NATO summit: The road to Madrid

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

So, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. Those of you who are here with us in the room this evening, thank you very much for joining us. I’m Robin Niblett, Director of the Institute. Great to have you here today, and welcome to all of our members and others who are joining us online. As usual, this is one of our hybrid events, so great to have the mix of participants on both sides, physical and virtual.

Welcome to this meeting on The Road to Madrid, or the Road to the Madrid NATO Summit, where we’re going to be discussing, in very broad terms, the future of NATO, which obviously, is a large, complex topic at the best of times, or normal times, but especially important right now, in the sense that we are faced with quite a historic moment for the Alliance. Just as it was thinking about its strategic direction, it has had to add the real complexity of being indirectly involved through its members, I’m going to say, in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Perfect time to remind people, do remember to switch off your mobile phones, or put them on silent, at least. Just to remind you all, on format, this meeting is on the record. There will be time, obviously, for Q&A. For those of you joining us here in the room, you know the format. When we come to the Q&A time, I will draw on you for questions, like I normally would. Please stay in your seats. A microphone, a boom mic, will come to you and you can take the questions that way. You don’t need to do anything else, other than that. For those of you joining us online, please put your questions, from the beginning, if you want, into the Q&A function, not into the chat, into the Q&A and option and I will see them coming up here. Typically, I’ve already got one question, already, so this is a good sign, but please bring them there. I might be able to call on some of you to ask your questions live, so we can hear them online, but we’ll be in touch with you via Zoom, if that is possible.

As I said, I don’t need to talk too much about the importance of this particular summit that takes place during the 28th and 30th of June of this month, but the Strategic Concept, as what was always going to be on the agenda, even prior to this new Strategic Context, will be part of our subject of conversation. We’ve got the desired enlargement, certainly desired by the majority of members and by those who have applied, and Finland and Sweden. We’ve got the question of NATO’s global ambitions alongside its ambitions, both closer to home and between the Eastern risks and the risks more to the South and the South East. And then, we’ve got the whole question of the modern, let’s call it, almost 2030 agenda of NATO, which gets us into issues of hybrid war and cyber and space and those elements, as well. We’ll go as far and wide as we can in the time available to us.

We’ve got four great panellists today and I want to thank them very much for taking the time to be here, and their participation here on this panel is a reflection of a growing partnership between the Real Instituto Elcano in Madrid and Chatham House here in London. And I’m very pleased, personally, to have a longstanding relationship with – over here, with the Real Instituto Elcano and being a member of their Advisory Board. And we were, together with our colleagues, and Charles Powell, the Director, and others there, in Madrid a couple of months ago, talking about NATO’s – and the transatlantic approach to China and to global threats, but also, specifically, how the UK and Spain are approaching that particular topic. And I think though each of our institutions looks globally, we both also are aware that the Spanish-UK relationship, given that it reflects very different outlooks, almost, from our geography in Europe, if we can get those two countries to be thinking strategically about the future together, it’ll be something positive for both of our countries, as well. So, Alice and Luis here on behalf of Hans Kundnani, the Director of the Europe Programme here, and Charles, the Director, also, of the Instituto Elcano, we’re all here working, very much, on this topic. So, I just wanted to put that on the agenda, as well.

Panellists, therefore, we’re delighted to have two official participants, Federico de Torres, Director General for Security and Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Europe, in Madrid. Thank you very much, Federico, for joining us today. He was the Director General for Strategy and Forecast and Coherence, which I love that word. We have joined up government in the UK Government, so coherence is a good thing to aim for. But also, an Ambassador of Spain, a lot of experience in Latin America, obviously a core area for Spain. I did want to add, as well as having been a Permanent Representative of Spain to the Council of Europe, but also a former Consul position here in London. So, welcome back to London. I know you’ve been here many times before, but here at Chatham House, delighted to have you with us.

Angus Lapsley, who is Director for Euro Atlantic Security at the FCO, known to many of you here. Angus, a lead player in the recent Integrated Review, on the official side, working on behalf of the FCO. I can say inside the MoD, but always been straddling those two worlds. Really a lead person on defence and security, both on this Integrated Review and the previous Strategic Defence and Security Review. He’s been a Director of Defence, International Security at the FCO prior to that role helping with the Integrated Review. Very importantly, he was the Permanent Representative for PESCO, the Permanent Security Co-operation, yes?

Angus Lapsley CMG

PSC.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

PSC, thank you, at the EU, so knows not just UK defence and security, but knows the process inside the EU, as well. And that’s going to be all the more relevant, ‘cause I can let you all know here that he will become the new Assistant Secretary General at NATO for Defence, Policy and Planning as of September this year. So, congratulations on that appointment, Angus, and a very interesting transition right now and great to have you on this panel for that result, so, wonderful.

Alice Billon, who I mentioned a minute ago, a Research Fellow in our Europe Programme, part of the NATO 2030 Young Leaders group. And she’s leading our work here, not just on transatlantic security here in Chatham House, but also has been looking very closely at the role that the UK will play with the E3, trying to think its post-Brexit security policy, in partnership with key other players. Looking also to security risks in Asia and held a position leading the European Defence Programme at the European Leadership Network before joining Chatham House.

Luis Simón, very much last, but not least, Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano office in Brussels, a very important position, therefore, given the centrality of European foreign policy for Spanish foreign and defence policy. Leading a couple of their very big projects on the future of transatlantic security, the role of China, the global outlook of Europe and Spain. He is a frequent mover around, as a Senior Visiting Fellow, in all of the best places, is all I’m going to say, ‘cause I’ve got Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, the EU Institute of Security Studies. I could mention RUSI, as well. So, all of the best places around Europe. Great to have you with us, as well.

So, that’s enough long introductory stuff from me, by which point – I can tell how many people are online, ‘cause I’ve got six questions now already lined up just through the introduction. But Federico, let me start with you. Here we are going up to this extremely consequential NATO Summit. Spanish priorities, what would success look like, from the Spanish Government standpoint, as hosts of this summit? Over to you.

Federico de Torres Muro

Thank you. Thank you, Robin, and thank you very much for inviting me and good evening to all of you. For Spain, this is, of course, as for the rest of the allies, a meeting at a critical point, a critical moment. I will say that it has been set for weeks, for months, I would say, that this is going to be a historic summit. Of course, it goes without saying, as I’ve said, that this is a meeting at a critical time.

I would mention – I will follow, more or less, the thread proposed by the Secretary General some time ago, known as the NATO 2030 Framework, and I think that we’ll have to stick to the different elements of that framework to emphasise the need for written agreements in each and every one of them. First of all, the framework talks about the “need to reinforce the transatlantic link and the political dimension of the Alliance.” We, in Spain, the Spanish Government is emphasising that “NATO is an alliance of democracies,” and you mentioned the prospects of enlargement, which are now on the table by the applications of Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. And I think that that is approved that their – that NATO’s still alive, it’s an organisation with, let’s just say, something to say in the international scenario. But on the other hand, we don’t – I mean, we shouldn’t forget that there is a need for strengthening the quality of our democracies.

I was talking in Spain a couple of weeks ago, in Barcelona, and I remember with some students that not so long ago, we were experiencing some challenges, so to speak, I would say threats to our democracy, all throughout Europe and even in the States. So, first of all, well, we are happy that NATO still – is still able to entice, to lure democracies into its fold, but on the other hand, we have to be serious about the need for rethinking our democracies. Because what we are facing, and this is the second point I wanted to refer to, is the need for NATO to adapt to an era of a strategic rivalry.

