The new Cold War

Bronwen Maddox

Right, well, we probably still have 30 seconds to go, but we’re going to kick off right now, because there is so much to talk about. A very warm welcome to Chatham House. I’m Bronwen Maddox, the Director, and I’m delighted to have here the former Director, Robin Niblett. This is, I think, the first time we’ve done this. A very warm welcome to those of you online, as well, and int – in our overflow rooms. It is so popular an event, so do start the questions coming.

Well, we’re here to talk about The New Cold War, and that is, indeed, the title of a book that Robin has written. We all fired questions at him when he stepped down from Chatham House about what he was going to do, and he’s doing many things, but one of them, indeed, was this. We’ve already started analysing the cover, which you won’t be able to see from the back, but whether the Chinese leader is taller than the American leader, and that led us mysteriously to the subject of the manipulated royal photographs, and we are going to stop there.

But we’re going to talk about the conflict between China and the US, the nature of it, the difficulty in calibrating it, and what it means for the world we’re in. And, as everyone at Chatham House knows, I tend to discourage people from using the word ‘unprecedented’, but someone said to me, “Well, look, I think we really are in unprecedented times because of this phenomenon,” which is, indeed, something we spend a lot of time at Chatham House talking about, and that is both the rise of China and the question of whether America is declining, or choosing to step back in the world. And the speed of transition, we were arguing with each other, then really does give us something unusual in the rate of change in world relations, and that is the background for an awful lot of the work we do here.

We are going to talk about all these things, about the competing models of the world. Most countries and people, it seems to me, are not queuing up to say, “We want to be just like Vladimir Putin’s Russia,” but you do have in the US and in China, two countries which are putting themselves forward as very different ways of organising relations between people and relations between countries, and each arguing that not only that it is the best, but the one that should set the rules for the world. And that it – those are the things we’re going to talk about.

Well, we’ve got a terrific group here. As well as Robin, fresh from launching this book, we have Baroness Cathy Ashton, as you know, Former High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Former Vice-President of the European Commission, who has seen many aspects of this at very close quarters. Dr Yu Jie, who runs our China work here at Chatham House, Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, who runs our US and Americas Programme. So, I couldn’t be in better hands here. But let me start with you, Robin, and welcome, again.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Thank you.

Bronwen Maddox

Very, very good to have you here.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Thank you.

Bronwen Maddox

Let me just ask you simply whether this is a Cold War.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Nice simple first question. I’ve spent quite a bit of time thinking about…

Bronwen Maddox

Well, I know you have, but you…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…the title. I can’t get away from it.

Bronwen Maddox

The normal…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

It’s there.

Bronwen Maddox

The normal evasion of putting a question…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Exactly.

Bronwen Maddox

…mark, you have not gone in for that…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

No.

Bronwen Maddox

…which I thoroughly applaud.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Exactly, and I think we strongly agree on that element. But first of all, thank you very much, lovely to be here. Great to be here with you, Bronwen, as well, on the Chatham House stage. It’s been great, with two of my colleagues, Leslie and Cherry, and with Cathy Ashton, who I was able to persuade to become a member of our Panel of Senior Advisors way back when. And I’m not going to call anyone out here in the audience, but I do see Isabel Hilton near the front, and Isabel was kind enough to write a, well, a nice little endorsement for the book. So, thank you very much, Isabel. I’ll definitely call you out on that basis.

Is it a new Cold War? I think it is. So, you then have to define, what do we mean by it? The word ‘cold’ implies that, as with the last Cold War, I believe that the two protagonists can avoid it becoming hot, first point. Second, war, again, if it’s cold, it’s not a war, in the traditional sense of the term, and I do use the word quite a bit there, ‘contest’, yeah? How the contest between the US and China will shape our century. And I think the word contest was, kind of, the best noun I could come up with to try to capture the nature of how these two powers, and they are the two great powers of the world, even though a certain person who’s won his fourth/fifth term, James, and this President might not agree with it, are the two main powers in the world.

They – if to the extent that the two of them see each other as fundamental adversaries, they are going to set the weather for the rest of the globe, for the rest of the planet. And I think there’s two dynamics to their contest. One, I suppose, is traditional, and I’ve had the opportunity over the years to travel fairly frequently to China. And I remember whenever I’d go for meetings there, there was always this desire and fascination with talking about great-power competition. And the Chinese perception that always struck me was that “Well, this is inevitable. We’re the rising power, you know. We used to be one of the top two powers in the world, along with India, we’re reclaiming our natural place, 1.4 billion people. We’ll eventually equal or maybe surpass the US in GDP. And we know,” the Chinese would say, “that America is going to feel uncomfortable with this and want to resist it. And that is the nature of our great-power competition. And hopefully we keep an eye win-win, but if not, and if we have to compete and contest, we will.”

But from a Chinese perspective, there’s this idea that if they didn’t try to push the Americans too far, didn’t try to usurp their position, yet, globally, but at least, being equally to them regionally, then the two sides would be able to be find a modus vivendi that would be short of a Cold War. But I remember, even two or three years ago, I’m certain it was before COVID actually, I said to them that I thought they were “misinterpreting a key dynamic of the contest between the two countries.” Which is that they represent, fundamentally, you said this in your introduction, fundamentally different approaches to national governance, and that difference to national governance spreads to their view of what makes them safe globally and what should be international order.

And this isn’t, sort of, communism versus capitalism. This is countries in which a small cadre are the leaders, and believe that by being a small cadre who understand what the future of the country should be so it can remain sovereign in a competitive world, citizens, institutions, all must bow down, I’ll use that term, to that leadership, who are responsible for being – you know, for making sure the country is successful, independent and secure and prosperous. And the system that we live under, and that the US has championed for many decades, is one in which governments, in fact, are servants of the people. And the people, in a very complex and robust way, as we know in many cases, end up determining what a government should be, the policy should be. It’s messy, but in the end, it’s tended to be fairly resilient.

