Rashmin Sagoo
Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to this Chatham House event, Nuclear Proliferation in a Fragmenting World. I’m Rashmin Sagoo, Director of the International Law Programme here at Chatham House, and I’m delighted to welcome you all here today. Before I introduce our distinguished speakers, I’d like to take just one moment [pause]. Chatham House would – wishes to express its deep sadness following the death of Her Majesty the Queen. We would direct you to the statement on our website, and we ask all our participants to please join us in observing a minute of quiet reflection, out of respect for our former Patron and the Royal Family [pause].
Thank you again for joining us today here at Chatham House to discuss where the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty stands in 2022. This event will be held on the record and recorded. I’d like to introduce our distinguished speakers. Firstly, Dr Patricia Lewis, Acting Deputy Director, Research Director of Conflict, Science and Transformation here at Chatham House, and also Director of our International Security Programme. Dr Lewis leads the international – sorry, the International Security Programme here at Chatham House.
We also have Ambassador Adam Scheinman, who is a Special Representative of the US President for Nuclear Nonproliferation with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Adam served in the same role under the Obama administration, and his prior roles included as Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation at the US Department of State, and Director for Nonproliferation on the White House National Security Staff, where he oversaw all aspects of US multilateral nuclear policy. We’re delighted to have them both here for this session.
This panel discussion will be followed by a Q&A in which members are encouraged to submit questions throughout the event using the question and answer function. We may call on attendees to unmute themselves to ask their questions, but if anybody would prefer that I read out their questions on their behalf, please indicate this when submitting your question in the Q&A function.
So, we’re going to have about 15 minutes for our speakers to give some opening remarks, and that will be followed by our Q&A session for another 20 minutes or so. Firstly, just a brief introduction to our discussion today. The Tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty took place in August 2022. The treaty is often hailed as a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. It has near universal ratification, including amongst states possessing nuclear weapons. It has played a critical role for over 50 years in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and providing a multilateral forum for the international community to work towards nuclear disarmament.
Patricia, you’ve kindly agreed to give us a little bit of an overview of the NPT, as we call it, and a bit of its history, before going into your opening remarks, so, I’ll hand over to you. Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thanks very much, Rashmin, and delighted to see everyone on the call, and very honoured to be speaking here with yourself and Adam today. I’m aware that perhaps some people are more au fait with the NPT history than others, so, I thought I’d do a very quick summary, and then we can get into the more substantive discussion.
So, the NPT, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, was negotiated in 1968, following a history of UN General Assembly Resolutions started by Ireland. It entered into force in 1970. There are 191 states parties now, including five nuclear weapon states, and there are outside the treaty India, Israel and Pakistan, and North Korea considers itself to be having withdrawn from the treaty, and also South Sudan has yet to join.
So, the main structure of the treaty is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear weapon states that exist within the treaty, to – then for those nuclear weapon states to negotiate in good faith to eliminate nuclear weapons, and then the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be promoted, and all of that taken care of by the International Atomic Energy Agency through a system of safeguards.
So, it was originally supposed to be a 25-year treaty, and in 1995 it was extended indefinitely, based on a number of decisions and resolutions, and of course, in 2020 it was its 50th anniversary, 50 years, so, 25 years after the indefinite extension, but because of COVID it was postponed, on a number of occasions, to 2022. So, this was the first opportunity we had to mark those 50 years. And in the meantime we’ve had a large number of changes. I would say, in the last two years the ending of the INF Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, extending New START Treaty in 2021, which now will go onto 2026, the clock is ticking on that, and a new treaty on the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, which was negotiated in 2017 and entered into force in 2021, and had its first meeting of states parties this year, just before the NPT.
I’ll leave it at that. There are a number of issues that we can talk about going in, but I’ll turn to – back to you, Rashmin, and then to Adam, and I can add in some of those, so…
Rashmin Sagoo
Thanks so much, Patricia. It’s such a helpful way to get an overview of the NPT itself, and to see some of the developments since the last review conference, so, thank you for that. Did you want to come in with any opening reflections before we go into our panel discussion, or are you happy for me to go to Ambassador Scheinman?
Dr Patricia Lewis
I was just – all I was going to say was, I think going into this particular meeting was very different to how we would have been going into it in 2020, I think. I think that’s the first thing to say, so…
Rashmin Sagoo
Yes.
Dr Patricia Lewis
And of course, the biggest thing was the war, Russia’s war against Ukraine and its invasion, and the threat to use nuclear weapons, that was the biggest thin. And of course, Russia is a nuclear weapon state, it’s a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it’s a founding member of the United Nations, and was present and negotiating throughout the four weeks of the review conference, so, it was a really, really difficult situation in that regard.
The second big – and of course, had threatened to use nuclear weapons, so, I think that was a big shock to people. The second biggest thing was, of course, the weaponization of the nuclear power stations by Russia, in both Chernobyl earlier in the war, and then, no, currently in Zaporizhzhia. So, this was a very big issue for everyone to address and it ticked so many of the NPT concerns.
