Creon Butler
Hello, everyone. My name is Creon Butler, and I’m the Director of the Global Economy and Finance Programme at Chatham House, and it’s my really great pleasure to welcome everyone today to this panel session, which is looking ahead to next week’s G7 Summit, which will take place in Cornwall on the 11th to 13th of June. The UK Prime Minister has set the objective for the UK’s G7 Presidency this year as “uniting legal democracies to help the world fight and build back better from coronavirus and create a greener, more prosperous future.” And in addition to the four members of the G7: Australia, India, South Korea, and South Africa have been invited to attend as guest countries.
Now, partly because of the enormous impact of the pandemic and all its ramifications, but also because there was effectively no US G7 Summit last year, there’s an enormous potential agenda for the G7 next week. And the substance potentially includes economic recovery from the pandemic, global health, climate change, economic resilience, international technology governance and the West’s relationship with China, among many other things. And there are also key questions about the future role of the G7, and also, how the year – this year’s Presidency will impact on the UK’s international status and role. A number of ministerials have already taken place and you can see them on the Presidency website when they’ve produced ministerial declarations, but typically, the Presidency tries to keep back some stuff, even in those areas, for the leaders’ summit, so we’ll have to see, to some extent, what’s going to come in addition.
Now, to discuss this agenda, I’m joined today by a brilliant panel of my colleagues from Chatham House who will already, I think, be well-known to many of you, and in order of speaking, we have Rob Yates, Director of the Global Health Programme. Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who’s Senior Research Fellow in the US and Americas Programme, and also the organiser of the Global Trade Policy Forum at Chatham House. Tim Benton, Research Director from Emerging Risks, Chris Painter, who’s Associate Fellow in our International Security Programme, and Renata Dwan, who’s Deputy Director of Chatham House.
Now, their full details are available on their CVs on our website. So if you would like further information, you can find there, and each panellist is going to speak initially, for five minutes, on the specific areas of their interest, and then I’ll ask a few questions before we go to Q&A with the audience. And if you would like to put your questions into the ‘Q&A’ function, please do so, you can start whenever you want, but I would really ask everybody to try and keep your questions as short as possible, and that helps us try and get through as many as we can.
Now, just a quick reminder that this event is on the record, and we have a hard stop at 2:15, so we’ll try our best to keep to that. Excellent, so, for our first set of initial comments, Rob, over to you.
Robert Yates
Great, thank you very much indeed, Creon, and I think many in the global health world are seeing this as the most important G7 in its entire history. But not just the health world, the economics world, and everyone is recognising that I think there really is the potential for the G7 leaders to do something very dramatic this year, and, you know, appear as, sort of, superheroes, really, to save the world. Often, sort of, G7 Summits can sound like a lot of hot air and people, sort of, talking about highfalutin things down the line. This time, they’ve got a chance to really do something.
Now, the big question is, will they really act, though? And I think there is a danger that there could be a mismatch about what the G7 ought to be talking about, in terms of health and what they will talk about, in terms of health because, in terms of what they ought to be talking about, it’s ending this current pandemic as quickly as possible for all our benefits, and whereas last year, you know, they – the G7 didn’t really have the tools to do that, now they do. I mean, it’s, I mean, amazing, the scientific discoveries and collaboration has brought us to this point that we now have the tools and resources to end this pandemic and end it quickly.
And the G7 have been given plenty of advice from the likes of the WTO, WHO, World Bank, the IMF, world leaders, faith leaders. Everyone’s saying the same thing, as though it’s not as if they don’t know what to do, and there are three things that they need to do. First of all, is that they need to share vaccines. You know, countries like ours that are building up big stockpiles of vaccines and are contemplating vaccinating children, and people like myself even having booster shots as soon as September. No, that’s not right, we should be, sort of, sharing those vaccines through COVAX, the global facility that is allocating and distributing vaccines more efficiently and fairly around the world, that’s the first ask.
The second ask is around funding, long-term funding for vaccines, therapeutics and tests, and I think about $50 billion is required at the moment, they think, the IMF think. Sounds like a lot of money, but put that up against the $9 trillion that will be saved for the world economy if we do this, and pe – everyone’s saying it’s the deal of the century, and about 60% of those resources need to come from wealthy countries in the G7.
And the final thing is tech transfers, we need to be, sort of, transferring technology to developing countries to allow them to make vaccines and therapeutics, so we’re less dependent on manufacturing in countries, you know, to avoid the situation that we’ve had of vaccines getting stuck in India. And if we can share out the manufacturing more, sort of, efficiently and equitably around the world, you know, that’ll be great. That’s what they ought to be talking about.
There’s a worry that countries like ourselves, that there is this illusion that we’re coming out of the crisis, that we’ll be saying, “No, no, you know, we’ve done our bit, now let’s talk about averting future pandemics,” and, sort of, talking about things like pandemic treaties and sharing data and clinical trials. And, you know, these things are important, don’t get me wrong, but they must be for the next G7s, and honestly, it’s a no-brainer that – you know, that we need to be sharing vaccines, funding health systems, and sharing technology, that’s what we should be talking about.
Creon Butler
Rob, thanks very much. The politics of that is clearly quite complicated, but we might come back and talk about that a bit…
Robert Yates
Indeed.
Creon Butler
…in the pull-up Q&A. So, next, Marianne, over to you.
Marianne Schneider-Petsinger
Thanks, Creon. I think, you know, there is clearly a link between trade and health, and it is one of the areas that the G7 Ministers have been talking about, and, again, it will be on the agenda for the leaders’ meeting. But I think the first thing to start pointing out is that this is the first time that there’s actually a dedicated trade track at the G7, which I think is quite exciting, and four priority issues have been identified. The first one is WTO reform, the second one trade and health, not surprisingly, but the third one, digital trade, again, for the UK, a priority, and the fourth one, trade and climate policy.
Now, those three issues that I mentioned last, they’re also very much linked to separate G7 tracks, so I think for the trade track in particular, the focus will be very much on WTO reform. However, that begs the big question, to what extent such a selective group like the G7 can actually make meaningful progress on those big issues that ultimately need to be agreed upon by all 164 WTO members, and keep in mind the WTO operates on the principle of consensus. So, I think what that means for the G7 is focusing on those areas that are called the plurilateral negotiations among a subgroup of WTO members, and one area that stands out here is the ongoing eCommerce negotiations. Again, that is key for the United Kingdom, but also for others, and then closely linked also to the economic recovery from COVID.
Another area where I think we’re really seeing some focus is ongoing fishery subsidy negotiations, and, you know, one area that probably is not going to be really front and centre on the agenda is reforming the appellate body, which is the highest dispute settlement body at the World Trade Organization that’s been in paralysis since December of 2019, and it’s just been so contentious, and, again, the Biden administration is still very much developing its approach. That issue, I don’t think, is really going to be tackled at all, it’s going to be put to the sidelines.
In general, I think, really, what the G7 Trade Ministers are going to be focusing on is the broader issue of WTO reform and to make meaningful progress in advance of the ministerial conference of the WTO that will take place in November, and the next G7 Trade Minister meeting is scheduled for October. So just before that, and again that, I think, to me, at least, signals that WTO reform will be front and centre, in the autumn, at least.
In the meantime, I think there is going to be really a focus and a commitment to free and fair trade, and I think here again the UK will really use its G7 Presidency to push on market destroying practices and again, taking tougher measures and approaches on that front. Issues around forced labour, for example, industrial subsidies, I mean, they’re all associated with China, but I don’t suspect that the G7 leaders are actually going to be naming China. Again, if you’re looking at the communique from the Trade Ministers just last week, again, all of the issues are really, you know, pointing towards China, but China has never been mentioned in name. And I think that means that that issue in general will very much be linked to the level playing field discussions that have been taking place at the G20.