Those two systems are mutually incompatible, and they’re incompatible because each fears that the other could undermine it. Certainly, in China, there’s a sense that at some point America will not accept China’s rise as a communist state in the world stage, because that would be a negative example to the rest of the world. And this fear that, ultimately, one party states, or one leader states, end up, however successful they are in the medium – in the near term or even medium term, becoming insecure, and they project that insecurity globally. They externalise their insecurity, and that, you could say Vladimir Putin has done in Ukraine, and the fear would be that at some point China might do that over Taiwan or the South China Sea. That an insecure leadership would have to confirm its credibility by externalising its insecurity. If you’re on the, obviously, the Chinese side, there’s that fear that America is going to try to undermine you, prevent you, therefore, from being able to take your rightful place.

So, each side fears the other at a really fundamental level, and therefore you start to compete at all levels. You compete through technology, you compete at the military level, you compete at the economic level, and you compete at the institutional level. I go through that in the book, and I’ll stop here. I think each side, right now, is trying to bring friends or allies onto its side. Through the Chinese prism it’s principally through the BRICS, and so far under the Biden administration, it’s been through the G7. Whether those structures can sustain themselves with the US election, we’ll talk about it in a minute, but as I said, I think the contest is not just about great powers trying to make room for each other, but it’s this fundamental lack of trust in the two systems of government, each thinking that the other is going to try to undermine it at some point.

Bronwen Maddox

And as you say, really incompatible visions of how to organise a country, organise the relation between citizens, people in the country and their government. Cathy, do you share this view of competition driven by mutual fear, as Robin has put it?

Baroness Ashton

I think it’s important to look at how China has viewed the US and how the US has viewed China in recent times. And fear is one word you could use. I’m always nervous about fear as a, sort of, idea of what drives a relationship, because I think – and I’m not suggesting, Robin, you feel any differently to what I’m about to say, which is it’s always a bit more complicated than it looks. And there’s no question that, for China, the system of government that they believe works for them is significantly different to the system of government that we believe, i.e., democracy, as being fundamental to who we are. And that, in China, the dramatic change that’s happened in one generation, to create this enormous what we would call middle class, as something the Americans would call middle class, group of people, has been absolutely extraordinary.

And so, from the perspective as I see it, and I will bow to those who know much more than I do, it is a country that says, “Our job in Government is to make sure that we look after the economic needs and wants of the people. In return, if you like, for which we have a system of government that is going to determine how people live, how the country exists.” And, in that context, it is very different.

Personally, I think the driving force is going to be who controls the global norms, who controls the global institutions? Is it going to be about blocs or networks? If so, what are they going to look like? And this is going to be, sort of, slightly hidden, because we’re going to talk a lot about economics and technology, because that’s the manifestation we’re all very familiar with. But the reality is quite different underneath that, and already, clearly, a key part of how China and the US look at each other, and how China looks at its place in the world, is who controls what kind of global order we have.

And avoiding cold becoming hot or ending the war, it’s going to be, eventually, how that plays out and what room there is for China and the US to operate in a world that we want to be fundamentally based on the norms and values that we hold. It doesn’t mean there isn’t room for China. It means that the overarching veneer that exists, is going to be around the norms and ideals that we hold, and that’s really the contest. And that’s not about military activity alone, though that will potentially play its part, but it is about a lot of different ways of operating. And so, in a sense, we’re dealing with the things that – at the moment, that are very obvious, technology, economics, military. You can see that, build up the arsenals, sort out what technologically we allow China to do, in Britain, in Europe, in the US, and economically, not allowing China to flood the markets, dealing with competition, and so on. All really important.

But the really interesting stuff is going to be how the networks work, the role of China, not just in the BRICS, because the Russians have always led the BRICS and the identity of the BRICS. But how China does its networks with the Silk Road, what it’s been doing on different parts of Africa, where China is operating, in the Pacific, how it’s building its relationships. So, that, for me, is the area that I think is going to be of dramatic interest, and Robin identifies that very well in the book.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm, and it’s really interesting the way you put it, I mean, a competition not just for alliances, but for the levers that control…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Hmmm.

Bronwen Maddox

…the institutions that run the world. As you put it, the Global North institutions, the old ones, but China being able to get enough allies to change – begin to change the rules of those.

Baroness Ashton

That’s right, and if you look at the Security Council, which is the traditional, big leverage, it’s frozen, because you’ve got the War in Ukraine, which means Russia doesn’t operate, at all, in any sense, as a partner or player, in any way. And the Chinese generally, but not always, will follow where the Russians are.

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah.

Baroness Ashton

So, what are we going to re – not replace it with, because we need to look after the UN, it’s really, really important, but what are the networks that are going to exist? You’ve seen the rise of the BRICS+. You see the role of the G20. You’ve got all of these different networks beginning to be in play and countries making their own decisions, which has been writ large through the reaction to the Ukraine War by many countries, who didn’t – who not – who do not think what Putin has done is the right thing, at all.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Baroness Ashton

And who do not believe in invasion, but have not just come on side with the perspective that’s been put to them from, if you like, the West.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm, no, thanks for that. Yu Jie, is it a Cold War?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, given my former boss is here and my current boss is here, I tried to work out, should I behave or not behave? Can I just add just…?

Bronwen Maddox

There is a right answer.

Dr Yu Jie

Can I just say, adding a slight disagreement in here with Robin? I mean, of course, we have something very similar to a Cold War, which is based on ideological competition, which is also based on military capability competition, and also, technology competition. But we seem to also forgotten that how much economic interdependence and, also, that people-to-people interdependence between China and the United States ever since 1979, when Nixon – when the both countries established diplomatic relations with each other. So, I think we’re not really yet in that sense of Cold War, that the two side almost never talk to each other.

But I think what really make the whole thing become more complex, is what – which I entirely agree with Robin here, that sense of driving by fear. The fear that determine the foreign policy of – from Beijing and also, from Washington. That interplay of the fears between the two countries. So, whatever United States issue, a sense of policy, for example, the so-called small yard, high fence, and the Chinese will come in with a direct response, scientific self-reliance, or Made in China 2025, and so on and so forth, to waterproof the Chinese economy and Chinese society against the US pressure. So, I think that sense of direct fear, really driven to the world where we are today.