I would say the Article 6, the disarmament article and the perceived slow progress by many of the non-nuclear weapon states and the defensiveness, if I might say that, by the nuclear weapon states, who all say, “Oh, we’ve done more than you think.” And then the entry into force of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons obviously was a big issue for everybody. The Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, which has been a very difficult issue in the past, no longer so much, but we can talk about that later, and of course, Iran’s nuclear programme, the JCPOA, which is still ongoing, in terms of the negotiation, and the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, which is still an ongoing, big problem for non-proliferation.
So, they would be, I’d say, the big issues going into the review conference.
Rashmin Sagoo
That’s really helpful, to have that overview, and certainly when you mentioned Ukraine, I also had in mind, in January the P5 had agreed the Reaga – or reaffirmed the Reagan/Gorbachev maxim and statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and it was really seen as a very welcome development, in terms of the goals of the NPT. But then that was shortly followed by the invasion in Ukraine, so – but anyway, really – would be – I’m sure these themes will all be picked up in our discussion.
One point that also comes to my mind is the peaceful uses of nuclear weapons side of things. I’d be really interested to hear your and Adam’s views on that, and whether, going into the conference, whether expectations were high, particularly given the link to the climate crisis at the moment. But, Adam, please, your opening remarks, and if you’d like to pick up these points now, or we’ve got time, in the course of the panel discussion, as well. Thank you.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Well, great, thank you very much, Rashmin, and Patricia, happy to share the panel with you, and let me also thank the organisers, of course, for inviting me here today. I’m very happy to join from my living room, so I could avoid having to deal with Heathrow Airport yesterday, so, this worked out pretty well for me.
So, let me offer a number of comments with respect to, you know, so, sort of, how we saw the review conference and perhaps what might come out of the back end of all this, and then, I think maybe it’d be better to talk about some particular issues in the Q&A.
Review conferences are almost always a reflection of both the externalities, the international environment and the internet – or the internal political divides, and this was really no exception to that rule. The conference broke down, of course, due to Russia’s decision to block consensus for reasons that were frankly outside of the central purposes of the NPT, that simply was the case this time through.
I think the fact that consensus was within reach was a bit of a surprise to the US delegation. Certainly our sense was that the odds were stacked against it, given Russia’s conduct in the war, and the degree to which it had upset the balance in the NPT. So, you know, it’s worth maybe making a few comments about what we can take away from that.
First, I think that despite the deep political divides on nuclear disarmament that Patricia was hinting toward, and even some of the longstanding demands on a Middle East WMD-free zone advanced by Egypt and Arab states historically, in this case the majority of treaty parties understood that another failed review conference, we had a failed conference in 2015 last time around, would contribute maybe to a sense of a treaty in collapse, or in reverse, perhaps a hollowing-out of support, and that this was a time to rally around the flag of the NPT.
Evidence of that was the responsible approach, I would say, that the United States and other leading supporters took to the review conference. Here I’d highlight the role of the three Atlantic nuclear weapon states: US, UK and France. Likeminded non-weapon states, including Sweden, Japan and many others, and even members of the New Agenda Coalition, which may not be familiar to all of you, but has in the past served a bridge-building role in the NPT. And in this case, New Zealand and Ireland in particular, states with whom we have a, you know, a fairly significant difference on nuclear disarmament, were quite hard to stitch together an approach to nuclear risk reduction under the disarmament pillar that ultimately was supported by the wide majority of NPT parties.
But, that said, I don’t think we can understate the risks to the NPT, both now and going forward, of Russia’s aggressions – aggression that, you know, Patricia made the point very well that Russia’s behaviour undercuts some of the core precepts of the NPT, its nuclear threats, it’s obvious – you know, its betrayal of the security assurance that were given to Ukraine as a non-nuclear state, and its actions around nuclear facilities are all utterly inconsistent with the NPT, and not what we would expect of one of the treaty’s originators, and someone who – a state that has really been there from the beginning.
Russia made very little effort to rebut, you know, these charges of its indiscretion, or to defend what, frankly, was indefensible. They sent a pretty low-level delegation to New York that was – you know, seemed to be fixated mainly on attacking the legitimacy of Ukraine’s elected Government in Kyiv and not focussing on the issues in front of the review conference.
A second takeaway is the role that was played at this review conference by China and what we might expect of China going forward. China’s position at review conferences historically has been fairly reserved, or even passive, I would argue. It has tended to focus on fairly narrow national concerns, but that’s changed, and I think we can see that China is today, you know, feeling its power and its rising global influence and sought to parlay that at the review conference in New York.
