to Taiwan that they did not have to Ukraine, because, of course, US was a signatory of the Budapest Memorandum? So, yeah, it’s just general curiosity.

Ben Bland

You want to jump in?

Professor Michael Cox

Well, I can jump in on the – yeah, I mean, the US has given guarantee, after guarantee, after guarantee, to Taiwan. I mean, the military capabilities of Taiwan are, in essence, American. I mean, six billion per annum for many, many, many years is there and it’s going on, and I think the crisis in Ukraine has, in a sense, rather than taking – everybody used to say, “Well, we’ve got the War in Ukraine, it’ll take American eyes away from the Far – from the East.” It didn’t do, it did the opposite, it actually had the opposite. It, kind of, connected them in ways that I don’t think had been obviously connected before. I think there is still, as they call it, strategic ambiguity and that’s the line and I think the United States sticks with that, but nonetheless, that ambiguity, I think, has been severely tested.

And I think one of the things we also have not discussed, and this is a whole question of Taiwan in this relationship, Russia has been absolutely firm, clear, on this question. It sticks with a One China policy. Any attempt to change the status quo, Russia will, in a sense, support China on. Now, whether that involves military co-operation, but you know, we’ve seen military co-operation in many, many spheres. We’ve seen military co-operation in the East and South China Seas, we see military co-operation over Japan, over Taiwan itself. You know, read into that what you will, but it does seem to me now, this, therefore, poses an even greater challenge and actually, a greater degree of instability.

I think one thing I would say, and again, without drawing too many connections between Ukraine and Taiwan, although you do need to draw them, what lessons has China drawn from Ukraine? And it looks to me like invading countries is not a very good idea, yes.

Annette Bohr

So, Ben…

Professor Michael Cox

But Annette, I think you wanted…

Annette Bohr

Yeah, if I could chime in on the Taiwan question. Hi, Melania. The focus of China’s defence industry is hi-tech information centric warfare. So, the War in Ukraine is not necessarily a useful template for Beijing. In fact, Russia’s War on Ukraine is almost exactly the opposite, industrial, aero-mechanised and attritional. China’s building – clearly building up its military capacity, but it would appear that Xi Jinping’s leadership isn’t ready to use it at this moint – at this point. There’s still so many steps that China could take. So, for example, they’re taking in outlying islands, and I think they also want to see how things play out in the Russian-Ukrainian front. It’s clearly showed them how damaging such a venture can be if poorly calculated.

So – and there are several reasons more, I won’t go into them now, why now would not be the time for an invasion, but the more immediate risk, at least in the eyes of some in Taiwan and Washington, is that China will see Putin’s venture as a step towards the normalising of more aggressive pressure tactics, including what’s called cognitive warfare, a mix of disinformation, political meddling and incitement that is intended to pry open internal divisions in Taiwan and make people feel more vulnerable.

Ben Bland

Thanks. I’m going to go to an online question first, then I’ll come back to the room. So, I’m going to ask Robert Brinkley, if you want to ask your question. Can we unmute Robert Brinkley and let him ask his question? Speak to the invisible Zoom Gods in the sky in the hope that this works.

Professor Michael Cox

Robert, are you there?

Ben Bland

Robert Brinkley?

Professor Michael Cox

No.

Ben Bland

I will ask his question for him.

Professor Michael Cox

You ask his question.

Ben Bland

Maybe one for you, Mick, but anyone, feel free to chime in. So…

Professor Michael Cox

Sure.

Ben Bland

…“If Russia emerges seriously weakened from its war against Ukraine, is China likely to seek to rectify the 19th Century unequal treaties, which conceded large territories to Russia?” So, is China’s invasion of Russia next?

Professor Michael Cox

No, I’ve – it’s fact. Well, I suppose the short answer is, I have no idea if – never think that things can be certain. Everybody who believes in certainty will always get it wrong, ‘cause the uncertain can happen. I think it’s very unlikely, let me just say that, without having any real knowledge about what’s happening on the Amur or Ussuri River at the moment, but very unlikely. However, there is a more subtle scenario, which actually, has been played out on the Russian side, which is economic.

