John Kampfner
Right, good evening, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House, whether you are here or whether you are watching online, it’s a delight to have you all here. My name is John Kampfner and I’m the new Executive Director of the new UK in the World Project, more on that anon. We are here primarily to launch an excellent report. Robin Niblett, our Director, all of whom you know exceedingly well, this is his last substantive research report, before stepping down. But he will be connected with Chatham House and he will be saying more before he leaves.
But this, I do commend to you all, is a fabulous report. It’s gone up online, only an hour or two ago, but when you have a moment to go onto the Chatham House website, if you haven’t received it already, to read it thoroughly. It’s a long report and a very detailed report, but an incredibly concise and perspicacious report, so we will be discussing that this evening. Shortly before we hear from Robin and our panellists this evening, as I say a few words about the UK in the world report, it is going to be looking, over the next few years, at how the UK navigates a world that is in uproar or in turmoil, it is certainly in a state of considerable instability.
The subheading of it is simply, Now What? And that is what we are going to be looking at here at the heart of Chatham House, all of our programmes, whether they are regional, whether they’re thematic, all working very closely together on that. Looking at the core work will be foreign policy and security in the round, but along with that, in this first year, some specific workstreams. One on trade and one on science and tech.
A couple of quick pieces of housekeeping if I may, if you have your mobiles, please could you turn them to silent, but please also do use them if you like, to tweet. The Twitter hashtag is CHEvents, and so please tweet your thoughts, your responses as well, and we will also be coming to questions and answers as well. I’ll introduce our panellists, once Robin has spoken, but if – and the other thing to say is this is an on the record event tonight, no Chatham House Rule, so do feel free to be loud and proud about what you think of this evening’s event.
Without any further ado, please give a very warm welcome to the Director of Chatham House, who will speak to his report, the person you know very well, Robin Niblett [applause].
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you. I think that’s – yeah, never mind, applause before you speak, and that hasn’t happened in 15 years I’ve been here. It’s kind of worrying. It’s a worrying precedent, no, but I like it, actually it’s very good. Well, look, John, thanks very much for the introduction. Thanks for the introduction to the new project, which you’ll be leading, thank you for taking on that small job. Because obviously, the UK’s role in the world is about everything, and hence, I’m really pleased that all of our colleagues at Chatham House will be able to weigh in from their different angles over the coming years.
In some ways, writing this paper a year after the last one I wrote, in January of 21, ahead of the release of the Integrated Review, both of these in a way, I suppose are setting out a stall of the challenges facing the UK, the opportunities, in some cases, as well. And hopefully, it’ll provide a menu for you and Chatham House to keep working on into many, many years in the future. And we were saying, just before we started here, all discussing William Wallace, you know, was a big leader of the UK’s foreign policy, back in the 70s, and wrote a couple of seminal reports, 73/75, about the future of British foreign policy, and it’s interesting that here we are, nearly 50 years later, really digging into that subject again. I think it’s a good thing, by the way, and a good thing for Chatham House too.
Right, used up a minute of my talking time. So, the paper that I’ve just released, and in case I forget later on, many thanks to David Lawrence, who’s sitting there. David, who’s a Fellow for our new UK in the World Project, had to do a lot of the digging when I said, “Can you get me some stuff on this?” So I’m sure this has happened. But in any case, a lot of the great data, and certainly all the charts and so on, are thanks to his work, so David, thank you very much for your help. There’s others I could thank as well, on the editing side, but I thought I should call David out.
It is a very difficult thing to do a one-year take of a big strategic review. It’s difficult, as you’d imagine, if you read the Integrated Review, it is a theory of everything. It has – I mean, it covers every dimension of British foreign policy, trade, development, intelligence, defence, security, foreign policy. So to then try to review it is complicated. Nonetheless, that’s what we tried to do.
It’s also, secondly, a moving target, I don’t need to tell you all of that, writing it through what’s been going on, with Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine has been interesting. But it has led me to add – to settle on the title, because the Integrated Review talks about global Britain in a competitive edge. Competitive sounds like the UK is one of those players, alongside many others, trying to work out how you compete in a – competitive edge is vaguely positive, if you see what I’m saying.
I’ve decided, in the end, to call this Global Britain in a Divided World and Divided World is much more zero sum. It is – the choices are more binary. They carry more risk and more negativity, if I can put it that way. And so I just wanted to capture that element of the division in particular, between let’s call them, for my shorthand, the liberal democracies versus Russia, kind of, and China, increasingly, it’s certainly the way this government looks at it. But increasingly, especially through COVID, and now through Ukraine, the developed world and the rest of the world, which are increasingly divided. So, I think this affects the kinds of choices for the UK ahead. So, what I did in the paper and I’m going to do very quickly here, in the next six minutes or so, is talk about what did the UK do towards its goals over the last year? And how does the changed context mean maybe that those policies should be adapted or tweaked going forward?
On the what it’s done, four things. Number one, I’d say one of the top goals of the Integrated Review, is the UK to help support an open, liberal, international order. You can quibble with the terminology, but I think we all know what that means, and on that space, I’d say the UK has done a creditable job. It’s Presidency of the G7 convened in a much more formal way than usual. A G7 grouping, plus some other invited members, that announced that the G7 and the Liberal democratic community were back, after the Trump years, and all of the division that occurred within that G7 grouping, in its time. But it also created the platform for what has been a much more inclusive and effective response to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, particularly seeing Australia, South Korea and Japan, step into sanctions, things they’ve never done before, vis-à-vis Russia, in particular, and again, I could say a lot more about it, but I think that moment in seizing it, and investing in it, has paid off and is important. There’s some other elements of content in there, the Build Back Better World, Britain’s British International Investment Fund, the commitment to open societies. There was some meat on the bones, which I talk about in the paper, but I think that gets a tick for me.
Secondly, the government also talked about defending that order, its allies and those partners of the democracy, contributing to the international security. Again, I’d say the UK Government has done a good job, in that space, over these last 12 months. Good investments in its defence, building up relationships with Nordic countries, in particular the joint expeditionary force, creating more of a sense of British commitment to European security, having called Russia out as the most acute threat to European security over a year ago.
Re-prepositioning armed forces in Sennelager in Germany, you know, having pulled them out pretty much a year earlier. You know, these were all forward leaning steps and big investments in Ukrainian security, a year before, and those investments in European security and then, as the threat from Russia built up, not just supplying anti-tank weapons, but the training, the training supplied by British forces has ended up actually being pivotal to the balance of force that we’ve seen in the last few weeks. So I think, you know, that commitment to European security, I think is clear and important.
The Indo-Pacific tilt was never the big pitch in the Integrated Review. It was a tilt after all, not a pivot. But I think the sending of the Carrier Strike Group 2021, the CSG21 was very important, with the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, important in a way, because of its weaknesses. It didn’t have all the aircraft carrier – aircraft on it. It needed support to protect it, but therefore, it acts as a bit of a hub for an interoperable group of countries, to come together, and say we do this together. To me that was a plus, not a negative. And there was a lot of bilateral stuff that went in there as well, with Japan and South Korea and so on, which is important. And obviously, AUKUS, we could talk about that later on, the Australia-UK-US deal, is important in the sense that the UK is a part of a player for the most formal defence partnership, that has been provided in that region, more than the quad and so on. And so, we can go into the details, but I think that gets a tick and proper steps in the right direction.