The two most prominent examples were China’s efforts to challenge the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, which in China’s words was a textbook case of nuclear proliferation, and to pick up the Russian argument and, frankly, canard that, you know, NATO nuclear sharing arrangements violate the NPT. China pursued both of those points persistently, aggressively, but in the end, I, you know, I think they failed to gain much support, owing to the fact that neither argument happens to be legally accurate. But also the manner in which China made these arguments, disingenuously dressing up a strategic preference as an NPT treaty issue, I think, failed to persuade.
It was also quite evident that China, which, I think, as most know, is accelerating its build-up of nuclear forces, had a very different bottom line at this conference, which was to prevent at all costs endorsement of a fissile material production moratorium. That is what it seemed to care about most, and, you know, even if it required that China twist the arms of some of the Global South states to oppose AUKUS and US extended deterrents, you know, China was unmoved, and very aggressive.
The conduct of China and Russia during the conference made plain what we’ve been saying for some time, to one of Patricia’s introductory points, that, you know, in our conception of it, the P5 are hardly a monolithic group. And it’s become increasingly evident over the last decade, and certainly since the last review conference that two of the P5 states, Russia and China, are pursuing military strategies, aiming to revise the balance of power in their respective regions. Modernising their nuclear weapons, in terms of their capability and diversity to support those aims.
This is very different from the approach taken by the United States or the UK and, excuse me, and France, whose programmes are largely focused on replacing existing capability, with the aim of preserving the strategic status quo, not to change it through intimidation or coercion, and, you know, the P3 put out a working paper on responsible practices for nuclear weapon states that was intended to point out these important distinctions. So, you know, some may wish to paint the P5 with the same broad brush as, sort of, equal in sin, but I think that hardly lines up to reality. So, those were some of the political features of the conference, and maybe just to make a few points on what it means for the future of the NPT process going forward.
One is, when we asked the question of, you know, whither the NPT, a question that’s been asked for decades now, I think it’s important that we distinguish political from strategic challenges to the treaty.
Differences over nuclear disarmament that we can get into in the Q&A certainly have roiled the NPT’s political debate, and sharpened the divides that don’t seem to be improving with time, but I don’t consider them to pose an existential threat to the treaty. That is very distinct from, say, a decision by Iran to leave the treaty to pursue nuclear weapons, which might lead to a cascade of withdrawals from the treaty, and many new cases of nuclear proliferation, or, you know, God forbid, a future use of nuclear weapons in a conflict involving the nuclear weapon states.
Two, you know, given this, it seems pretty clear that we bear a heavy obligation to protect the NPT from its principle challenges, most clearly by elevating international policies, the twin aims of preventing any further nuclear proliferation, and averting nuclear weapons use. And that will require that we make every effort to preserve the nuclear arms control architecture that’s left, that we move to negotiate new agreements, that we work with the P5 on nuclear risk reduction actions, and that we stick with the multilateral arms control agenda, including CTBT, and I’d say, even more important in today’s environment, getting on with talks on a fissile material cut-off treaty.
And third, you know, I think it would help if debates on nuclear disarmament took on a less, sort of, theological character in tone. I think it’s fair to say that neither camp has it just right. You know, nuclear deterrents alone will simply not meet the core challenges of preventing proliferation and use in a satisfactory way.
And in the same way, I think it should be clear that nuclear disarmament alone will almost certainly fail on the score, you know, unless the security that’s needed to sustain it is present and enforced. And if we could just agree on that point alone, I’m willing to bet that we could build a wider, you know, sort of, community of interest focused on preserving the NPT system that we have, and to improve on it. Even if, you know, it’s slow, and we go action-by-action, it’s important that we keep moving in the direction that is offered to us by the treaty.
So, just to wrap up here, I guess, you know, we can say that the review conference failed, because it failed to produce a final document, but the treaty hasn’t failed. And I don’t think it will, provided that its members, you know, work to contain the, you know, pretty significant centrifugal forces that – and pressures that bear on it, but that’s a political challenge, and it’s within our control to effect, and I certainly hope as a community that we’re up to it. Thanks.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thank you, Adam. There’s so many rich points for discussion here, and I’ll bring Patricia back in to perhaps comment on a few of them, but really your last point, indeed, it feels that in a way, I don’t know what you both think, but actually, just the fact that the review conference went ahead in the current geopolitical period that we’re in is a pretty remarkable thing, in that states wanted to come together. Okay, an outcome document wasn’t secured but, as you said, I think, Adam, we came pretty close, I think, so, that in itself is a big thing. Sometimes we have to hold onto what we do have, even if the NPT isn’t perhaps perfect, and we’ll definitely come into some of those imperfections, I’m sure, in the discussion.
I’m also interested in the points you were mentioning about, I suppose, the way I’d summarise it is, kind of, dialogue. Like, how do you keep party to our part – our signatory states have ratified the treaty in, like, how do you encourage that dialogue? And I’d be certainly interested to hear your thoughts on the discussion about different aspects of that dialogue, so that, traditionally, as you’ve said, the question used to be about, well, how do you engage with the non-P5 members who are nuclear weapon states? And that’s an ongoing, very important issue, but in this situ – in the last six months or so, we’ve been talking about a P5 member, nuclear weapon states possessing P5 member, who’s done the unthin – you know, done the unthinkable, saying the unthinkable. So, there’s that side of the dialogue question.