You mentioned the Russia’s assertiveness. I mean, we are expected to qualify Russia’s behaviour, saying that it is launching an unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Ukraine. It’s an attack, as we know, on a rules – International Rules-Based Order, but I wonder whether we should be thinking, as well, about the day after. How are we going to co-exist with Russia after what we hope will be a Russian defeat in the Ukraine, because of its dimension and because of the fact that Russia is and will still – and is still – and will be a nuclear power? I don’t know whether it will be wise to assume that the West, so to speak, will be able to co-exist with an impoverished Russia. So, we will need to think about that, as well.

Of course, the summit will talk – we will talk – oh, sorry, we will talk about burden sharing, as well about capabilities. There is a debate already going on within the North Atlantic Council about this. There are other points, so such in the NATO 2030 Framework, dealing with partnerships and there, allow me to put stress on the need for the European Union and NATO to work hand-in-hand with this, let us say, common approach to the International Rules-Based Order.

You are right in state – you have – you were right in stating that Spain was particularly active in putting an adjective to the concept of a strategic autonomy. We want, of course, an open strategical autonomy, but we want something more, which is that NATO and the European Union co-ordinate themselves and work within the principle – preserving the principle of complementarity.

Of course, there are other issues, such as the new challenges within the hybrid domains, the need to neutralise, which is, in a sense, is connected to what I said about Russia, which is the need to neutralise fake news, manipulation of electoral processes, for instance, the resolve to energy supply, I mean, to energy as a weapon, even the manipulation of migration flows. And of course, my Minister would not accept if I don’t mention the need for taking into consideration, as well, even if we are now, in a sense, focused on the challenges and threats coming from the East, in Spain, we believe that it is high time for NATO to concentrate resources and a bit of a strategic thinking about the challenges and the threats coming from the South, mainly from – not from the Mediterranean, not only from the Mediterranean, but also from the Sahel.

Just to remind you that Spain is neighbour to the Sahel. We have the Canary Island just opposite Mauritania, which is one of the G5 Sahelian member states. And that is why we think that it will be a good opportunity for the allies, I mean, the Madrid Summit will be a good opportunity for the allies to take into considerations those challenges coming from the South. And I hope that the – we can go on talking about the – and other aspects, such as the need for balance among the three core tasks: defence and deterrence, co-operative security and crisis prevention and management.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you very much, Federico, for laying all that out. Can I – and I can see this list if priorities that, as you said, interweave those three dimensions: defence deterrents, co-operative security and, really, defence co-ordination. But could you just say a word or two, very quickly, about whether this invasion of Ukraine, which has clearly had an impact on Spanish public opinion, I think, where is the government on, sort of, defence investment? We’ve seen a complete, you know, Zeitenwende, as they call it in Germany, on this issue. Clearly, there’s a very changed political atmosphere in Spain, with all the pressures on budget. Where is Spain on, sort of, defence investment right now, leading up to this summit? Have commitments been made by the Spanish Government to invest more, or is it more about investing more smartly? Just something about that, quickly.

Federico de Torres Muro

Well, first of all, I want to emphasise that the Prime Minister went public about the – his commitment to increase – I mean, to reach the 2% level of our gross national product, in terms of defence expenditure. I think we have to be smart enough to persuade the public opinion about the need to increase defence expenditure and it might be one of the ways to do it is to explain that, in a sense, defence expenditure nowadays should be linked to the need for technological change, right? And making sure that there is a – we look for synergies between the civilian industry and defence industry. And that if we are smart enough, as I’ve said, to, let’s just say, channel our scarce resources towards research and development in the defence industry, we will be able to promote technological development as well, within the civilian industry, which, by the way, in Spain has been a bit neglected, I mean, industry as a sector. We are becoming an economy of services and there is some work to be done there.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

No, thank you. That’s a useful, I think, additional point. I mean, even the government here is trying to think through very carefully the balance of, sort of, reinvestment in large land, kind of stuff, which we’re seeing in the news right now, and whether to stick with a more high-tech transition. And, therefore, how does the burden sharing play out amongst member states, with the US inside of that? Which is a good transition, Angus, to you. Maybe the same question, if you don’t mind, you know, what does the UK see as its priorities? What would success look like from the UK Government, from the Madrid Summit?

Angus Lapsley CMG

Well, thanks, Robin, and good evening, everyone, and I think I’ll probably start – well, first of all, I’ll say if I start coughing violently, it’s not COVID. I’m not spewing germs out into the room. It’s just bad asthma at the moment. But look, as you might expect, I agree with an awful lot of what Filippo said, and I think there is quite a lot of good consensus emerging from allies at the moment about what they want from this summit.

You mentioned Sweden and Finland earlier on, Robin, and I mean, it wasn’t on our agenda six months ago, but now it very much is, and I think, from our perspective, having Sweden and Finland in the Alliance would be a huge plus. They add geographic coherence to the North of Europe. They bring a lot of capability. They also bring, I think, a lot of smarts. I think they bring a lot of clever thinking. I mean, you – Filippo, you mentioned the ‘hybrid’ challenge that we all face and this is something which both those two countries are really practised and interesting at doing. So, we are working flat out, as you might imagine, to try and resolve the problems that are still there, in terms of getting that accession decision taken at Madrid.

But I think if we step back, what the UK is really interested in seeing from this summit, and I think we do see it as a really big moment, I think you could argue this is the most important moment for NATO since it invoked Article 5 in response to 9/11. It’s the biggest strategic shock that we’ve faced in the Alliance since then. I think, first of all, we would like to see strengthened defence and deterrence. Now, that is partly about investment, as Filippo said. It’s also about modernising the posture that NATO has, about getting the command structures right, about making sure that NATO really knows how it would deter and, if necessary, fight a direct threat from a peer opponent. And we all know now where that peer opponent is. So, I think that’s really important. I think, in particular, it’s important for the Eastern flank countries, who want to know that NATO is going to be there for them, but we need to do it in a smart way. We need to make the most of the advantages NATO has, in terms of manoeuvrability and technology.

I think the second thing we would really like to see is a NATO that is modernising and that is partly about responding to different kinds of threats, terrorism, hybrid, but it is absolutely, as Filippo said, about technology and harnessing it. So, actually, in the UK, we now have a Defence Industrial Policy, on overt one, for the first time in, well, probably 20 years or so, and I think NATO, like the European Union, has a role in making sure that the allies are modernising their capabilities. And it’s not a choice between having tanks and planes and ships and having technology. Most of the time it’s about using technology to make those tanks and planes and ships work much better than the opponents.

I’d say that the third issue, which is very much on our mind, is recognising that NATO needs to think globally. So, obviously, our primary objective is dealing with the collective defence of Europe here and the threats immediately to that, whether it’s terrorism or whether it’s Russia. But it’s more and more apparent to us that we need partners in the world. We need them on technology, we need them on diplomacy and NATO needs to have something it’s offering to partners, whether that’s training or exchanges of advice and strategic engagement. There’s all sorts of things NATO can offer partners, partners in the South, partners in the Indo-Pacific, etc. So, I think we would like that global role for NATO to be captured.