The third area was supporting global resilience. Now what does global resilience mean? The world, more broadly, especially the poorer countries, are under threat from climate change from global health, from the instability that inflicts those countries. And Britain, the Integrated Review says, is less well off, and is more insecure, if those countries are insecure, as people have said with health, until everyone’s vaccinated, no one’s safe, just play that through into all aspects of development. And this was a big calling card of the Integrated Review.
So, COP26 successes, tick, that’s a good step in the right direction. But I think the G7 convening really delivered pretty thin commitments in practice, there was a lot of emphasis on vaccines. At home, the AstraZeneca thing was a good idea, at cost, but in the end, was not able to be deployed the way the government would have wanted. Combined with the government’s decisions to cut overseas aid, I’d say that, the way those cuts were undertaken, I go into quite a bit of detail in the paper, serially undermined commitments to the Integrated Review. To Africa, to some of the worst conflict zones in the world, to, you know, even the women’s education, and girl’s education, rights parts, it’s contributed, along with others, to the emergence of this great divergence, as Rajiv Shah of the Rockefeller Foundation, called it. And in a way, that’s not good for the UK. So, it was done severely and suddenly, in my opinion, it could have been done gradually, and it could have been maybe, rebooted gradually. But to have done it the way it did, undermined the Integrated Review. And the last point was all about the economic agenda, a foreign policy that would help British citizens at home, and the trade policy was critical to that. Lots of deals were carried forward from the EU, that was important.
But in the end, it’s not going to make much difference to British prosperity in the near term, and all of the latest data shows the UK is lagging, not just in recovery, compared to other G7 nations. Is that due to Brexit and a decline in exports? Probably, in part, when you compare it to others. If you look at the export performance, and we have underperformed by a significant margin, in net terms, host of 15% compared to other advanced economies, and I think that is tied to the very thin trade and co-operation agreement. In compensating for that, with new trade deals, that will not add up, in terms of monetary capacity, isn’t going to help.
The one area where I think has been a bright spot, and this is a point that Sophia Gaston and the British Foreign Policy Group have done in a report, prior to their Integrated Review report, that came out this weekend, I’m sure you’ll talk more about it. But the earlier report you did on regulatory investments and scope for some fund divergence from the EU, and some greater innovation, there I think the UK, and I go into quite a bit of detail in the paper, is showing some positive signs. And it’ll take time, but that is a down payment on the UK as being a science and technology superpower, one of the Integrated Review’s big commitments.
So, quickly, what do we do? That was then going forward, an equal four, and number one, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, obviously there’s been a remarkably robust response by the EU, and what it simply means is the UK and the EU need to rebuild their relationship. I talk in the report a little bit about how that can done, in particular through integrating the process of the NATO strategic concept, which the UK is a full player at, with the EU’s strategic compass, where the UK, of course, is not at the table, but trying to find ways to knit those two things together, I can talk more about it later, how to do that. There’s some real opportunities to make progress there, and it would really – it could help manage what is likely to be a very tough year on the economic agenda, between the UK and the EU. The TCA is still playing through, in terms of frictions. They’re still being brought in, in 2022, so you’re going to need account availing agenda, which I think you can provide on the security front.
Second, the UK is going to be excluded from areas of the US-EU co-operation. That would have happened in any case, after NATO’s response, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, after Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, what we’ve seen in the US is, and Tony Blinken talked about this at the Munich Security Conference, he talks about the NATO and the EU being a sort of power couple, that together they provide that spectrum from the hard to the softer aspects of security. And when America talks of it like that, well, the UK is not at the table.
Now, the UK can try to, sort of, play its way into this, but things like the Transatlantic Technology and Trade Council is a very difficult space for the UK to insert itself. It’s dealing with a lot of the regulatory questions, the UK would like to be part of. How to avoid getting squeezed. I say invest more, if you can, G7, UK is only one member, but, sort of, trying to build up the idea of a G7 plus. I’m not going to put numbers to it, it’s a hostage to fortune, to put a ten or 11 or a nine, because it maybe needs to be a bit more mobile. But on issues like sanctions co-ordination, you don’t just want this to be US-EU. This needs to be US, UK, EU, Canada, Japan, and maybe South Korea and Australia, on critical supply chains, on technology. These are all areas where creating that more informal, but consistent period of co-ordination, would give the UK, sort of, voice that is parallel to, but I would say influential to that US-EU debate. So, again, we can talk more about that later on, but I think that’s an area.
Third, if we can’t on our trade policy, as a country, deliver huge growth through our new trade arrangements, what you can do is start to underpin better relationships with those countries that will be swing players in the new divide, between let’s call it the liberal democracies and certainly China and Russia. And that means CPTTP, the Comprehensive, Progressive, Trans-Specific Partnership, which the UK hopefully should be able to join in 2022, has a strategic meaning to it. Because the US isn’t going to join, UK shows this is part of a bigger global commitment to the Indo-Pacific. But trade deals with Turkey, again, a bit of a swing player in this new divide, perhaps with some of the Gulf countries, you know, Mexico is a swing player in the G20. All of these trade relationships become part of thickening up the community of liberal democracies, in a more divided world. And I think talking about it in that way, inviting people into it that way, means we don’t overegg the economic benefits, which won’t show up and then disappoint. But you show there’s a meaning for it, strategically, so that’s the third.
And the last thing I wanted to talk about is, kind of, living up to what Global Britain means to a lot of people and Global Britain’s a title that people look at in a slightly suspect way, around the world. Has slight echoes of Great Britain and Empire and so on. But one of the ways that Global Britain seemed real to many people, was through the Global Resilience Agenda, that we’re committed to everyone: climate change, global health, women’s empowerment.
It was that more infrastructure investment. It was that inclusive approach. What the UK’s got to be incredibly careful about right now, and not just the UK, is it doesn’t look like we’re retreating into a Euro-Atlantic vision of the world because of the Ukraine crisis. And then not continuing the investments in the big agenda. And the UK is ready and poised to keep that agenda alive, ensure the 100 billion is paid through to all of the less developed countries as part of the COP26 follow-through. It’s got follow-through on the vaccine commitments, which weren’t done in 21, could be done in 22. It can follow-through on infrastructure investments, which were promised in 21, should be delivered in 22, but that messaging is critical, ‘cause so many countries around the world are not with the West, in what they think is a recreation of a Cold War with Russia.
That might be a wrong interpretation, but that’s the view, having just come back from the Doha Forum yesterday, you know, it was heavily described by the participants there, across the Middle East and other parts of the world. So, if we don’t follow-through on that fourth part, on the Global Resilience, we will be accused of actually not being Global Britain, but kind of Little Britain, or Euro-Atlantic Britain, and that will be hugely damaging, given our soft power’s always a little – already a little hit, ‘cause we didn’t follow-through as much as we should have done in the first part. So, I think I will stop there.
John Kampfner
Thank you very much indeed, Robin. We have Bronwen Maddox with us, who’s a Director and has done an amazing job at the Institute for Government, and Sofia Gaston, Director of the British Foreign Policy Group. And Bronwen, and we’ve also – were hoping to have Nick Timothy, Advisor to Theresa May and Columnist for The Telegraph. Unfortunately, this morning, he’s succumbed, as many have done, to COVID, and Nick, if you are there, in cyberspace, you said you might be, if you’re well enough, do provide us with a few of your thoughts, which we will push up front and centre in the discussion.