There’s also the dialogue question that Patricia mentioned about many states supporting the treaty, the ban treaty, the treaty for the – the TPNW, so, how do you engage with them in a meaningful way to actually support the NPT also, and the NPT process, and the wider role of civil society and other stakeholders engaging with them?
I know both of you were at the review conference so, I think, insights into how the – how these conferences work, you know, what – the feel and mood in the room at the time, I’m sure, will all come through, but it’s always fascinating for us, ‘cause we’re not there to get that colour. So – but thank you for kickstarting that discussion.
Patricia, did you want to come back on any of the points that Adam ma – mentioned? He spoke including China’s rise, and the power politics that come out in that respect, or any of the other various points raised.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Sure. I think – so, I agree with Adam, I was very struck by how states were prepared to compromise, and how they were really putting the treaty right at the centre, despite quite big differences on thinking about the past, which is always the hardest part, and thinking about the future. And it was deeply disappointing, I think, because although – I think there’s a comment in the text, although, you know, it was clear that the issue of Zaporizhzhia was going to be very difficult, and the UN had very strong language, and there was a meeting that Russia called in the Security Council in the last week of the NPT, in which not a single other country supported them, including the Chair, China.
I understand that what they had indicated was, so long as Russia wasn’t mentioned as a name, they would be able to go along with language, and that clearly was not the case. But I was struck by the really, really stretching, every country really trying hard, despite their concerns, to put those concerns somewhat aside to get the best possible outcome.
I was very pleased about the discussion on risk reduction, and the fact that the accountability part of it, because, strangely enough, the NPT has never had accountability measures, it’s been implicit, but not explicit, and so, the – and which is, kind of, odd, isn’t it, for a treaty? I mean, the review process is an accountability process, so, let’s put in some measurement of some kind, and at the – up until recently, I think, the only measurements have been done by non-governmental academic institutes, as well as, you know, country reports, their own self-reporting. But I think this idea of accountability is so very important, and it’s true, throughout all the treaties, so, it’s really important to put those down.
I want – I just want to say that in terms of the TPNW, I don’t think there’s a single country in the TPNW that doesn’t support the NPT. You know, the NPT and Article 6 and a very different sense of urgency about the need for disarmament is what prompted the TPNW negotiations and the adoption of the treaty. And so, I think there’s a huge overlap, and I think this is recognised by most states within the NPT, even if they don’t join the TPNW.
And some states that won’t join or haven’t yet wanted to join have observed the TPNW in the first meeting, which I think is a – I do encourage states to observe the TPNW and indeed, you know, the United States, for example, observes the mine ban convention, and has been a really important player, even though it can’t be – it can’t join the treaty yet, it nonetheless participates, it joins in the discussion, it’s a very important role that it plays, and I think we must encourage observing treaties. You know, we’ve had Israel observe the NPT. We’ve had Pakistan observe the NPT. We ought to do more of that, it seems to me, and find a way to, sort of, plug those gaps a bit, in terms of knowledge.
The last issue I want to address, which I was very struck by what Adam said, is what he called the “theological character,” and this is something that I’ve been working on for quite a lot with our team here at Chatham House, as you know, Rashmin. We’ve been trying to think about nuclear weapons as a wicked problem in a complex, adaptive system, and a wicked problem is a problem that, no-one agrees on what the problem is, and there is no single solution, etc., and we need to understand it very differently.
I think for a long time a lot of people thought, “This is the problem, this is how you fix it, why don’t you just do that?” And it’s not got us very far, we – as you say, we’re often talking past each other. We see the problem quite differently, and if we see it as a complex problem and we understand the complexity, and we’ve been working with Imperial College to develop a model that models the complexity of nuclear policy decision-making, then what you can see is that the interaction between the wicked problem and its environment, you change something in the environment, the problem changes, you change something in the problem, the environment changes. And then small steps, tiny little things that may not even be seemingly connected can make a big difference, and large steps can lead nowhere. So, we shouldn’t be surprised that, you know, years and years and years of negotiation, or lack of negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on Fissile Materials has so far led nowhere, because this is quite normal with a wicked problem.
What we should be surprised about is that we keep thinking this is the next step, and this is why we’re not moving anywhere. So, we have to have some – we have to have a different understanding, I think, of the way in which nuclear weapons fit into our world, and in getting rid of them and in fulfilling Article 6, to understand that complexity and its interaction with the environment. So, it’s not that one side is right and the other side is wrong, it’s both sides are both wrong and right at the same time, if that makes sense, Adam.