Let me just chase views for a second and also point towards the finance track because there’s some very interesting developments happening on that front. And the G7 Finance Ministers are meeting again later this week and they’re expected to back a global minimum tax on corporate profits, and I think that would be very much in support of efforts that have been going on at the level of the OECD. And, again, I don’t think that the G7 Ministers are going to be discussing any concrete figures or rates, but I think a clear statement by the G7 would really boost efforts that there can be an agreement at the level of the G20, which is supposedly meeting in July. And, again, a broader agreement on that front would not just be meaningful progress on making sure that tech giants actually pay their fair share, but it’s also very much an effort to raise revenues and to alleviate pressures on public finances in the wake of COVID. So, those are, I think, the key issues to look out for on the economic resilience front.
Creon Butler
Marianne, thanks very much, and I think, you know, the question is, I think, as always with trade, do the Trade Ministers keep it all to themselves or are there some things where they, you know, accept that they might need some help from leaders, and which, if any, of these elements might come up onto the leaders’ track, but we’ll see a bit later on.
Now, next, Tim, over to you.
Professor Tim Benton
Thanks, Creon. Hello, everybody. So, the overall G7 agenda is about building back better, building resilience, tackling climate and biodiversity, and promoting prosperity through free trade, and I’m going to focus a bit on the environment side of things. And the Environment Ministers’ communique set out an extremely ambitious agenda, which, of course, we very much welcome, but if you flick through the 28 pages or whatever, they promise to tackle biodiversity, climate change, decarbonisation, nature-based solutions, building back better, $100 billion for development finance, creating more ambitious NDCs, ambitious net zero plans under the long-term strategies, net zero energy, net zero mobility, net zero economy, phasing out fossil fuels, mainstreaming nature, protecting critical biomes, tackling antimicrobial resistance, adopting One Health, tackling illegal wildlife trade and fishing, protecting the oceans, dealing with food loss and waste, just transitions, leaving no-one behind. Phwoar, that’s just going through the headings, and it’s like a kind of an extended essay attempting to win the environmental buzzword ‘bingo challenge’.
Now, of course, I very much, you know, well, welcome the ambition of this, and, frankly, they are a huge step forward on where we have been in the past. But I think the note of caution, it’s not clear whether or not there was an actual agenda to deliver, not just any one of these things, but the collective of them, given that they’re all interrelated. And just to emphasise that, you know, there was a report in the press today about government putting money into fossil fuel polluting industries, and I quote from The Guardian, “G7 nations missed opportunities to make their response to the pandemic greener. This included lifelines that were thrown to aviation and car industries, which received $115 billion from the G7 countries. Of that money, 80% was given with no attempt to force the sectors to cut their emissions in return for the support.”
So, I get the feeling that, at the moment, we are sidestepping the key issue, and for me, the key issue is very central, how do we build prosperity, build resilience, promote free trade, whilst not degrading the environment? And, in particular, how do we have a consumption-based, GDP-driven economic growth model, without finding ways to stop us overconsuming and crossing planetary boundaries?
So, for example, if you take the food system, on which I work a lot, a sustainable land economy involves tackling demand, and there is no real momentum to do that. Instead, the aim is to make agriculture more efficient, to make commodity trade more sustainable, primarily through promoting forest risk-free commodities. However, this approach is likely to reinforce and perhaps amplify negative outcomes through intensifying agriculture and promoting more demand for food through reducing its prices, incentivising more land take through the Jevons paradox, and making things worse as a whole rather than better.
So, whilst I welcome the ambition and very much look for the summit to talk the talk because I think they will talk the talk, I also want to see them walk the walk. There needs to be a more integrated, honest, transparent discussion of the trade-offs about how to drive economic growth, given the risks that the environment will increasingly throw at us, and those risks that will grow as we degrade the environment further. Not tackling climate change, not tackling biodiversity loss, and so on.
How do we have it all and what are the transition costs that we are collectively willing to pay to get to a better place? And I think, you know, in summary, without concrete plans, it’s good to have the ambition, it’s good to have the pledges, but there is a risk that it all becomes meaningless because of – it can be seen as greenwash. So, back to you.
Creon Butler
Tim, thanks very much. Again, extremely clear. I mean, I think one can see in some areas, you know, increasing information on what the path needs to look like, increasing research on that, but I think you’re right, this is not yet, sort of, incorporated at the, kind of – the G7 level among the leaders, but we may come back to that, as well.
Next, Chris, over to you, please.
Christopher Painter
Thanks, and I think, you know, as all of us know, the G7 started really, or the G7 then the G8 started as an economic club, but it has, over the years, really dealt with a lot of security issues, as well. And I should say that, you know, back when I was in government, I was deeply involved in chairing one of the G7 groups on cybercrime and cybersecurity, and they played a role, I think, as a crucible there, really, as a model for wider adoption of a number of different measures. And so that was very helpful, in terms of cybercrime in the – as early as 1997, I think it was, when they put out principles and action plan, but also in cybersecurity and other issues that have now become much more mainstream.
So, they have played, I think, a valuable role in the past, and when you look at security, and my field, cybersecurity, more specifically, where that usually shows up is in the Foreign Ministers’ statement, and, indeed, again, in the Foreign Ministers’ communique this year, there is – there’s really three things in that I would point to. One, with respect to Russia, there’s a long laundry list, just as our last speaker said of various, in this area, areas of the world, trouble spots in the world, and the – and it goes on for pages and pages. Not surprising, ‘cause there’s lots of trouble spots, but one not surprising one that’s called out is Russia, and Russia’s called out for a whole range of malign activity. But also – but specifically in terms of election and interference in democratic processes and malicious cyber activity, where we’ve seen quite a bit, including in the United States, with some of the recent ransomware attacks that shut down pipelines, you know, local police, and other – and meatpacking plants now, as of yesterday. So, it’s been a much more broad swath of Russian line activity, everything from the Ukraine, which has also called out to this.
So that’s called out more specifically, and then they talk about internet shutdowns, which is more a human rights issue, concern about countries shutting down the internet to control their population, particularly during elections. And then they have an area where they call it cyber governance, which really deals with a lot of the negotiations that have been happening in the UN around the application of international law, the cyberspace, what the norms of behaviour are, what accountability looks like in cyberspace, and there it’s pretty much a pledge to continue to work together, to be this crucible to work together.
Interestingly, this year, there was a whole separate ministerial, a tech ministerial, which was, you know, the ‘Tech Ministers’. Now, some countries like the US don’t have a Tech Minister. We had our Secretary of Commerce who went, and it really dealt with an interesting range of tech issues, which had a little bit of overlap with security, too, including, you know, child safety issues was one, and trust issues. But it got into a much wider area, including the hotspot around dealing with 5G, for instance, and 5G technologies, and supply chain issues, so how you can promote resilient telecoms. Standards, digital standards, working together on digital standards, a – and, interestingly, and this ties in with the trade issue, too, deepening co-operation on digital co-operation. And that’s interesting because, you know, back a number of years ago, the G8, when it was a G8, and France was the President, had this big eG8 Summit, where they invited all these companies and other people, and their Sarkozy Government was very much into regulation then, and that was widely rejected by everyone else.
