Prospects for UK-Afghanistan relations

Hameed Hakimi

Welcome, everyone, good afternoon. This is a Chatham House Members’ event. My name is Hameed Hakimi, I am a Research Associate here at the Asia Pacific and Europe Programme. Welcome to an event titled ‘Prospects for UK-Afghanistan Relations’. We have such a distinguished panel today. We are so delighted they could make time to be with us today.

Initially, I’d like to go through a few housekeeping rules. This is an open meeting, so this is on the record. We encourage the participants to engage with us on Twitter, as well. The hashtag for our events is CHEvents, #CHEvents. Feel free to tweet. After the participant – the panel, have made the initial remarks, we will have an in-conversation segment, and before opening the Q&A floor. For the Q&A please use the chat function, which is in front of you, there is a box which is by the Q&A box, so please post your questions there, or I won’t be able to see them to raise them to the panel. We will also have an option of asking questions in person, on audio. The raising of hand option is disabled, so please post your questions in the ‘Q&A’ box. And I think we all agree that Afghanistan is in such a pivotal juncture, and that’s a cliché sentence, it’s often used of Afghanistan, but truly, this does feel a very historically significant moment for the country and for the region, and of course, for the world, by extension.

We’re very pleased to be able to have this conversation today and allow an interactive segment hopefully, with all of you and the panel. I have, on the panel, three very distinguished panellists. Baroness Anelay of St John’s is the Chair of the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Select Committee. I have a very distinguished bio in front of me for her, but I’m not going to read all of it. She recently was the State Minister from the – at the Department for Exiting the European Union, and there’s another long list of a very distinguished political career.

We also have Dr Mustafa Mastoor. He is currently the Special Representative and Senior Advisor to Afghanistan’s High Council for National Reconciliation at the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He has a very senior career within the government. He was recently the Minister of Economy. He’s a political figure, and also a long-distinguished career in engagement at the Ministry of Finance with the international donor community, in particular. Again, a very long, a very distinguished bio, which I’m not going to read all of it.

And thirdly, we have Her Excellency, Alison Blake, CMG, the British Ambassador to Afghanistan. She was appointed to this role in May 2019, and she is joining us today from Kabul. We are so grateful that you can. And before this, recently, she was the High Commissioner to Bangladesh, 2016 to 19, and also a Member of the FCO’s Management Board. And earlier you were a Deputy High Commissioner to Islamabad, also in Washington, also in NATO and Brussels, so quite a global footprint. Very relevant, very important for this conversation today.

Without further ado and taking your time, I’m going to hand this over to the panel. I’d like to invite Baroness Anelay of St John’s to deliver her first opening remarks, please. Baroness.

Baroness Anelay of St John’s

Well, first of all, of course, I’d like to thank Chatham House for this opportunity to discuss the prospects for UK-Afghanistan relations. Our International Relations and Defence Committee published a report on the UK and Afghanistan in January. And Chair, I’m very grateful to you personally for giving important evidence to that inquiry. We’re a parliamentary committee, independent of government. Our members come from the three main political parties and the independent cross-bench group. The views expressed in the report, and I’m reflecting on those today, were agreed by everyone, regardless of party or none.

Some of the key points we made are as follows. The UK’s prioritisation of Afghanistan since 2010 has declined, but the challenges facing the country have not. They include terrorism, drug production and trafficking, the fragile nature of the Afghan state and the ongoing Taliban insurgency. We were struck by the extraordinarily high level of civilian casualties over decades of conflict and the very high levels of poverty and humanitarian need, but also by the substantial level of aid dependency of the Afghan government, but with little prospect of developing alternative sources of revenue in the immediate future, despite the concerted efforts of those in the Afghanistan government.

Our enquiry was carried out as the talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban got underway. It was a moment of fragile hope, but considerable uncertainty. We highlighted a number of major future challenges. For example, a successful outcome to peace talks must include a ceasefire, the reconciliation and reintegration of armed groups, respect for the rights of all Afghan citizens, and a commitment not to provide support for terrorist groups.