Rashmin Sagoo
I mean, if I may say, Adam, I mean, just to quickly interject, it just – it’s a fascinating idea, Patricia, because it also, kind of, helps one if you start moving that discussion a little bit more and towards the facts, and trying to understand, like, different viewpoints. It can remove the rhetoric and the brinkmanship, the political rhetoric and brinkmanship that we’re seeing increasingly, especially in recent months. Adam, yes.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Yeah, no, I very much agree with Patricia’s characterisation of disarmament in general as, you know, among the most wicked problems, and I guess I’d be interested in learning more about the research underway, it sounds quite fascinating. How we apply that in, you know, the sphere of government policy, of course, will be a little more challenging.
I do very much agree that, you know, disarmament is, you know, a wicked problem because of the complexities that it introduces, and, you know, this, I think, is one of the points of difference on the question of TPNW. It’s not that we disagree that, you know, use of nuclear weapons wouldn’t be catastrophic. I think, you know, we ought to be able to accept that as a predicate. Because of the obvious challenges of limiting escalation in a conflict, whether that is a local, you know, skirmish, or a regional war that might, you know, trip into a nuclear war, we simply can’t look at, you know, the prospect of Great Power competition, without recognising that nuclear war is a present threat.
Now, you know, the question of what we do about that is where I think the camps tend to go in very different paths. One camp will look at this wicked problem and perhaps assume that the issue is the weapons. If the weapons go away, the countries that have them and that have security differences will be forced to co-operate, you know, because of the risks of tripping into a war.
Another – the other camp looks at the problem and says, “Well, you know, without the security conditions present, we can’t possibly, you know, in good faith to our societies, pursue nuclear disarmament, because we understand that the verification challenges are far greater than any we’ve ever attempted,” I mean, we just have to stipulate that.
The, you know, the question of verification poses challenges way beyond anything we have considered. You know, the legal measures that would be required to sustain and enforce nuclear disarmament are, you know, not really proximate to those, you know, in relation to the world that we currently live in, you know. It’s a world of sovereign states, there is no global enforcement and, you know, we try to, you know, sacrifice some small measure of sovereignty in the agreements that we pursue. But we’re not prepared to sacrifice, you know, complete sovereignty, or our ability and responsibility to protect, you know, the rules-based order.
So, this is a challenge that, I think, sort of, defies our ability to conceive of a solution in the near term, but it’s one we have to keep working on, and then the question is, you know, how are we working toward it, and are we working toward it? You know, I can’t say that every US administration is taking the same view of what is necessary and desired, with respect to nuclear disarmament goals. Certainly it’s the view of this administration that, you know, we need not simply military tools to deal with global disorder and insecurity. We need to exercise the full set of diplomatic tools that we have as well, which, you know, includes foreign policy, support for international institutions and treaties and, you know, by God, support for nuclear arms control, to the degree that we can advance it.
So, that’s, sort of, how we come to the problem, and I apologise for the longwinded response.
Rashmin Sagoo
No, not at all. I mean, these are complicated issues, and it’s wonderful to hear the richness of your and Patricia’s answers, thank you so much, Adam. I think I’m going to just say that we’ve got an opportunity for members to really be able to ask questions. I’m going to open it up to the floor. I see we’ve had a number of questions that have come in already, so, I’m just – and I – there’s a few people that have been supporting various questions as well. So, I’m going to start with Julia Quornoya and she asks me to read out her question, which is for you, Adam. “What does the US consider was the most important element lost in the outcome document? What is the cost of having failed to reach a consensus on this particular outcome document?”
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Yeah, thanks very much for the question. I would offer a 1a and a 1b. The 1a is what Patricia has already mentioned, which is an approach to nuclear risk reduction that is needed. You know, it’s needed in the sense that we have to be concerned that the nuclear powers are, you know, facing a world that is in some transition, from something to something, and we don’t know what that “to something” quite is. But we do recognise that we have, you know, different interests in Europe, in Asia and with respect to global order more generally. And there is a very high risk, as high as, I think, we’ve seen from the beginning of the NPT’s history, that we could trip inadvertently, maybe through misperception or miscalculation, into a conflict that could escalate into a nuclear exchange. So, we almost have to start back at the beginning.
You know, in the Cold War we had a series of agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent incidents where miscommunication that might lead to that cycle of events that I just mentioned. And I think it’s essential that we start talking about the whole panoply of formal and informal confidence-building, transparency, communication-type measures that are needed to set a predicate for China to engage in arms control, which is not there at this point, and to bring Russia back into arms control as a priority in its national policy. I’m not sure it currently is in Moscow.
So, the loss of the risk reduction element and the loss of opportunity to bring this into the NPT as a point of dialogue, not just among the nuclear weapon states but, you know, with the nuclear weapon states, in conversation with the non-nuclear weapon states. I think many of our challenges are, you know, we face them because of lack of effective dialogue and engagement. And, you know, not to be too critical of the NPT review process, I think most understand that when we debate issues in the full hall, in plenary or in main committees, you know, with 150 countries having the opportunity to chime in on debates, we don’t tend to get very far. You know, we’re reading our talking points at each other, we’re not responding to the comments made by others, except in rights of reply, which tend to be a little unfriendly at times.