Bronwen, you and the Institute have – obviously, you focus a lot on the mechanics of government, on the way government performs, and you’ve done that incredibly well. Maybe if you could cast your eye on that, and with particular reference to the FCDO and its priorities now, in your responses to Robin’s presentation.
Bronwen Maddox
I can do that, and, John, thank you very much, though I’m going to say some things, if that’s alright, more broadly, on what Robin has said in his excellent paper. And thank you, I found it a useful mental discipline always to think that Nick Timothy is there, in cyberspace, in whatever context.
John Kampfner
I’m waiting to hear from him.
Bronwen Maddox
He has ways. So I’m going to make one point about what I think the UK has got right, which seems to me a really interesting emphasis in Robin’s paper, what it’s got right in the past year and beyond. Two points about what it’s got wrong, and then something briefly about what it should do now, picking up on Robin’s points on that. And what it’s got right, I think, the balance of priorities in the Integrated Review, was a good expression of what indeed faces the UK.
It rightly identified Russia as well as China, as things that the UK ought to think about, in its defence, as well as all the terrorist threats that it has spent many years developing its capacity on. And in Russia, it seemed to me that the UK claimed to have, and in fact has done, quite a lot to repair the peace dividend that it took after the fall of the Soviet Union and those years when it took its eye off the Russian threat. And then, after Syria, about a decade ago, it did indeed begin to repair that, and when the Skripal poisoning happened in Salisbury, we saw that in fact, quite a lot of that, that gap in Russian intelligence, on the UK side, had been repaired.
China, I think the Integrated Review usefully got away from this tendency that the UK has had to portray China as the UK’s commercial opportunity and to the extent it’s a threat, that’s the US’s problem, and it did begin to acknowledge that the UK needed to consider both those aspects. It talked about relations with likeminded European countries, it – and the UK, in the past year, has also done quite a bit to explore at least some trade deals that, I agree with Robin, are probably more valuable as alliances than they are in trade, but they are valuable nonetheless.
And on the Foreign Office, DFID merger, a very controversial, and indeed I’m giving evidence in Parliament tomorrow on that, and John’s asked me to say something about it, there are many things that can be said against it, but there are some that can be said in favour, in the sense of trying to clarify, including for the outside world, what the aims of British foreign policy are. I think it has been to DFID’s cost and to the cost of Britain’s aid policy, and that’s a subject we could have a whole discussion on.
That was my package of things that the UKs got right in the past year. What it hasn’t, bluntly, the UK does not have the wealth to support the presence in the world that it would like to have. Not in military terms, not in aid, not in diplomatic presence, and I think we’ve seen a lot of signs of that. And so to an extent, the Integrated Review and other expressions of British foreign policy in the past year, have had a big element of wishful thinking or of being implicitly a free rider on the US and NATO. That’s got harder since the Afghan exit, but at the time this review came out, that was a possibility in British planning.
We’ve seen the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office and Development budgets cut, trade deals have not – we’ve not been able to have the clout that we wanted, to the get the terms that really we wanted, and we don’t have the clout in Washington that we would like, as the Afghan exit showed.
Second point, the UK is also very careless about soft power. The government’s carelessness about the country’s reputation for the rule of law, we’ve seen the episode of proroguing Parliament, and also the tolerance of what’s been known as London Grad, of money that is now not welcome, particularly in London, but has been for many years. Casualness as well, about things like the BBC’s reach, through the approach to the BBCs budget, towards visas and immigration, students, [inaudible – 32:10] about, for example, Caribbean republicanism, which the royal trip has exposed, but it’s one that you can hear in Whitehall as well. And if I could pick on one aspect of foreign policy in the past year, it’s been the indulgence of the war of words, with President Macron. And there was always a very good chance that he was going to be re-elected, and to pick verbal fights at least, on three or four different fronts, including fish, seemed, I’ll use again that word, an indulgence.
What should the UK do now? I entirely agree with Robin, sort out its EU relations. That doesn’t have to mean the whole of the EU, and the EU is showing – and when Robin referred to a divided world, actually there are days, weeks, when that refers to the EU itself, including over aspects of Ukraine, but the UK needs to sort out relations with its biggest trading partner, and with which it has common cause on so many fronts, and that includes sorting out the Northern Ireland protocol.
It needs to work out what its alliance with the US amounts to. It is still a lot, it is not everything. It needs to boost defence and diplomatic spending. There aren’t many ways to achieve the foreign policy it wants, without some more in that area. It should, I agree with Robin, build on net-zero and its considerable success in convening more of a consensus on that, than the world at one point expected. And then it should finally turn to domestic things. And I think the levelling up agenda, it’s, in one sense, a good slogan, aware that a Conservative Prime Minister can talk about equality in an aspirational way.
But on the other, something that means a lot, it matters to the integrity of the UK, and the final thing it should do is really give a lot of attention to that integrity of the UK, to the aspirations of Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, because if there’s one way in which we’re going to be talking in a year’s time, or ten years’ time, and considered that Britain will have gone backwards, in being Global Britain, is if we’re suddenly talking about England in the world. I’m going to stop there.
John Kampfner
Thank you, there was so much there to unpick, which we will, and I think your point at the end around the integrity of the UK and its institutions, what happens in the new phase of the monarchy, and that sort of thing, is going to be very important to look at in the coming months and years.
Sophia, you’ve done your report, the UK Integrated Review of Foreign Policy, one year on. In your response to Robin’s – well, for a start, set out your thoughts on this and your response to Robin’s presentation. I also have a question for you, which is, to what degree in your writing of it, what has Ukraine, what has the war in Ukraine, what did that do to your report? How much of it has fundamentally changed, how much of it would have stood the test of time, had that invasion not taken place?
Sophia Gaston
Well, thank you very much, John, and thank you so much to Chatham House for having me here and all the people who work behind the scenes, to make these events possible. It’s a privilege to be here with Bronwen and Robin of course, and as it is a privilege to be a minnow alongside the large ship in the marketplace of ideas. I agree with a lot of what’s been said, in terms of the assessment of what we have and haven’t achieved. In my paper, we have a little set of achievements at the beginning, which is quite handy actually, just bringing it altogether, in bullet point lists. You can see there is a lot that is quite substantive and I do think it is important that we give that credence.
A lot of this of course is strategic and conceptual. We are still in the infancy of the implementation phase of the Integrated Review. I would say that the geopolitical context which is, sort of, the first section we’re looking at what we’ve done, the second section we look at what’s been happening around us, and then bring that together, to ask the question of is this Integrated Review, which – and, you know, it is important to acknowledge this is an unusual question to be asking, one, you’re into what is meant to be a generational strategic framework, is this still fit for purpose? And I think that just says so much about the enormous dynamism there has been in the geopolitical environment, over the past year.
I actually was writing this in the aftermath of the invasion, and I suppose that’s one of the dividends of being a very small ship, we can move quite quickly. But I think, you know, and it’s not an exhausting piece of research, but you know, I think the conclusion that we came to is that actually, the review is still fundamentally fit for purpose. In part, and in large part, because it actually embedded flexibility as a doctrine within the review itself. So there was a lot of elasticity to be able to respond to a lot of these circumstances.