But the Taliban’s commitment to a negotiated settlement and to power sharing is not clear, and it remains closely associated with Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network. The Taliban remains ideologically opposed to the progress made on human rights since 2001. Progress on these rights is in danger of being reversed, particularly those relating to women and minorities. The withdrawal of US and NATO troops without a deal we believe is likely to undermine the Afghan government’s negotiating position. President Biden has committed to a full withdrawal this September, and NATO allies will withdraw in sync with that.

We recognise, of course, that fatigue with their deployment is not surprising. Troops cannot stay forever, but the consequences of the withdrawal should not be underestimated. We conclude that international funding must remain an essential component of support for the Afghan people. The UK’s contribution has been significant, but our government’s decision to cut its spending on aid from 0.7% of gross national income to 0.5% this year will have a serious impact on funding for Afghanistan. The figures for Afghanistan have not yet been published, and we hope that funding provided by the World Bank and the UN may be protected from some of these cuts, but that is, perhaps, uncertain. Other countries are facing heavy cuts, and it’s hard to hope that funding for Afghanistan will be protected entirely when funding for Yemen, for example, has fallen precipitously.

The UK has been heavily engaged in and with Afghanistan for two decades. It has contributed funding for both military and development aims, employed diplomacy, and tragically lost hundreds of troops in active combat. This has been a long-term engagement, and progress has been made, for example on women’s rights and on governance, but it’s been fragile and contested. The UK’s ongoing willingness to support the Afghan government and people is no longer quite so clear. If the UK’s troops have left by September, and UK development assistance is cut, there will be a real question mark over whether the UK really does intend to fulfil the commitment in the Integrated Review to continue to support stability in Afghanistan. But Parliamentarians are not giving up on Afghanistan. Our House of Lords Committee will continue to make the case for aid funding and support for the Afghan government and people, and for the UK to maintain its support for human rights and the future for the people of Afghanistan to be able to live in peace. Thank you.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for those initial remarks, Baroness. Could I kindly now invite Dr Mustafa Mastoor to kick us off with his remarks, please?

Dr Mustafa Mastoor

Good afternoon to everyone. Thank you, Mr Hakimi. First of all, I would like to thank the Chatham House for inviting me to attend today’s prestigious event along with the distinguished panellists. We already heard Miss Baroness Anelay and also my great my friend, Ambassador Alison Blake. It’s a great pleasure to be here and interact on the prospects of the UK Afghanistan relations.

Colleagues, Afghanistan is yet at a great, critical juncture, as the prospects for a political settlement with the Taliban has started to gain momentum. The country is facing a number of threats. Threats such as drug trafficking, the criminal economy, extremism, Daesh, the corona pandemic, the internal displacement, and the possible mass migration, including to other countries up to EU, UK, the – and a number of other socioeconomic challenges, which requires vast efforts by the Afghans themselves, as well as the joint work with the co – and co-operation with other friendly countries in the region and beyond. On the other side of the spectrum, and in the wake of a peace settlement, Afghanistan will have big opportunities for co-operation, like trade, transit, and many more.

Coming to what is happening on the peace process, Taliban have not fulfilled their obligations under the Doha agreement with US. Under the Doha agreement, Taliban were supposed to start the intra-Afghan talks in good faith, reduce violence significantly, and cut ties with the terrorist groups, especially with Al Qaeda. The Taliban have not shown serious commitment to any of these key issues yet. On this side, particularly the HCNR, now fully functional, have maintained a national consensus and all political leaders on the Republic side has agreed on a consolidated peace plan and we were waiting for this type of conference to present there and negotiate with Taliban.