But in the small group sessions that we had on the nuclear disarmament pillar, the dialogue was much more productive, in my view, not because we were hammering away at agreed language, but because we were able to respond to the comments made by others. And so, that level of engagement and dialogue is necessary, that was lost with the failure to reach a consensus outcome.
The 1b I would mention is with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I think that pillar tends to be forgotten…
Rashmin Sagoo
Yes.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
…in, you know, in NPT debates, just because of the overwhelming role played by the nuclear disarmament discussion. And I was frankly pleasantly surprised to hear from so many Global South states that the peaceful uses pillar matters to them and, you know, the NPT matters because of their ability to access peaceful nuclear energy. Not everyone agrees that nuclear power is the answer to climate change, but, you know, it’s certainly the case that peaceful nuclear technologies, outside of energy, play a critical role in ways that we just don’t see because, you know, the issue tends to be siloed in the community of Nuclear Scientists, you know, that peaceful nuclear applications can help solve sustainable development problems. And again, having, you know, given some emphasis to that in the final document draft that was not agreed, I guess we can argue that that aspect was lost too. But the work will continue. We’ll pursue it in our national policy and regional groups, and the IAEA, in the same way that, you know, we’re not going to give up on arms control just because the NPT was unable to reach agreement in the end.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thanks, Adam. Patricia, did I see you wanted to come in there?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yes, I did. So, I wanted to say, just adding into what Adam just said, is not – do not forget that peaceful uses of nuclear energy also includes nuclear medicine, and such an important thing for all of us, whatever country we’re in.
The second thing I wanted to say, that the thing that I thought we lost was that opportunity for consensus, which is so precious and so difficult to get. But I think we also gained something, and that was, there was a real sense from everyone in the room that Russia’s attempt to change the language, to be able to get that consensus was a step too far. That support for Ukraine, that support for the rule of law, the support for the NPT as having meaning when it comes to not threatening the use of nuclear weapons, etc., it meant something, and I think we should remember that, ‘cause it’s really important for the treaty in the long run.
Rashmin Sagoo
Really important points, thank you, Patricia and Adam, and that also all links in to Syed Muhammad Hadrin Idid’s question, which is essentially, “What should state parties to do ensure that NPT remains relevant, and how could the new informal working group contribute to strengthening the regime?” I mean, it sounds like you’ve answered part of that, but I’ll just leave that with you for a moment, and come and just mention a couple of other questions and points that you’ve touched on already.
Andy Calitz asks, “Was there a noticeable sense of increased interest in nuclear power for electricity due to climate change concerns?” I think you’ve touched on that already, but a few colleagues on the chain certainly interested in the environmental, climate aspects.
I wonder – I mean, there’s also – I just wondered also, going back to our question about transparency and dia – and Adam’s point about dialogue also, do you – given where things have – the challenges that the world’s faced in certainly – well, certainly in the last six months in particular, but have you – did you feel that we had gone through, like, a period where even those nuclear weapon states who – P5 states even, who had been more willing to, kind of, be transparent in their nuclear weapons policies were perhaps, kind of, going backwards a little bit because of the changing security situation?
Do you feel that the – did you get the sense from the RevCon, from what you’re saying, that perhaps that might give an impetus for leadership in being transparent and, you know, self-reporting, and these sorts of very important initiatives that build trust and mutual respect and trust in the process? I’d be really interested to hear from both of you. So, Adam, were you nodding there? Yes.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Yeah, so, maybe just quite quickly, and turn to Patricia. You know, there is a – perhaps a general sense that nuclear power will play an important role in addressing climate. But I can’t say it was an overwhelming point made at the review conference, and perhaps that is due to the fact that not all states, including some European states, you know, favour nuclear power in their energy mix. Perhaps there are other reasons, but I wouldn’t say it featured very prominently. Certainly in my conversations with other delegations, it’s recognised, it will play a role.
But the issue of the NPT working group and opportunity for transparency and dialogue, as I say, I think we need more of it. I don’t know how the proposed working group will function, and whether there are truly, or genuinely good ideas for ways to improve the NPT’s, you know, political process. You know, this has been on the table for a number of years, I’ve yet to hear a super solid idea on ways to make the process better. But, you know, we ought to be open to it, and at a minimum, you know, if we can use a work – you know, this idea of a working group to impose more interactive dialogue on the membership, then I think that will be a positive.