There’s just one last thing I’d, sort of, put on the table at this stage in the conversation and that is that there is – there’s no doubt that NATO now faces a really difficult challenge around what to do with the countries in its own neighbourhood, which are, if you like, between us and Russia. And Ukraine is the one we’re all focused on, for obvious reasons, at the moment, but it’s also Georgia, Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans. Now, for some of those countries enlargement and becoming a NATO member is a realistic prospect, for others, it’s a much more distant prospect. But I think for all of them, we need to think about what is it that NATO is going to do to help them become more robust, more resilient, better able to deal with the threats that they are under? It’s not a role just for NATO. It’s a role for the European Union, it’s a role for allies individually. But I think that’s a really – that’s quite a tough one, actually, and I think we’ve got to take some important steps forward at this summit.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you, again, also, for laying that out very clearly. Can I just put one follow-up question for you on the table, right now, Angus? Nuclear, will – and you’ve talked about the importance of deterrence, do you see – do you foresee, would Britain like to see nuclear deterrents, or that component in the mix, on the table, just nodded to, discussed? Has something changed with Vladimir Putin’s, you know, frequent reference to escalation, predictable in a way, given that it always forms part of their exercises, in any case? But do you think NATO is just going to soft peddle that issue or does it step up to the front or not? And, obviously, the Brits would have a particularly important view on that?

Angus Lapsley CMG

So, I think something’s changed and nothing’s changed. The something has changed is that what many of us have been arguing for many years, which is in a crisis, Russia, and perhaps other great powers, will use its nuclear status and its nuclear weapons as a way of posturing and coercing, or trying to coerce. It’ll use it in a very political way to try and shape the way the crisis plays out. And that is, undoubtably, what has been happening over the last couple of months.

But what is NATO’s response to that? Well, NATO’s response is to maintain the deterrents that we had in place for 60 years and, actually, if you look at the last – certainly at the last three or four summits, they have all had quite strong statements that NATO is a nuclear alliance and for as long as there are nuclear weapons, we will remain a nuclear alliance. And that’s an important part of how deterrence works and there’s a lot of debate about whether deterrence has, in some way, failed. As far as NATO is concerned, it hasn’t, because, you know, NATO is not directly under threat and, of course, we never had a nuclear umbrella over Ukraine. So, I think I don’t expect a new policy, because the policy is a good policy and it’s a solid policy, but the relevance of that policy, why it matters, is right back on the table.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thanks, no, very much and I think we may want to come back to that and there may be questions in the room about it, as well.

Alice, let me turn to you now. You were part of designing that, part of the 14 Young Leaders who helped design that 2030 agenda. Obviously, there was worry about the escalating risks coming from Russia well before the invasion on 24th of February, but has it changed the prioritisation? Where do you see the 2030 agenda fitting now? Does it remain as current? What will you be looking for from this summit?

Alice Billon-Galland

Thank you, Robin, and same caveat here. I think it’s a COVID-free season of sore throats issue on this side of the panel, so bear with us. I think it’s actually a little bit of both. I think it’s leading to, both, a reprioritisation, but as Angus was saying, I think it’s also a vindication of the NATO 2030 process and the fact that the times are changing, brutally so, and that the Alliance needs to keep adapting to it.

So, obviously, what will come out of the Madrid Summit and the Strategic Concept is probably quite a bit different from what maybe we expected a year ago or two years ago. I think the importance of the deterrence and defence for that, as we hinted at, will clearly be more important now. The way we talk about Russia, which was in the co-operative security basket back in 2010, will definitely not be in the same basket this time around. We’re now not really talking about NATO-Russia co-operation, but more to avoid a NATO-Russia confrontation. So, that’s definitely a change.

And I think, obviously, a lot of NATO energy and time, and I think this will be your job, Angus, will be on really updating the defence and deterrence posture, building on all the adaptation that had been done in the Alliance since the Wales Summit in 2014, following Crimea and, sort of, building on that, in terms of forward presence, investment, burden sharing, etc. So, that will definitely be, sort of, back on the main stage and the agenda.

But at the same time, I think a lot of the changes and adaptation that we will see in Madrid and in the Concept have actually been in the making for a really, really long time and definitely before February, when Russia invaded the whole of Ukraine. When we were working with the Office of the Secretary General on the 2030 process, what was interesting is that there was a very clear understanding that the world of 2010, which was the previous Strategic Concept, focused on Afghanistan, terrorism, pre-Crimea, etc. That world was no longer the one we lived in and that things had changed quite dramatically, and in a way, what is happening now is, sort of, reinforcing that.

So, NATO does need to, sort of, keep adapting to a world of strategic confrontation, great power competition and that, sort of, notification or at least diversification of threats. And what you see a lot on the agenda is, you know, the mention of cyberspace, climate security, coercive actions from China and, sort of, the need to rethink what exactly is Eurocentric security and how can we do it going forward? And I know that Luis will talk about China, so I won’t come to that, but it’s quite interesting to think that ten years ago it was not really discussion about China. NATO, last year in the Brussels Summit, the idea was China is a sort of, ‘systemic challenge’ and now, with the, sort of, the closer China-Russia relation, this, sort of, no limit friendship between the two, it will be really interesting to see how China is being framed within the Alliance. It won’t be the core of what it does, but it’s definitely something that allies agree we need to keep an eye on, going forward.

So, for me, in Madrid, and what I’ll be looking at, is how allies find the right balance between, on the one hand, focusing on the existing crisis in the East, the deterrence and defence posture, etc., but on the other hand, continuing with the adaptation and, sort of, addressing the broader changes of Eurocentric security. And, obviously, now the Alliance has limited means, we haven’t really talked about funding of the Alliance itself, but allies will be very careful not to overextend NATO’s mandate unnecessarily, because this is also where the unity and the political tensions can come back in. We may want to now mention Turkey. There is a US election coming up in 2024 that may also have an impact.

So, I will look at how NATO reframes its core tasks, where the Alliance’s added value is, and as you were saying, what is the balance between the different pillar? Because you know, there needs to be a discussion about crisis management post-Afghanistan. It will likely to be less of a priority, but the South is still crucial, even – if only because, you know, Russia is active in the South, China as well, etc. So, how do we find the right balance? And I agree with you both, I think partnerships will be really, really crucial.

What we’ve seen in Ukraine is that it was the ability of the EU to work with NATO, to work also with Asia-Pacific partners in other regions, Japan, Australia, etc., to, sort of, build those connections and make sure that NATO has partners to deliver its mandate, which is, sort of, growing by the day. So, not overextending in, but making sure that, you know, countries at the neck discuss what matters to Eurocentric security and unfortunately, that is growing today.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Just to take you, maybe, a little bit off the 2030 agenda for a minute, but I know in our Europe Programme, you look quite a bit at French approaches to security, German approaches to security. In particular, France, where even in the electoral campaign, you know, there is a tradition of being sceptical. It didn’t win, in this particular presidential election, but do you think there’s been a transformative sense, at all, about the importance of NATO and a willingness to get onboard with this much more unified, I suppose, approach to, you know – giving some amount of primacy to the US? We’ve talked about open strategic autonomy, which is not exactly the terminology President Macron would necessarily use. Do you feel that France is, kind of, with this process or, kind of, holding its fire for the moment? Yeah.

