Ben Horton
Good afternoon, everybody. Good morning to anyone joining us from the US, or from further afield, if you’re in a different time zone. Hello, my name is Ben Horton and I’m Head of the Director’s Office here at Chatham House. It’s wonderful to be invited back to moderate yet another of these Members’ Question Time events. Tey keep letting me back, they keep giving me power to ask these questions of our experts. It’s a great privilege, and a great responsibility, which I take very seriously, of course. This is our monthly series where Chatham House members get to raise their concerns about the critical issues shaping international relations and engage directly with the Senior Researchers at Chatham House. And today we’re talking about the role of the People’s Liberation Army, the PLA, in China’s foreign policy.
I’m really delighted to be joined by my colleague, William Matthews, to discuss this topic. William is a Senior Research Fellow within our Asia-Pacific Programme, focusing on China’s role in the world. As China’s global influence has grown, so too has the power of its military. The People’s Liberation Army has undergone a rapid transformation in recent years, modernising its technology, increasing its strategic reach and evolving in response to both domestic and international pressures. Increasing naval power, new missile systems, cyberwarfare capabilities and in – advancements in space and AI are all areas in which the PLA has looked to gain a global advantage. Defence spending has steadily risen, as President Xi Jinping looks to challenge America’s military dominance, but is China’s military able to meet China’s foreign policy objectives? That’s what we’re here to discuss today.
A little bit of housekeeping before we get into this topic. This event is on the record and a video will be published afterwards of our discussion. We’d encourage you to share your thoughts on the event. on whatever social media platform you remain attached to. It says ‘tweet’ here, I will be sharing it on X, I guess, and – but many other platforms besides. Please do use the hashtag, #CH_Events, and tag us @ChathamHouse, if we’re on the platform you’re using. If you’d like to ask a question during this conversation, you can do so by submitting it in the Q&A box that will appear at the bottom of your Zoom feed. I’ll do my best to get to as many of these as possible, as well as covering the many questions that were sent to us beforehand by our audience members. Thank you very much for sending those, so many interesting points to pick up on.
So, I’m going to hand over now to William for some opening thoughts on this topic, before diving straight into Q&A as quickly as I can. At the end of the event, the Events Team will share a poll where you can vote on an aspect of what you’ve heard today. We’re going to make you give us a bit of a prediction of what you think the next decade holds for the PLA and China’s foreign policy, so stay tuned for that. So, over to you, William. Thanks so much for joining us today and it’s great to have you with us.
William Matthews
Oh, brilliant, thank you, Ben, and it’s great to be here to talk about this very, sort of, important, and increasingly important topic, actually. So, I’ll start off by just, sort of, giving some thoughts on what I think are, kind of like, the, sort of, top line aspects to be aware of when it comes to PLA in Chinese foreign policy and international ambitions.
So, what is the PLA? The PLA, the People’s Liberation Army, this is China’s military, it’s not just the army, the ground forces, it’s also the navy, the air force, the rocket force, that encompasses China’s conventional and nuclear missile capabilities. And the People’s Liberation Army is not a, strictly speaking, a national army, it is a party army. It’s the army of the Communist Party of China. Since its inception in, you know, the early days of the CCP and the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party has emphasised having civilian and party control of the military. And that is what we have now with the PLA led by the Central Military Commission, headed by Xi Jinping himself, both as highest military authority and highest political authority in China.
So, that’s what it is, but why should we care about it? Well, the PLA is, you know, the largest military in the world. It’s key to China’s broad strategic goal of displacing the United States as the major power in East Asia and the Western Pacific. So, there’s a key, sort of, geopolitical goal there for building up its power to a level where it can compete toe-to-toe with the United States. It would also be central to any Chinese attempt to unify with Taiwan, and also to China’s attempts to assert control over its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, as well as securing China’s thousands of miles of borders.