The United States is, you know, happy to talk about its nuclear programmes, you know, from alpha to omega. At the review conference we brought in three Under-Secretaries to talk about our nuclear policies and have an open discussion of it. But what we would like to do is to try to bring that into the NPT formal process, and not simply do it in, you know, side events organised on the margins of the conference. You know, I would like to think that other NPT nuclear weapon states view it the same way. I’m not sure that’s the case for at least one state, probably two states, but I think the process and the regime could – you know, would do well with a healthy injection of more dialogue and transparency.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thank you. Patricia, did you have comments on this one?
Dr Patricia Lewis
I did. I mean, it was important, I think, to salvage some of that genuine agreement on what things could be done, in terms of transparency, dialogue, accountability, better ways to measure progress, etc., so, I think that’s really important. We’ve yet to see how that will work, but I’m hoping that that spirit of compromise, with the exception of one, what we would say, “consensus minus one,” would be a good basis to go forward.
I think on the issue of nuclear power, nuclear energy, the NPT, from the beginning, has always been about promoting that, so, that’s not new and, you know, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency predates the NPT, in terms of its own promotion of nuclear energy. So, this has been a constant theme throughout the years.
The problem we have with nuclear energy is the issue of upfront costs, and the long time it takes to see any gain for those costs from the private sector or from government, and so, it requires a huge amount of investment at the beginning, and that’s – in terms of private sector investment, that’s quite a turn-off. So, that’s part of the problem and so, governments then have to, kind of, get behind it, and then, you know, that works in some countries, and not in others, I’d say.
So, I also wanted to bring up one of the issue Adam brought up about the five. So, I would agree, I think, you know, the five nuclear weapon states, what have they got in common, other than the fact they possess nuclear weapons, right? And, you know, there was this attempt to try to use this shared responsibility, if you like, to move forward with transparency, with understanding, with maybe some arms control measures and, sort of, socialise this thing a bit better throughout the five, but I would say that this has not worked, and it’s – so, my question, I guess, is has this attempt been worthwhile, or has it just delayed progress when it comes to nuclear disarmament and Article 6? ‘Cause there’s such a big discrepancy now between them all.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thanks, Patricia. I’m just going to go back to the questions, there’s a couple more coming in. Please, we’ve got ten more – ten minutes or so, if anyone’s got additional questions, and I’m just going through various that have come through. I wonder, Andreas Kelman – Kullberg, sorry, if you’d like to come on mic, you’re welcome to ask your question.
Andreas Kullberg
Yeah, can you hear what I’m saying?
Rashmin Sagoo
Yes.
Andreas
Okay, thank you. Well, my question is, sort of, a cynical approach, if I may, and it’s, if we used to have consensus on the RevCon, so, we came from serious RevCons where, even though there was debate, we also – we ended up with a end document. Now we’re not seeing an end document, but anyway, we still ended up where we are today, with the JCPOA, with the DBRK, and especially with Russia’s rhetoric on use of nuclear weapons, and Zaporizhzhia, so on and so forth. So, for those larger nuclear proliferation, geopolitical things, does it really matter that we get – that we end up with a consensus document and at the RevCons, or are there actually other places or means or ways we should look at in order to handle those things, in terms of non-proliferation? Thank you.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thank you. So, what’s the important of having an outcome document, I suppose, and having consensus at RevCons, and what else can be done in the absence of consensus being reached? Patricia.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yeah, maybe I’ll start – have a go at starting that. So, first of all, it’s not a simple thing like that, because if we just go from 1995, there was actually no agreement on the review document at 1995, right? There was agreement on the extension decision, so, that’s one.
In 2000 there was an agreement, and that set up a whole set of, you know, measurable activities to – for progress, but in 2005 there was none. And then, in 2010 there was agreement, that was a very exciting year, which was the whole action plan and everything and, you know, we – sort of, a new injection of enthusiasm and so on. And then, in 2015 there was no agreement, and now in – and so, what we’ve got now are two consecutive no-agreements. But I would say, this was a bit different, this was agreement minus one, and I think that’s very different.
In the last one, it was much more tenuous in 2015 and, you know, everyone could see that the weapon of mass destruction-free zone was going to be a big problem because there was no other process in train, which there is now. But also, there was a lot of uncertainty about whether – how states felt about the compromise more generally, in terms of what they would achieve. So, I think this felt like there was more passion for the treaty this year than, I think, there was in, you know, five – well, in 2015.
But we have two consecutive review conferences now without outcome documents, but one of the things to note is that the previous outcome document agreed in 2010 still stands, right, because of that, and we could have Lawyers argument – arguing about that, Rashmin, and I’m sure you would be the – one of the best arguing about it. But, you know, until it’s, sort of, superseded – and indeed, the outcome document that was nearly agreed at this one referred back to the previous outcome document. So, that’s really important to note, it’s not suddenly that we’re without anything to do, right?
Rashmin Sagoo
Really important points, thank you, Patricia. Adam, do you want to come in as well?
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Yeah, thanks. I think it is, it’s an important question and, you know, many wonder why we put ourselves through it when, you know, we fail to reach agreement in the political process almost every other review conference. And I think, you know, part of the answer is that working toward an agreed outcome document gives everybody a stake in the treaty, and the opportunity to, you know, build their preferences into outcomes.