The United States and NATO’s decision to withdraw troops by September 11 or even sooner has imposed a new reality on the ground. We respect the US, UK and other NATO allies’ decisions and thank them for their sacrifices and continuous support for Afghanistan. But facing this new reality, I think the role of the international community in the ongoing peace process is becoming even more important. We expect UK to put more pressure on the Taliban, particularly if this could be done through Pakistan, considering UK’s good relation with Pakistan and Pakistan’s influence over Taliban. It is a major step that we’ve witnessed the big Carter initiative, and yesterday General Bajwa was in Kabul, both of them were in Kabul, and we may later – in the question and answers, we’ll talk about, that’s really a good step.

With the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban should no longer have another excuse. War has never had religious legitimacy. Afghanistan today is a completely different Afghanistan, as we heard earlier from Miss Anelay. Afghanistan today is totally different, and Taliban must understand these new realities. Taliban should accept that Afghanistan’s last two decades’ values and achievements, like girls’ and women’s rights, minority rights, democracy, and freedom of expression, needs to be acknowledged and preserved. Taliban cannot win the war militarily but can prolong the suffering of the Afghan people if they miscalculate. That’s why co-operation between neighbouring countries, the region and international friends, especially UK, is becoming more important.

We want UK to get more engaged in the Afghanistan peace process, as well. Friends, in the last few weeks, violence has reached its peak in several provinces, but our security and defence forces have been able to manage the situation and push back hard. Just two days ago, the attack on a school in Kabul, more than 70 innocent girls were attacked and more than 100 were injured, and these unfortunate incidents are unbearable for our people. However, the Taliban did not accept responsibility for this terrorist incident, at least they are the ones who paved the way for other terrorist groups.

We want the international community to press Taliban leaders to reduce the violence significantly and agree to permanent ceasefire. The three days’ ceasefire for Eid is welcome, but it’s not enough. The Istanbul Conference is of particular importance for the peace process and we expect the UK and other NATO friends to use their leverage to put maximum pressure on Taliban to agree to come with better preparation and flexible mood, so that we could get the maximum advantage of this event, to agree on a just and durable political settlement for Afghanistan.

As far as the UK development assistance is concerned, UK has been one of the largest donors of Afghanistan since 2002, with a total commitment of over US $5 billion contributing to achievements in a number of areas, a number of crucial areas, including security, governance, rule of law, infrastructure, education, culture, health, agriculture, rural development, social protection, economic stability, growth, jobs and I can go on and on. We are grateful for the UK’s past assistance with your new commitments, for the year 2021, considering the current challenges for all of us, supporting health, education, infrastructure and families facing food shortages due to harsh winter conditions and the COVID – the pandemic.

We also appreciate UK’s commitment to continue its support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in 2001 and beyond, and also our private sector. However, when it comes to the fiscal sustainability for Afghanistan, despite the fact that international assistance have fallen from 100% of GDP to around 40% of the GDP today, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and for the obvious reasons, no doubt because of the continuous conflict, and will continue to rely on international community’s financial support, including UK’s, to finance its security bill and sustain the economy for a while. Under the political scenario, security spending is projected to decline to around US $4 billion. Our total financing needs are likely to remain at close to the current level, driven mainly by expenditures for new initiatives to support post-settlement programming.

And finally, so we would expect aid to continue, because its abrupt decline, either from security or civilian needs would have serious implications for sustaining security, economy, and the peace, and other developments. I would be very much happy to respond the questions later on, so that I would like to cut my remarks short here. Thank you very much.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much, Wazir Sahib, thank you, Dr Mastoor. Ambassador Blake, could I kindly invite you to make your remark? Will you try and stick with, sort of, five to six minutes? We will be able to then take more Q&A especially. Thank you.

HE Alison Blake CMG

Well, thank you. I – like others, I am grateful to Chatham House for hosting this event at what is, and I think we’re all agreeing, a very significant moment in Afghanistan’s history, and in the UK Afghanistan relationship. I think the key point is that our international troops, the UK forces, are withdrawing as part of the NATO and the US troop withdrawal, but that the Embassy is still here, and that we remain committed to our partnership.