It’s in the news a lot. It’s continuously deploying in grey-zone operations, particularly around Taiwan, but also because it’s modernising rapidly, and this includes upgrading of China’s, sort of, hardware capabilities, modernising how the PLA operates in a modern war, kind of, situation, expanding its nuclear forces. And through the PLA’s growing international presence in joint exercises, including with Russia, where we’ve seen, sort of, increasing co-operation there between the two militaries as part of that, sort of, closening political relationship. But also, through things like UN peacekeeping missions, and as China’s international interests have expanded, the expansion of PLA bases and so on, to maintain security of shipping lanes and other economic interests of China.
So, what are China’s ambitions for the PLA, particularly in the region? Since the 1990s, particularly following China’s observation of how the US military performed in the Gulf War, China has been very concerned with being able to take on the United States in a conflict where there was a, sort of, dis – an asymmetry of technology and, kind of, high level, hi-tech capability. So, actually, since then, the modernisation of the PLA has really been focused on being able to take on and defeat the United States in a regional conflict, most likely over Taiwan. But the PLA also has broader – a broader security role in maintaining things like security on the long border with India, where there have been significant tensions in recent years, the Myanmar border, where the ongoing civil war there poses security risks to China, both within the country and on the Chinese border itself, the security of the Korean Peninsula. And, of course, always having the PLA on hand as a, sort of, instrument of last resort in maintaining internal order, particularly in areas like Xinjiang and Tibet, where there are concerns from the government with separatism, terrorism and so on.
So, just briefly on, sort of, the PLA’s current capabilities. Overall, Beijing’s efforts to modernise the PLA have been pretty successful, so far. On paper, at least, technically, it’s a highly capable military, it’s a major regional military power, and arguably a peer of the United States now in its immediate region. But it’s not capable of global power projection like the United States. What it does have, though, is the backing of a huge, sort of, industrial and manufacturing economy, which is capable of, sort of, producing very large numbers of new equipment and rapidly, kind of, disseminating those into the forces themselves.
It’s also been quite successful in, sort of, gear – re-gearing its doctrine, that is how the armed forces would actually operate in a war, to a very, sort of, technical – technologically infused form of warfare, what the PLA calls “informationized and intelligentized warfare,” that is, the importance of information for military operations, the importance of technologies, like AI and automation. At the same time, there are still issues. There’s been major restructuring of the PLA under Xi Jinping, partly to root out vested interests and corruption, but also to ensure that actually, what used to be a very army-dominated and not particularly technologically cutting-edge force, can actually transform into one that can – that is capable of that, kind of, informational and intelligent warfare that would be needed today.
There’s been a – corruption scandals in association with that disruption to the PLA high command, through purges by Xi Jinping, and there remain concerns about whether the PLA is actually experienced enough, given that it hasn’t actually fought in a war since the late 1970s with Vietnam. So, on balance, growing capabilities, but still some areas of concern for Beijing. But nonetheless, the United States is clearly concerned about China’s capacity to challenge it, as a peer, what that would mean geopolitically for the balance of power in East Asia. The Pentagon has labelled the PLA as its “key pacing challenge,” that is the military they need to pay attention to, to make sure that they can stay ahead.
I think, you know, going forward, as well, there are a lot of questions there about the relative balance of power, the geopolitical implications for East Asia, particularly for US allies in East Asia, of a China that could become more dominant and more able to assert its position, backing up its economic power with serious military capability. And then all the questions of risks and threat perceptions that go with that, in terms of, you know, you’ve got two major powers trying to face off against each other, but also – not wanting to start a war, but also realising they need to keep pace with each other, if they’re going to maintain an effective deterrent. So, that creates an ongoing environment of risk in East Asia, but I’ll stop there and maybe we can move onto some Q&A.