But now, the tide has turned a little bit, and you have things like the Digital Markets Act in the EU, which, unfortunately, looks like it’s targeting US companies rather than trying to be much more of a broad-based sort of act right now, from the statements that are coming out of that. So, I think there is – I think one thing to watch in this – you know, it’s not on the formal agenda, these issues, but, inevitably, these get discussed. The regional issues get discussed, and given all the recent cyber events that will get discussed, particularly with respect to Russia and China, I suspect, and there might be some discussion, in terms of these digital market issues, which I think will come forward, too.
So, you know, as they said in the past, it’s been – you know, it’s been very relevant because you still have very strong actors in the space, and now you have other attendees, including the Australians are going to be there. But also, we – you know, these issues are – have much more broad application beyond the G7, as well, so it’s important for the G7 to hold together. And they’ve been very instrumental in the past with something called the Ise-Shimi Declaration, Ise-Shima Declaration that came out of the Japan Presidency. It really tried to move the ball along in some of these discussions in the UN, but it’s still a likeminded club, and – but that can have some value, and some impact, as well.
Creon Butler
Chris, thank you very much. I think, you know, it’s one of those areas with so many moving parts, you know, competition policies, security, investments, that, you know, in a sense, you – I think you’re absolutely right, there needs to be some discussion, in order to find a way through it, but how much, we will see at that point, we’ll find out.
Christopher Painter
Yeah, I suspect…
Creon Butler
Great.
Christopher Painter
…it could be…
Creon Butler
Yeah, go on, Chris.
Christopher Painter
Yeah, I mean, I suspect that, you know, it’s a practical matter, and we recognise this on this panel, that the primary issues are going to be COVID recovery and climate change. I mean, I just think, naturally, those are going to be the predominant issues that are going to be discussed, but that makes sense.
Creon Butler
Hmmm, yeah, thanks. Great, well, Renata, there’s a good selection of some of the substance that’s going there. I mean, what does that mean for – from your perspective, for the role of the G7 more generally, going forward?
Dr Renata Dwan
Thanks very much, Creon, and, indeed, it’s hard to follow my four colleagues and the richness that they’ve laid out, but maybe I’ll start just with Chris’ – where Chris started, which was what is the G7 and therefore where can it have real impact? When the G7 started discussing the economic crisis, the OPEC oil crisis, in the 1970s, the members, the advanced economies that made it up, controlled 80% of the world’s GDP. Today, they control under 40% of the global GDP, and as we saw in the 2008 financial crisis, the G7 was able to pave the way for some of the response, but it was really driven by the G20, which brought together the 20 global economies.
So, if we don’t see it as the central, most powerful economic actors and drivers anymore, what is it? And I think my colleagues have hinted at that, but I would say G7’s real role and relevance is as a spearhead for international action in targeted areas. What it does is it sets policy directions and agendas for multilateral forums, whether that’s the G20, whether that’s the WTO reform that Marianne mentioned, whether it’s setting the agenda for WHO issues and items, that’s what it can do very successfully.
Second, it can champion specific initiatives, and perhaps the most example of that is when we saw back in the 18 – 1989, the 90s, money laundering, and [inaudible – 25:00] setting up a financial taskforce and really driving a whole approach that then widened to look at terrorist financing. And it can also build coalitions of support around specific issues, we saw that very successfully in the 2015 Paris climate negotiations, where the G7 made some statements, and that’s where we’re seeing the most action right now, around the preparations for COP26. Tim mentioned how broad the agenda is, but really, I think one thing to watch is really the commitment to end international financial support for coal and for coal production, that was a strong statement, let’s see how that is mirrored in, can that be a driver and set an agenda for strong statements at the COP26?
So, that’s where the G7 can have real relevance, and I think for that to happen, and for that real relevance to happen, three things are required. The first is a real sense of prioritisation and focus, and to Tim’s point about the agenda just being so broad right now, I think that’s one of the challenges this year. Clearly, COVID and the response, both on the health and the economic, have put that as a challenge, but the risk I see with this G7 is that there’s just so much on the table that there’s nothing on the table.
Second big success challenge for G7 is the sequencing and the co-ordination with the parties, and you’ve seen this successfully with the COP26. You’re seeing Alok Sharma, the President of the COP26, active engaged in some of the discussions, you’re seeing sequencing of the UK’s preparations and the Climate and Finance Ministers’ meetings with some of the directions for the COP26.
But to be really impactful, we need to see that co-ordination going between the UK and Germany as the next G7 partnership, what’s on the German agenda, where is there bilateral discussions there, do we see any themes coming on the table that will continue? But also for the Italian G20, and to what extent are we seeing real drive and handover and passing the batons. So it’s not just clear that there’s a policy issue on the agenda, whether that’s tax, digital tax arrangements, but there’s clarity on where it’s going to be discussed, where the G7 are going to drive, and who and how they’re going to drive.
Example I would say, and, Rob, you talked about health and the more success, but perhaps the more successful G7 initiative to date was the 2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which saw it discussed in 2000, endorsed in 2001, and then 75% of funding provided by the G7. So, that’s an example of when it’s been a policy endorsement followed through an engagement. And I think today, possibly because of the sheer scale of the challenge in front of us, as well as the countries facing significant domestic spending challenges, we’re not seeing those same financial commitments. Rob talked about the hundred billion DATs or the – Tim, I think, for climate, Rob, you talked about some of the commitments, but we’re only seeing very, very small commitments so far yet to financial outlays. Famine prevention relief, 42 countries at risk of catastrophe and famine, 1.6 billion being promised to address these questions, 1.5 billion to Yemen, South Sudan and Nigeria alone, so some real challenges there.
Two things I would suggest to look out for, in addition to where we might see this commitment and focus is first, the extent to which this G7 will be a G7 about democracy and about a club of democracies. That’s been very much central to the UK’s Presidency, calling it a value-based group, a club of democracies, and, indeed, some of the early initiatives of the John – Boris Johnson’s Government was to call for inviting Australia or Republic of Korea and India to come as – and establish a D10, D10 of democracies. That’s not going to happen right now, those three countries are invited as observers, not full participants in the meeting. We’ve always had observers in the G7, 2004, China was there, and we’re also seeing the South Africans there, and I think probably a lot of pressure from France to have an African presidence – presence and an African engagement.
So, are we going to see this as a club for democracies and will there be statements in that line? I think first, we’re only seeing, I think, the – this club of democracies represents 10% of the global population, so I would encourage a degree of caution there, a degree of modesty. It’s also a time in which these same G7 countries are facing up to domestic challenges in their own country, whether around racism, whether around inequality, whether around populism, so I think a certain tone of caution there and moderation that I would say. And including and in particular because the success of the G7 has often been its inclusiveness, its ability to set out a tent for others to follow in, and too much of a focus on a certain type of democracy will raise questions and challenges. India, in particular, India’s presence will be also a challenge there in the context of open trading commitments.
Second area to work – watch out for is messaging on China. Again, at times in this year, during the year’s discussions, a question is is the G7 an anti-China tool, is the G7 a China containment initiative or effort? And I think what you’ve seen from the Foreign Ministers’ communique is that the G7 are not necessarily united in their approach to China and in how to respond to China. The tone on Russia, for example, in the communique, much more focused, much more clear on these are the three areas we’ll co-operate with Russia, but this is the threat that Russia represents. China, much more talking about, “We need to find spheres of co-operation,” and, as Marianne said, around issues like market and free and fair trade, around issues like human rights, the message is a little bit more circumspect, not necessarily singling out China, and also, indeed, and with relation to Xinjiang, saying, “We will take action unilaterally in addressing this threat it presents.” So there is now a united front on there, and I think that’s key.