That said, I think it is difficult to not come out of the process of taking stock of all of that and feel that the scale of the challenges and the urgency with which to respond to them, has intensified in the past year, and yet, our fiscal capacity to do so has been further undermined. And that does create a pretty sobering picture. The way I thought about how we, kind of, look forward, is really around the resilience agenda. And I think this was something that I very much welcomed in the Integrated Review, it talked a lot about resilience, whole of government, whole of society. And I think these are the areas that fuel the least advanced. So I think there are three areas that we highlight in the report, as kind of particular priorities, within that resilience agenda.
The first is our international relationships. Now, obviously, we’ve talked quite a bit already about the EU. I do think there has been some genuine signs of a, kind of, rapprochement and productive co-operation recently, that actually was building before the invasion of Ukraine. And certainly I think has a lot to do with the rehoming, the repatriation of the UK-EU relationship, back into the Foreign Office, which I think is one of the most important things that’s happened in British foreign policy in the past year. But I think the particular relationship that feels integral to the resilience agenda, is the US relationship. It’s the bilateral relationship, but it’s also the way in which we consider our particular global and regional role, in light of what I think is fair to say, is a pretty long-term structural recalibration in the United States’ own imagining of its global role.
And I think it’s now clear we are not just a year into the Integrated Review, we’re a year into President Biden, there are very substantive shifts that have taken place under his leadership. The restoration of America’s moral mission, but I think we need to be thinking about things like how do we affect co-operation within the G7 around shared geopolitical objectives and interests, when the United States will not necessarily be the driving centrifugal force behind that agenda? How do we make decisions, how do we move forward effectively? So, I think that’s really essential.
The AUKUS relationship, perhaps we can talk a little bit more about that, but I actually think that’s quite essential in guaranteeing, in a way, both a European security and pacific security role for the United States. And we should definitely be investing in AUKUS, as a very – I don’t know if that’s me. I might be sitting on my microphone – productive forum of co-operation. I think there’s essentially a lot more that we could be doing, to ensure that we are intensifying our very closest relationships and deepening them, which allows us then to also, on that foundation, start to take more hardnosed, strategic look at broader relationships with countries that don’t necessarily share all of our values and principles, but may share some of our interests, and that’s going to be particularly crucial in the Indo-Pacific. And I think in terms of other kind of global relationships, the central question for the UK, and I don’t think this is something we can solve individually, but is how we can be a competitive partner, an appealing, an attractive partner, as transferring democracies with strong accountability functions. Particularly in terms of infrastructure and technology projects and that is going to be essential on the question of balancing against China’s rise.
The second area of the resilience agenda, which is a very particular focus of my organisation, because we’re rather unusual in operating at this domestic international intersection, is around our democracy in society and how this pertains to our foreign policy. I think the integration of the levelling up and Global Britain agendas, has not happened in any substantive way. I think there are some people in government who really get that, the need for that. But these are two agendas that are relatively siloed at the moment, and we need to bring them together.
Now, there are several areas of potential emergent tensions, where the domestic and the international story could fall into competition in the near future, in which I think the government needs to get ahead of and twist those into opportunities. And they are the net-zero transition, which I can tell you, from doing focus groups, a heck of a lot of focus groups over the past six months, we – there is a very strong sense that our international leadership on this, for which there is huge support, which is a great strength and factor of legitimacy for us and our global role. That this is going to necessitate us making that transition more quickly and that that is going to exacerbate social inequalities. And so, while there is, at the moment, a lot of support for accelerating the net-zero transition in light of the energy crisis, that may not hold over the coming months, as things intensify.
I do think that it is really striking that three of the most profound foreign policy choices we have taken since the launch of the Global Britain project, all involved migration pathways. Hong Kong, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine, and again, there’s very different public attitudes around those, there’s a very high level of support actually, for all three at the moment, but again, when we get into cost of living pressures and so on, it’s – and they are, you know, it’s an expensive thing to do for our – for us to fulfil that moral responsibility. Again, that’s potential point of tension, and then just finally, I think this – the question of the restoration of 0.7, which the government had recommitted to in the introduction to the Integrated Review, we are now in a cost of living crisis, the restoration was contingent on our fiscal position, so again, that feels it could be in play.
I do think it is interesting, just to come back to your point, Robin, about the title of the review, being a competitive edge, I think that’s partly the government wanting to proactively position this as an opportunity.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, I agree.
Sophia Gaston
And I think, in a way, they have strong partners in the British people for that, who do tend to be relatively optimistic and buoyant about these sorts of things. So, the third resilience agenda, and I’ll be quick, sorry, I’ve gone on too long, but I think, in many ways, it’s the most important. I’ve already alluded to it already, it’s about the machinery of government.
There has been a huge problem in government with bandwidth, there has been crisis lurch, there are very few aspects of the implementation of the review, in terms of personnel, and you know, that are actually ringfenced to be able to continue that long-term strategic work, when we have COVID, Afghanistan, Ukraine, etc., etc. So we need to not only bring levelling up and Global Britain together, but we need to make sure that we’ve got the machinery of government, as we have done for the levelling up agenda, we need to radically reorganise our machinery of government, to make the most of global Britain. So I’ll end there. Thank you.
John Kampfner
Thank you very much for those remarks, to both of you, and Sophia, those – bringing us also back to net-zero and to migration, is also incredibly helpful. Robin, I want to ask you about one aspect of what Bronwen said, when she was talking about capacity and how a lot of the framing of the Integrated Review is based, in your words, Bronwen, on “wishful thinking”, in terms of Britain’s ability to behave – to act according to a power clout that may not be there to the extent that the British think they are.
Notwithstanding your points, Bronwen, about behaviours rhetoric, you talk about carelessness and about reputation, the rule of law, you talk about casualness, in terms of money laundering at London Grad, etc., and many other things besides, those are behavioural, and they, in theory, can change. In terms of size and capacity, they can’t, so, to what degree is this, is the situation Britain finds itself now in, structural?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
It’s interesting ‘cause it was a theme, I think, kind of, across both Bronwen’s comments and then Sophia’s as well. And by the way, again, not go on too long, it was a – there’s a big section on the soft power element in the paper, which actually highlighted, Bronwen, you’ll be pleased to know, ‘cause I agree with you very strongly, I didn’t use your good language about being careless with our soft power ‘cause I think it’s a great line, but I mentioned all the BBC and immigration and these things have undermined global perceptions, at least of the UK.
But actually, I think the ability to follow-through, at least on the agenda I’m proposing, and I’d need to check it against Sophia’s and Bronwen’s comments, but it’s not about money, it’s about decision-making and focus. What do I mean? When you think that the UK was able to renegotiate and carry forward, 43, roughly, trade agreements in 2021, 20 to 21, plus actually add on some new dimensions though the Australia deal, and an extra digital chapter in the Japan deal, a new agreement on the financial sector side, with the Swiss, the UK can follow-through on a more strategically purposed trade agenda, without any more resources.
It’s got the resources to do it. It’s a matter of focus, messaging, deciding which matter, and it will be able to deliver some wins on that front, without any more resource than it has today, probably might be able to do it with a bit less, I don’t know. But it doesn’t strike me as mattering. I think this effort to focus, as I’m recommending it, on the G7, as the kind of vehicle for a UK in the world that’s effective, and maybe the government’s parlance, the Global Britain, again, doesn’t require resources. It’s about focus, diplomatic emphasis, and if the UK can run a whole G7 Presidency, in the year after running a G7 Presidency, it could focus its effort on that dynamic.