Afghanistan does remain a priority, and one of our key aims at this period is to ensure that between ourselves, working with the people of Afghanistan, working with the region, working with international partners, we do not lose this current window for peace. There is still a window for peace, and we are committed to doing whatever we can that will best help move the process towards delivering a sustainable, inclusive political settlement and a just and durable peace that benefits all Afghans. And the Doha talks have clearly becalmed. We’re not anywhere near where we had hoped to be by this point, and we saw the prospects, and we are still committed to an international conference at Istanbul, as a way to inject momentum into the Doha process, not to replace it. As yet, there are few signs that the Taliban are transforming themselves into the political partner that we hoped would be capable of engaging in a political process in good faith.

But that said, I would point to two, sort of, major developments, that I think are new, that were not here when I was first posted here nearly two years ago, and that we are doing our best to inject momentum into and to keep moving on, despite the appalling sustained violence. We’ve not seen yet the reduction of violence that the Taliban were expected to deliver as part of their agreement with the US. Despite that, despite the political stresses and tensions, there is an unprecedented unity among the Afghan leaders, and the – also the Afghan people, for peace, and a readiness to work through a process of reconciliation and to consider, and that was something that seemed inconceivable even a year ago, a power sharing agreement with the Taliban, provided that there could be a process in which there’s discussion on what end state is acceptable to both parties. There is an Afghan team in Doha that we very much support, that we are engaged with, backed by the people and the leaders.

And second, and this goes to the point that Dr Mastoor raised, and there is an extraordinary convergence in the region and internationally behind the proposition that international troop withdrawal must be orderly, that it must not signal or mark an abandonment of the state, and that what’s left behind must be stable, stabilising for the region, and that now is the moment for all international partners, regional neighbours, to step up to the plate to help make the most of the opportunity. And in that context, we’ve been working a lot with Pakistan, using our good offices as friends to both countries, to help bring them, and we believe, actually, the leaders in Pakistan get this, to see that they benefit more through a stable, peaceful, and reconciled Afghanistan, not through more decades of conflict. So that’s got quite a big part of our current engagement.

Critical to this is finding ways to convince the Taliban that the only way they can come to power and hold onto the gains is through a negotiated political settlement and power sharing, that they must get to that point through substantive talks. So a big part of the UK government policy at the moment is to work with the UN, to work with the international partners, to work with those, including Pakistan, but also others who have links into the Taliban, to get them to understand that this is the only way they will get what they want, which is to share power and to hold onto the power that they get.

So, peace and supporting a peace process is a key priority for us. We’ve brought strong diplomatic and development engagement alongside our own military engagement over the past 20 years, and our aim and intention is to keep that strong diplomatic engagement, and also defence engagement, to support the Afghan security and defence forces in their work to tackle the terrorist – [inaudible – 24:34] of terrorism as well, and to help keep – build a sustainable peace process. Clearly, since UK forces withdrew from Helmand and NATO transitioned from – to the Resolute Support Mission, Afghanistan has been less in the pub – British public consciousness.

So we aim to use this period to explain better both what we have achieved here and what the future looks like. Counterterrorism remains a primary security objective for the UK and Afghanistan, together with support for the Afghan state. We will continue to prioritise our fiscal and development support for the state, as Dr Mastoor has said, and as Baroness Anelay has said. Afghanistan is still critically dependent on support from the IFIs, from the donors, and it would be challenging for them if that were to decline dramatically or to stop.

We will continue to prioritise our work around institutional capacity building. The humanitarian situation continues to be very challenging, with the current drought on top of COVID, and the impact on the economy deepening the numbers in poverty and need. And we will continue to work with our regional partners around tackling organised crime, countering narcotics, trying to stop trafficking of people or illicit financial flows.

Our diplomatic military and development efforts have been critical in suppressing and reducing the threat from Al-Qaeda and international terrorism, but international terrorists are – groups are still here, and we’ve seen, in the terrible bombings of the school and other outrages over the past year, that there are still many groups. So even if the Taliban were to be reconciled and us to move forward, the need to tackle the terrorist networks is still here.