The Boris Johnson Government made a big point about introducing the Indo-Pacific angle into the Foreign – into the G7, into the Foreign Ministers’ communique, but you actually saw the statement on the Indo-Pacific was actually quite modest, talked about regional connectivity, talked about infrastructure projects, but relatively limited, and disengaged.
So, I think it’ll be key to watch out for if and what messages come from China. Perhaps it might be the case that the discussions will take place between leaders much more frankly off the record and in situ than any public statements. But I think, from the response that we saw from China already on the 6th of May in response to the Foreign Ministers, it suggests that there will be quite a sensitivity on the part of China to look out for them.
I’ll just end with a final point of what this means for the G – the UK. This is obviously a key moment for the UK. It’s its first large global, sort of, summit and leadership opportunity post-Brexit, so it’s a chance to, I think, articulate its global leadership role. It wants to demonstrate that it is a broker and free of the shackles, of the European Union that will be reaching out to the Indo-Pacific. So a lot of this tilt to the Indo-Pacific, and with the guests from the Indo-Pacific area: India, Australia, and Korea, you’re going to see a lot of emphasis around there.
You’ll see very much, I think, a commitment to the climate and to preset presaging, the COP26 leadership, and the UK wanting to show they can take an initiative and drive it to a successful conclusion on the international policy front. Probably quite a bit of emphasis on vaccines because there the UK believes it has a story to tell from its own domestic rollout and engagement, and probably what you won’t see is a huge amount of commitment on development. And that’s a new aspect for the UK, because, traditionally, the G7 were forums in which commitments to development, financing commitments to extreme – ending extreme poverty, commitments to levelling up particularly a partnership with Africa, were always a strong feature. But at a moment when the UK has slashed its development budget to the extent it has, it’s probably not going to want to see development commitments at quite the profile it has. So, it’s a first dance, it’s going to be an important moment to watch, and we can – I think the challenge will be to be specific on the deliverables, as my colleagues have said. Thanks.
Creon Butler
Thank you, Renata, thank you very much. That’s great. Now, I would really welcome our viewers, if they could post their questions. I have a small number of questions already, but it would be good to get a good selection, and while you are thinking about your questions, I’d like to come back very quickly to each of our panellists for some quickfire responses, so with the emphasis on quickfire.
So, Rob, if I could come back to you. I mean, the way you presented your initial comments, you really, sort of, presented it as this is the G7’s job. I mean, you didn’t talk about, sort of, the wider G20 and so on, and you also focused on the short-term rather than the long-term. So if I could just, sort of – on these two points, is it really right that this is the core responsibilities of the G7 rather than the G20, rather than, as Renata was saying, this is about the G7 showing the way for the broader group?
And secondly, you know, we’re in the position we’re in now partly because we didn’t do enough, sort of, longer-term thinking in the past, and is it really wise to, sort of, delay that until a period when, you know, the crisis may not be so intense and it may have gone off the boil? Shouldn’t we do – be doing some of that longer-term planning now, as well? Over to you, Rob.
Robert Yates
Yes, thanks, and maybe to ask the se – the – answer the second one first. Yes, we should, of course, be looking to the future, as well, and there are lots of reviews going on. The IPPR review, and people really looking at the lessons learnt from this, and, you know, these would – should be discussed, you know, at the G7 and the G20, but I think it is the case, you know, there’s a fire burning at the moment, and, you know, to, sort of, have a, sort of, discussion around fire prevention, while the house is actually burning down, is perhaps not the – what the priority is. You know, we really must put the fire out. And, you know, to answer the question about the role of the G7 vis-à-vis the G20, I keep thinking that, you know, both are failing.
You know, we’ve had two G20s, you know, in Riyadh, and, you know, that already, sort of, discussions at a Global Health Summit involving G20 Health Ministers recently, and, to be perfectly frank, it was not very impressive on these agendas. Lots of talk, lots of discussions about what ought to happen in the future, and there just seems to be this amazing lack of urgency to really get down to these issues, and now it’s the G7’s turn, and, you know, are they going to shine where the G20 failed last year? And, of course, what the G7 has got a lot of, I would say, is power, and money and resources, you know, particularly money and resources and thinking about the health sector.
You know, the – a lot of the pharmaceuticals are manufactured in our country, so decisions around TRIPS waivers, tech transfers, us showing some real leadership there, and we are seeing that from within the G7, you know, the Biden administration and President Macron, you know, sort of, getting serious about, you know, TRIPS waivers, and, you know, sharing resources. So, I think, in many respects, because it’s a smaller club, you know, they have got, sort of, greater ability, I think, to come to a consensus and get on with it, and to some extent, you know, then they can, you know, pass the baton to the G20 and say, “Okay, we’ve done our bit, and certainly when it comes to financing, you know, the rest of you are going to have to chip in, but we just need someone to start acting.”
Creon Butler
Thanks very much, Rob. Now, we’re getting a lot of good questions coming in, so with apologies to my other panellists, I’m actually going to go to some of the questions now, and maybe come back to you with my own questions a bit later on, and actually, there’s one question which actually goes very much to the point that Rob was saying, which is from Gideon Rachman. Maybe I’ll just read it out ‘cause it’s good and short, and the question is, “How does what the G7 is doing fit with what the G20 is doing? Is the G7 now trying to displace the G20 as the main international forum, and could this give rise to antagonism with China-Russia and the new emphasis on democracy?”
Now, Renata’s addressed this to some extent, but I want to actually go to Tim first, actually, because one of the areas, which is really important is going to be around climate change, and that’s a key area of co-operation between the G7 and the G20, and clearly, there’s a risk if the G7 becomes too focused on issues, which are controversial with China, this isn’t going to work on climate change. So, what’s your view on that question and the issue more broadly?
Professor Tim Benton
Yeah, well, it’s a very good question and I’m sure we could all have a good view on this. I think my own feeling is, as Rob says, the G7 is perhaps more of a group of likeminded nations. So, it’s more possible to build consensus, and therefore, in some senses, more possible to create a bubble that you can take to the G20, in terms of trying to persuade and cajole and discuss things. The G7, as Renata said, still is a – is quite a powerful group of nations, and very often, when you’re talking about things to do with technology transfer or new approaches, you need to have a critical mass that creates the social tipping point that allows things to happen, whether it’s from a adoption of electric vehicles or whatever.
So, within the G7, there is enough of that kind of critical mass to speed things over, but I do think the issue between how does the G7 as a likeminded group of countries interface with the G20, which is not so much a likeminded group of countries, and whether that’s going to be positive or negative is a really good one. And I suspect it needs to be dealt with on – you know, very much on a, kind of, case-by-case basis because climate co-operation, there is an argument for saying this is like nuclear disarmament of 20 or 30 years ago. It’s an existential threat from a global situation, whereas co-operation over, I don’t know, digital security or something might be something that doesn’t feel in the same sort of bucket, and therefore, isn’t so much scope for a common agenda across the G7 and the G20.
Creon Butler
Thanks very much, Tim. Does anybody else want to come back on Gideon Rachman’s question? Yeah, sure, Renata.
Dr Renata Dwan
Yeah, I’ll just come in a little bit, Gideon. I would say that, I mean, the G20 is much more institutionalised, right? There’s structures, they have more meetings across the year, it’s a bigger agenda, to some extent, there’s more international financial institutions, engagement in the issues, so you can drive more momentum, potentially, around with the G20, and especially around financing and development financing initiatives.