Alice Billon-Galland

So, I think yes, mostly yes. I will say that I think in France, just like in any other country that’s not under attack, an election is usually not decided by some foreign policy issues. So, I think a lot of people that voted for, especially, sort of, far right and far left parties, did so because of, you know, purchasing power, maybe, you know, feelings towards immigration, etc., which I don’t think had much to do vis-à-vis, you know, the position on NATO, specifically, because NATO is not being discussed that much in France. Obviously, France has that history are quite, you know, sceptical about, sort of, US leadership in Europe, wanting Europe to develop its own identity, its strategic autonomy, and no matter what that means.

I think what France is saying today is also that the EU has actually stepped up in this crisis. That it has been very united and that it has something to bring on the table, and what I think is very interesting that we’re seeing today, to me, is that the war is providing quite, sort of, clarifying moment, especially in terms of EU-NATO complementarity, which we’ve mentioned before. It’s very clear that NATO is needed for collective defence and that there were a lot of things that need to be on the agenda and also on the transatlantic agenda, but the EU does have something to contribute, you know, even just in Europe, when it comes to capabilities, defence industry, sanctions, etc.

So, we will need to make that partnership works, and it was alluded to the tensions, obviously. You know, glass ceiling of Turkey-Cyprus is one of the things. But this is where I think we should go, a positive division of labour, and there is still work to be done, both, I think, here in London, in Paris, as well, in terms of how that means and how the two organisations can work together for the security of Europe in a positive way. But I hope that we’ll get into a place where we can actually make the most of the two organisations, and I think that’s something that France will definitely support.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you very much. Before I turn to Luis Simón, let me just say for those of you online, we’ve got a huge number of questions, I mean, huge, 30 or so, or at least it looks like that to me. So, do keep an eye, if you’ve asked a question, keep an eye on the chat, please, because my colleagues behind the scenes may be trying to reach out to you to see if you can – would like to unmute to ask your question. Some of you are, helpfully, saying if you want me to ask the question on your behalf, which I will, but those of you who may be interested in asking the question yourself, keep an eye on the chat after you’ve put a question in the Q&A. Thank you very much.

So, Luis, we’ve, sort of, skirted around the China dimension, the global NATO. It was noticeable that this time last year, in that sequence of Joe Biden visits to the Carbis Bay NATO Summit, then to the EU Summit, then to the NATO Summit, there was almost like the, you know, the Atlantic Charter, as well, they almost all had the same language. China was in there in ways that it had never been before, as explicitly. So, what’s your read about whether this is distracting, helpful? Do you expect it to be in the NATO – you know, a major feature, or is that – and do you sense there will be certain member states saying, “Look, let’s not get pulled off on that track.” It’s going to actually make, maybe, life more difficult, in terms of being really coherent on Russia. Any thoughts you’ve got…

Luis Simón

Yeah, that…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…and anything else, of course.

Luis Simón

Yeah. No, I think that’s a great question and a lot has been said already. Let me try and address that question, sort of, using Ukraine as an entry point, because indeed, it’s very relevant, right? And it’s true that pre-Ukraine discussions on the Madrid Summit and Strategic Concept already revolve around the need to prepare NATO for a great power competition and I think both Angus and Federico, but also Alice, alluded to that. And that was supposed – the great power competition theme was supposed to give Madrid a distinctive flavour, right, and mark a sharp contrast with a post-Cold War trajectory that, sort of, dominated – was dominated by the absence of peer competitors and a focus on more transnational challenges, right?

And, of course, the war in Ukraine has made a strong entry into the debate on the Madrid Summit and Strategic Concept. It certainly vindicates that assumption that we – that great power competition is back and that war is back. But, also, by the way, I would say that the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasions also, sort of, challenges some of our assumptions about how the future of war was supposed to look hybrid, primarily, by the way.

But in any case, suddenly, the question of how to revise NATO strategy and posture in the East has become central on the Road to Madrid, I think. I agree with Angus there. However, I would say that uncertainty as to the fate of Russia’s operations in Ukraine and how they may impinge on Russia’s force posture in Ukraine and alongside the Eastern border of NATO, but also Russian force structure, that means that any reflection on NATO strategy in the East has to go beyond Madrid and beyond the Strategic Concept. I think that’s clear by now.

And it’s true that the war has led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship and even to a renewed US focus on Europe. However, and sort of, to go back to your question, Robin, and contrary to what one may instinctively think, my sense is that the war is not going to alter the steady shift in the centre of – global centre of gravity, towards the Indo-Pacific region. Or for that matter, the steady shift in US-Europe strategy towards the Indo-Pacific, right? So, I think rather than reverse that trend, which is structural, it seems to me, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far actually provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European dynamics.

I think – and we know that China-centric and Asia-centric considerations have actually featured rather prominently in US debates about how to respond to Ukraine. I mean, some people in Washington were arguing that the US should avoid getting bogged down in a European conflict, which might distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others were making the reverse argument, saying that “A strong US response on Ukraine and Europe will deter adversaries elsewhere and reassure allies elsewhere, including the Indo-Pacific.” But – and beyond that, I think it is safe to argue that without China’s tacit support, Russia’s ability to sustain the war effort and withstand international sanctions over the long-term would be seriously compromised.

So, I guess the very point here, to go back to your question, is that in the Indo – as the Indo-Pacific, sort of, becomes the centre of gravity of global economic growth, military competition, technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a more important impact on other regions, including the Euro Atlantic, in much more significant ways than Europeans are accustomed to. Because we are accustomed Eur – the Euro Atlantic being the centre of gravity of global politics, because it has been for many decades.

And I think that compels, and I agree with Angus here, I think that compels NATO to think more globally about security and strategy. That doesn’t necessarily mean that, you know, that NATO should be directly engaged in the military contingencies in East Asia, that’s not what it means. But I think it means – it needs to think more systematically about those strategic factors that connect the Euro Atlantic security architecture to broader dynamics, and I would perhaps highlight three sets of actors to watch.

One has to do with the global implications of China’s strategic rise. The other one has to do with the evolving Sino-Russian relationship that affects European security in a number of ways. And another one, of course, with debates on geostrategic priorities, Europe versus Asia and the United States, that affect directly debates on transatlantic burden sharing.

So, I would agree with Alice that the main challenge for NATO leaders in Madrid is to find a balance between the need to prioritise deterrence in the Eastern flank, which is the immediate threat, and the broader challenge of understanding that what happens in Europe will be increasingly affected by broader strategic dynamics.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

No, thank you very much, and I was just wondering, just to take you back on that, you said there’s this, sort of, connection now in many Europeans’ minds and certainly in the minds of many Asia-Pacific countries that see America as their main protector, their understanding that maybe they need to stand with America right now on Russia-Ukraine, in order to know that America will stand with them. They’ve got to stand with them, sorry, on Indo-Pacific, to know that America will stand with them on Russia-Ukraine. So, there’s a bit of a, sort of, quid pro quo that’s understood here and I’m just wondering, Luis, in your discussions in Brussels, and I know it’s something that we’ve worked on a bit at Chatham House, this, kind of, growing awareness of the risk of Taiwan. And whether – is there some sort of underlying sense of that quid quo pro that Europeans now need to take threats to Taiwan that much more seriously because America would expect at least some type of political support? And you were saying, Federico, at the beginning of this, needs to become a more ‘political’ Alliance, understand threats politically through the same lens. Do you sense, Luis, that there is an awareness that Taiwan is, maybe, something that Europeans can’t dodge anymore?