Now, in terms of China’s median responses on this stalemate, on its relationship with United States, I think it’s largely broadly fall into three categories. Now, the first category, as what Cathy just mentioned, in terms of building alliances, building global norms, by hoping that as many developed countries would come under China’s wings, and by doing that, that’s what Beijing call it – referring as the so-called orderly multipolarity today. So, the term of orderly multipolarity and multipolarity is a term that’s very much favoured by Beijing, because that would really enable the Global South to play a much bigger role, and hence, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative. Be that passive for now, be that old-fashioned. Now, instead, you have the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, and lately, Global Civilization Initiative. So, exactly meanings need to be determined, but nevertheless, China has showed the willingness of doing that.

Now, I think, secondly, this is terms of that being proactive diplomacy, and what recently, two weeks ago, the Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, spoke about, by being proactive diplomacy, again, that China should be more assertively setting the international agenda, both at a bilateral level, as well as at multilateral level. So, on two things, by being proactive, in order to continue to creating a “window of strategic opportunity,” a term that policymakers in Beijing has been using ever since last two decades. And I think that so-called windows of opportunity, Beijing realised this did now become much shorter and shorter. And hence, really, be – come back to the trump card, or the responses Beijing put forward, to really, it is to hoping by utilise what has happened in War in Ukraine, and hoping what has happened between Israel and Hamas, that enable to expanding Global South support towards Beijing, towards Beijing’s initiative. And then that’s the part of the Global South.

Now, I think, also, and this come to the second part, when it come to China’s relationship with Europe in here, that lot has been said, because of China’s choices on Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine that has worsened the relationship with Europe. But China also sees the opportunity of the likely return, yes or no, of President Trump, you know, the second term with this Property Developer, and somehow China would taking this – reconcile this opportunity with Europe. So, that’s another part which really was in Beijing’s consideration.

But having said all of this, what we should also remember that is now a slowing economy. A slowing economy, like any other great power, have to reconsider where to spend its financial resources and manpowers more wisely. So, we no – we will no longer to see the level of the investment, foreign development assistance, and so on and so forth, like would have experienced in the last two decades, for what Beijing has done. Now, it’s a completely different model that Beijing have to think about, where have to become more thrifty, spending its money wisely. I mean, to handle this properly, I think we’re probably going to have another 50 years of calm period…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm hmm.

Dr Yu Jie

…but to handle this poorly, we’re going to plunge into something, I think I wouldn’t call it a Cold War, probably a freezing war.

Bronwen Maddox

A new ter – a freezing war, with obviously, the potential of…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…of a hot war, that would be, I think we can all agree…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…catastrophic. I mean, I want to get onto Leslie in just a second, but Yu Jie, I can’t resist from asking you…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…whether you – what you’ve described is wonderful tactics for China, of…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…increasing its influence on every side…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…and this very opportunistic looking round the world for influence. Is it possible to say what China wants? And so, Robin described at the beginning, the, kind of, the symmetrical fear of…

Dr Yu Jie

Hmmm.

Bronwen Maddox

…these two countries, thinking the other might be in a position to annihilate them and what they stood for. Where does China want to stop? I’ve just come back from Japan, where they say, “We think it just wants parity.” That may have been wishful thinking and I supp…

Dr Yu Jie

Hmmm.

Bronwen Maddox

“Just wants parity with the US,” where would it want to stop?

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Hmmm.

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I mean, China can say what it wants, and China can determine its priority, but it’s not only depending on China’s capability to project this power to making this narrative attractive, but this also largely depends on how China’s intended audience responds on China’s initiative. And if they do not respond very well, then perhaps it’s not really doing China any favour. So, it’s really the perception of the others and how the others making the policies, based on those perceptions, and that is where China’s difficulties are, I think.

Bronwen Maddox

Right. Leslie, there are so many questions that begin and end in the US, but, you know, is the US right in the way it calibrates this tension, this contest?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Ooh, well, let me answer that, but first, I just – I want to weigh in on “The New Cold War” – on the Cold War, “New Cold War,” title of Robin’s book, by saying one thing in particular. First of all, it is truly an honour to be on this panel, not only for the reasons Cherry has said, but also for the reasons that Cherry said, but Robin, it’s great to be able to talk about your book and with you, Robin.

The nice thing about – there’s so many nice things about this book, you must read it. But one of the really nice things about this book is that even though there’s not a question mark, you can actually read the book, it’s tremendously fluent, as you would expect from Robin, and you can find all the datapoints in there that explain why it’s not a Cold War.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Hmmm.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

And you can also find all the datapoints in there that explain why it is a Cold War. So, everything that’s been said is actually in the book, but not in a, you know, not in a one side, the other side, way, in a very fluent way. And so, you know, Robin recognises very clearly in the book that even though this is, in some fundamental way, a New Cold War, we live in a very different world, the nature of the conflict is different, it’s a very interdependent world. He talks – you know, all the factors that have been laid out, and that you can think of, and that we’ve all heard if we’re engaging in this debate about whether it’s a new Cold War. We’ve heard them all, and it’s integrated into the analysis, so it’s really beautiful in that way.

I think the Cold War concept is really useful for one thing, which is that it’s a nice thing, it’s an analytical construct that focuses the debate and that sharpens our ability to think through the period in which we live in, which Robin has clearly recognised, and we all know is very consequentially different from what it was during the Cold War that we all grew up – or at least, I don’t know about you, but I grew up during, and I know the rest of you grew up during. So, it’s different, but the beauty of the book is talking through why and how it’s different, and that debate, I think, is fundamentally significant and important.

The second thing that Robin says, and here, I think I disagree, but it’s a really important point, and he doesn’t say it ‘til the very end, and maybe it’s in there, but you, sort of, pull it out at the end, I was like, “Wow,” in the conclusion, you say that “it’s fundamentally an ideological war.” And it’s – that the first thing, and I guess my view on that would be it’s clearly the case – you know, if you read the National – the 2022, Biden’s National Security Strategy, they make the point that China’s the only power that has the ability and the interest in shaping the international order and being a peer competitor to the United States on that dimension.

That’s not necessarily about ideology, but it’s clear that ideology is in there, Robin, you put that right up front. I thought that was absolutely fascinating. I have to say, working for you all these years, I wasn’t – I didn’t predict it. I didn’t know for sure that’s where you would come out, so I really also appreciated that because it’s a sign of what I take, and experienced in your thinking, which was one of deep nuance, and really reading and listening and talking before you decided on where you landed. So, it was very interesting to see where you landing.