It’s far more significant that – you know, if you look North of the Ussuri and you – North of the – East of the Ussuri, North of the Amur – you can see where I’ve been for the last few weeks – you know, you got three or our million rather depressed Russians on one side of that border and you’ve got at least seven – I don’t know how many millions of not depressed Chinese, very economically active, on the other side of that border. And it seems to me that that will be a much subtler, less costly and by the way, economically more advantageous way, of, you know, it’s going to be a change in the status quo. The status quo remains the same. You keep the border where it is. You know, you’re not going to change those unequal treaties. Russia will never go with it, by the way. They’ve fought that, by the way, with the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s, which was great fun, by the way. We had this diplomatic toing and froing.

But no, it’s not going to be an invasion, I can reassure you on one part of the world. However – or I think the economics of it could play out very subtly over the very long-term, and I think Russia could live with that. That’s my take on it, now. They couldn’t leave with it in the 1990s, for all sorts of interesting reasons, but I think they could more likely live with it an economic, if not a takeover, but a kind of, gradual economic interconnection. You’ve got four bridges across that river now, by the way. You know, they weren’t there before. There was one there before and now there’s four.

Dr Yu Jie

Because obviously, that’s one of the major irritants between China and Russia, in the…

Professor Michael Cox

Yes.

Dr Yu Jie

…past, really back to 90s…

Professor Michael Cox

Oh, yes, oh gosh…

Dr Yu Jie

…and 20s.

Professor Michael Cox

…yes.

Dr Yu Jie

And also, you know, these whole ideas of Yellow Peril, people of that…

Professor Michael Cox

Oh, my gosh, yes.

Dr Yu Jie

…relaying people of that Russian fear from Chinese, yeah.

Professor Michael Cox

Yellow Peril, they’ve thought of that stuff. They were…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Professor Michael Cox

…certainly were.

Ben Bland

Okay, yeah, I’ve got a question here.

Jonathan Singh

Hi, thanks, Jonathan Singh, a Chatham House member. One quick one, just I wondered if you think the strategic access to the Arctic is also a motivating factor for China having a strong relationship with Russia, in terms of access to the trade – potential trade routes as the ice melts, and to resources. And then, another very quick one is, do we see any co-operation on the soft power side of things? And we mentioned about economics and the military, but I – is there a soft power element to this, as well, where they are collaborating around diplomacy or…

Professor Michael Cox

Yes.

Ben Bland

…cultural activities?

Professor Michael Cox

Two dice.

Dr Yu Jie

Two dice, yeah, idealise that.

Professor Michael Cox

I’ll do soft.

Ben Bland

Yeah, Yu Jie, if you go first.

Dr Yu Jie

Alright, okay. On our Arctic’s – I think it’s actually the opposite. Russia view this very suspiciously. It really prefer Beijing not to participate in the Arctic Council, because obviously, given the technology, in terms of exploration that Beijing can see already quite clear, so I think Russia are really putting a huge suspicion on Beijing’s motivation to be in that particular club. I mean, if you go back to the statement on 4th of February, one of the very short sentence on that statement was that, “Oh, China-Russia continues to observe how our Arctic Council works.” We did not see co-ordinate, did not see work together, but just simple observe. So, there’s already now, there’s so much reservation has been exist on both sides.

Now, on soft power, I think Russia soft power in China these days, it raise very little currency, as simple as that.

Annette Bohr

Yeah, it does…

Professor Michael Cox

I’ll pick up this – oh, sorry, you go.

Annette Bohr

If I could go…

Professor Michael Cox

Yeah, yeah, you go.

Ben Bland

Yeah, do you want to come in on the Arctic and then…?

Professor Michael Cox

Arctic, do you…?