When I’m asked about the gains of the last 20 years and what it is we want to protect and continue to support, I point to a rising generation of Afghan leaders and citizens, and I would say that our job, and part of how we talk about what we are trying to protect and preserve here, is to acknowledge that the Afghans have built this for themselves, with our support. It’s not come as a blessing from us that is imposed on them, if you’re the Taliban, but that it’s actually what Afghan citizens, Afghan women, Afghan young people, Afghan leaders, businessmen, have wanted for themselves. So it’s really important for us that in supporting peace we advocate for meaningful participation and inclusion of women, young people, minority groups, all Afghan society needs to find itself in the peace talks, that their voice is heard and that they have a stake in shaping their future.

So I think that, to sum up here, we see our priority – clearly there are a number of challenges around security as the troops withdraw, but our priority is to stay as the UK alongside our partnership, to continue to invest as we have done in the relationships and the institutions, to preserve our ability to deal with these challenges that undermine Afghan security as well, and to promote dialogue and a peace process that enables us to build and support an Afghanistan as stable and inclusive as possible. Thank you.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for that, Ambassador. I’d like to remind the participants that we will be opening the Q&A very soon, so I encourage you to post your questions in the Q&A box on the chat. If you would like me to see your question, please put it in the Q&A box, and indicate whether you want me to raise the question to the panel, or you would like to do that yourself, in which case my colleagues will unmute you and you can ask your question. Please stay brief and to the point, so we can cover as much as possible.

But that leaves us with about just half an hour on the dot. I know, Ambassador, you have to leave and the other panellists, as well. So I wanted to kick us off, before we get some Q&A questions, with some – kind of, an interactive in conversation segment here. And if it’s okay, I’ll go with the same order that we had the remarks delivered. I wanted to ask each panellist specific questions.

To Baroness Anelay, with these kinds of – kind of enquiries, now that you’ve done such a wide-ranging enquiry, a fantastic report that I had the pleasure of reading and the honour to be presenting to the enquiry, as well, but the one question I thought would be really important is to comment on the engagement you’ve had with the Afghan – with the Afghans, and the quality of Afghans, what are the Afghanistan-based civil society, what are the diasporic Afghans family? And if you could kindly give us some clarity on that.

Baroness Anelay of St John’s

Well, thank you very much indeed for that particular question. Working in the virtual world has many disadvantages. You lose that personal interaction, and we all look forward to getting that back. But my goodness, a huge advantage for us in carrying out our enquiry about our relations with Afghanistan was that we were able to reach into Afghanistan and hear from people there, and not only from the very excellent diaspora, who are spread around the world. So we were able to talk to some of the people who perhaps hit the headlines because of the superb role they play. So I’m thinking of looking at our list of over 60 witnesses, Shaharzad Akbar, Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and Dr Orzala Nemat, Director of Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

But far more widely, we’re able to talk to those who take part in the delivery of services within the NGOs in Afghanistan, and we were able to take also some confidential information from minority groups, the Hazara, for example. We list the fact that we’ve taken that, but you can imagine, sometimes for security reasons, they don’t wish to make their individual names and their locations public. And for us, that enriched our opportunity to learn better about how Afghanistan is seen from the inside. We can never learn it properly. We rely on our amazing, and I think they are amazing, diplomats to provide us with that kind of link, but it helped us, I think, write a better report.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for that. Dr Masoor, I have a series of questions. I mean, your remarks were quite wide-ranging and you’ve covered, you know, important segments of that, but I wanted to ask you about Afghanistan’s economic co-operation and regional integration agenda. For us, it just seems like things have been put on hold while the whole conversation around peace process is taking place. To what extent are you hopeful that in the absence of international troops, including the military withdrawal implications, would be providing challenges and presenting challenges to the hard found ambitions to integrate economically with both Central Asia and South Asia? If you could kindly comment on that.