The second thing in the conclusion that’s really interesting, and again, I think it’s very interesting, I’m not sure I agree – I think I don’t agree, but I think it’s something I’m very interested in, is that you said, “It’s going to be won or lost in the Global South.”

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

That this competition is going to be won or lost in the Global South, and I think that’s part of it. But I guess, my reading, and again, I’m trying to follow in all of your footsteps and continue to watch it before I decide, but I think that’s only really one place. And I think what Cathy said is really important. It’s going to happen at the level of who controls the rules of the game, who controls the structures of power. Not just, you know, A getting B to do something they wouldn’t otherwise do, but setting the rules, controlling the structures, having the influence, displacing the dollar as a reserve currency. All those things that we know really matter, I think that’s, kind of, where the game is.

And I guess, on this question of the US and its, you know, intentions and ambitions, you know, we all like to say there’s a bipartisan consensus that China’s the problem. Within the US there’s a bipartisan consensus, and I think that’s obviously true, but it doesn’t get us very far. I think that the second thing is that it – there’s a consensus on not wanting China to be a regional hegemon in the Indo-Pacific, ‘cause America considers itself an Indo-Pacific power…

Dr Yu Jie

Hmmm.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

…it wants primacy in general, and, certainly, it wants to have a primary role in the Indo-Pacific, for reasons that have to do with the global economy, but also with ideas and values and norms that shape how the global economy is governed. And I think there’s a debate about, you know, how far China can go, and there are a range of views and there’s a – on that, within the US context. So, I think that’s where you start to get a lot of difference and a lot of dispute. And I think on the specific tactics that will be chosen, you know, depending on what happens in the months ahead, but especially in November, that we will see very different China policies.

But at the core – and then, I guess, the final thing I would say is, this gets to what’s interesting in the US, and Steve Walt said it in an article I think, in 2018, he said, “For the first time ever, starting at around 2016,” really with Trump, “the US is having a debate about what its current strategy should be.” That was not the case. The US, kind of, knew what it wanted to do, which was to control the institutions, control the globe, have a lot of allies and partners and make sure that China was in its place, as with any other potential challenger. And now, it’s not clear, you know, there is a debate. Some people think the US should restrain itself, balance from – at home, and others think it should continue to play this game of controlling the institutions and liberal institution – and liberal internationalism. But there is a very serious debate, with some agreement about the role of China in that.

Bronwen Maddox

Because it seems to me, you’ve – you’re describing this debate within the US, but if there are those who care about the US’ ability to shape the world and set values, then you and Robin have made a good case that the US should indeed worry a lot about this. That the, kind of, fear and cross-party fear of China that you hear is absolutely justified if you care about the abilities – the US’ ability to set those rules and shape the institutions.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

If – it’s not really about the US, in my view, and this is where I guess I would agree with – implicitly as – not – as well as explicitly, what Robin’s suggesting, which is that that’s where the ideology part comes in.

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

‘Cause it’s not just, you know, you want control for control’s sake. You want control because you, sort of, align with one set of ideas, principles and values that have to do – even if say, let go of the, you know, political and civil rights agenda, but the whole privacy, separation of the state from civil society and other independent institutions, all those things that are embedded in rules in international institutions, sure, control matters if you’re going to have – if you’re going to be able to shape the – and you need partners for that.

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

It’s not just about the US. It’s about the West.

Bronwen Maddox

So, I’m going to come really soon to questions, ‘cause I think there are going to be loads, if only because there are loads of people who really, really wanted to come here, and there’s lots online, as well. But let me just pick up with all of you this point about the Global South, and both, if you like, playing for it, China arguably more strategically and more knowingly. Robin, you’ve – I will add to Leslie’s praise of Robin’s book, because he’s done what many books do not. He’s described the problem, but he’s spent much more time on the – what you – what might be done about it. What should we do? What should all kinds of countries do, in order to stop this Cold War getting colder, and then presumably hotter after that?

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Or freezing.

Bronwen Maddox

The metaphor breaks down at some point. And you’ve got all kinds of suggestions. I don’t overestimate the threat or focus on arms control, which I completely agree with and rally liberal democratic countries. But the one I want to pick out is the dialogue and the patience in talking to the Global South. And I wondered if you could just expand on that, of what really you’re calling on the US and European countries and Japan, other democracies, what you’re calling on them to do, and whether there’s a point where they have to follow that with money, which China has indeed supplied.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah. Well, thank you, and these are all great comments, which I’d love to discuss, but I’m going to do what the Moderator and Chair is telling me to do, which is answer her question. Obviously, one of the big differences between this Cold War and the last one is that the countries across the Global South – and I use that term with some confidence, because it was used by the BRICS, and we had a big discussion with Samir Saran in the Raisina Dialogue – actually, it was something else I was involved with him in. And he said, “You know, we’ve decided we’re using that term.” There were a lot of Americans who said, “Don’t use the term Global South,” I said, “I hate it,” but he is a, kind of, like you said, representative of an inner view, said, “We should keep it for now.” So, I’ll use that term.

So, the countries in the Global South, obviously in this new Cold War, are in a completely different position to where they were in the 60s, 70s, even 80s. They represent, you know, 65 plus, close to 70% of world population. They’re at a 30 to 35% growing percentage of global GDP. Critically, they have the resources that are going to be needed to conduct the energy transition, without which the planet will not survive, and any order, or any multilateral institutions or values could all find themselves completely undermined. And I do a whole chapter on the difficulties of trying to deal with climate change in geopolitical competition.

But I come back to this point in the end, these countries are in play. They are not leaning one way or the other. Democracies are not leaning towards the liberal democracies and autocracies aren’t all leaning towards the autocracies, you know. Saudi Arabia’s playing it both ways. India’s playing it both ways. You can take your pick. Quite understandably, because as much as we talk about a literal international order that there was…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…there really hasn’t been. I’m – well, we wrote together in Foreign Affairs, I’m very leery of the term, “We need to protect the liberal international order.” There was an order that said, “Countries don’t invade other countries,” and I’m – that order has been, you know, until recently, pretty much upheld.