Annette Bohr

Oh, on the soft power issue, it just might be of interest to note that all state controlled media in Russia prohibits any criticism of China. Now, this does not mean that there’s much soft power. In fact, you know, the relationship, in a way, was always going to be vulnerable, because it’s based purely on calculated interests and, you know, China is not an admirer of Russia at a civilisational level and Russia isn’t really interested in China at the popular level. There’s still actually Sinophobia in Russia and little interest in Chinese culture and institutions, even if this is changing a bit.

And there’s really relatively little that goes on in terms of people-to-people contact or ties, especially for such large and important countries and, you know, Russians just still see themselves as Europeans, first and foremost. And as a final point here, China doesn’t really care about Russia. China doesn’t really care about Ukraine. It cares about China and Chinese aspirations and interests.

Ben Bland

Hmmm.

Professor Michael Cox

On soft power, just to make it a more global answer to your question, which I think you were trying to drive at, as well, there’s quite a lot of work that the Chinese and Russia do. The Global South, I mean, we’ve – which, again, we’ve left out of the whole debate. You know, what place in Europe about the Ukraine War is fine, you know, I’d go along with that, mainly, not entirely, but mainly. What plays in the US about this war? Fine. Go to the Global South, you get a different – and you get a different narrative, and China and Russia together have been pushing that narrative rather successfully in parts of Latin America and what happened with South Africa, you know. I mean, don’t underestimate that. That is part of what is soft power.

They tell a story which is different to a Western story and that story, although it’s not one I agree with, or go along with, nonetheless, has some credibility. America invaded Iraq in 2003, duh. They went into Libya to do a humanitarian intervention, we ended up with regime change, duh. You know, Western restructuring of the Global South to keep us poor, that does play, that does play and I don’t think one should entirely underestimate that, and if we want to get a global perspective on this war and not just what I’d call a Western or Eurocentric view on this war.

Ben Bland

Yeah, and I – from my work on South-East Asia, it’s not just a question of Chinese or Russian disinformation, but it’s people’s long-held…

Professor Michael Cox

So, it’s still there.

Ben Bland

…beliefs in Indonesia or Malaysia because of their own experience of colonialism and Western backed coups and violence and the rest.

Professor Michael Cox

Absolutely.

Ben Bland

And maybe a question from this side, at the front, here.

Hilde Rapp

Hilde Rapp, Centre for International Peacebuilding, and welcome to your new post, Ben. I was very intrigued by your mentioning the border with such emphasis and it made me think about whether you think the fact that both China and Russia, perforce, are geography literate and understand the challenge of governing such huge countries with such huge populations…

Professor Michael Cox

Yeah.

Hilde Rapp

…which is shared by some of the people in the Global South, may be one of the factors why they’re best enemies.

Professor Michael Cox

Frenemies. Well, I don’t quite know, ‘cause I’ve not spoken to Xi or to Putin about border recently. But yeah, I think they’ve understood this border question, I think, pretty well. On the Chinese side, I mean, I think they get border quite well. I mean, this is why it’s been such – so disputatious. I mean, you know, being – this is why I – when I started out thinking about China-Russia relations, I, kind of, thought, well, they’re an – it’s the anti-American stuff. Or if they want to regime preserve, or they want to, kind of, at least improve their economic relationship and, indeed, their military relationship, as our other colleague from Cambridge has pointed out.

But the more and more I, kind of, got into it, the more I kin – I got into borders, I don’t know. Maybe – there’s some wonderful books on this, too, by the way, and both – you know, the recent books. Been a wonderful book about “Along the Amur,” and it really brings home how important borders are. You know, maybe in the EU, we’ve forgotten about what – I say ‘we’, we’re no longer in the EU, I’d forgotten, right. Still trying to forget. But yes, I think this is extraordinarily important.

I asked somebody the other day, “How many meetings were held?” – and this is not an answer to your question, but it’s a good fact. I think it is a fact, too. “How many meetings are actually held between the Chinese and the Russians between 1979 and 2008 to try and sort out border que – and islands in the river?” And by the way, do you know what a thalweg is? It’s a line of demarcation along a river, not on one bank or the other. Very complicated stuff I had no interest and knowledge about before, until I started looking at this problem. They had something like 2,000 meetings to sort these questions out, and that would indicate to me that, therefore, getting that right, and it took a very long time to do so, was crucial to creating the foundation of this relationship, which we now talk about as if it only began, somehow, on the 4^th of February 2022.