Luis Simón

Yeah, so, I think there’s a great question and I think it goes back to the same point, right, that as long – and you were alluding to this, as long as the security of Europe and Asia hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise a significant pressure on US defence resources, their deterrence architectures will be linked. And so, I think that that means – going back to the point about, you know, thinking globally versus acting globally, I think that at least it means that both sets of alliance systems, and I’m thinking here specifically of Japan or Australia, which are closer to NATO, but perhaps also the ROK now, with the changes, I think that the – both sets of alliances should operate their consultation mechanisms at the political and military level and think about deterrence more from an inter-theatre perspective, right? Because if there is a Taiwan contingency, that will have a huge impact on the US and that will indirectly, but significantly, have an impact on European security.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Well, thank you very much for these comments and thank you, everyone. Let me get a few people in here and let’s see if we can get some more – some questions, as well, in particular. I’m being reminded by my little thing down here that it’s a one-hour panel. I always thought that when we have four people on a panel, we go into an hour and 15 minutes, so I may indulge on some of your time and see if we can keep this extended a bit longer, ‘cause I think this topic is so large and important, I don’t want to rush it too much. And maybe we can keep our online audience on for a bit longer, as well.

So, what I’m going to do, just in case we run the risk of losing any of our online audience, let me just see if Madeleine Moon and Duff Mitchell are available, because if you are, I want to ask you to ask your own questions. If not, I’m going to ask them to the panel here and let them to the panel here and let them do them, and then I will come to the room. But Madeleine, are you there? If you are, we’re, sort of, calling on you, if you see what I’m saying, and it says you’re both unmuted. So, Madeleine, you first.

Madeleine Moon

I just want to ask about increasingly, the Baltic, the Arctic, the maritime and Mediterranean Seas, along with the North Atlantic, are facing increasing maritime challenges with Russia. So, should the Madrid Summit focus on NATO’s flagging maritime capability and our over-reliance on the US Navy?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

So, a very important question there about reliance on maritime capability. Is there enough emphasis on it? And sort of connected, but maybe not, but nonetheless, Duff, do you want to ask your question, ‘cause I think it does touch on it?

Duff Mitchell

Yes, hello. My question is, now that NATO is poised to expand the number of members with a stake in the Artic and given Russia and China’s interest in the region, to what extent are Artic sovereignty issues a priority for NATO?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

So, we’ve got two big questions there, one around Arctic sovereignty and protecting it, especially if we have this enlargement, and the other more broadly about – from Madeleine Moon, former MP and very much involved in defence security issues for the UK, whether, yeah, the, kind of, maritime is going to get enough of a focus with this big land war going on at the moment, in our own region, you know, Baltic, etc. So, I don’t know, who wants to start, Federico, then Angus, in particular, yeah?

Federico de Torres Muro

Oh, with pleasure, thank you. Well, in my view, development of – oh, a modernisation of maritime capabilities will be dealt with by the allies, by the Heads of Government, in Madrid, of course. There is already, as you know, an element of maritime contribution to the defence, to the – even to this, what we call the Enhanced Forward Presence of NATO in the Eastern flank. We are being particularly active, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the Black Sea, now the situation has evolved and we need it to, I mean, to play more this completely, so to speak.

But, of course, your question goes hand-in-hand with the need and it has something to do with the need for thinking globally, as Angus and Luis and Alison said, because if you come to the Indo-Pacific, of course, there is the principle of freedom of navigation at stake, that should be taken into account in our, let us say, talks in Madrid and later. And I would say that even when you start to assess the situation in Africa, for instance, in the Sahel, you realise that the situation of instability in the Sahel can spill over the security in the Gulf of Guinea, for instance. There, there is already a maritime, what we call a co-ordinated maritime presence by some states. There are some measures being made in connection with people in the states of the Gulf of Guinea. So, I would say that, definitely, the development of maritime capabilities should be add on the agenda in Madrid. I’m sure it will be.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Okay, and great.

Federico de Torres Muro

I know it will be.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Well, you know it will. But a question, so that everything will be on the agenda in Madrid and which ones, you know, kind of, get that cut through. Angus, thoughts?

Angus Lapsley CMG

I would agree with that, and I would say that, actually, this has been an agenda for NATO for some years now. I mean, we took a bet, if you like, in our Integrated Review in 2020, that investment in maritime was needed and that it would grow slightly faster than the other domains, for exactly the reasons that Madeleine set out. And actually, what NATO has done, in recent years, is reintroduce a specific command to deal with the North Atlantic. It’s based in Norfolk, Virginia. It was a historic command that had disappeared as – but has been brought back for exactly that reason.

And then, the last thing I would say is, actually, you know, I would dispute the idea that there isn’t such a maritime dimension to Ukraine, because actually, it – Russia’s ability at the moment to blockade Ukrainian ports is one of the most strategic things that’s happening and it’s having a global impact, because it’s stopping food exports and that will only get worse as time goes by. So, actually, I think it’s quite a good illustration that even what looks like a continental conflict can have quite an important maritime dimension.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you very much. I think, do you want to – yes, do you want to come in quickly? Yeah.

Alice Billon-Galland

Just – I just…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Just a quick point. I want to get through these.

Alice Billon-Galland

Sorry, very briefly. I think on the, sort of, Arctic High North point, I would maybe just point to the fact that with Sweden and Finland likely joining the Alliance, that will also, sort of, shift the centre of gravity a little bit more towards the North, with this idea of, sort of, a Baltic Lake being under, sort of, NATO control, or more important for NATO. But I think the Arctic and the High North have been a priority, or something that has been looked into for a long time. In the UK, with the Joint Expeditionary Force, has been looking into the North of Europe for a long time.

And just to mention that on the Arctic, there is also a climate security angle, which is also why discussions around climate and climate security are being, sort of, mainstream within NATO as part of the NATO 2030 agenda. You know, how does it impact exercises, operational deployment, etc., to operating in a different climate? What type of, sort of, sea lanes are getting opened in the region and what is the impact, in terms of big power competition? So, there is this, sort of, climate security impact, as well, which I think is very linked to the North and the Arctic.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

I think it’s a – got so many good questions coming in and want to cover the floor now. I think there’s a bigger question as to can NATO show, at this summit, that it isn’t just obsessed about itself and that it is thinking? When we talk about a global perspective, it’s not just our global security, it’s other people’s global security, but in any case, getting off my own hobbyhorse there.

Right, I’m going to take, sort of, two or three questions. I’ve got one at the front, one at the back and I will come to there, and then I’ll do a second round. So, in whatever order. You can start at the back if you want, the gentleman with the bow tie, who I haven’t – starting – oh.

Mike Makosi

Yeah.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

I’ll – second point for you, yeah, please, and then I’m going to come to the front, and then to you, then it’ll be you next up. Yeah, you go ahead.

Mike Makosi

Yes, Mike Makosi from the United States, member of [inaudible – 56:29]. Anyway, thank you for the talk. I wanted to ask you about the China Belt and Road Initiative and, sort of, how economics can play a role, because we touched on China toward the end of the talk. I wanted to see how that might be impacting and maybe NATO can be counteracting that initiative, now that Russia and China have become such strategic partners, in a way of creating benefits from member countries in a more proactive way? Thank you.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Right, sort of, counteracting it. There’s some microphones there. Let’s just pull forward and we’ve got lots to get through, so I was hoping to get four, yeah.