What I think the G7 can do is help launch a pathway, if the goal is then – let’s say on the famine prevention, if the goal is climate financing, if the goal is health financing initiatives, the G7 can pave the way for that, but for success, you need the G20. There’s also an accountability issue, I think, that’s important for us all to bear in mind. There is quite a history in the G7, and, indeed, the G20 of declarations that aren’t delivered on, and commitments and summits that aren’t engaged on. So I think there’s also the issue of there’s more focus on the G20, in part because of the institutionalisation that the Canadians tried some years back, and that gives at least the vehicle for at least follow-through. That happens within the U – the G7, but in a much more government to government way through sherpas and through engagements.
And then, finally, I would just say, if you look at each initiative that’s on the table right now for the G7 for the summit, it’s interesting to look at where they point to a multilateral forum. There’s hardly an initiative that doesn’t have a landing site, let’s say, which is a bigger forum, and I think that’s a good vehicle to say is it really connected to real organisations, real processes, real debates, and drive process through? And I think the G7 has been pretty consistent in trying to link that up to forums.
Christopher Painter
If I could add to that, too. You know, I think that the G7 does have a number of processes throughout the year. I mean, I think it’s a mistake to judge the G7 by the communique. As Renata says, communiques of the G7, and, frankly, in the G20, too, often are full of stuff which bureaucrats, like I used to be, spend, you know, long times negotiating over, like, phrases and words, but, frankly, they’re forgotten after they’re written, largely. But where the real work happens is in the interest issues and the preparation and the time– and the various groups that are under the G7, or, frankly, under the G20, and there are lots of them, that do work throughout the year on this, and to make sure there’s continuity and connectivity there is important.
And the other thing is, you know, there is value, as you said, and the leaders having a discussion or the Ministers having a discussion among themselves, much of which never finds its way onto a declaration or a communique page, and I think that there’s certainly value there, too. And as far as, you know, the G7 taking positions that will somehow alienate countries in the G20, you know, I think they can walk and chew gum at the same time. I mean, you know, often, these countries in the G7 take positions that are strong on things like the South China Sea, on things like, you know, security issues, on economic issues, and they should, because where I see the real value of the G7, and even when it was the G8, is being that crucible for – you know, to bake ideas with a group that can agree than to try to export them. So, you know, I think that makes sense.
Creon Butler
Thanks very much. I mean, if I just come back briefly with my own view. I think I’m in a slightly different position to Renata because I think the G7 actually is – needs to be in a place of reshaping its role, and I think there are going to be two elements to that. One of which is, as has been set out, very much coming up with solutions for global problems, which take account of the wider set of interests, but I think there’s also going to be a growing role for the G7, which we haven’t perhaps seen so much of in the past, which is about doing things that are very much in the interest and the security of its core members.
And I think the Mark Sedwill group on economic resilience is an example of that, it’ll be interesting how much of that gets picked up in the Leaders’ Summit, but I think, increasingly, we will see that element of the G7 coming alongside the broad element. And I think there is a real challenge of how you mix the two, because, you know, you can’t – on the one hand, saying we’re doing this for the broader good, and at the same time, these are things that we’re doing very much from our – from a point of view of core interests, but we’ll see how that develops.
Excellent. Now, we’ve got some other really good questions. Let me go to Max Colchester from The Wall Street Journal, and it’s in a similar kind of vein. His question is, “Can you flesh out why the messaging on China is likely to be ambiguous, and also, can you explain whether it makes sense for the UK to try and mould the China – mould the G7 into an anti-China tool?” Well, I think, to some extent, we’ve already, sort of, given our views on those questions, but I would like to just, sort of, come to the question of specifically what – you know, there’s a discussion within the G7 vis-à-vis China, and then there’s what can be said more broadly, and this is particularly important, I think, Marianne, in your area, in relation to international trade, the reform of the WTO, and so on, and I wonder, what do you think would be the most valuable messages coming out of the G20 around that, sort of, broader question, and specifically as it relates to engaging with China, because that’s going to be absolutely crucial for the reform of the WTO more generally? Thank you.
Marianne Schneider-Petsinger
Look, as I mentioned before, the WTO operates under principle of consensus. Ultimately, China has to be onboard for any reform to happen. But I think the challenge here is also, again, calling out China’s practices and policies at a time where also the West, more broadly speaking, is seeing a, kind of, you know, shift towards more industrial policy. And so, striking that balance to call out China on those practices could perhaps, you know, call also, you know, some hypocrisy, and I think that is going to be quite important to get that balance right.
I think more broadly what we’ll see is, again, kind of, calling out specific issue areas, without mentioning China’s name directly, at least in any, kind of, official communications, and that, again, is critical for those issues around forced labour for intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, some of the more, kind of, tech issues, as well. And here I think it is really important also to keep in mind that there could be unilateral measures that G7 partners or others outside of the G7 can adopt. But really, what’s needed is a kind of united front to bring about change and to get China to not just, kind of, commit to refraining from some of its policies and practices, but to actually deliver. And, again, to that extent, I think it’s quite important that the Biden administration is committed to multilateralism and to working together with allies, so I think, again, that element is going to be quite critical going forward.
Creon Butler
Marianne, thanks very much, and now we have another question for Rob on global health, which actually goes back to where, in a sense, the G groups started in relation to global health. This is from Jacob Goldberg, and his question is, “To what extent will we see the prioritisation of antimicrobial resistance gaining momentum, given the focus on the pandemic giving global health threats more of a focus?”
Robert Yates
Yes, and we certainly should, and, of course, I think, you know, what the pandemic has exposed is, you know, a) that we’ve underinvested in health as a world, but also, that we’ve misallocated our allocations when it comes to health. You know, we haven’t been focusing enough on things like pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, you know, these aren’t the big flashy hospitals that we all think of, in terms of health systems, and these are the issues that we need to address. And also, antimicrobial resistance, I think, sort of, showing significant market failures when it’s come to investing in pharmaceuticals, you know, we’re investing in the wrong things, and, you know, that we’re not producing enough antibiotics, and making sure that they’re getting to the right people.
So, I think all these issues will need to, sort of, get wrapped up in, you know, what’s called, sort of, universal health coverage reforms, making sure that greater investment is put into preventing illnesses, and, you know, encouraging healthy populations. And so I think you are going to be seeing some of these agendas, things like mental health services, other neglected issues are going to rise in prominence, but the big message for leaders, Economists and Heads of Government is the need to spend more money on health.
Creon Butler
Tim, yes, go ahead, please.
Professor Tim Benton
So, I think antimicrobial resistance is an interesting one because there is a lot of – or growing evidence, of course, that the prophylactic use of antibiotics in livestock agriculture is making the system worse. So, actually, to deal with antimicrobial resistance means that we have to grow food in different ways, and that then leads to all sorts of issues to do with food prices, international competition, food security, environmental land use, and all a whole range of things. And that’s partly what I meant within the – my framing comments, that when you start unpicking any one of these areas, the implications for multiple areas become very clear. So AMR, dealing with AMR, or pandemic preparedness, means restructuring a whole lot of our farming systems, for example, and it’s not a simple thing that you can just say, “Well, we’ll invest a 100 million in AMR, and we’ll solve the situation ‘cause we’ll just invent new antibiotics.” It won’t work like that.