Ben Horton
Absolutely. Thank you so much, William, that was a great overview there. So many topics raised and so many questions already coming in the chat, so thank you for those. We have a lot of different questions to focus on here, so just a plea to our audience, like, this event is very much primarily about China’s military capabilities and the uses of that, so broader questions on China we will cover in other, sort of, discussions, through Chatham House’s event programme. Feel free to reach out to William directly. This email is on our website. I hope you don’t mind me saying that, William…
William Matthews
No, please take…
Ben Horton
…if you’ve got a non-military related question that you want – that you’d like to ask. But first off, I wanted to start with a question that was sent to us ahead of time, which is, essentially, what is China’s military being developed with an eye to doing? What’s the military for? The person that asked this question says – it remains nameless, but said, “It would appear that China has no ambition to conquer territory, so the PLA’s role is one of defence of China rather than some, sort of, proactive, invasive external role.” Or perhaps is another role that – it’s a way – you know, by setting up a military that can contribute to international peacekeeping efforts overseas, that that might be a way to assert China’s, sort of, constructive influence and role in the, kind of, multilateral…
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
…system. So, what do you have a sense that these capabilities are being developed to do?
William Matthews
Yeah, sure. So, just on that, sort of, peacekeeping point first, that is something that China is trying to do. It’s trying to, sort of, portray itself as a responsible international player, contributing to things like UN peacekeeping. It doesn’t need a military of the scale and level of modernisation that it’s developing in order to do that. From China’s perspective, I think, yes, the official line from Beijing is that this is for defensive purposes, but it should be borne in mind that, from Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.
The situation on the ground is a little different. It’s a de facto independent country, even if not formally so, and China’s military is, yeah, is being developed with a view to being capable of conquering Taiwan by force, should it need to do so. So, Beijing has a number of red lines over Taiwan, where it has, sort of, made clear that it would be open to the use of force, and those include a situation where Beijing judges Taiwan independence to become a formalised reality and that it wouldn’t be able to go back from.
So, ultimately, there is a defensive capability, though, alongside that, which is about the United States. China has perceived the United States as seeking to contain its ambitions, including through military means. And I think it’s important to bear in mind that from Beijing’s perspective, China has experienced – historically, the People’s Republic of China, has experienced conflict with the United States during the Korean War, nuclear coercion by the United States in the Korean War, and, you know, China is surrounded by US military allies. The, like, the key driving force in terms of the direction that China has taken its military modernisation is very much geared towards those two things, then. It’s being able to take Taiwan, if it needs to, and being able to fight with and ideally, prevail over, the United States in such a conflict.
Ben Horton
Thanks, William, and one more question that was sent to us in advance, before I dive into the live Q&A, which is just about how sure we are that we have a good understanding of China’s military capabilities. The person that asked the question drew a, sort of, comparison and analogy with what we’ve seen of our understanding of the Russian military and how that has developed as the conflict in Ukraine has rolled out. And, you know, in some cases, you know, vastly overstating what Russia – what we thought the Russian military might be able to do, and in other cases, actually Russia’s military proving more resilient and able to adapt in ways that people maybe thought wasn’t necessarily the case previously. So, short of a, kind of, live example of the PLA’s…
William Matthews
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Horton
…kind of, on the ground capabilities, like, how sure are we that we really know…
William Matthews
Sure.
Ben Horton
…what the situation is?
William Matthews
Yeah, and there’s a couple of aspects to that. I mean, ultimately, as with any military, but particularly the military in a one-party state like China, there’s only so much information one can get meaningful access to. But that said, there is a lot of information out there in terms of China’s capabilities and, also, through things like China’s defence diplomacy engagements, engagements in joint exercises, and things like that. I thi – I mean, I think the question really comes down to even if it looks good on paper, would it actually hold up in the event of a conflict? Which is obviously, sort of, where, kind of, questions have been raised about Russia in relation to Ukraine.
Well, ultimately, it is impossible to know without a conflict actually breaking out, but I think, on balance, there’s less of a risk of overestimation when it comes to China, for a few reasons. First, you know, part of the problems that Russia has faced have been due to systemic corruption within the forces. As I mentioned, that has been a problem within the PLA, but I think the trajectory there has been one of actually relative success in rooting out a lot of the vested interests which could hamper operational effectiveness.