And then there’s a, sort of, economic order, which was about, you know, not exhibiting protectionism and following the rules of the WTO. But most of the rest of the stuff has been honoured in the breach laws and in the rule and in the word. So, I’m very leery about it. What I do think is that those countries in the Global South are saying, “We’re going – we can triangulate. This is an opportunity for us to play one off the other.” Now, we could either say, “No, that’s thoroughly unfair. You need to stand with us, stand with us on Ukraine.” I think it’s – I’ll be a little provocative and say it’s a waste of time asking…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…Ind – yeah, India or other countries in the G20 to stand with us…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…on Ukraine. It’s not their fight, it’s not their battle. Indians will say, “Where were you with us on Pakistan?” Others will say, “Where were you with us on the Middle East?” Each country has its whataboutism on that. It’s our battle, as Europeans. We need to fight that battle.

But where I think we have an offer to the Global South, and this is what I, I suppose, major on, to use the American term, in the conclusion, is that, actually, what China’s been offering was fine as a waystation. But as you said, its Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a tired phrase, has been useful for an early phase of trying to invest, but a rather ineffective way in some cases, in infrastructure across Africa and other parts of the world. But it’s also upheld crony governments from Venezuela to…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm hmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…take your pick across Africa. We have an offer to make, and that offer is to say, “We want to take you up the value chain. You will be more successful economically, not by selling us primary commodities, or simply allowing our companies to come over and build your railways or build your roads. You moving up the value chain is a proposition, certainly to us in Europe, because otherwise, those populations will be coming in our direction, as a result of climate change and instability. We have an offer to make where we lead you to become more successful as middle class, evolving economies, where you add value to your primary commodities, where you’re actually building batteries rather than just selling us nickel or cobalt.”

And that offer is one that we can make, partly in Europe because of our geographic proximity to Africa. Difficult thing to say to the United States, but they need to focus more on Latin America, with the same proposition, and absolutely, money is required.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

You know, we…

Bronwen Maddox

I think, also, trade…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…want that…

Bronwen Maddox

…trade, as you’re saying – I mean, you were saying, the offer is the old one of trade…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

…but more valuable trade than in the past. May I just – I want to come to…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah, we’ve got time.

Bronwen Maddox

…questions very…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Brilliant.

Bronwen Maddox

…very quickly. Cathy, can I just ask, you’ve been leading one of these institutions in a way, one that stands for rules or par – you know, its foreign face, if you like. What do you see of this new battle for values, for allegiances?

Baroness Ashton

Well, I was going to build really, on what Robin said, because I think it does require us to think much longer term about a strategy towards China, towards what we call the Global South, to what we’ve always, sort of, relied on. Quick fixes, or short-term interventions, with money thrown at the problem, in a, sort of, what I call a Whack-A-Mole-y kind of way, “We’ll knock that problem down.” Until the problems, kind of, have become so large and so recurring that you start to realise that there are things that need to be done for the much longer term.

And in the context of how you compete for where countries are going to come out, and where populations will find themselves, it is precisely about building up the value chain…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Hmmm.

Baroness Ashton

…in every possible way. It is about what we do not for ten years, but for 50 years. When the Ukraine war broke out, a number of people I spoke to in countries of the Global South, leaders one way or another, who said, “Well, why are you expecting us to get involved in this? Where were you when?” as you rightly say. “How many coups in Africa can you name last year?” said one to me. “How many armed conflicts have we seen in Africa that you’ve not even noticed?”

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Baroness Ashton

Not just you. So, there is a real, I think, need to, from a European perspective, in the broader sense of Europe, really be thinking, what is the long-term proposition and offer, not to countries as a mass, but to individual nations…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Hmmm hmm.

Bronwen Maddox

Right.

Baroness Ashton

…that’s going to make the difference?

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, thanks. With that, let’s go to questions. As I expected, lots and lots and lots of hands shooting up. Alright, I’m going to take them in pairs, and start here in the second row.

Isabel Hilton

[Pause] Thank you very much. My name’s Isabel Hilton. I do recommend the book. I have – I don’t disagree, that there’s a contest in the Global South, but I wonder whether Europe has also been a little slow to rethink the security paradigm. The degree to which, for example, economic dependencies can be weaponised. The new strategic confrontation that we see forming in the High North. The spread of, you know, the potential threat surface, and curious phenomena, like a member of the European Union and a member of NATO who has also signed up a security – to a security pact with China, as Hungary has.

Now, are we really thinking in the right, sort of, multiple dimensions about what this means in – and how we redefine security, and how we address those questions in Europe?

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you very much, and let me take another one. Okay, I’m going to go, oh, right here in the front.

Oliver Lycett

Oliver…

Bronwen Maddox

Oh, can you wait for a microphone, please?

Oliver Lycett

Oliver Lycett, Durham Diplomatic Society. Which tension points do you think are most likely to disrupt the current status of the New Cold War, be it Iran, be it Russia, Ukraine, etc.?

Bronwen Maddox

Sorry, I didn’t quite understand that.

Oliver Lycett

So…

Bronwen Maddox

Which tension points are most likely to disrupt?

Oliver Lycett

…to disrupt, sort of, the current conceptualisation of the New Cold War, be it US versus China being – yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, Iran, Russia, you’ve suggested several, alright. Well, we have – where shall we start? Cathy, would you take the one about Europe and whether it has been ‘slow to rethink’, as Isabel Hilton put it, the security threat and the nature of things like economic dependency?

Baroness Ashton

Well, Isabel, I think the language that’s always used about Europe is it’s ‘too slow’. That’s true of practically every aspect of European policy, and it’s a combination of the fact of trying to get 27 countries into the same place is not as fast as anyone would ever like. We speeded it up on occasion, but I think it’s a general problem.

But in a broader sense, this goes to my point about thinking longer term, that there is an issue in how Europe is able to think conceptually much longer than has traditionally been the case. It’s managed it on economic issues better, because it’s thought about how to think trade and development and so on, partly through the structures that the Commission has, whether you like them or they don’t, that they can think 20/30/40 years ahead. But when it comes to the member states and foreign policies, as I used to say, “There’s always an election somewhere in Europe, and there’s always going to be a problem.” And then there’s Viktor Orbán and Hungary, and that creates a whole different dynamic, at least for now. Things will change eventually.