Ben Bland

Yeah, and there was a gentleman over there who’s been trying to ask a question for a while.

Sean Curtin

Thank you very much. Sean Curtin, member of Chatham House. Yu Jie has talked a lot about the, sort of, negative impact of the relationship, the plus/minuses. I just wonder if you’d like to comment on – I see from China, Japan and the larger region perspective, that since the outbreak of the war, it’s had a very negative impact on China’s image, because it seems to have turbocharged this idea that China could invade Taiwan at any minute. And certainly, if you read the Japanese papers since the invasion, a lot of negativity has been towards China, and so, if you want to comment on that.

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, I mean, surely, from the Japanese media, negativity seems to be the de rigueur, rather than something, you know, something unexpected. So…

Professor Michael Cox

Fashionable.

Dr Yu Jie

…that’s not a surprise to me at all. But I think while we’re talking about Asia, we need to distinguish, you know, what kind – which part of Asia we’re talking about. So, for example, if you’re talking about countries like, Ben, from their words, Indonesia, Vietnam, for example, and do not necessarily just to share the view that West has been put forward on this war towards Ukraine. So, China is not alone within Asia on its own, you know, sense of the choice and so-called pro-Russian neutrality. So, I think that’s really putting China in a very interesting position. Yes, many other countries has made this very similar choice. Just because for China, for the sake of its size and also for how close it is with Russia in the past, its own position has been put under scrutiny enormously.

So, I don’t think, necessarily, it’s about reputational damage. I mean, surely, has really damaged China’s reputation in the West, but when it come to a larger part of the South-East Asia and the Global South, I think it’s still quite ambivalent.

Ben Bland

Yeah, it’s only really, what, Japan, South Korea…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Ben Bland

…Singapore…

Dr Yu Jie

Hmmm.

Professor Michael Cox

Hmmm.

Ben Bland

…Taiwan, that have taken tough positions against Russia. Any more questions from…?

Annette Bohr

I just think it points – this question points to another part of the great asymmetry now between the two powers, it’s partly on steroids. I mean, China has no interest in supporting Russia’s expansion in Europe, although Russia is willing to help China challenge the United States in Asia. But China’s not willing to help Russia challenge the United States in Europe. Joint exercises take place in Asia, not in Europe. Beijing was never going to send troops or weapons to the warfront to support Russia. And its immediate military support has been mainly in the form of acknowledging Moscow’s concerns about NATO’s encroachment into its perceived sphere of influence, particularly since Beijing fears NATO is being recreated in the Asia Pacific through AUKUS and the Quad security dialogue.

Professor Michael Cox

Yeah, if I could just jump in there. I mean, I agree with the general thrust of your argument. However, the position that China took on the original Russian position, say back in November and December 2021, those conditions that they then gave to NATO, which, in a sense, said, “NATO, pack up and go home.” I mean, that – it wasn’t just about Ukraine, it was – it – you know, China went along with that. So, it’s not a question of military invasion of Europe, but it is a question of questioning the pre-existing security architecture that was there and that security architecture was largely, and in fact almost entirely, provided, at least in military terms, by NATO, and China took a pretty tough line on that and went along with that.

So, that’s not a military invasion. That’s not on the cards, I agree with that. But it did back Russia over that and, indeed, throughout the war itself, and said, “The fundamental cause of this is not Russia. The fundamental cause of this is an illegitimate security architecture caused by NATO expansion,” and I think that is important to remember.

Annette Bohr

Absolutely.

Ben Bland

And yeah, the gentleman in the blue shirt.

Jonah Kaplan

Hi, Jonah Kaplan from the United Kingdom National Committee on China. There was one question we haven’t exactly touched on and we don’t know the answer to it, but one year on from the signing of the no limits partnership, does the panel think that Putin informed Xi of his plans to invade, and by doing that, China giving tacit approval, or did he surprise Xi by invading?”