Dr Mustafa Mastoor

Thank you, Mr Hakimi. But I guess, you are asking that in a prospects of ease, if you are asking that, otherwise, you know that Afghanistan has a number of competitive advantage, particularly because of its location, but our President always mentioning it as the heart of Asia, and Afghanistan is a land bridge between Central and South Asia, and particularly the issues related to the untouched amount of natural resources and currently the number of educated young generation. These are all the opportunities.

But as conflict and the existence of terrorist groups has affected negatively the prospect of regional connectivity and co-operation, but durable peace and political settlement in Afghanistan will offer enormous opportunities, particularly related to those issues between our neighbours and particularly the demands that South Asia has, particularly in – for access to Central Asia, and Central Asia needs to export its energy to the South Asia, and vice versa, the trade and transits and other opportunities. But if you are talking about the opportunities for peace, definitely. It’s not only us who benefit from the durable peace, all the region will benefit from peace in Afghanistan.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for that. Ambassador, I see the questions here flowing from the floor to me, which I’ll come back to, but I thought, you know, you candidly talked about the challenges but also, I think you candidly covered the important perception that exists in Afghanistan about UK’s relationship with Pakistan and vis-à-vis the relationship, you know, within that context, you know, that the fact that potentially the UK points a leverage of the Pakistani.

But also, you know, I think the burning question is to ask, what kind of conditionalities do you see attached to the future of UK commitment? But also, you know, near to the current commitment, I mean, to be honest, maybe we don’t know much, or maybe I haven’t looked in the right place. So if you could kindly talk about the conditionality? Because there is a concern that if the Taliban come tomorrow and are absorbed into the government, there might be certain things, values, that will be challenged, that UK holds quite dearly. So what happens then?

HE Alison Blake CMG

Well, no, thank you. One of the things that we did at the Geneva Conference, when we negotiated with the government a new Afghan partnership framework was put right up front, a set of principles that we would want to see upheld mutually in any future partnership, both with the current government and more generally, and that included things around commitments to human rights, to gender equality, to respect for international agreements, all the things that you would expect. I mean, it was a big challenge, boiling down over 500 other conditions that all of us had into a statement of the sort of partner that we could partner with and have the sort of relationship that we have with Afghanistan.

Now, we did that in a very maximalist way, partly to – we had hoped that by Geneva, the Taliban would be in a peace process that they could be at Geneva, that we could have a discussion. In fact, their behaviour and reluctance to engage meant that there was never any suggestion that they should come to Geneva, and clearly, the partnership framework was not negotiated with them and doesn’t bind them in.

Now, if there were to be a political settlement acceptable to all Afghans, it would be for Afghans to decide the nature of their state, and then we as donors would have to have a discussion about the extent to which we could partner that. But I think it’s quite important to say it’s not re – for us to impose red lines for Afghans, but to be clear to Afghans about what we would expect. As a, sort of, long and rather – probably waffly way of saying, “We don’t know.”

You know, there is a humanitarian space where we already support partners who deliver services on behalf of the government in areas controlled by the Taliban. We know that the Taliban would, if they came to power, still, we believe, want donor assistance to come. Whether they would be prepared to sign up to all of the conditions in the Afghan partnership framework agreement is something that needs to be discussed, I think, as part of intra-Afghan talks.

But it’s very hard, you know, the Taliban as yet have not got – you know, they’ve given us a few headlines, saying, “Of course girls can be educated,” but they’ve not begun to sit down with the Afghans to explain what that looks like, so we are clear there has to be conditionality. There is in our current relationship, making sure that, you know – and there’s a distinction between the sort of conditionality you have in development programmes, with benchmarks designed to encourage greater delivery, and the, sort of, political conditionality for peace. But I can explain further, if that wasn’t clear, but I’ll stop there.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much. There are a number of questions coming, so maybe I’ll modify the wording a little bit, just to make sure we gather more – we cover more ground. Baroness, a question to you. How worried are you about the UK’s cuts to overseas development and aid budget, and to what extent do you think that the inquiry that you’ve conducted could potentially leverage some influence if, for example, there was – and, you know, I’m sure there is some consideration to cut aid, but to what extent do you think the inquiry can have significant, sort of, leveraging that the other people have?