Creon Butler
Indeed. I mean, yes, I mean, this is where a really – the really key area, which I think the pandemic has – I mean, it was always true, but the pandemic has made it more important, so many of these things are interrelated, and I think there is a, sort of – almost a, kind of, congestion problem as to, you know, where do you begin in these very complex interrelated issues, given that, you know, the political momentum requires you to start somewhere? I mean, perhaps in that respect, Tim, I could just come back to you with a question from Marie Elisabeth Fauroux, and her question is, “Do you think that,” and you may be familiar with this, I’m afraid I’m not, “the Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact, which was recently approved by the G7 Foreign Ministers, will be reflected in the Leaders’ Summit in some way, for example, in the communique?” I’m not sure if that’s one that you’re familiar with, or if anybody else on the call is, if you’re not.
Professor Tim Benton
I’ll pass to Renata.
Creon Butler
Excellent, thank you, Renata.
Dr Renata Dwan
No, thank you, and thanks for the question. Indeed, this isn’t the first time the G7 has spoken on famine prevention and hunger, they’ve spoken in the context of 2015, and in the German Presidency then, and the G7, so I would say a couple of issues. We’ve got two dimensions: one is risks of famine prevention, and two, the increasing use of hunger as a weapon of war. We’ve seen that in the context of Tigray, we’ve seen that in the context of blockages and to food orders and deliveries in – and humanitarian access in the Civil War in the Sudan, so – and Yemen, of course. So, this is a – very much a big issue, in the context of the UN and on the Security Council, where, of course, the UK is on the Security Council.
I think in terms of the communique, what it – where it fell short was in, again, the scale of ambition. So the communique pointed to 1.5 billion to the three most at-risk famine countries who are currently experiencing famine or near famine, which is Yemen, South Sudan, and Nigeria, and then, in addition, or total, rather, of seven billion to 42 countries that are defined as one step away from catastrophe or famine. But, as I mentioned in my remarks, I think it’s – the relative low scale of that financial commitment may make it not something that’s flagged as a key point of the Leaders’ Summit. So it’s likely to be there, but not to be touted to the same extent as perhaps some of the climate commitments or potentially let’s say commitments around vaccines.
Creon Butler
Renata, thanks very much, and perhaps while I could come to you on another question, actually, which is from Karla Adam, but I think others will have a view on this, as well, including Chris, but others, as well, which is – the question is, “This is President Biden’s first foreign trip, and it comes after four years of Donald Trump. Do you see America playing a more traditional role in this meeting? Also, in the bilateral between Biden and Johnson, would you expect Northern Ireland to come up?” And that’s from Karla Adam at The Washington Post.
Dr Renata Dwan
Yeah, no, thanks, Karla. This is absolutely going to be a key visit for President Biden, his first to Europe. It’s interesting that the first International Summit that President Biden had was with the Quad, so this is an important turnaround now to the European context. You’ve already seen the much more active role of the United States, in the context of Secretary of State Lincoln’s visit here in May for the Foreign Minister and Development Ministers’ communique, very active roles. You can see, I think, some of the US messaging already, particularly on messaging on Russia, particularly on messaging of engaging on value-based and bringing human rights into some of the equations, and the commitment to multilateralism, which all reflects some of the Biden administration’s priorities. So I think we can expect to see those messages, and we can see an active role.
In terms of Johnson and Biden bilateral, I absolutely think the Northern Irish question will come up. It’s – the Northern Irish protocol is – has become or is a flashpoint, and we are one month away from the marching season in Northern Ireland, which is traditionally a flashpoint for violence. So, they will meet in the 11th to the 13th in the G7, but the 12th of July is the Orange season and the start of the marching orders, so I think you will see Northern Ireland come up. You’ll also probably see Russia come up, ahead of the Biden Russia Summit in Geneva just immediately after the G7, and in the context of Russian actions in Ukraine and Belarus, around the issues of chemical weapons, where, of course, the US and the UK have worked very closely together. So, I would also look out for a statement on Russia in that respect.
Christopher Painter
Yeah, and I would add…
Creon Butler
Go ahead, Chris.
Christopher Painter
…yeah, absolutely, this is going to be a night and day difference. I mean, first of all, just procedurally, the other leaders will not have to be walking on eggshells, afraid that the US leader will walk out or have some sort of temper tantrum, so that alone is a major difference. There – they’ll have a communique that’ll be baked pretty early, instead of wanting – you know, waiting ‘til the last minute ‘cause they don’t know what’s going to be in it, so there’s going to be predictability, which is important.
And as Renata said, you know, you already see stronger statements and more consistent statements, so Russia, clearly climate change is an area, which has changed dramatically since the Trump administration, and this idea of more multilateral co-operation. I think, you know, the G7 meeting will change from being looked at as a chore to something which was really something where, you know, President Biden can make substantive progress with his counterparts. And I think there’ll be, frankly, more substantive bilateral meetings with all the different leaders, including with Johnson, so it will – I think it will really be night and day.
Robert Yates
And just on the health front, Creon, you know, obviously, President Trump set the bar pretty low when he was talking about people injecting themselves with bleach and slashing funding to WHO in the middle of a crisis. So, there is a tremendous opportunity for President Biden to shine, not least because there really hasn’t been any decent global health leadership from any of the G7 leaders to date on these issues. And, as Renata mentioned, the UK slashing its aid financing, including for health, in the middle of a pandemic, isn’t best good, either. So, I think there is a great opportunity, and I think there is a real hel – hope in the global health community that President Biden’s up for it, you know, that – you know, certainly that, you know, the TRIPS waiver was a big bold move, I think, sort of, taking on big interest in the American pharmaceutical industry. You know, he has been talking about sharing vaccines, so, hopefully, that he could show some great global leadership and perhaps, you know, show the likes of Boris Johnson what should be done.
Creon Butler
Yeah, I mean, I think the – both the global tax and the TRIPS waiver are examples of really strong leadership, and I’m sure some of the other G7 members are a little bit uncomfortable by this – about this, but, you know, it will have to be seen. So, Marianne, yes, over to you.
Marianne Schneider-Petsinger
Well, just to also say that, you know, the trip for the G7 isn’t just in isolation, it’s also then followed by a US Summit, and by a NATO Summit, so really a, kind of, conservative transatlantic or broader transatlantic, I think, effort, which is important to keep in mind. And then in terms of the bilateral, and particularly, you know, trade issues, that question of the Northern Ireland peace process is or has been, kind of, you know, staked out as a potential precondition for any bilateral free trade agreement, but I don’t think that is going to be high up on the agenda. Biden has made it very, very clear that a bilateral trade deal, whether it’s with the UK or others, isn’t going to happen because the priority is clearly on the domestic issues, and clearly also on economic recovery from COVID.
But I think in terms of trade on a bilateral basis, there is still a number of actual trade irritants in the UK-US relationship, whether that’s overstated aluminum tariffs that are still in place, whether it’s, you know, finding a permanent solution to Boeing-Airbus, whether it’s over digital services taxation, even though there is progress at the OECD, it could derail. So, again, just to say a number of bilateral irritants that, if they don’t get managed properly, could perhaps undermine some of those global issues that we talked about before.
Creon Butler
Thanks, Marianne. I mean, the other thing I’d just say is typically the US will come along with something else that we don’t know about just yet, probably about five or six days ahead of the actual summit, but we’ll see.
And maybe, Marianne, I could just stay with you, but then some of our other panellists, because we have a – quite a deep question from Anna Isaac at POLITICO, which, if I read it out to you, “Has the UK laid out a clear path for tying trade issues from cybercrime to export of vaccines to security risks ahead of the G7, and if not, what should it look like, and can there be a consensus?” So, maybe if, Marianne, you go first, and then Chris, and then others, if they want to come in.