I know that the EU, there are EU officials, and probably a few EU countries that don’t want the UK to succeed on doing that. Because they know what the UK’s up to, which is trying to find a way to retain influence in areas where the UK would quite like – sorry, the EU would quite like to strike up more of a bilateral relationship with the US, as has happened. And the G7 comes along, the EU is a member of the G7 table, it’s like the eighth of the G7 in a way, alongside France, Germany, Italy and then, you know, the other G7 members, Canada, Japan, US.
But from a UK standpoint, it actually is a really useful space and one that you could tack onto. That doesn’t require resources, and getting a better relationship with the UK-EU doesn’t require resources. It’s about machinery of government, that Sophia noted, having the EU relationship back inside the FCDO, allows, and has allowed actually, already, an improvement under the Foreign Secretary, and with some of the other changes of personnel. Nonetheless, undermined, now and again, by the Prime Minister, doing his domestic politics with the EU.
So, again, that’s not a money, it’s not a resources thing, it’s doable. The only one where I suppose, you could say the money matters, is the Global Resilience Agenda, and I’m taking the Integrated Review’s terminology of this, helping the world be resilient, the external part of that, to the big global challenges. That costs, but our commitment to the 100 billion are – part of our commitment to the 100 billion on the helping less developed countries cope with climate change mitigation and adaptation, is already baked in, it’s already boiled into our money.
And the big debate right now, is I think, for those who are looking at this, there’s a big discussion about where the international development strategy should go, now that this has all been rethought, within the FCDO, and there’s a lot of pain and angst that maybe the government is going to cut its commitments to global health and to climate, now emphasise them more on women and girls’ rights, but maybe then a bit more on the Ukraine. Yes, you can get a bit more co-ordination and maybe logic on this and have a less, Bronwen, I think you were saying, sort of, FCDO, so the DFID doing its own thing, and the FCDO doing something else, but you’ve got to be really careful that message doesn’t then become dominated by what Foreign Offices do.
Diplomats deal with crises, they deal with the moment, whereas development is about longer-term commitments, and again, I don’t think it’s a money issue, it’s got to be a focus and decision point. So a long way of saying, or at least on my list of four, it’s about decisions, not about money.
John Kampfner
And in your closing remarks, Robin and, as you say, it’s framed, in terms of resilience, but you are warning against the return of the notion of the supremacy of the Euro-Atlantic vision of the world. In other words, the concept of the West, at the West and the rest. And I suppose to you, Bronwen, on that, that question of, in your view, has Ukraine, in some ways, and the very strong, Western, plus Australia, Japan and others, response to it, do you think that has reinforced that potential for hubris, for a return of the 1990’s agenda, that was then subsequently denounced by others? To what degree is it that? Is it a vision thing, is it a language thing, is it a behavioural thing? Or to what degree – and to what degree is it, as Robin points out, a question of inconsistency on delivery, whether it comes to international development, whether it comes to vaccines, whether it comes to climate, as well?
Bronwen Maddox
You’re asking what difference Ukraine has made?
John Kampfner
Well, to what degree is that – to what degree do you share Robin’s concern about this return of a more arrogant, for want of a better term, sense of Western hegemony, and the extent to which it has not delivered on the resilience agenda, is that juxtaposed?
Bronwen Maddox
It’s a really interesting point, I don’t think there’s a lot of room for arrogance at the moment, nor do I detect an awful lot of it about. Russia’s action in Ukraine has made that point, that whatever assumptions we made about 30 years of international rules and of progression in many countries, towards democracy, that’s been almost literally blown up. And the real – even arrogance and triumphalism are not quite the right words for what you heard in the 90s, from very sober Diplomats, but just the kind of headiness of feeling that they were on the right side of history, they were going around Central and Eastern Europe, really feeling that they were offering, you know, the bounty of the West.
I think that has been smashed and we look the pictures of Ukraine literally smashed, and I don’t find a lot of room for arrogance. There has been though, a strengthening in – of the clarity, I think, of what the West used in the, sort of, sense of the alliance of values, not a geographical sense. What those countries now feel, and perhaps a reminder that they need to put aside some disputes, whether fish or disputes within the European Union or so on, because of this external threat. Indeed, you’ve got a whole vein of commentary in the US, bubbling up about whether the US would have had quite the divisions, political divisions it’s had in the past few decades, if it had had an external enemy.
So I think that, you know, there’s a strengthening of views, of values there, and a strengthening of an alliance, which is not the same thing as a resumption of arrogance. On Robin’s other point, many, many ones there, and I can’t pick them all up, but on the point about money, I still – it gives me pause, Robin, because if there had been the Foreign Office DFID merger and we had not cut the aid budget, then you would still have the questions, you absolutely put, about what is the focus of this, what is the UKs development policy going to be? Do these – you know, is it healthy that these point in two directions?
Many people would say yes, but to combine that with a cut, which was driven by the national finances, at the same time, has produced something of a crisis in that department, from which I think, the development culture and projects have had the worst of it. So I think money does play a part, and it plays a huge part in the military, where we have scaled back, what can do and what we try to do, partly because of a sense of lack of money in many, many competing claims.
John Kampfner
It’s time for questions. We’ve got 25 minutes or so, we’ve also got several now, online. If you could keep to your seats and the mics will come to you. Let’s start at the back, a gentleman there, there’s lots of men, just to say. Sorry, it was just behind, just behind, just there. And if you could please say who you are, and apologies in advance, as I’m new, but if everybody could do that, that would be great.
Sam
Hello, I’m Sam. I was just wondering how…
John Kampfner
And…
Sam Hogg
Oh sorry, I’m Sam Hogg. I write a weekly briefing on UK/China relations. I was just wondering how the panel thought Liz Truss’ Network of Liberty strategy fits into the Global Britain strategy?
John Kampfner
Thank you, let’s take a couple more, so Liz Truss network, let’s take two here in the front, and then a lady there, and thanks, these two right here in the front. So first one, we’ve got Liz Truss, Network of Liberty, thank you.
Mark McDonald
Hi, Mark McDonald, Chatham House member, and I’m in the investment community. Just to paraphrase Barack Obama, with the Integrated Review, does “yes, we can” become “no, we can’t afford it?” We’re heading into higher inflation, we are heading into higher interest rates, a squeeze, I think Bronwen mentioned this, in terms of rising inequalities, net-zero. Twinned with that you’ve got a rising, more integrated EU post, sort of, Ukraine, does UKs sort of soft power become less relevant and the Integrated Review fall to pieces in a government which is in shambles, discuss.
John Kampfner
Discuss, right, no need to move any further, just next to you, thank you.
Sean Curtin
Sean Curtin, also a member of Chatham House. My question is about the definition of Global Britain. Robin mentioned Global Britain in a divided world, but could we not rephrase it as Global England in a divided UK? Bronwen and John briefly touched on it, and the reason I say this is that, in recent years, since the Brexit vote, in the 2019 election we saw Nationalists in Northern Ireland get the most MPs for the first time. We saw the Scottish Nationalists romp home in the 21 Holyrood election, and in May we will see Sinn Féin take the lead in the Stormont Assembly. And it feels to me that the UK is, sort of, like, splitting apart, and that the Prime Minister seems to articulate British Nationalist, and most recently, in his comment about voting for Brexit and the Ukrainian people fighting the Russians, which went down very well in the EU.