So, yes, I think it needs to speed up. Yes, I think it needs to define what it means by security in the broader sense, as well. This is a massive economic power that doesn’t feel its own strength and doesn’t use its own strength, and it’s now got to think, how does this apply in ending the war in Europe, Russia-Ukraine? How does this apply when it thinks about its relationships, especially with China, across the Atlantic, and everywhere else in its own neighbourhood? And I think there’s a lot of work to be done on that. So, I don’t disagree with you, but I think it’s a – partly a function of the nature of the beast.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you, and thank you both for the emphasis on Europe, as Robin put it in his book, you know, between the US and China, and trying to calculate its position there. I’d like to mention as well, we’ve re-boosted, relaunched the Europe Programme, and I would like all kinds of comments and suggestions on that, but Armida van Rij is now leading that for us. Right, Robin, do you want to comment on the other one, or Leslie, or Yu Jie, on the, what’s most likely to bring new tension into the new Cold War? Whether it’s something like Russia, or Iran, whatever you’d like to.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

You go first.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

I’ve already – you go first, I’ve already said a few things, and then I’ll come in. I will say it quickly after.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

You get to do mop up this time. I, you know, I’m thinking on my feet here, but – so I might change my mind, but I – my instinct is that the Russia – that the Ukraine War drives us potentially, if I understand your question correctly, more into a bifurcation, a Cold War, a New Cold War. It would, you know, give us evidence and data that that is a direction of travel, and I think the War in the Middle East is less clear.

There’s clearly a, you know, Global South, to use the term, backlash against the US, and to an extent, the West, on its hypocrisy when it comes to supporting Israel, or – and not calling Israel out for – or not calling the US out for providing arms and weapons to Israel and allowing the tragedy that’s currently unfolding in Gaza. But it’s not clear that that leads to a clear bifurcation, ‘cause it’s just not really clear where China is on this. Whereas, in Russia, in the Ukraine War, you, sort of, see, you know, Russia, China, right, that’s heading in one direction, and the West is heading in another.

I do want to add one quick point on India, on your comment about India, Robin, because I agree with you, it’s not their fight. We’ve heard this a lot, and we’ve been to India a lot recently, and I understand, we all understand the strategic position and the India-Russia relationship. However, I think that India missed a trick by not having a slightly more nuanced position…

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

…which is at a minimum, saying, “This is Europe, this is your war, this isn’t our war, fine. We’re not going to go along with your sanctions. We have a different set of interests. We have people, fine.” But call out the sov – the violation of sovereignty. Stick to the norm that you’ve always agreed is the bedrock of the international order and it’s the one norm that India, along with others, have said…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

…is really important. I think they missed a trick, and, you know, it’s never too late, by not just saying, “We agree with the baseline, but we – you know, we’re not going to, kind of, go down the further question about human rights, democracy and sanctions.”

Bronwen Maddox

I think you’re absolutely right, Leslie, and it’s – I mean, it’s a point that India might well want to argue in its own favour, in terms of territory disputes with China, and so on. And, you know, Japan, despite being a very long way away has said firmly that, you know, “We regard that as our fight, and Ukraine, it is a clear invasion of that principle.” Did you want to come in on that, yeah?

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

I’ll just come in very quickly to say, obviously, I completely agree that the Russia-Ukraine War is reinforcing the New Cold War. In fact, you might even say it precipitated it from what it was into this, and I talk about it in the book, so I won’t say more now. I think I’ve got my – in terms of reinforcing it, about tensions on the South China Sea, it’s very interesting to see a country like the Philippines try to push back late, some might say too late, on the status quo that China thought it had established in the South China Sea. And the one thing China is not going to accept right now, or the CCP won’t accept, is going backwards from where they were. Each incremental state forward – stage forward needs to be held. So I’m, kind of, watching that as much as I would watch Taiwan.

And again, I think the Middle East, the real – there are many tragedies in what’s happening there. One of the disappointing things for this is the G7 had tried to catch up a little bit with China on infrastructure. They proposed at the last G7 Summit this IMEC, this India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, which would have to go through Israel to Europe, and now can’t. On the other hand, the offer of it might be something that a future Israeli Government might say, “Actually, this is worth going through.”

But the one tension with the New Cold War, of course, is what would a Donald Trump presidency mean for the New Cold War? ‘Cause whatever anyone else says things are, he’ll say the opposite. And I’d be fascinated to see if he were to become President, the, sort of, bifurcations between him and some of the people who think they’ll get a shot in the new administration to really go for China, and go close to hot war. Whereas I think that may not be what he would be interested in personally.

I do think on Europe, just a very, very last point, I think Europe has moved on. I do think Europe – Europe has to be, has no choice, but to be strategic now. It hasn’t been for a long time, you’re absolutely right, but even if Trump were to come in, that would not mean that Europe then turns back to China as a halfway power, because they know China is backing Russia, and they know they need the US to support them in the War in Ukraine. So, I think there’s no going back for Europe, they’ll have to be more strategic.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm, thanks. I’m going to come back to the Trump point in a second. Let me take a question from Chris Western, which I feel has been hanging over this conversation, and Yu Jie and others, but particularly Yu Jie, I’d love your view on this. And it is, he was saying, “Is there not an argument that given its own demographic and economic problems, that China is a declining power?” And then he adds to that, “And will become more aggressive as a result, in asserting itself?” That one and let me take another one from the audience. Who’d like to – sorry, there’s a whole load of hands up. On the aisle, near the back, thanks. Yes, no, this aisle.

Member

So, that one before, then…

Bronwen Maddox

Yes, yeah.

Member

I’ll give that to you.

Josh Gold

Thank you, Josh Gold, I work for a political consultancy firm. A lot of the, kind of, media focus on – has been on Taiwan and, kind of, the fight for semiconductors. But you touched on, kind of, energy transition earlier. I was just wondering, how much, kind of, potential for military engagement do you see in, kind of, Central Africa, in places like the DRC and, kind of, that area?

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, great. Yu Jie?

Dr Yu Jie

Shall I go to the…

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah.

Dr Yu Jie

…aggressive, whether China will become more aggressive or so?