Baroness Anelay of St John’s

Well, I think that Parliamentarians in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons have made it clear that we are very concerned about the potential impact of aid cuts on some of the poorest people around the world and those living in conflict affected areas. Also, of course, we have the opportunity to try to get further answers from the government about what kind of decisions they’re making. And what we did find is that, for example, when I raised questions in a debate just a couple of weeks ago, specifically about Afghanistan, I got a letter back from the Minister, Lord Ahmad, Tariq Ahmad, almost immediately. Now, this is impressive, I have to say. I’m not just saying that ‘cause I used to be a Minister at the FCO, and thoroughly enjoyed my time there, but it is impressive, and particularly at the end of a parliamentary session. And what he tried to do was to address some of our deepest concerns about the reduction in overseas development assistance.

What we’re trying to do is then – then when we had a two-hour session with the Foreign Secretary, again we raised questions about overseas development assistance, and it means that we can ask targeted questions. I’m going to continue that next week, when we have a debate on the Queen’s Speech and on foreign affairs, I’m going to talk only about Afghanistan, and it means that we don’t give up. At the moment, the concern, I think, is more practical, and that is that the government hasn’t told the NGOs who deliver services what the money is that they’re going to receive more than for eight weeks at a time, it appears. And we all know, if you’re trying to be efficient and effective, which NGOs are, you need longer than that.

On the other hand, the UK economy has taken a heck of a hit as a result of COVID. We’re going to see that bounce back soon in the economy. So I do know that it’s tricky for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I’m going to have to tell him now, we’re going to keep on trying to make sure that the – that those who need assistance overseas see that the UK is there to help. As an Ambassador said, not to tell other people what to do, but to assist.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for that, Baroness. Dr Mastoor, I’m getting quite a few questions on – related to the regional dimension that – and the Taliban in particular. So I’ll maybe bundle a couple of those together to give you a single question. One is about this idea of who has influence over the Taliban? When you talk about pressuring the Taliban, what do we mean? How is that possible? So who has influence, as far as you’re concerned, you can see? And secondly, how can Taliban be pressured to reduce violence and come to the political process?

Dr Mustafa Mastoor

Thank you. It’s a very good question, first of all. Who has influence on Taliban? At least, I can give you an example. Whenever there is a consultation needed for our negotiation team, they come to Kabul, or to Afghanistan, to consult. If there are other international delegations, they – if they want to consult, they go to their own capitals, but when Taliban want to consult their leaders, they go to Pakistan. So obviously Pakistan has a certain role and influence over Taliban. And that is really big, I mean, factor that we can invest on, even in yesterday’s meeting, which was a very good meeting, that General Bajwa was to the Sapedar Palace and met with Dr Abdullah.

And the issues, how he was mentioning, it was showing that, yes, they would like to utilise their influence and pressure, and he was saying that there’s no excuse for jihad after the withdrawal, and he was believing that they will be able this time to bring Taliban to the table and also prepared with a plan. And it was also good that we’ve heard him, that they were saying that we only support a peaceful settlement and we support an inclusive government.

Taliban, so far, we’ve seen, even since 2000, in the time that they were in power in Kabul, and since 2001, all type of pressure were used on them, but unfortunately it didn’t – they were not much affected. The financial assistance maybe, and the leverages that we were looking for, it should be thought pre-exit and post-exit. The pre-exit at this moment, I don’t know what exactly they are waiting for, but the delisting of their leaders, the President is another leverage and also a pressure that we can use on them, but overall, I think the regional countries are really important, and they have their relationship with almost all of them.