John Kampfner
Thank you. Here in the second row, thank you. In the – yeah, here, thank you. Thank you.
Member
This is pretty much a moot question, because the gentleman there has put it so eloquently, and much more in a very quick, succinct detailed way. But I honestly, I’d like your opinions on this, but I give this country ten years before it splits. I just do not see how it’s going to still remain the United Kingdom, especially under the leadership now. What’s that bilateral relationship with Scotland, how’s that going? And where do you see it, and where do you see this country in ten years, and will it be Global Britain, so I’m really just channelling this guy here.
John Kampfner
Yeah, no, that’s great. So we’ve got those four questions, but Robin, because we haven’t asked you yet about the, sort of, the cohesion, the domestic cohesion of the UK, could you take those third and the fourth, and then we’ll take the other questions?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, it’s – I’m very cheeky on this, ‘cause in the first paper I kind of said, “I’m not going to address whether Britain’s going to hang together or not at the beginning of this, ‘cause it’s just, I don’t know.” You know, and so I just parked it, yeah, I mean, okay, that’s what I did and it let me write the paper and get on with it. And I’ve kind of done the same. So, it doesn’t mean your question isn’t really right, it’s just one of those known unknowns that is really difficult to factor in, then to what a government should be doing in the next five to ten years.
Though, comment, ten years’ time, the country might not be the country it is today. Therefore, what decisions might be taken probably in five years’ time, four, five years’ time, that takes the country in that direction? At that point there will be a panel here, and we’ll all be discussing what the hell do we do, and is it going to go that way and how can we stop it? Now, you could argue you should be doing things today that would stop it then, and in a way, the levelling up strategy, which is not just about England, although it’s heavily about England, but it has, I think, quite a big Northern Irish dimension in it, and probably quite a heavy Welsh dimension in it. Scottish dimension, I think Scotland’s a bit more in charge of its own levelling up. May or may not have paid off by that time. But I suppose the point I would make is that yes, there’s huge appetite, but it’s a bit like, as I said, I’ve got to be very careful of my parallels. There are certain countries that love being in the EU and complaining about being in the EU. But the idea of being outside the EU, in a very dangerous and difficult environment, can give pause for thought, when you actually have to take the actual leap and the jump.
So, everything that we see about the politics and so on, would lead you to think at the moment, especially in Scotland, and maybe increasingly, in Northern Ireland, as I’m always reminded by Welsh friends of mine, “Don’t forget Wales.” But money, the more constrained the money is, I mean, you look at those numbers for Scotland, and I don’t know what the latest number is, but the Scotland only deficit of debt to GDP on an annual basis, so deficit to GDP on an annual basis, is over 10% now. It’s going to be worse if everything we’ve heard from both Bronwen and Sophia is correct, which it is.
So, the money call for separation is going to get more and more difficult, not least as England still appears to be the main provider out of net money, to all three of the other nations. And the security dimension will be interesting, because, actually, yeah, when it was all nice kumbaya world of globalisation, you could think of your own future, separated out. But it may be that if the more divided world is the reality, a bit more hanging together just plays at those margins, if we are talking about a 45/55 potential vote split in one direction or the other, it only takes 5% to knock it the other way, in a net number.
So, that’s all I’m going to say. I can’t see the future. I think there are some different dynamics that will play against the change, yeah, and let’s see what happens.
John Kampfner
Sophia, could you answer the point about Liz Truss, and the Network of Liberty, the phrase in which she actually used here, in terms of defining priorities in foreign policy, and to what degree, or what is your audit on that?
Sophia Gaston
Well, to some extent, I’ve already answered this question because I made reference to this point about us becoming a more competitive infrastructure and technology tender partner, and I think that is the central aspect of it in a way. It is hugely aligned, and kind of brought to life through this British international – British Investment International project, and I believe there will be a series of, sort of, new strategic frameworks coming in the months ahead, that will put more meat on the bones of that and reorganise within that. And I would imagine that we are likely to see the international development strategy hooking into that very, very strongly. But I think, you know, in – to some degree, it is about, you know, and let’s be frank, it’s not a network of democracies, it’s called the Network of Liberty. And there is a transactional element to that, in that you can kind of roll in and out your docking points.
We share, you know, countries like Vietnam or other countries in the Indo-Pacific in particular, but, you know, around the world there are going to be countries with whom we share some interests, and maybe not all of our values or principles. And so I think it’s trying to be an accommodating structure for that. I would say though that that project can probably only be successful if we are actually also assuming a little bit, and this is probably a provocation, but more confidence in the projection of our cultural diplomacy. I do think there is something about those relationships, which are enduring the sort of relationships that facilitate an agreement, like AUKUS, in which there’s some pretty serious pooling of sovereignty going on there. And you know, I just don’t think we can say like for like, and only take a hardnosed view about our strategic interests, these values and principles of democracy and openness and transparency and the freedom of people, is all incredibly important. So I think that will come into it.
Can I quickly respond on the others, or are they…?
John Kampfner
Yeah, just very quickly, ‘cause I – just very short answers, because we’ve about half a dozen online I’d like to go to immediately.
Sophia Gaston
Just on the final one about the whole of the UK foreign policy, I mean, I would say that more important than the national distinctions, with the UK, is probably just a broader trend around the politicisation of foreign policy. So, it’s in – in many cases, there’s some very, kind of, hostile views I’m getting about foreign policy when I’m doing focus groups or surveys in Scotland, and not necessarily pertaining to this Scottish identity. They’re pertaining to their political alignment, and particularly their antipathy towards this particular government. And that is something that extends outside of Scotland, certainly, so I think what we should be most attuned to – I mean, look, I’ve – we need to invest in this. We can’t be complacent about it, and I think we do need to reach into the erosion of this concept of the national interest in our foreign policy.
John Kampfner
Could we go online first, and just want to call in a couple of questioners, and then I’ll read out a couple of questions. David Manning, David, are you there? You’ve got a question on US relations [pause]. If David isn’t there, I’ll read out David’s question.
David Manning
Yes, I have managed to unmute, I think, John.
John Kampfner
Excellent. Right, hi there, David, your question?
David Manning
So thank you very much, and can I just – David Manning, Distinguished Fellow of Chatham House, thanks to Robin really. And thank you Robin very much for reviewing the Integrated Review and it seems to me it’s very timely. My question is in two halves, if I may, and they’re both about America and one is to ask how you think we’re doing with the Biden administration? The Integrated Review made it clear that the relationship with the United States, not only remained our most important bilateral relationship, but was in the light of Brexit, going to require even greater salience probably. And yet we’ve had a year when we’ve had the Afghan issue, which I think Bronwen referred to, we’ve had the difficulties over Northern Ireland, we’ve had no free trade agreement delivered. What is your take, Robin, and indeed, the other two great experts on the panel, on where we stand, actually, with the United States? And how do you feel we should prepare ourselves against the possibility that whatever our relationship with Biden may be, we may face the return of Trump, in three years’ time?
And since we now lean so very heavily on NATO, having left the EU, and yet we know that President Trump was thinking about taking the United States out of NATO, what would this mean for Britain, and I have wondered, in the last few weeks, what would it have been like, the Ukraine crisis, if we’d had President Trump?