Bronwen Maddox

And the implications of its economic problems, the youth unemployment, the property bubble, and – if it is one, and so on…

Dr Yu Jie

Okay.

Bronwen Maddox

…and whether those are connected.

Dr Yu Jie

Sure. I mean, essentially, this is really depends by the ruling Communist Party, how are they going to draw their social contract? Are they going to continue the social contract that is resting on improving the ordinary people’s living standard, and hence, the other population do not questioning the freedom and politi – individual political right, or Xi Jinping himself need something to justify his position and his political legacy? From our side, it seems to be it’s quite natural that the country will become – behave more aggre – assertively. But I think, on the other hand, when you go into China and talk to people on the street, it seems to be really the ordinary population concerned about property price…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yes.

Dr Yu Jie

…concerned about job opportunities, as much as in the West, the population does in here. So, I wonder, I mean, judging from this now, it doesn’t seems to be the Communist Party want to change the social contract at all at this stage, but what real – they really need to have, is they need to have a clear economic direction of travel and where the country’s heading. I mean, ‘cause so far, that direction of travel on the economy it is very unclear, and hence, that would determine how politically, China would behave. I think so far, it is all very ambivalent over there, yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

Thanks, and, Robin, did you want…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

I’ll just…

Bronwen Maddox

…to pick up the next one?

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

I’ll say a very quick word. There are many bigger experts on Africa here at Chatham House than I am. My simple comment would be that this is a space where – I talk in the book about ‘spoilers’ being empowered in a New Cold War, as much as those countries that try to triangulate in a positive sense, those who are trying to use it to gain economically. And one of the biggest spoilers is Russia in many parts of Africa.

I mean, last year was the year of coups, or the last two to three years have just seen a whole suite of them. Trying to create a new front, in essence, a physical front, against Europe from the South, and trying to muck up the positive vision that I put out there of those countries potentially becoming answers to the green energy transition in Europe. And trying to, at the very least, create, a sort, of layer of instability through which those better endowed with resources countries in Africa would be able to transport their positive gains up towards Europe. So, if, really Russia’s trying to create a wave, an arc of instability across that arc, then it’s very deliberately done. So, yeah, it’s a contest there.

Bronwen Maddox

Hmmm. Let me – I just want to – because we veered onto the question of Trump, I want to pick up a question from Fanaaka Chidakwa, on – who’s saying, “On the question of the US and its intentions, what is the role of America’s domestic politics on its global standing?” And I wonder if we could just explore this for a moment, because it is hanging there over the whole year, and the number of conversations I’ve had that – in every country, it feels like, that begin, “What if Trump?” Cathy, would you like to start, and then maybe Leslie?

Baroness Ashton

Well, it does hang over any conversation in America, for a start. And I think for a lot of the thinking, going back to the question Isabel asked about Europe and thinking more strategically, there is a real concern, let’s put it like that, that the domestic situation in America could dramatically change, which will have both internal and external consequences. And there are lots of stories and ideas about what Trump two would look like, and how different it would be to Trump one. The most – the one you hear the most is that “This time he won’t be bothering to bring in people that we all might regard as experts. He’ll be bringing people with a determination to pursue his agenda, and that’s it.”

And so, that will have a big impact. It will have a big impact, I think, for China, because we don’t really know which direction he’ll go in. Whether his admiration for Xi Jinping, which he talked about as a ‘strong leader’, equivalent to the admiration he talked about for other strong leaders, at least – whatever, or whether he will decide that, actually, China is someone to be – in a very transactional way, becomes the enemy, if I can put it like that. It’s very difficult to be absolutely sure which way it will go.

What is very clear is that it will rock the institutional framework again, it will rock the transatlantic relationship. And it will make countries have to think more carefully about how they’re going to conduct business, how they’re going to operate in the international arena. How if – how much he will go through with what he says he will do is an unknown factor. If countries are not prepared to put up their 2% plus into NATO, will he simply withdraw American support from those countries? All sorts of things that are up for grabs. But it is, for sure, going to be a situation where organisations and individual nations and collections of nations are going to have to think very carefully about how they’re going to manage what will be a very difficult four years.

Bronwen Maddox

And beyond that, though, Leslie, would it profoundly change America’s standing in the world?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

I – where to start. I guess, yes, for sure. I – but I mean, that’s, sort of, notional, right? I mean, it – yes, people would feel different and they would feel more insecure about America’s commitments, and they would feel more uncertain, and that is absolutely true for people inside the United States and people outside the United States, frankly, whether they hold a passport or not.

I mean, I guess, I’d say a couple of things. One is that I thought Elbridge Colby, who was in the Pentagon at a high level for Donald Trump in his first administration, and certainly I think would be a contender to go back, and is a, you know, serious Scholar and thinker and Writer, we hosted him not too long ago, he made an important point that we all know, but it’s worth reminding. That, you know, “The United States spends anywhere between 850 and 800 billion – and $880 billion a year on defence.” It spent a huge amount on entitlements, nobody is going – neither Biden nor Trump are going to cut entitlements. And that means they’re not going to have any – given a $34 trillion debt, they’re not going to have a lot of room to increase spending on defence, and the China challenge is real. It’s not made up, it’s real, and it’s going to grow.

And so, the United States is going to, regardless of what happens, have to rethink how much human time, money time, strategy time, it puts into transatlantic security, not because it doesn’t care, but because it’s constrained financially, and in human terms. And so, whether it happens in a bumpy, uncertain, unnegotiated, unilasteral – unilateral, bombastic way, or it happens in a thoughtful, measured, considered, deliberate way, with exceptions made for major land wars…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Dr Yu Jie

Hmmm.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

…it’s going to happen. And it should happen, because a country need – with that amount of military power and therefore, because of the nature of the last seven or eight decades, responsibility, does need to think about where it’s putting its resources, and Europe does, too.

And so, I think that, you know, we all – and trust me, I really have a fundament – I am not in the category of, he’s okay, it’s okay, he’s acceptable. I think Donald Trump is completely unacceptable as a future leader of the United States, and I personally think that there are many datapoints to believe that he won’t get there, and that far more Americans than anybody believe don’t want Donald Trump to be President. But they’re a little bit concerned about saying it, but watch it – watch people vote.