Also, you know, in the, kind of – China has been preparing the PLA for a very specific kind of conflict. There is a war that the PLA wants to be capable of fighting, and it is one with the United States over Taiwan, and all of their, you know, their equipment, their modernisation, has been geared towards that. The question of combat experience, though, is serious. China hasn’t experienced combat in a major war, but the kind of war that would be fought over Taiwan is also on that actually no country has really fought since World War Two. So, if you were to have a US-China conflict, yes, the US military has greater actual on the ground operational experience. There is a question there, though, of how far that would actually translate into a huge scale maritime conflict of the kind that that would arise over Taiwan.
Ben Horton
Thank you. Well, I feel like I’ve been burying the lead a bit and keeping our audience waiting for that big question, which has come up a couple of times already in your answers over Taiwan, and a number of questions have already come in in the chat about it. So, I’m just going to refer to a few of them. So, Thomas has come in with a question around the reports that the CIA put out, that Xi had instructed PLA leaders to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, and Thomas just wonders, “Has that actually been confirmed publicly?” Is that a directive that that we know actually to be the case? Is that China’s, kind of, glide path for…
William Matthews
Sure.
Ben Horton
…readiness? And Geoffrey Allen also asks a, kind of, related question on, you know, the implications, or how useful these, kind of, staging exercises that the PLA have been running in the vicinity of Taiwan, how useful are they in actually preparing the PLA for a full-scale invasion? So, do you want to take a couple of – just those two on Taiwan?
William Matthews
Yeah, sure.
Ben Horton
Carry on.
William Matthews
Sure. So, on the ‘2027’ question, yeah, this is something that that comes up quite a lot in these discussions. What that is, is a milestone on the way to military modernisation, and there are a few dates which are quite important, 2027, 2035, 2049, as milestones along the way for the PLA becoming a worldclass military, that is, among other things, capable of taking Taiwan. That does not mean, though, that there is a definite PLA plan, or Chinese plan, to attack Taiwan in 2027, and that I think is where often, in some commentary, you get some confusion around that. China clearly wants to have this capacity, but I don’t think it’s, sort of, at a fixed point on the agenda that they’re – they would want to initiate a conflict or launch an operation to take Taiwan.
That actually goes quite nicely into the question of, sort of, the grey-zone operations around Taiwan and so on. I mean, Beijing’s ideal scenario is to not to have to launch any kind of amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The ideal scenario for Beijing is to continue those operations around Taiwan. So, those involve things like continuous incursions into Taiwan’s, sort of, air defence identification zone, so air space around Taiwan, waters around Taiwan, increasingly including what are called “joint combat readiness patrols,” where you’ve got different branches of the PLA, the navy, the air force, and so on, working together in different kinds of exercises.
Now, these do enhance the PLA’s, sort of, operational effectiveness and training, but a big part of their effect, though, is to normalise the presence of PLA – of the PLA around Taiwan in the long-term. And this I think goes to that point of what is Beijing’s actual aim? In an ideal scenario, it’s to normalise that, kind of, activity to the point that it becomes very, very difficult for any outside force, particularly the United States, to actually intervene to prevent it going further. And then what you have is if, you know, if China can maintain that, in a way that’s impossible for the US to do anything about, maintain that for long enough, while also building up China’s military capabilities, professionalising the military and so on, you’ll then get to a point where actually the balance of power will tip in China’s favour if there were a war. And then you’re basically, from Beijing’s perspective, disincentivising US involvement in a conflict.
That said, you know, these operations, particularly what we saw last year in the so-called “Joint Sword exercises,” major exercises around Taiwan, these were clearly – you know, these were, in part, rehearsals for things like a blockade of Taiwan and so on. But again, they have two purposes, they are there for training, but they’re also there as part of an ongoing strategy of, kind of, cutting Taiwan off, effectively.
