What the UK should do in defence of Ukraine and Europe

The UK must lead on Ukraine’s defence with clear spending commitments – and invest in European collaboration. 

Expert comment Published 18 February 2025 4 minute READ

Last week’s Munich Security Conference marked the moment when the US told Europe emphatically that it could not rely on transatlantic support. Vice-President JD Vance’s diatribe at the event, in which he railed against the alleged cultural decline of Europe and the UK, powerfully illustrated this sudden dislocation between Washington and European capitals.  

It is right for the UK to now step in and take a leading role defending Ukraine and the continent: it is one of Europe’s few full-spectrum military powers, Europe contains its closest trading partners, and the region is key to UK security.  

There are five areas the UK should now prioritize to support this effort:

Defence spending – 2.5 per cent and more

For the UK to take a credible leadership position, it must commit to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence by the next financial year – and to raising it thereafter.

The UK needs to reorient away from the assumptions that underpinned the war on terror.

The UK’s forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, led by Lord Robertson, was already expected to state an urgent case for higher defence spending – repeating the point made by a Lords report in autumn 2024 that the UK has sufficient ammunition for only two and a half days of intense fighting. 

Recruitment, investment and procurement – including from the US – need to be shaped into a coherent plan. More than that, the UK needs to reorient away from the assumptions that underpinned the war on terror: expeditionary combat against non-state enemies, frequently complementing a larger US military presence. 

European thinking on financing defence spending

How to fund that increased spending is a problem the UK shares with its fellow European countries. For many – including probably the UK – it will mean more borrowing. 

Countries which have spent years enjoying the benefits of the peace dividend, in effect taking money out of defence budgets to pay for health services, welfare and pensions, may look to tilt back the other way. But that is a tough political challenge which will take years, even decades to realize. 

In the short term, many will look to borrow more. The UK government, operating under tight (though self-imposed) fiscal rules, is well placed to help steer a discussion about ways of doing this that would not send interest rates jumping up.  

Essentially, that means convincing capital markets that the money is earmarked for defence – not general government spending. The EU overall might look to loosen the fiscal rules under which it has been operating for more than a decade – but this is also a dilemma for nation states beyond the EU.

London is already proving a magnet for many early-stage informal conversations about whether this might be done with defence bonds, defence development banks, pooled borrowing or other schemes. 

Contributing to a peacekeeping force in Ukraine 

However, a sustained military commitment requires more than new spending. UK troop numbers are a significant concern that cannot be resolved overnight. 

Former military chiefs such as Lord Dannatt have questioned the British army’s ability to muster even 10,000 troops for Ukraine.

UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has now stated that he would be prepared to station British troops in Ukraine, even if the requirements of the commitment are still unclear (and even if it is uncertain what make-up of peacekeeping force can be agreed). This is the right move, if he wants the UK to have influence. Yet a deployment by the UK is far from straightforward.

The UK does not have enough troops to sustain the likely contribution it would need to make in the long term. Former military chiefs such as Lord Dannatt have questioned the British army’s ability to muster even 10,000 troops for Ukraine – where Kyiv says a total force of more than 100,000 will be needed. To address manpower concerns, the UK will need to overcome difficult, longstanding problems with recruitment and retention.

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Regardless, British troops would have to work closely with other European militaries. But Poland has said it will not contribute forces to Ukraine. That leaves only France as a significant partner – even there, a potentially significant change of government looms on the horizon.

Cooperation with Europe on defence industry development

The UK government and its EU partners appear to have reached a sense of the perimeters of the much-vaunted reset in post-Brexit relations. The UK should put defence cooperation at the heart of this reset. This is one of the areas where both sides share an interest in developing more of their own military capabilities and funding their own defence.

There must be a shared reorientation to addressing joint geopolitical risks together.

National defence investment is a contentious issue, where countries battle to protect their own industries. But there are efficiencies from working together – and following Munich, the case for collaboration is compelling.

An ambitious reset on defence and security should not just focus on regular consultation and the odd PESCO project. There must be a shared reorientation to addressing joint geopolitical risks together.

A bridge to the US

Perhaps to Starmer’s surprise, he appears to be getting on well with US President Donald Trump – at least judging by Trump’s pronouncements. That relationship is vulnerable to the speed, demands and unpredictability of the Trump team; much will depend on Starmer’s meeting with Trump in Washington next week.

But the relationship also owes something to the UK government’s tactic of ‘don’t poke the bear’ – that is, avoiding unnecessary provocations and finding issues on which to join the US.

So far, that has allowed the UK some room in which to depart from the Trump line, for instance on Israel. The UK has also made a point of not ‘playing every ball that comes onto the pitch’ – not reacting to everything the White House says. It is a sensible strategy, but its success is not under the UK’s control.

The UK may have to choose between the US and Europe at some point. It should, for now, still try to cultivate both. The greater danger is that it ends up with a shallow relationship with each, making a nonsense of its ambition of serving as a ‘bridge’ between the two. Improving defence relationships with Europe immediately is a good start.