But yes, I think there’s going to be a – you know, there’s going to be a very significant change. It’s a question of how it fol – unfolds, and at that level, regardless, and I – there’s a consequential difference, but regardless of who comes into office in the next administration, and frankly, thereafter – and we’re making a huge mistake in not thinking about America 2028. Nobody’s talking about it, nobody’s thinking about it. We’re not going to have Trump, we’re not going to have Biden. We’re going to have very, very different people, and we need to be thinking about 2028. So, yes, the way that people feel about America is going to change in a sharp way soon, potentially, but there’s something else on the horizon and it’s really very different, 2028, going forward.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah, that’s a really important point to remind ourselves that Trump or Biden is for four years, it’s not forever. Though, for me, it does make a difference, if America, this country which has identified it so much – identified itself so much with democracy and international order, then produces a President, an elected President, who seems casual about those principles, quite aside from the damage he could do on the Middle East, in particular, I would single out. Let’s – Yu Jie and then…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, sure. Just…

Bronwen Maddox

…Cathy, and then…

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, I mean…

Bronwen Maddox

…we’ll…

Dr Yu Jie

…just really following what you said, I was just thinking in here, sitting in Beijing, which one would you prefer? Obviously, the Communist Party, the way, how they run things, they always prefer certainty. They always dislike uncertainty, like any businesses. The key thing in here is that there are two devils, the devil that Beijing can work with and the devils that Beijing does not at all. And I think Beijing has not any particular preference on this regard, because ultimately, the nature of US-China contest won’t change at all. It’s a structural. It’s because China’s GDP per capita has surpassed the 70% of United States, and which never any other countries in the world have ever done that, and that puts China in that very difficult spot. So, irrespective who is next US President, the relationship will continue to be in stalemate. It will continue to be in difficulties. I’m sorry, no optimis – not much optimism in here.

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah, and so, let me come…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

There you go.

Bronwen Maddox

And so, we’ve got about a minute, and I’m going to offer just apologies to all the hands up and offer Robin a chance to give us, in about one minute, his prescription for what should be done.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Oh, my God.

Baroness Ashton

It’s just one chance to steal…

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Oh, dear.

Baroness Ashton

One minute, Robin.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

Apparently there are drinks after this, so I’m very happy to – I could filibuster ‘til the drinks, which might be a good idea.

Bronwen Maddox

No, no.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

But no, no, I won’t, but I’m happy to answer questions…

Bronwen Maddox

Please don’t. Please don’t.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…upstairs. So, prescriptions, I offer five prescriptions. The first is to avoid fulfil – a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Baroness Ashton

Hmmm hmm.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

I think that’s self-evident, but I’ll talk a bit about misperceptions. We got through those at the beginning of the last Cold War. I’m worried that in this Cold War, we’re in the pre-Cuban Missile Crisis phase, we’re in the pre-Cuban Missile happ – the crisis phase, and so it’s a inevitably dangerous phase.

The second point that I talk about there is one that Leslie should be very familiar with, rally the liberal democracies, ‘cause we wrote something about that. We got, we thought, the short straw of a foreign affairs combination of articles, but I thought it was the right one to go for, and I stick by it very much. But I think we are – we’re in a world where we need to defend ourselves at the moment. We’re not going to win a global conversation of what – about what the global rules should be today. We’re not in a position to do it. We’re not a good enough example, and we’ve got too much on our plate, and we’ve got a lot to deal with close to home, certainly as Europeans, with the War in Ukraine in particular, and the future of Africa and the Middle East.

So, I talk about investing in deterrents, investing in the G7, enlarging the G7 – sorry, Creon, we keep going backwards and forwards on this one, but at some point, to Australia and South Korea. I think they are critical both for the technology and for the green energy that’s needed in the future. We do then need to have some type of idea of how we’re going to manage our relationship with China to have an effective economic relationship. Picking up my pens down there, so, made in China. You know, there is so much trade you could still be doing with China. The problem is we don’t know how to – where the fence should be, or how big the yard should be. You all know the Jake Sullivan phrase about the “small yard with the high fence.” But every time I pick up a newspaper, a new thing’s been added to the yard, you know. It’s Cloud computing one minute. It may be electric vehicles, as far as I can tell, ‘cause now…

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

It could be. It’s now being…

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…Biden has said, yes, that cars driving around are – China’s cars are a ‘threat’. So, you know, no-one knows quite what those boundaries are, but we do need to define them, because I talk about reversing into a New Cold War. We do want to keep the benefits. It is a discipline on both sides to keep those benefits. And then, I suppose, I talk a bit about arms control, Patricia, it’s in there. One of my big worries is that as China increases its nuclear arsenal, which it seems to be on a very strong road to doing, America won’t look and say, “Okay, we’ve got 1,500 nuclear warheads, Russia has 1,500 nuclear warheads, China has 1,500 nuclear warheads, we’re all kind of even.” They’ll say, “Hold one, we have 1,500 and they have 3,000.” And if you do have a Trump or whatever, one of my big worries is you will have nuclear proliferation. There are countries that are going to say, “If we can’t trust America, and we’re close to a 1,500 nuclear warhead China, and we’re in South Korea, or we’re in Japan, or we’re in Turkey, or we’re in wherever,” so this really requires focus.

And the last point, and I will stick with it, I think the countries in the Global South will be a disciplining force on the structural competition between…

Bronwen Maddox

Ah.

Sir Robin Niblett DPhil

…the United States and China. We each need them on our side, and the more we spend our time trying to engage with them, the less time we have to fight each other or contest with each other. And in a way, that is my big optimism, is we will work together and the stronger the Global South starts to become, the less room there is for us in the Global North to be having our Cold War.

Bronwen Maddox

Well, thank you for that, and I completely agree about proliferation. To me, that’s one of the big, big costs of the Ukraine conflict, is Ukraine feeling that it couldn’t rely on the promises from the US when it gave up its nuclear weapons. We’re going to have to stop. There are indeed drinks upstairs. There is a chance to pepper Robin and the others, and me, with questions, or each other. But for the moment, can you – and apologies to the many, many people who are, I’m sure, asking excellent questions, but we could get in only what we could get in. Thank you for coming. Please join me in thanking Robin and the panel [applause].