John Kampfner
Maybe we’ll leave the account of that out, but thank you David. Bronwen, do you want to go first, how do we insure ourselves, I mean, that’s against the return of Trump or Trumpism?
Bronwen Maddox
And I’m trying to think what kind of world market you could buy such insurance on. I think it’s a very good question that David has put. Our relations are thinner than we would like them to be. I think returning to that theme, we have had this, as David Manning said, the point made by the US setting the terms of the Afghan episode, though I would say that the UK and its military could have drawn more warning from the direction of travel, of the talks for the Taliban, a good six months earlier than the UK did. And in the lack of preparation, the lack of British preparation for that exit, partly has itself to blame. We do have the strain of a Northern Ireland, and indeed, no free trade agreement.
We need to – on NATO, I think – first think what we and others are prepared to do, and that is partly a European conversation, which is going at the moment, in a positive direction. I remember years ago, when Tony Blair and George Bush were standing up and announcing all kinds of things together, people were writing eloquently about the death of NATO at that point, that between the UK and the US, they had made it redundant. And NATO has been struggling for some years, President Putin has done more to revive it and its sense of purpose, and indeed, its funding, than years of American complaining that Europe has managed to do. But we do need to continue that, that business of strengthening NATO.
We need to have some tough conversations now about what we would do if China made moves on Taiwan, whatever those moves were. We can’t have a foreign policy that simply consists of wishful thinking or, kind of, private exultations for the US to do something where we’re not. So we really need to think, you know, what is our foreign policy, and to what extent is it separate from the US? It’s, you know, clearly it – the US remains our closest ally in many, many ways, but the relationship isn’t quite what we would have liked it to be, for many years, and that goes back well before Biden. And on Trump, I think on Ukraine, we – the world would be in a much more difficult place had Trump been there. In fact, it’s sobering to think what overt encouragement he might have given President Putin, and I’m going just by Trump’s offhand remarks about how clever Putin’s move was, in the immediate aftermath of the beginning of the invasion.
John Kampfner
It’s obviously a subject that merits a very long discussion, but Robin, if I can ask you, in a few words, on both those questions, the relationship with Biden, and the insurance policy against Trump. But also, you were talking earlier in your remarks about the strong and increasingly strong US-EU relationship and how the UK plays into that, in both scenarios now.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I mean, just very quickly, the discussion about Trump is a reminder that, as Sophia was saying a second ago, the divisions within nations are often as big as the divisions outside. So the deep splits and polarisation inside our societies, are part of the weakness of our foreign policy= and the unpredictability of it, as much as Scotland versus – so, I think that’s just a very important reminder.
But to David’s point, I think the UK is actually in a good place with the Biden administration, where they want us to be good with them, with just helping on NATO, being a useful wingman, in the Indo-Pacific, through AUKUS and being, you know, one of the lead partners in that sort of [inaudible – 73:34] kind of role that we’ve done in the past, on intelligence around Ukraine. So that was a real example of the UK-US duo, UK in that small partner way, helping along. But obviously, the EU relationship, the Biden administration is committed to the EU, and if we’re not, then they will gain us. And American administrations are expert at gaining the UK versus others, they’ve done it forever. And they did it when I was in Washington, when Bronwen was in Washington, on defence, and we were in Iraq, shoulder-to-shoulder, they wouldn’t give the UK all sorts of defence co-operation agreements that had been promised.
So I just think, David, you know this, you were based there as well, the UK is doing fine with the Biden administration, but it’s always got to be watching itself, and this brings me to your second point, how do you hedge? A bit of a broken record here, I think the way the UK hedges is through the G7. Formalise, if you can, in some way, it won’t be easy, everyone’s got to agree, but try to formalise a bit more the G7 process. Because then, if you get a Trump in later on, G7 is something that can be just blown up, because it doesn’t really exist except for when the leaders want to get together. And start to have it there as a kind of lifeboat for when things might go a little wrong, which they could go wrong potentially, with a future US administration, and if not, it keeps the US engaged in a larger community in which the UK has a voice.
Bronwen Maddox
Can I just ask, Robin, do you think that Russia’s action on Ukraine has split the G20, which was having a great era, and has it now shattered it?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
That’s a very good point, ‘cause one of the points I saying, part of the reason for the G7 we need to invest in it again, because the G20 cannot play the role. I mean, what Biden has said, in his own inimitable style, in his recent unexpected comments, is his gut and the gut of many people, which is, “I’m not going to meet with that guy,” you know, “he’s got to go, because I won’t be in a room with him.” And given where China is on that, and other countries, India and so on, the G20 becomes a shell, and real action has to then happen in a G7 plus, which is like a – there’s always been a caucus inside the G20, will make that caucus more real.
The EU will object to it, Japan will be cautious, but might think maybe it’s worth it. Remember, Japan and South Korea are saying “We’d better step up with the rest of the G7 on the Ukraine, ‘cause we need you guys if things go wrong in our part of the world later.” So this is a moment to grab.
John Kampfner
So we’ve only got five, maximum, ten minutes left, just to save time, I’m just going to read out. There’s a couple of questions on globalisation, and I’ll just read one of them out from online, and then we’ll quickly go back to a couple of questions in the hall, if we can. From Yosef Isaac, if I’ve pronounced your name correctly Yosef, “Does the world risk becoming less global, after Ukraine, after the invasion of Ukraine and how would this affect the Global Britain agenda?” So, in other words, this is a fascinating question, with regard to obviously the severing of ties, but also, sanctions and the repatriation of so much of this agenda. Who wants to talk to that?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Just a quick a quick comment, just to be very – sorry, anyone want to go first, no?
Bronwen Maddox
Well, can you dive in and then I’ll say something, and Sophia.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Go. You’re going. Go on.
Bronwen Maddox
Yes is the answer, I think. You know, technology, trade, the finance, sanctions, difficulty in travel, difficulty in visas, yes, the world has got a lot smaller. What does it mean for Global Britain? It makes it much, much harder, and it means, going back to Sam’s point about Liz Truss, that you get more of what in the Iraq era, was called ‘coalitions of the willing countries’, who can find common cause on something, but yes, these ambitious international pacts of openness have really had a real battering.
John Kampfner
Sophia.
Sophia Gaston
It’s obviously not just Ukraine, it’s the pandemic as well, and it’s also the processes that we’ve been going through in our democracies, responding to the systemic challenge of China’s rise, all of that entouring of supply chains and so on, has been taking place for quite some time.
I think we need to think about this in the, sort of, context of there is going to be a greater degree of Balkanisation in various aspects of the way in which we function, as a global economy and a marketplace of ideas and movement and so on. But we also need to intensify our openness and co-operation with others who we deem within that sphere of trusted partners. And so those processes have to be symbiotic, and we have to really put a lot of energy into the second one, because we’ve spent a lot of time on the first. And the thing is, a lot of the resilience agenda, is often couched just in that first frame of, sort of, pulling up the drawbridge a little bit and making ourselves more self-sufficient. We actually have to position co-operation as a source of resilience. And, you know, I think one thing we should be taking a very positive lesson from Ukraine on, is, you know, there has been this narrative developing, I mean, quite rightly so, our advanceable democracies have been in a pretty tough state over the past decade. And I think we’ve got some big structural weaknesses, but by God, the case for democracies has been surprisingly resilient, agile, responsive, and capable of moving to flexible scenarios. And the counterargument against authoritarian states, I think, is being made.