Ben Horton
Yeah, thank you, and I wanted to bring in also a question that Elizabeth Rylance-Watson has asked, around China’s presumptions or calculations about the Trump administration over Taiwan, and just a sense of picking up on what you were saying about disincentivising US engagement in the issue. Do you have any, kind of, emerging sense of how Beijing is thinking about the Trump administration and how credibly the Trump administration can be relied upon to defend Taiwan, if it came to it?
William Matthews
Sure. In terms of Beijing’s perception, I think they are waiting to see if a clear position emerges. The difficulty with interpreting that is that the Trump administration is actually extremely contradictory in terms of its approach to China. On the one hand, Trump is very clearly keen on, or has certainly voiced a willingness to compete directly with China quite aggressively over things like trade, over things like technological leadership. At the same time, it’s not at all clear that he personally cares much about Taiwanese independence and certainly, I mean, what we’ve seen the last few weeks is that he doesn’t necessarily shy away from disappointing American allies on issues of defence. That said, you have got people in the Cabinet, like, Marco Rubio, for example, who are, you know, notable China hawks, have been very pro-Taiwan and Taiwan defence. And you’ve also got people, though, like, Elon Musk, with extensive economic interests in China, and so on. So, you’ve got all these competing perspectives and competing interests there.
I mean, personally, I think, on balance, the Trump administration would be unlikely to defend Taiwan, but I also think that Beijing would be very wary of taking the risk of launching an all-out attack, or something like that. I think they’d – they will see it, ultimately, probably as a good opportunity to have at least another four years of enhancing those grey-zone operations, making it that much more difficult for anyone to really intervene. And, sort of, gradually wearing down Taiwan’s willpower to, sort of, resist any final attempt at coercion.
Ben Horton
That’s really helpful, thank you. There are many more questions on Taiwan that we could get into, but I want to try and broaden this out, because we’ve only got 15 minutes or so to go. And we’ve got a few different questions about China’s – the capabilities to act in other parts of the world. So, we’ve got a question in from Henry Bull about the role that the PLA might play in the Middle East moving forward, given China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil and declining trust in the US security framework in that region. We also have a question that’s come in on the PLA’s potential security role in Central Asia, particularly if Russia continues to be preoccupied in Ukraine. “Does China have the ability to step up and be a, kind of, security guarantor or a lead security partner in that region?” And we’ve also had a question on the India-China border from Maite Reece.
So, I just wondered – sorry to group those together, but I just wondered if you could comment a little bit on, you know, if we’re thinking slightly further afield than China’s immediate neighbourhood, the, sort of, capability of the PLA to play a role in those theatres.
William Matthews
Hmmm hmm, sure. If we take the India border question first, ‘cause that, ultimately, is a question of, sort of, territorial dispute along the border, one that that is occurring, though, between, you know, two major regional powers with a, sort of – with serious strategic rivalry with each other. That is something where China, I think, has sought to, kind of, normalise relations there, as we saw towards the end of last year, in normalisation of India-China relations over the border dispute. But that doesn’t mean that China will not, sort of, continue to maintain a presence there. It doesn’t mean that there is not always the risk of tensions re-emerging, and that’s, you know – after, sort of, the big priorities of Taiwan and the South China Sea and so on, where, sort of, most of the large-scale war fighting capability is oriented, security there is still a priority for Beijing.
I should mention, also, though, on the China-India question that my colleagues, Dr Chietigj Bajpaee and Dr Yu Jie, have got a report coming out soon, actually on China-India relations, which will be a, sort of, a good go-to source for answering some of those questions.