Mikhail Ramos

Mikhail Ramos, member of Chatham House. Just a brief question. Federico started off with saying something about ‘strengthening democracies’ and the EU has its issues with some of the members on whether they’re as democratic as we would like them to be. NATO clearly has these issues, as well, if we look around the globe, as well. How do we deal with that to keep unity together and how do we deal with that in the long run? Because the EU seems to struggle with one of its member states at the moment, and it seems need to be paid off or so, and then, how does NATO do that to keep things under control?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

And I think, yeah, there was a question here online on exactly the same thing, but I’m going to come to somebody else. Domenic, I’ll come to you on a different question later on, maybe one about Germany blocking Spain. But any case, that question came up a couple of times on the Q&A. When you said, “We are an alliance of democracies and we’re so pleased that the enlargement of Finland and Sweden has confirmed it,” there was a pfft, like, a few questions along that line. If we come right to the front first and then I’ll come to Tricia. Sorry, I’m just doing the order in which I showed.

John Wilson

John Wilson, I’m a Writer on defence matters and a member of Chatham House and a number of other military think tanks. My question is this, ladies and gentleman, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Macron described NATO as ‘braindead’. I put it to you that despite all the subsequent bluster, NATO’s subsequent ineffectuality has proved him right. On paper, NATO is much stronger in armaments and troops than Russia, I checked that this week, and yet, Russia is capturing more territory and winning the war every day.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

That’ll be a good one to contest, discuss, I can see that. My colleague, Patricia Lewis?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, and thanks to all the speakers. Patricia Lewis from Chatham House. First of all, on the Arctic, really important, but let’s not neglect Turkey and the Southern flank. So, that’s really – just wanted to say that. I wanted to talk about arms control, but not nuclear. I wanted to talk about arms control as a mechanism for stability and predictability, which is most needed, of course, when the relationships are bad. And, you know, that’s always been true, but if we look at conventional arms control, that’s been really difficult, even when relationships were not so bad and, actually, not bad at all. And so, one of the problems, I think, is with arms control you’ve got to get all the players seeing the need and the advantages, but how could that possibly work now? And could it be somehow brought in as part of whatever happens, in terms of a ceasefire, if we ever get to that stage?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Great, thank you very much. Now, we’ve got four questions, you don’t all have to answer all four. I was even going to, kind of, give one to each of you, potentially. And just to remind everyone, apparently, we had this scheduled to seven, you know. I would normally have a panel do an hour and a quarter, ‘cause this – it’s big, you know, and trying to get everyone done in one hour is almost impossible. So, if you can hang on, hang on, ‘cause I’m going to hang on for a good extra ten minutes, if we can, and we’re going to tell the online audience we’re doing the same. So, hopefully, you’ll all – are you alright, or are you alright? Okay. So, let’s just try and give ourselves a bit more time, ‘cause I definitely want to go back online and I want to come back to the room to take a few more questions.

I was think – just thinking that Luis, maybe you might have something to say on the Belt and Road and whether you think NATO’s relevant for that. Do we want to start with that one? If anyone else really wants to come on, do, but otherwise, I’m going to give you each one of the other ones.

Luis Simón

Yeah, so, thanks, Robin, and thanks for your questions. So, I think short answer would be not very much, because it, sort of, falls outside of NATO’s scope. However, you did touch on the Sino-Russian relationship, which in that context, is very relevant and on that, I would say – because, you know, we keep coming back on, you know, whether that relationship is dominated by co-operation, conflict, I don’t know. Alice is saying that it – the – it keeps getting closer, but we know there are frictions and the continental front is one example of that. The Arctic is another example of the Sino-Russian relationship not being entirely co-operative.

And I think it’s important, going back to what we were discussing earlier, Robin, I think it’s important that NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners engage in a much more systematic exchange of views on China, Russia and their evolving relationship and how we see their relationship going forward. Because I think that could – and even that we negotiate a narrative and how we talk about the Sino-Russia relationship, because that could help mitigate this idea – the risks inherent in this idea of, you know, leaning on Russia to restrain China, which has been an argument going around now, in the short-term. But also, for that matter, that idea of leveraging Russia against China in the long-term, which is an idea that has also had some traction in the United States, for instance.

Because I think that, at the end of the day, whatever the – you know, we, NATO and key Indo-Pacific partners think we can do in relation to China, Russia, or manipulating their relationship, it’s important that we stay on the same page, in terms of how we talk about the Sino-Russian relationship. Otherwise, there’s a risk that we may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how the relationship may evolve, and therefore, frame our premises towards them on the basis of different assumptions.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

So, this is back to this idea of a more political NATO, so we’re actually…

Luis Simón

Yes.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…talking about these things in future. Thank you. Federico, I’ll let you come in if you want on others, but I thought the question about whether this is “an alliance of democracies” has to go your way, a little bit, as that was your…

Federico de Torres Muro

Yeah.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Yeah. You can answer one of the others, if you want, as well, but as you used the phrase…

Federico de Torres Muro

No.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…and there is, obviously, a lot of discussion about this.

Federico de Torres Muro

I’m happy with that question.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Okay.

Federico de Torres Muro

No, no, very good.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Go for it.

Federico de Torres Muro

No, no, I thank you very much for the question. Of course, it is something that it is – that it’s in everybody’s mind, right? Well, the European Union has its own proceedings, as you know, the rule of law. And the Commissary in charge of that file was today in Madrid and she was asked about the quality of democracy around Europe, including Spain, why not? Well, she sounded quite optimistic, in the sense that she relied – I mean, she convey a message of reliance on the proceedings of the European Union to, I mean, to look for a way out of the situation we were experiencing before the War on Ukraine.

What I was saying at the beginning of my presentation was that, in a sense, the fact that we are going through a very serious conflict, a traditional conflict, the return of war to Europe, shouldn’t make us forget that we have to put our own house in order, not to the same extent, of course, that Mr Putin has to put his house in order, of course. We are talking of different situations and problems, but that is what I meant when I started by saying that we should reassess the state of affairs concerning our democracies.

I understood that you ask about the – about NATO in this context. Well, I’m not that familiar with the way NATO can respond to the same challenge, but I’m sure that that will be one of the issues that the leaders will have to tackle with the summit in Madrid. Because there is this question of outreach that is – has been mentioned, and we are talking about – a lot about counternarrative. It is a bit sad that we, as let us say, consolidated democracy – democracies, are using the counter before narrative, because we are countering something that started before we thought about it. Only – I mean, in a nutshell, I would say that we have to have, as you say in English, the courage of our convictions and promote the values we believe in.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

That’s part of what this summit will probably be about. Angus, there’s a lot of questions there, but somebody’s got to do the braindead and is – you know, are we living up to – is Russia winning?

Angus Lapsley CMG

So, to, sort of, challenge my – to channel my inner Gorbachev, has NATO failed? No. But in two words, has NATO failed? A bit, and I think what I mean by that is that, yeah, NATO is primarily an organisation which protects its members and no NATO state has ever been attacked by another state since it joined NATO. And that’s the reality of things, because NATO deterrence and defence holds and its successful and we have to make sure it carries on being successful, even though we now have a more aggressive Russia next door to us.