Ben Bland

Yu Jie…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Ben Bland

…quick answer to this.

Dr Yu Jie

Oh dear.

Ben Bland

Then, we’ll go…

Dr Yu Jie

Oh dear, the quick answer, okay.

Professor Michael Cox

No guessing.

Dr Yu Jie

No guessing, and…

Ben Bland

Exactly, I was going to say, you must ans…

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I can only judging from public record. I did check the website…

Professor Michael Cox

For the…

Dr Yu Jie

…for the Chinese Embassy in Ukraine on the 24^th of February and it was business as usual, as you can now see how…

Professor Michael Cox

Yeah.

Dr Yu Jie

So, from the public resources, you can only say China didn’t. That’s the only – you know, from…

Professor Michael Cox

Maybe you’re…

Dr Yu Jie

…the [inaudible – 60:00].

Professor Michael Cox

I know, right, and you have a go.

Annette Bohr

Yeah, I mean, if we’re talking about a full Blitzkrieg on three fronts, Putin didn’t – suffice it to say that Putin didn’t even inform his own Prime Minister about that, so much less a foreign leader. He may have intimated that he was going to, you know, undertake an action in the Donbas, but certainly not the Blitzkrieg on three fronts that it actually took place.

Professor Michael Cox

I’ll jump in very quickly on this, ‘cause I – well, I’ll be honest, I wasn’t there in the room, surprise, surprise.

Ben Bland

It’s starting to go historical monitoring.

Professor Michael Cox

And yeah…

Ben Bland

And I didn’t think this…

Professor Michael Cox

…if I’d…

Ben Bland

…would be…

Professor Michael Cox

…been there…

Ben Bland

…before…

Professor Michael Cox

…yeah, I’d have said, “Don’t do it, Vlad, it’s not a good idea.” And indeed, by the way, one of the things we got totally wrong, most of us got wrong, except the American Intelligence Service and MI6, was actually, they got the invasion right and nearly everybody else got it wrong, let’s be perfectly honest. So, well done to United States, I suppose. Joe Biden even said on the 17th of Feb, “It’s going to happen in a few days’ time,” and guess what? It did. So, let’s be clear on that, so yeah, they thought it was going to happen and nobody else seemed to, including, by the way, the President of Ukraine, it seems.

So, we don’t really know. I mean, all I would say, and it’s the only thing we can say at the moment, you know, if we’re honest about it, is we could – I would only say that it – that something must’ve been said, but the question is what? Look, you’ve got 100,000 Russian troops on the border. What are they doing, you know, taking the air? I mean, Chinese military and Russian military co-operation was very close, put it nicely. I can’t remember who said this to me. It was somebody who knows a lot more about this subject than I do, said, “Look, the idea that somehow and another you’d spring it on Xi Jinping, “Oh, by the way, I meant to tell you.” “Oh, thank you, I did – thank you.” No, it’s, kind of, it’s stretching.”

What went – I think what went wrong, if I – it was a game of surmising, be honest with you, we are guessing, I hope intelligently, is that I think Putin might’ve said, could’ve said, “I can get this done in two weeks,” because that’s what everybody thought, let’s be honest. Everybody thought that if the war isn’t going to go ahead, and if it does go ahead, it’ll be a quickie, a Blitzkrieg in the old-fashioned sense of that word, and it’ll be over in two three weeks and you – and we can live with it. What nobody calculated, and Putin least of all, and I think that is the problem for China, that this war has just gone on and on and on for all sorts of reasons we haven’t talked about here today.

Ben Bland

Yeah, well, I think we’ll have to end it there, but we do have a lot of events and podcasts and papers coming up, which are going to be exploring these questions of when the war’s going to end, and my colleagues have lots of answers for you, which are all different from each other, but very insightful. So, do come along to hear them talk about that and if you have any more questions afterwards, just come and talk to the speakers here. But please join me for now in thanking Annette, Mick [applause] and Yu Jie.