Middle East and Central Asia, I think you will see an expanding security role for China in both regions. I think it’s very important, though, to bear in mind that China is unlikely to engage in the kinds of defence agreements and military alliances that we have seen in the US security order. China is – well, Beijing is, sort of, explicitly anti-formal alliances in its approach to dealing with other countries. Very unlikely, I think, to issue any, kind of, binding security guarantees. Where I think we are already, though, seeing a growing security role for China, in both regions, though, is the provision of defence equipment. Including, I mean, in the Middle East, including now Chinese fighter jets in – being bought by Egypt, actually in preference over American alternatives. So, that is quite significant, and I think on that kind of question, China will act quite opportunistically. If there’s an opportunity to become a defence provider in terms of equipment and so on, they will take it, but they won’t necessarily actively seek to push, I think.
But the other key thing, really, is about where China’s own security interests or other interests abroad are potentially at risk. In the Middle East, a lot of this is to do with things like oil trade routes and China’s very reliant on Middle Eastern oil. And that, I think, is the motivation behind things like the, you know, reports of a PLA base in Oman, for example, being on the cards. That sort of thing is going to be not necessarily with an explicit aim of power projection for its own sake, or for an intervening role, but one to, at least in the first instance, secure Chinese economic interests abroad.
In Central Asia, you see something similar with the role of Chinese private security companies, and things like that. China has a lot of concerns in Central Asia and the border with Xinjiang over transnational terrorism, transnational drug trafficking and so on, so there are security questions there which will provoke greater Chinese involvement. Doesn’t mean that’ll be the PLA going in and sorting things out, though. That would be quite an unprecedented move for China.
Ben Horton
Hmmm, absolutely, thank you. We’ve got a question here from Anita Punwani, who has asked about ‘military bases’, and, sort of, the significance of those and the, kind of, presence of the PLA overseas in China’s strategy for engaging with the Global South in other parts of the world. So, just a word on military bases are they…
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
…a big factor here?
William Matthews
Sure. So, I mean, certainly China has expanded its range of overseas deployments, including bases, most famously the base in Djibouti, which is also, sort of, one of the oldest of these. But then you’ve things like the port at Siem Reap in Cambodia and so on, which is – you know, a lot of these things get labelled as, kind of, in media commentary as ‘military bases’, kind of, giving the impression they’re like, sort of, a US style major base for conducting, sort of, combat operations abroad. Typically though, so far, these have been about, you know, creating space for China to station ships, troops and so on, where needed, but in a capacity to defend those economic interests that I mentioned previously.
In terms of co-operation with the Global South, though, you know, these do fall into a wider landscape of China’s provision of infrastructure, of, you know, cultivating relations economically and through things technology provision and so on. These fall into that, kind of, landscape and they will serve as a vector for Chinese influence in that regard, but also things like defence diplomacy and so on. So, I think, going forward, where there has been, or where there already is, an existing, sort of, economic relationship, it’s easy to see how that can start translating into a closer security co-operation relationship with countries where China is stationing troops or contributing to the building of bases.
Ben Horton
Thanks very much. We’ve got a question from Leslie Michael Birch about Panama, the Panama Canal, and I wondered if I could maybe broaden it out a little bit, to think about, kind of, the US Western Hemisphere and the extent to which the PLA is developing the capabilities to act on that side of the world.
William Matthews
Right, okay.
Ben Horton
So, Leslie has, basically, said there that, “Trump claims that the two container ports in the Panama Canal, being run or partly owned by Hong Kong companies, represent a threat to the Canal, but also to US interests.”
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
Do you see that as credible? And maybe if we broaden it back to our, kind of, military dimension, you know, what – like, is China, sort of, developing the capabilities to be acting in Latin America, or much closer to the US, sort of, mainland?
William Matthews
Hmmm. In terms of the ability to actually, sort of, project power and conduct military operations, no, that’s quite a long way off. That doesn’t mean, though, that there isn’t something in Trump’s claim about security risks and so on. I mean, the more credible question over the Panama Canal is in the event of a conflict between China and the United States, would China, via CK Hutchinson, you know, these companies, be able to shut down those container ports and disrupt vital trade into the United States?