But if you go back to the last Strategic Concept and they’re written once every ten years or so, I think it starts, almost, with the phrase, “Europe has never been more free and secure.” And if you – you couldn’t start the Strategic Concept by saying that today, because it’s quite clear that part of Europe has been traumatised by a brutal invasion by Russia.

Now, I think the ambiguity there is that NATO never set out to protect Ukraine. It was never explicitly part of our mission and I think that’s what I meant earlier on by the fact we are going to have to grapple a bit with to what extent are we willing to underpin the security of some of the countries around NATO that are not part of NATO, that are not covered by Article 5 and that collective defence guarantee? And I think you could argue that we didn’t – you know, we didn’t anticipate how severe the challenge was going to be to those countries. Now we can see it right in front of us, I think we’ve got to respond to that.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thanks very much, and there’s only one question we haven’t done. I’m not sure if it’s the one you want to do, on arms control, probably not, and I’m just wondering if anyone else, if you don’t want to take that one, does anyone else see the – yeah, I’m just wondering…

Alice Billon-Galland

Yeah, no.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…whether it fitted at all…

Alice Billon-Galland

I mean, I don’t think…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…into your 2030 agenda.

Alice Billon-Galland

…that the – that Patricia’s really good question on arms control is for me, specifically.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

No, exactly.

Alice Billon-Galland

So, I would have given it to Angus.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

I know. I’m…

Alice Billon-Galland

I mean…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Just take another one and I’ll…

Alice Billon-Galland

We can…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…give it to Angus.

Alice Billon-Galland

Yeah, we can take it after.

Angus Lapsley CMG

Okay, if it’s not – yes.

Alice Billon-Galland

Just maybe a few thoughts on the brain death and the China question. On the China question, there has been discussions around the Economic Committee at NATO and, you know, maybe, sort of, seeing how it can be used regarding it. The main question is what do allies want? To what extent do allies want to deal with China and economic and trade within NATO? This is quite a contentious issue, because in part, they don’t want to bring it into a military and political union, but also, some Europeans and maybe, you know, being French, you can hear what I’m thinking about, don’t necessarily want to align too closely to the US on that.

So, the discussion is more what about we do that at the EU? And there are discussions between the EU and the US. Question, where does that leave the UK? That’s for another time. But what exactly do we want to do vis-à-vis China? What the Secretary General keeps saying is, “It’s when China comes to us.” So, it can be in terms of, you know, investment infrastructure when it comes to the Eurocentric, but beyond that, it’s not for us at the moment. So, I think that’s where partnerships come into play and allies will be very, very clear what are NATO’s tasks and what are other organisations’ tasks, and I think on the economic questions, we’re not there.

And just on the brain death, actually, it was quite interesting, ‘cause reading the whole, very, very long interview, what he was saying is that “NATO are strong militarily, but it was weak politically,” because, you know, the – “because of Turkey, because of President Trump relying too much on the US, etc. And I think what we’re seeing now is that, actually, as Angus was saying, obviously, no NATO member has been invaded. There has been a very clear distinction between who is a NATO member and who isn’t, which is also why Sweden and Finland now want to join NATO. So, it has confirmed that point that, militarily, the Alliance is strong, and interestingly enough, that whole 2030 process, and maybe the new Strategic Concept, also came out of the brain death interview and the idea that we need to shake things up and not let, sort of, NATO have a mandate creep and do a little bit of everything. We need a real discussion what do we want to do? So, I think that’s where we are now, and in a way, it’s partly come out of that very provocative comment by the French President.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you. Look, I’ve got – I’m going to try and squeeze in, ‘cause we’ve got so many questions on here, as well as in the room, I’m going to try and squeeze in the three that I’ve committed to online already. Please be very succinct with your questions. These are much more current questions, as you will notice straightaway. Starting with Robert Fox, then I’m going to Robert Cooper and then, to Domenic Carratu. So, Robert, are you on the call there?

Robert Fox

Yes, can you hear me?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Yes, perfectly.

Robert Fox

To cut to the chase, how will the summit square Turkey’s reservations about the accession of Finland and Sweden to full membership, especially given Turkey’s current activities against its seat at its own insurgency of Kurds inside its borders and beyond? And I would’ve thought if ever you want a regional paradigm with global reference, you’ve got it there. Thank you.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you, Robert Fox. Another Robert, Robert Cooper. Robert, are you there?

Robert Cooper

If you can hear me, I am.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Perfectly, we hear you loud and clear.

Robert Cooper

Yes. Well, there’s a war going on. It hasn’t been mentioned very much. Is it going to be mentioned at the NATO Summit and is NATO going to have a policy on it? If our policy is that we don’t want Russia to win, then the question is what is NATO going to do about that?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

It’s a pretty fundamental question, so it’s – NATO’s been so careful at keeping itself out of these things. And Domenic Carratu, you had several questions, a couple of them have been asked, but you had quite a pointed one about Germany and Spain. Could you ask that one, please, Domenic?

Domenic Carratu

Yeah, it follows on from the previous comment. Is it true that Germany is blocking Spain from sending vital weapon supplies to Ukraine?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

That’s a very simple question. I’ll let you think.

Federico de Torres Muro

Very sweet, very decent.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

I’ll let you think about that one. I won’t start with that one, ‘cause I think that’d be very unfair. Why don’t we start with the really easy one of Sweden, Turkey, Finland? Actually, looking at time, this gentleman here had his hand up and I think it was somebody in the front row had their hand up, as well, so, I’m just going to take these two. I’m afraid that’s all I’ve got time to, these two at the front, ‘cause – and that’ll give you more time to think about your answer to the Germany-Spain one. Yeah.

Member

My question was stolen by Mr Robert Fox. Right, but instead of that, what I may ask – the question that I wanted to ask, enlargement of NATO. Will this, in the near future, cover Japan, South Korea, etc., to join the Alliance? And the b) part of the question, will there be any response to Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Okay, well, I believe we got that a little bit of the Robert Fox one, I think. So, yeah, please, yeah, looking at you.

Stephen Porter

My name’s Stephen Porter. I’m sorry, excuse me. My name’s Stephen Porter, I’m a private member and observer. My question is as well as having an obvious Russian problem, doesn’t NATO also have an American problem? Because every single European General speaking off the record, after the Afghan withdrawal, felt a deep sense of betrayal and a deep sense that the United States had not consulted its NATO allies, in a way that would’ve been unthinkable normally. Doesn’t NATO have to grapple with the fact that America is very capricious in the way that it moves? And we thought after Trump, maybe it would be a bit less capricious, but actually, that wasn’t the case.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Right, and what I’m going to do, just to keep it simple, is run in reverse order down to me. So, Federico, you’ve got the most time to reflect. Pick up one or two questions, but obviously, I’ll make sure they’re all answered by the time I get to the end. We’ve got four minutes. How about that? So, you got roughly a minute each, but I may extend a bit towards the end. But my Chatham House and Elcano colleagues will be especially disciplined. Luis.