John Kampfner
Robin.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I agree entirely with the analysis, what more can I – yes, I think however, for the UK, as a solo trade power or solo trade payer, player, there are opportunities, because in a way, for the EU, again it’s very difficult to do these big cross deals, and you’ve got a lot of different interests within there, across different sectors within the EU. But if you’re the UK, and trying to do a sectoral deal, in the specific services area, which is less about onshoring and less about those kinds of risks, actually, the UK, in a more Balkanised world, has got a bit more room for manoeuvre. So I don’t want to – too much of Drake and small boats, you know, with the big galleons around, but what the hell, I’ve said it, so I can’t draw it back now. But I think, you know, just try not to be negative about this, ‘cause I think there are some opportunities for smaller players.
I mean, there’s a little chart in the report I’ve done, of already where the UK compares to other players in the trade deals that it’s done. And what’s interesting in there is the UK already is a bit more knitted up than the EU and the US. So I think in this Balkanised world the big players are stuck, but the smaller ones might be able to get some things done.
John Kampfner
The datasets in the report by the way, are fascinating, which obviously is not rendered in an event like this, so it’s another reason to read the report in full. Two questions in – three questions, lady there, and two here in the front, and literally – who’s bringing the mics? Okay, gentleman here, lady there, and gentleman here. But they’ve got to be one sentence, and then we’re going to have one sentence answers. One sentence question, literally very short.
Euan Grant
Oh dear, and it’s a little bit longer than that. It is written out.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Get a drink, then.
John Kampfner
Do it over a drink. Lady there in the third row. Thank you.
Nicki
Hi, I’m Nicki. I’m a student. How do you see our UK Indo-Pacific strategy different from the rest of Europe and UK – and the US? And can I have one more question about China, like, how do you see UK-China relations going forward with this Hong Kong situation? Thank you.
John Kampfner
Right, one sentence on Indo-Pacific, one sentence on China, that’s going to be easy, isn’t it?
Arthur Corvin Powell
Hello, everybody, my name is Arthur Corvin Powell. I’m the CEO of Project Ukraine, so we’re trying to help rebuild them. Can we start sanctioning Western elites, such as ex-Chancellor Schröder? They are as responsible as the Russian elites. They’re as corrupt, it’s a multi-layered, cancerous tentacle of Russian corruption, let’s hit it, yeah.
John Kampfner
That’s a very good challenge. I would certainly endorse anything on Schröder myself, but – and I’m a Germanophile, and I think his approach has been utterly abhorrent. But let’s stick therefore to Indo-Pacific and China, and let’s use this as wrapping up thoughts, Bronwen.
Bronwen Maddox
Nicki, it was a very good question. I think Britain has to acknowledge the threat from China, not just the commercial opportunities, which assorted governments have been committed to pursuing, and it needs to look at those two things together. It has begun to do that, if you look at the Huawei treatment here. But you know, it needs to keep talking to China, and pursue that separately from the US.
On Schröder, Arthur, I agree with you, I’m glad that Germans now seem to be increasingly of that view. But for many years, they weren’t, and that was obviously their choice. I have to stop there.
John Kampfner
Great, that’s perfectly succinct. Sophia, that’s your challenge.
Sophia Gaston
How is our Indo-Pacific strategy different? I think it’s very strong emphasis on trade and dialogue relationships, it’s focus on development, which I think will probably come into view, over the coming months. And AUKUS, for which it will both be kind of an amplifier and a counterbalance to areas of America and Australia’s interests there. China, we need a strategy, we need a UK-China strategy. You do not have one, you need to do that, because we need to do a full audit of our vulnerabilities, across every single department, in a really co-ordinated way, so that we can engage in that relationship from a point of greater confidence.
And on Ukraine, I salute you, I’m glad you’re doing this. We haven’t actually got to one of the most fundamental questions, which is what role is the UK going to play in the reconstruction of Ukraine? And not just diplomatically, but the enormous amount of money that’s going to need to be put in there. So, we have done a lot of really good work in Ukraine, through investment agreements and so on, for a long time. We have been playing a long game, but there’s going to be a big, big question that’s going to land on our doorstep very soon, and I hope we take an ambitious role in that.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Absolutely. Four lines, I think. One on the Network of Liberty, I’m just jumping in here. The Network of Liberty, I don’t think, in my mind, Sophia, is coterminous with the Network of Democracies, as you said. But really, you’ve got a Network of Liberty, and you’ll have a Network of Pragmatism, and they’re going to co-exist next to each other, and there’s a line about this in the report. ‘Cause Liz Truss, I think, put it quite articulately, in the answer to her question, that she reckons we can do with both. “We’ll work with those countries that are not undermining liberty, even if they are not democracies.” And, you know, I think in today’s divided world, we need to live with that.
The UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy is different from most EU countries, other than France, in that it’s focused on security more than others. It does have a heavy economic dimension, but that’s nascent, but it’s really about showing to America that we can be there to help a bit in ways that other European countries are more economic.
On the UK-China relationship, the golden era has gone completely, buried, and what you’re moving to now, I hope, is a relationship where the guardrails are clear. What’s out of bounds and what’s in bounds. America does this very well. America tells everyone else to don’t trade with these people, don’t – but then, America’s doing some great stuff with Boeing, with China, a lot of financial companies are in China. You’re working out your guardrails, so I think if we can work out the guardrails, and critical infrastructure goes off, other things go off, then the UK will arrive at an intelligent strategy that will be sustainable.
And then the last thing on your last question, we released – well, I had to kind of engineer slightly, the release of our report, The UK’s Kleptocracy’s Problem, which you can still find on our website, back in December, we were releasing it, it turns out, on the same day as Liz Truss was giving her speech at Chatham House, or was going to. So we had to, sort of, disentangle the two of them, because it’s, you know, there was a problem. But there was a question asked about it. What the report talks about here is preventing people from being able to profit from engineering those relationships. So rather than just jailing Schröder, Schröder is on the board of companies that are not sanctioned, so you can’t do much about it. Unless you want to sanction Gazprom Rosneft, but they’re not actually sanctioned as companies yet, as I understand. But what you can do is make it much more difficult for people to profit from the illegal money.
We have to change our laws, the government’s doing it, the UK’s catching up late on this weakness in its position.
John Kampfner
I can’t resist asking a very quick question that’s online, and I can answer on your behalf, Robin. The first half of the answer is yes, and the second half of the answer is unlikely. And the question is, “A positive future for Britain depends on the integrity of its leadership, would Robin Niblett consider becoming Prime Minister?” [Applause] And “Chatham House team becoming Cabinet Ministers?” That bit is the unlikely one. So you have the opportunity to, over the drinks, to ask your longer question of Robin and the panellists. Please do, if you want more information about The UK and The World Project, talk to my colleague David, or myself. We’ll be upstairs for drinks as well.
May I thank you all online for paying so much attention. I’m so sorry we didn’t get a chance to get so many of you here, and online, to ask – to answer – to ask questions. A huge thanks, we never heard from Nick Timothy, but if you were in cyberspace, Nick, it was great, thank you for being there, and hope – and best wishes for your recovery. To you, Sophia, to Bronwen, thank you hugely, for your participation in the event and for your thoughts, and we look forward to working more with you in this project, as we go forward. And a particular thanks to you, Robin. Thank you very much, everybody [applause].