That, I would say is a legitimate question, but a lot has to happen to get to that point, and you’ve got the, sort of, the bigger issue beforehand of, I think there would need to be actually a war going on between China and the US. But, you know, that kind of geostrategic thinking is all about anticipation of, you know, what could happen and how do you, sort of, minimise the risk? And actually, Trump’s, sort of, approach to that has – is actually quite reminiscent of the approach that China’s leaders have taken over the past few decades, to, sort of, anticipate risks of US influence, where that might potentially, under certain circumstances, compromise Chinese interests and so on.
I think the area where China might have particular concern, in terms of Trump’s, sort of, Western Hemisphere stuff, is Greenland and the Arctic. Because China has been trying to position itself as a greater player in the Arctic, and, you know, Greenland is – obviously would – actually, US control of Greenland, were it to happen under whatever circumstances, would actually pose a risk to China’s monopoly on a lot of critical mineral resources and things like that. So, there are genuine strategic questions here, but a lot has to happen, I think, for them to, kind of, become a concrete reality.
Ben Horton
Thank you very much. I wanted to, sort of, take a domestic turn, I guess, now. We’ve got a question from R Wang about the role that the PLA played during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of population management, quarantine, monitoring and surveillance within China itself and how political that issue has become within China. So, R Wang wants to know, “Do you have any insights on the PLA’s role in health security in China today?”
William Matthews
Hmmm hmm…
Ben Horton
But I wondered, maybe…
William Matthews
…sure.
Ben Horton
…if we broaden that out a bit, as well…
William Matthews
Yeah.
Ben Horton
…and comment on the health stuff, but also what role is the PLA playing within China, within the domestic, sort of, yeah, dynamics of society?
William Matthews
Sure. So, I mean, I think it’s worth considering that in terms of actually a broader role that the PLA has often played in terms of, you know, crises – internal crises, where there is a need for, sort of, effective logistical support, construction work and so on, so hospital construction, provision of resources and their distribution, and so on. Humanitarian aid is another, sort of, key thing, and disaster release internally, where the PLA plays a role. The PLA is distinct from the People’s Armed Police, which is the key security force domestically. It’s also controlled by the Central Military Commission, it’s a, sort of, paramilitary security force, but generally speaking, things like maintenance of internal order and so on, form to – fall to the People’s Armed Police. But the PLA is always on hand, should Beijing deem that a greater amount of force is needed to enforce control.
But I think, you know, it’s an important point, particularly domestically, that those questions of, you know, disaster relief provision and crisis response, as in COVID, these are all areas that have also enabled the PLA to actually gain some, sort of, actual in-crisis experience in terms of these logistic questions, as well.
Ben Horton
Thanks very much. We’re approaching the end, but I just want to squeeze a couple more things in. You mentioned in your early, sort of, opening statement about the PLA’s development of, kind of, emerging technologies, investment in research and development, innovation, and Christina DeCoursey has just asked a question about the use of gene editing technologies to modify PLA Soldiers. We’re seeing claims from the likes of the Atlantic Council and other…
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
…other thinktanks about this. So, I just wondered, do you have any – I mean, is that something that you’re aware of? Do you know – do you want to comment on the gene editing?
William Matthews
Sure, sure.
Ben Horton
Or on the PLA’s…
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
…use of emerging technologies more generally?
William Matthews
Yeah, I mean, I – not in a position to, sort of, verify claims on gene editing. So, I know it’s something that has been – you know, there have been concerns about it, and, you know – with emerging technology more generally, which does encompass biotechnology, you know, and as I mentioned at the beginning, the PLA is seeking to be able to implement this as much as possible, in order to ensure an edge in operations.
Now, if we move away from the, sort of, biotech side to, sort of – the side I’d be more familiar with is things like, sort of, AI, autonomous weapon systems, use of, sort of, different kinds of surveillance systems and things like that. Those are areas where, actually, you know, China overall is actually very advanced, in some cases, sort of, directly competing in terms of its advancement with the United States. And all of that, really, is about, sort of, gaining, kind of, full spectrum control of both the, sort of, the battlefield itself, but also, wider dimensions of a conflict, including things like popular perception. So, something we see, if we look at Taiwan, for example is, you know, the co-ordination of military operations, drills and so on, with things like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, things that the PLA calls, sort of, ‘cognitive warfare’ that is trying to shift the perception of the relevant actors, whether that’s the military, whether that’s the civilian population, in order to gain an advantage.