Marianne Schneider-Petsinger
Well, the short answer is no, I think there’s two overarching themes, kind of, for the trade track, and the first one is fair and tra – fair and free trade, and the other one is modernising trade rules, so the security element is pretty much, you know, pushed to the sidelines. But I think that perhaps is a missed opportunity, and particularly when you’re looking at supply chain security and supply chain resilience, that is, I think, a critical area where trade and security are so intrinsically linked. And particularly, again, if you’re looking at some of the tech issues and semiconductor shortages, again, particularly from a US perspective, increasingly salient, and I think there could be an opportunity here to work with allies to address some of those underlying issues, and, again, there is a security element here.
Also, in terms of climate risks, you know, that is particularly, in the runup to the COP26, another area where there could be more linkage, and obviously also in terms of health, you know, the kind of security risk for personal health and safety could also be emphasised more. But as far as I know, those linkages have not been made.
Christopher Painter
Yeah, I think the primary one, as you noted, was coming out of the ‘Tech Ministers’ declaration, talking about supply chain issues, and how we deal with that, and it doesn’t mention China by name, but China is written all over it, I think, is the concern, and that goes to the 5G and telecommunications. But supply chain really is a future-looking thing too, it’s not just about the technologies we’re focusing on today, and so I think that will be part of the discussion.
But I agree with you, I don’t think there’s a lot of leverage points that have been built up on this, and one of the things I found missing, even from the Foreign Ministers’ declaration or communique, was this idea of holding bad actors accountable by using the full suite of tools you have, including trade tools, you know. And, you know, there has been a lot in the US of using sanctions, the EU has the diplomatic toolkit that it’s been using recently, too, on sanctions, but this idea of global accountability and the G7 working together as likeminded countries to hold folks accountable, in cyberspace, but also in other areas, too, that doesn’t seem to be strongly present in that, and maybe that will come out of this, we’ll see.
Creon Butler
Thanks very much, Chris. We’re doing pretty well on questions, and I’m really keen that we’ll be able to try and have a go at all of them. So, if I move on now, perhaps I could go to the question from Oded Meyer, which is, “Will uncomfortable issues, where there’s no consensus be raised, for example, Nord Stream 2 or the Middle East peace process?” Renata, do you want to have a go at that?
Dr Renata Dwan
I mean, I think it depends, you know, what do the participants want, what do the leaders want? The UK wants a success, Boris Johnson wants a success. The US wants to say the US is back on the multilateral stage. This is Angela Merkel’s last Leaders’ Summit. This is an upcoming summit for the foreign affairs or for Macron. So, for a whole set of reasons, this is the first of Suga’s broad international engagements in Japan. So, everyone has an interest in making it look like a success, and that means there’ll be a lot of massaging of difficult issues. Israel-Palestine has come at the wrong time for the G7, Middle East is never an issue that – which it’s easy for unity. And I think there, what you will have, is probably the way you’ve seen in the Foreign Ministers’ communique, short sentences, short paragraphs, not very much new or initiative, and, frankly, there’s no new initiative on the agenda for Israel-Palestine in the G7, it’s traditionally not been a G7 issue. They – the Foreign Ministers have already made statements on Libya, on Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, so I think you’re going to see that approach more broadly.
On Nord Stream 2, I mean, I defer to Marianne, but my sense is that the US has made a decision, and Germany will not wish to waive it too strongly, that it’s – there’s a go-ahead. But it’s obviously in the context of very strong statements then and united positions on Russia. So I think what you’ll try to see is unity on the issues that are seen to be imperilled by any such action and obviously, Belarus will feature quite heavily, I think, in this context. So, I think it’s going to be an issue that every – to just to think about the interests of everyone in having a good and positive outcome is going to override, I think, issues of points of tension.
Creon Butler
Thank you, Renata. Marianne, any views on Nord Stream 2, specifically?
Marianne Schneider-Petsinger
Well, I think what we’ve seen is, you know, sanctions immediately waived, and I think that is very much with the intention to create some space for a more transatlantic joined-up front. So we’ll see what happens in the long-term, but for the time being, it is again trying to create leverage together.
Creon Butler
Thanks very much. Good. Now, a question for Tim from Tim Stickings at The National, and this is very UK-specific. “On climate change, what’s a successful G7 outcome for Britain, given its big ambitions for COP26?”
Professor Tim Benton
Yeah, good question. Well, the outcomes of the COP are around driving ambition for mitigation, so the net zero and the NDCs, it’s around building adaptation into the system. So building resilience and ability to cope with climate change, it’s about finance for – particularly for the developing world, and it’s about collaboration around phasing out coal, standards for electric vehicles, sustainable commodities trade, etc., etc. And I think, to a certain extent, all of those appear in the ministerial communique, the Environment Ministers’ communique, and I think there’ll probably be some kind of background conversations around wanting to promote greater ambition from the G7 and, you know, perhaps persuade Australia to become more ambitious in its climate agenda through attending the G7 in itself. But I think, as Renata was saying, the key thing is for this to be trumpeting the fact that COP is the big moment, we’re all going to be ambitious, we’re all going to drive climate change, we’re going to solve all of the problems, and the world is going to be bet – a better place because we’re in charge.
Creon Butler
Tim, thank you very much. Well, we – I think at the end, I’d like to come back to everybody with – just for their quick comments on what this means for the UK’s role, but just if we take the opportunity to finish off the questions we’ve got. There’s one from Euan Grant, which to some extent we’ve addressed in relation to the G7’s interaction with other groups and so on, “But there is a specific question about whether they will say anything on the origins of the virus, particularly in view of some of the reporting that’s coming out of the US at the moment,” so, Rob, I’m afraid that’s one for you.
Robert Yates
Yeah, no, sure, no, and, you know, we have to, you know, look at these issues, and, you know, there are lots of reviews going on at the moment, you know, sort of, instigated by WHO, and we – it’s very, very important for future pandemics that we do understand the origins of this one, and, you know, that – but, of course, the politics of this are very, very tricky, and, sort of, just marching into China and demanding to see everything, you know, is obviously, sort of, proving impossible.
So, I think that it’s – you know, we are going to have to investigate this and encourage this being done as thoroughly as possible, but recognise that in the short-medium-term, we really do need the collaboration of the Chinese in producing vaccines as much, if nothing else, and, you know, sort of, given the shortages coming out of India at the moment and the fact that both the major Chinese vaccines have been proved to be effective, it will be very useful to have those vaccines into COVAX and shared out around the world. So, I think going on a, sort of, confrontational approach with China at the moment is not best bright, and we should really avoid that at all costs, but then try and have that proper investigation done in the cold light of day, once things have calmed down.
Creon Butler
And, Tim, I think you have a comment, as well. Thanks, Rob.
Professor Tim Benton
So, from a biological, evolutionary, ecological perspective, there is zero evidence, from a molecular sequence perspective, that there has been any human involvement in the virus evolution. There has been a lot of circumstantial expectation that we’re in a world where environmental change is going to drive – increasingly drive pandemics, SARS, MERS, HIV, Ebola, all took multiple years to work out where their initial pathway was. And I think, you know, there is a – obviously, there’s a risk that they were studying coronaviruses in Wuhan and something happened. But there’s a much greater risk that it’s just happened to be coincidental, just like, you know, in the UK perspective, Novichok in Salisbury, that’s near Porton Down, therefore they must be related, and it wasn’t related, of course, and so I think, as with Rob, he should be very careful about keeping an open mind ‘cause the likelihood is that it’s natural.