If it didn’t matter, you know, we wouldn’t spend so much time, you know, preparing and conducting the diplomacy and, you know, really leaning into the conference to work toward some agreement. So, it – while it might be a bit intangible, I think it’s certainly clear to the states parties who care about the NPT and want to protect it going forward, protect its integrity and political authority, that we make every effort to reach agreement in the end.
You know, that said, it’s also the case that the NPT, and I think this is fairly well-recognised among states parties, can’t by itself solve the most pressing proliferation challenges. You know, that’s why we needed the JCPOA to work on the Iran issue and, you know, frankly, I think we have to recognise that the NPT process by itself can’t, you know, resolve the Ukraine set of problems, and it can’t by itself resolve the North Korea challenges. We have to, you know, apply every tool in the toolkit. Use diplomacy at every, you know, at every opportunity and at, you know, as best we can to try to come up with solutions that might be more helpful than the NPT itself can provide. But that’s not an argument for, you know, not caring about whether the NPT produces outcome documents or not. It clearly is important to the membership.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thank you, Adam. I think we’ve got time to squeeze in one last question, and I’m going to look to Carmen Wunderlich. Carmen, if you don’t mind posing your question as succinctly as you could, please.
Carmen Wunderlich
Sure, can you hear me?
Rashmin Sagoo
Yes.
Carmen Wunderlich
Thank you. My question is a bit more directed towards, what kind of measures could we have to come out of this, well, dire circumstances, given that multilateral and bilateral arms control is in a crisis since ages, given that Russia’s behaviour has, well, revealed that there are no nuclear shared norms? So, what approaches do we have, is it, if new institutions are not available, is it norms, is it informal institutions, is it dialogue, is it communications? What are your thoughts on how can we – yeah, how can we manoeuvre out of this situation right now?
Rashmin Sagoo
Thank you, Carmen. We’ve probably got about a minute each. Patricia, did you want to go first?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Sure, I mean, I would say all of the above, obviously. So, I think it’s really important to have the bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia, find a way somehow to do that. I don’t know how right now, but, you know, Russia’s in a very peculiar state. I really hope that Russia changes its course and that we can get, after that, I think, back on track. This is a very dangerous situation and, you know, it goes beyond the NPT, but it’s dangerous, right? This is a really seriously – really serious situation, in terms of the conflict and the potential for the – for escalation and possible use of nuclear weapons.
So, that’s, kind of, in a way it’s been a real wake-up call, I would say, for states, wherever they are. Now that this has happened, they’re no longer just some, kind of, political deterrents in the background type of weapon, they’re, kind of, real and present danger, as Adam said. So, I think that’s the most important thing, so, I hoping that this really does focus minds and maybe that’s what we saw at the NPT, maybe that was the reason analysis of what happened. And then I think that, you know, that we – that there is this commitment now to having a series of meetings, starting next year, that will, you know, help strengthen and set up some kind of accountabil – I really think we need accountability mechanisms and risk reduction mechanisms, as well as the disarmament mechanisms that we have already committed to.
So, it’s in addition to those, it’s part and parcel of the same thing, and it’s to put it – to understand the seriousness and the gravity of the situation and put it right at the centre.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thanks, Patricia, and Adam.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Yeah, I would just add a 30-second response on top of Patricia’s comments, which I endorse wholeheartedly. You know, at some point conditions will change. You know, I obviously very much hope that conditions in Europe don’t turn in a more negative direction. They could, but they could also turn back toward negotiations and some sort of settlement. And it will be essential that we have available all of the tools that we need to manage nuclear threats, when we come through this moment of crisis and, you know, that, I think, is why, as Patricia said, so many countries were interested in ensuring that the NPT survives, and that we keep alive the opportunity and the option to promote nuclear arms control, strategic stability and, you know, every measure available that I hope will, you know, help us, as a collective community, avoid any further nuclear proliferation or any possible use of nuclear weapons, which of course could be game changing for global security.
Rashmin Sagoo
Thanks so much, Adam and Patricia. It’s been an incredibly rich and thought-provoking discussion, and just so insightful to hear just how the dynamics played out in New York in August at the review conference which, you know, it sounds like, from the discussions, my quick summary would be, okay, NPT is far from perfect, but there’s a lot of people, a lot of states having that wake-up call that Patricia mentioned, who really want to – who really realise that it’s something that’s worth preserving. And work has to continue to make sure that that’s the case, which gives us some hope and reassurance at this challenging time.
So, just remains for me to say thank you again for joining us, it’s been fascinating to hear your insights, and thank you to all the members and questions that provided such rich discussion. Thank you.
Ambassador Adam Scheinman
Thank you.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thank you very much. Thanks, everyone, for participating.
Rashmin Sagoo
All the best.