Ben Horton
Absolutely, thank you. I’m going to pause in our Q&A now just to ask my wonderful colleagues in the Events Team to publish the poll that we’d like our audience to contribute their thoughts on now. So, in front of you on the screen there, you should see a question that we want to ask. Based on what you’ve heard from William, or what you know, professionally, or just out of interest, “In the next decade, will China become the dominant military power in the world?” Total prediction, no stakes, you know, there’s no – you know, we’re not going to be marking your homework. We won’t be getting in touch again in 2035 to tell you that you were wrong or that you were right, but just give us your initial reaction based on today’s discussion [pause].
Awesome. Well, we’re just getting the answers ready there. Okay, it’s tight, William, it’s a…
William Matthews
Yes.
Ben Horton
Yeah, but thank you, everybody who voted, we’ve got a lot of people who are still not sure…
William Matthews
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Horton
…but we’ve, kind of, got a fairly even three-way split, just nudging towards ‘no’. There’s a…
William Matthews
Hmmm.
Ben Horton
There’s a fair chunk of people, 40% of respondents, who think that actually China is not on the path to becoming the dominant military power in the world. As we very unfairly asked this question of our audience, I’m going to ask this of you, as well, William, what’s your take on this? Just throwing it forward as…
William Matthews
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Ben Horton
…as the 2020s develop.
William Matthews
Yeah, I mean, I – actually, I think the, sort of, the distribution of the polling results is quite good. I mean, I’d say within the next decade, almost certainly not, but does – what I would say, though, is, in the next decade, I think it probably will become the dominant military power quite – reasonably comfortably, in East Asia. I don’t think China actually has particular explicit interest in becoming a globally dominant military power. There is – you know, the question there would be – if it were to, it wouldn’t be over the next decade. It would be over many decades, and I think you’d actually have to see quite significant decline in the US’ commitment to maintaining its own level of both, sort of, defence spending commitment, operational commitments and so on.
Not saying it couldn’t happen, I mean, anything seems possible at the moment in the world of geopolitics, but yeah, I think, broadly speaking, dominant power in East Asia, but certainly not globally.
Ben Horton
Thank you, William, and one more prediction, if you will, just a final question that Dina Mufti asked, which was, on the spot, “When do you anticipate that China will take over Taiwan?” Very unfair of me to sneak this in at the end there, but just your sense of this.
William Matthews
I, as I said, I don’t think they will, sort of, launch an invasion, at some point. They would have to put boots on the ground if they wanted to maintain control. I suspect that in, sort of, ten to 15 years’ time, unfortunately, probably, we will see a Taiwan that has succumbed to Chinese pressure.
Ben Horton
Okay, come to…
William Matthews
Hopefully not, but…
Ben Horton
A sombre note with which to end.
William Matthews
Yeah.
Ben Horton
Thank you very much, William. We’re out of time, I’m afraid. Thank you everybody who submitted questions, who contributed to this discussion today. We really, really appreciate your engagement, and William, thank you so much for your time. We will be…
William Matthews
Thank you.
Ben Horton
…in touch fairly soon with future Members’ Question Time events. I don’t think we’ve got one in the calendar just yet, but there will be one coming soon, in March, so keep an eye out on the Chatham House website. If anyone has a topic that they’d be interested in us covering on the Members’ Question Time series, do let us know. You can email the Events Team directly, I think, at [email protected], and we’d be very interested to hear your suggestions. All that remains for me to say is have a great rest of your day wherever you are, and William, thanks again for joining us.
William Matthews
Thank you, thanks.