There is an extreme small chance that it might have been studied in the lab and escaped from the lab, but much more likely it came through other routes, as with other recent emerging diseases. We’ve got a new avian flu found today, for example, so these things are happening all the time, and I think we just need to be politically careful about creating this great big war between us on one side blaming somebody else, and actually, it’s, sort of, a natural phenomenon.
Creon Butler
Yeah. So, in a sense, even if it – even if, in the unlikely event that this was an escape from a lab, it doesn’t let us off the hook, in terms of the broader issue. Indeed. Excellent.
Now, we have some questions around the role of the guests, and what I’d like to do, actually, is just group these together. So, if we just – if I read them out just very quickly, so there’s a question from Simon Burkert, which is what role will the guest countries play in the meetings? Emission reductions by India will require delivery of financing and rules by the G7, Australia needs to contribute to both shortfalls.
Then there’s a question from Torsten Jelanike, which is around the extent to which the club of democracies will unite a further divide and fragment the global order. To some extent, we’ve already addressed this, but I think it also goes to this question of the role to be played by the guests. And then also there’s a question from Duncan Bartlett on – regarding South Korea. “South Korea’s intending – attending as an observer, its relationship with Japan is poor at the moment, would we expect there to be a bilateral between the President and the Prime Minister, during the course of the summit?”
So, maybe if we could just – I’ll give you all a chance to talk about the role of the guests, but maybe, Renata, I could start with you. And, I mean, the interesting thing I – as far as I see it, the initial presentation was that the guests would have a very deep and fundamental role in the preparation of the summit, and that may have been true, in some areas, but not in others, in the sense, so it’s not really very clear. It was notable, I think, in the Environment Ministers’ outcome, that the guests were there, but the commitments were all made by the G7, but what’s your view about that clutch of questions and the role of the guests more generally?
Dr Renata Dwan
Yeah, I think much has been made in the UK of the invitation of what is effectively members of the Qua. There are many members of the Quad, other than Japan, and I think I would just put out a couple of thoughts. First, it’s not new that visitors are invited, it’s a very common practice, and, indeed, many of those countries have been to previous G7 meetings. But, two, as you said, Creon, I think the UK’s initial ambition was for a more inclusive and for a more – almost, like, a group of ten making a set of statements, and that is a challenge because it’s essentially trying to patch together two forums: the G7 and the Quad. And I – the Quad is not such an institutionalised body, the Quad of Australia, Japan, India, and Republic of Korea, it’s not such a tight unit. It’s moving towards a discussion of going beyond security, and more broad economics, in a very, very broader sense of the word, but it’s still a very nascent entity and alliance. So, I think one would want to be careful of that, and also, to reflect the very different perspectives where they’re looking at.
The fact that India represents a challenge for countries that have committed to open free trading, committed to human rights-based statements when China has – or India has not made statements, for example, of condemnation in Xinjiang and other contexts, does challenge this idea of a likeminded and how likeminded is the club. And then, as Tim can attest, Australia and India, on some of the climate commitments, also on – challenges the extent to which they can be seen as a likeminded body on these agendas.
What I think it does is perhaps very neatly set Australia and India up for having to make good on some of the commitments in the COP26. It’s very hard to attend the G7 and not then, sort of, make a completely different statement. So it’s clever and a way of engaging, and an example of what the G7 can do effectively by bringing in a coalition, makes it harder to opt out of statements that will be made at the G26.
But I would just flag one issue that on this idea of a democracy and unite or further divide. I think the G7, as I said, has to work towards and in other multilateral bodies if it’s not going to be – proceed to be what I think Torsten is suggesting, a divisive group, and I think the G7 have been careful to do that. What I would just flag is the emphasis less increasingly now on democracy and more on open societies. The Foreign Ministers’ communique has a whole section on open society, so I think you’re going to see language more in that direction than on specific democracies, and I think you’re going to see a commitment to inclusion and to engaging other partners.
And the final point I would say is the African partners, France will be very keen not to ensure that that’s not dropping away from the agenda altogether. ASEAN is there this year, but in the past, you’ve had a G7 African partnership, so for every pull towards the quad or the Indo-Pacific, you’re going to have a pull by other countries to other parts of the world.
Creon Butler
Renata, thanks. Would anybody else like to comment on the role of guests in their specific areas? I mean, I think it’s – it is one of those areas, I think it just remains to be seen quite how different what has happened this time is compared with other times. They have – as Renata says, they’ve often been guests invited and they’ve played different roles. I mean, certainly, in 2019, the then French Presidency did try at the, sort of, integration of preparation to a significant extent, with some of their guests, and, you know, that is obviously a trend, but it’s…
Dr Renata Dwan
If I could…
Creon Butler
Please carry on, yeah.
Dr Renata Dwan
…Creon, on just one point, I think the question was asked about Japan, can we expect…
Creon Butler
Sure, yeah.
Dr Renata Dwan
…a bilateral meeting between Japan and the Republic of Korea? I’d be surprised if there wasn’t. I’d be surprised if it got any high profile. But one thing I would just note is it will not be Boris Johnson driving it and playing the mediator, as we’ve seen, for example, in [inaudible – 74:23] in 2019 where you had Macron seeing to – really driving this idea as he – as the driver of an Iran-US meeting, as the driving together of an Africa-EU agenda. So, I think you’re not going to see it, but with the UK trying to be the individual mediator of that meeting, if it happens.
Christopher Painter
Yeah, and…
Creon Butler
Thank you very much, Renata, thanks.
Christopher Painter
And it might…
Creon Butler
Yeah, Chris, sure.
Christopher Painter
…be that…
Creon Butler
Yeah.
Christopher Painter
…it brings a certain legitimacy, you know, so the idea of the G7 is always seen as this, you know, closed club, and when you can bring in other countries, particularly countries like Australia, India, and others, it gives it more legitimacy for the things it’s trying to do. So as you talk about whether the G7 going forward and how you – we architect it, I think bringing in other countries is a wise idea. But you have to be pretty specific on how you’re going to add them and what their roles are going to be, otherwise it starts to fall apart, but I do think it’s a valuable thing to do.
Creon Butler
You can’t make it up as you go along, or at least it’s not – that’s not necessarily very wise, in that respect. Good. Okay, Rob, did you want to make a comment in this respect, or I didn’t…?
Robert Yates
Yes, just very briefly about India, that, you know, sort of, in global health, India is extraordinarily important, you know, the seventh of the world’s population, massive manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, so to engage, you know, sort of, India in health reforms across the world is very, very important. And I think, you know, India potentially, sort of, looking at, sort of, G7 members, how much they’re spending on their health systems, India only spends 1% of its GDP on its public health system. Has got a very weak public primary care system, and, you know, this is a major concern, when it comes to things like antimicrobial resistance, people just buying drugs in the open market is a massive driver of AMR. So, I think to bring India more into the discussions about what other countries have done to cover their populations is very important.
Creon Butler
Rob, thank you very much. Right, well, unfortunately, I’m afraid we’re out of time now. I mean, that certainly was a really broad-ranging discussion, and I’m glad that we were able to get to all the questions. I’d like to thank all our viewers for watching, and for all those questioners who put questions to us, and for the particular, I’d like to thank our panellists for some really excellent interventions and some really good perspectives. I think now the real issue is just to wait and see what happens next week, but I’m sure we’ll all be following very closely. So, thanks to everyone, and I think until next time, so, all the best.
Professor Tim Benton
Thanks, Creon, and well done.
Creon Butler
Not at all. Cheers.