Luis Simón

I will be very disciplined. So, I’ll take the – this question here from the gentleman on the first row on, “Would NATO enlargement cover Japan, the ROK, etc.?” Well, I mean, I think not, certainly not in the short or medium-term. As for the long-term, you never know, but right now, we’re talking about co-operation, in terms of, you know, security co-operation, political dialogue, but certainly not about making mutual defence commitments at inter-regional. They – I think they’re likely to remain intraregional and probably for good reasons.

On the American question, “Does NATO have an American problem?” Well, I think that sense of lack of co-ordination and consultation that emanated out of the way in which the United States handled the Afghanistan withdrawal, has, sort of, been mitigated, at least partly, I would say, by the way the United States handled the Russian military build-up in Ukraine and the way it showed intelligence. And that, sort of, helped mitigate that perception, which was, indeed, very much clear after Afghanistan. But, of course, the question’s related to command, military command, burden sharing, are always contentious. Oh, thank you.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Great, thank you very much. Alice…

Alice Billon-Galland

Just…

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…what do you want to take?

Alice Billon-Galland

Yeah, very briefly on those two points. I think the American problem is a dependency on American leadership and capabilities problem. The fact that Europeans depend on the US for critical enablers for pretty much everything. Even the French and the Sahel depending on the US. So, I think that’s the burden sharing issue that goes – takes us back to the, sort of, European capacity to act issue, European pillar within NATO, strategic autonomy, different discussions. But I think that’s part of the problem and why I think, in Madrid, we will get back to that, sort of, 2014 Wales Pledge and how is burden sharing going and how can Europeans keep building up their capacity to act? Because as Luis said, both our Asian partners and us are depending on the US and the US won’t be able to do everything at the same time for the next 50 years, so we need to be more active there.

And on, sort of, enlargement of NATO, etc., I mean, I think that’s completely not on the table at all. I think something that’s been going on and on again is the idea it’s a regional alliance for regional security. Eurocentric security is being impacted by more global threats now, but it does mean that NATO is going everywhere. It does mean that NATO’s going in the region, and the mere fact that Asian partners, or it’s called the Asia-Pacific at NATO, it’s not called Indo-Pacific, so these – I think that says quite a bit about their relationship with the region, as well.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Good point.

Alice Billon-Galland

Yeah.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Angus?

Angus Lapsley CMG

Look, I don’t think any of us are really going to take on the Turkey question, because I mean, Turkey has put a lot of issues on the table with Finland and Sweden. There is intense diplomacy to try and resolve those issues. How it will end up, I don’t think any of us will predict here, but I think we all want the same thing, which is that there is a resolution to those issues, and we get those countries into the accession process.

On the US, I mean, Afghanistan was clearly a very difficult moment for all of NATO. We’ve also seen, though, in the last few months, what the US does for European security when it does put its shoulder to the wheel. And the scale of what the US is doing to support Ukraine now and, therefore, to directly support European security, is pretty impressive, it really is. So, I mean, I always think, kind of, you know, reports of American disengagement from European security can be exaggerated for effect.

And lastly, on what – I mean, Robert’s question, which was, sort of, the question I was putting out there in my first intervention, and look, I think, Robert, it’s very clear that, you know, NATO is not going to fight this war in Ukraine. No NATO ally is in – is arguing for that, really. But I think it does play a really important role in a number of ways. So, firstly, what allies are doing, as nations, for Ukraine, I think, it’s, kind of, politically possible because they know they have the backstop of NATO’s collective security guarantee behind them.

I think that’s particularly true for smaller allies, who I think would otherwise be facing pretty brutal coercion from Russia now. And remember, at the beginning of this conflict, Russia said any support to Ukraine would be a, you know, a cause of – can’t think exactly what the words now, but they threatened us all if we tried to support Ukraine, they would react, and actually, we are now all supporting Ukraine.

I think, secondly, NATO has provided training and support for Ukraine in the past and I think there’s a really interesting, important question we’re going to have to grapple with quickly about when the conditions allow, is that something we should come back to and at what scale, and what should it look like? And thirdly, you know, as allies, we are all, at the moment, putting a lot of our defence effort, a lot of our resources, our equipment, our munitions, etc., into supporting Ukraine. There’s an important role for NATO in then making sure that that doesn’t come at the expense of our collective defence and that we reinvest and rebuild those stocks and get ready to meet whatever challenges that we’ve got.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Very important and thank you for a very clear answer. Last words to you, Federico. You’ve got…

Federico de Torres Muro

Thank you.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

…one tough question hiding in there and you can – may want to answer another one or two. Over to you.

Federico de Torres Muro

No, I will start with the easy one and I would say that I understand that the gentleman refers to the information in the media about the Leopard tanks, of course. Well, I would say that is one of the options the Spanish Government is considering to increase our military support to the Ukraine. It is not the only option and it, as I’ve said, is one option among others.

Of course, being an element of German make will have to consult with the German Government whether they give us the green light to provide these tanks to the Ukraine. But you have to understand, I have to be very cautious about this, because we haven’t made a decision and we have to take into consideration, as well, the Ukrainian needs. So, this is just one information, which showed up in the Spanish media. I understand it is around – a bit around the different media in Europe, but I would say this is not something, which has been decided upon by the Spanish Government, let alone by the German Government.

And on the rest of the questions, I would say that on Turkey, well, what we are doing is listening to Turkey’s concerns and I’m sure that the first one that they are – that are listening to the Turkey’s concern are the Finns and the Swedes. And that is the way democracies should behave, hearing – I mean, listening to one another and looking for, I mean, for fields of co-operation and see how we can reach an agreement. I don’t know whether we will reach an agreement. We will be more than happy, of course, to reach – that that agreement is reached in Madrid, but if not, we will go on working towards that objective. But I mean, we have to, as I’ve said, to hear to the Turks, to hear, of course, to the Finns and the Swedes, too, and I’m sure that we will reach an agreement at the end of the day.

And on American disengagement, so-called disengagement, I will say that the Americans were particularly active in, at least in assessing the reason for the situation in Afghanistan, and as far as I know, they are absolutely ready to extend, let us say, the role of the co-operative security quarters, which means that they are ready to rethink their way without – with the African challenges, let us say. We shouldn’t forget that that was a mission which started with a clear focus on fighting terrorism and then there was that, sort of, what the Analysts call “mission creep” and it became a, sort of, good governance and institutional building initiative or a – which, in a sense, changed the focus of the mission. But I mean, in my view, the organisation is strong enough to face all these challenges we have been mentioning.

Sir Robin Niblett KCMG

Thank you very much and thank you, everyone, for staying here, ‘cause well, I said, we’ve got a huge number of questions online, some very good ones in the room. We got to all of them, well, I think all of them, actually, I missed a couple at the back, apologies, stayed a little closer to the front – and the front, so, it’s equal opportunity. I missed somebody at the front and missed two at the back. But we’ve gone way over time, but we had to. Always remember, four people on a panel, at least an hour and a quarter. We even went over that, but I felt such an important summit, great panel and great questions. They all deserved justice.

Hopefully, this summit – yeah, I think it’s going to be a really important moment for the Alliance. It doesn’t mean that the problems aren’t there for the future, but I do feel it’s one of the most serious NATO Summits we’ve had in a long time, the preparation for it, in particular. So, good luck to our Spanish colleagues in Madrid helping pull this together and we look forward to reporting out on it to all of our members afterwards.

Thank you for being in the room, thank you for being online, and very strong hand for our panel, thank you [applause].