But financial resources now, they are more or less – at least for their fighting, they are self-sufficient, not like the time that they were in power, and on that time there were some Gulf countries that they were also supporting. So, I think, knowing that most of the countries, they would like to strengthen their diplomatic assistance to Afghanistan, it will help a lot, and we’ve heard the Troika just last week that there was good promises, at least not returning the Emirates back, it was one of the steps, and we think it will help.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much for that. Ambassador, if I can come to you, I think it neatly ties to what Dr Mastoor was just saying. Apologies to the participants that I’m not naming them when I’m asking these questions, but I know your questions are coming to me in the box, and I’m trying to put them forward, sometimes bundling them together.

So, on the issue of the region, I mean, if I can, kind of, ask a mixed question. One is, initially, I think there – I mean, right now there’s a feeling that the Taliban have already declared victory. As far as they’re concerned, their jihad has paid off, the internationals have been defeated, [inaudible – 46:33] and they’ve won, and if that is the prevalent narrative, you know, that is quite a challenging one to overcome, domestically and internationally. So, in that regard, do you accept that the last 20 years has been a – quite a waste for – you know, talking from a military perspective. I mean, I know you’re not a military person. And in that regard, how do you see a – kind of, a new regional dimension? Because back in the nineties, you did not have the Central Asia of today, you did not have China in the same way, so the Chinese and the Pakistanis, CPEC, and, sort of, all of that dimensions and dynamics are new. And if all of this is going to contradict in Afghanistan, what does that mean for the UK foreign policy? So, kind of, a two-part question.

HM Alison Blake CMG

Okay. No, I mean, the Taliban is psychological warfare, the media getting out messaging is a challenge. You know, they have not won. It’s really, really important that they understand that although the international troops are going, you know, they are not – the field is not being left open to them. You know, we all support the Afghan Armed Forces, and not – you know, the last thing we want to see is war, so it’s really important, and I think that is the message they’re getting from all the regional countries, and anyone who has links into them. And that’s why the, sort of, international statements coming out of meetings in Moscow, Istanbul, Doha, where they’re hearing people say, “No Emirates, political process, stop the violence, ceasefire now.”

I think, you know, I don’t know, but I am assuming that there is a reality that they’re about to bump into, and that will be quite a moment of some danger for them, because they are predominantly a military movement, they’ve got – but their membership, some are driven by ideology, some are driven by economics. So I think there is a whole set of issues around how you reconcile the Taliban and get them to see that what they want, if they are Afghans, and they want to be part of the future, and that the region is not what it was 20 years ago or even 30 years ago. So, this really is a moment when they need to hear it from as many different voices. I think they ignore – they may be tempted to discount Western voices, because at the moment they think they’ve won and we’re going because they’ve won. So there’s a lot we need to do to make sure that they – that is not the dominant narrative.

But then, I think, in terms of – you know, this is a moment of opportunity. I mean, you know, all diplomats are sent overseas to be optimists and we often get told off for it, but I think, you know, this is a moment where we can create a more virtuous circle. Lots of others – you know, the term that we’ve often used, analysts watching the region, is to say, regional countries are hedging. You know, people have felt that the only way they can protect their own interests is to play some sort of role in Afghanistan. Now we want actually to say, “The way your interests are best protected is through having a sovereign, independent, stable, neutral Afghanistan, with whom you can have more normal relations.” So that’s quite a big piece.

And last point, the peace process so far, there’s been a lot of international support for it and interlocking circles and different groups of people. What we’ve not quite managed, and one of the things that Istanbul was going to be about, was bringing together the biggest, broadest, international coalition, if you like, as a set of all of us turning up and sending the same message, and all meaning it. So that sounds very Pollyanna-ish and utopian, but I think it is about changing the international narrative, making sure that people understand this is not a moment where we abandon Afghanistan to retrograde forces and all walk away and allow it either to be – you know, to implode or to struggle or proxy wars to rage under the surface. Thank you.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much. I’m getting quite a few questions for both of you, Dr Mastoor and Ambassador, and it’s relating to the peace process, so if I can come back to you, and then I’ll go to Baroness Anelay with another question. To what extent, Dr Mastoor, this is a question from one of the participants, do you see resource issues a challenge for your High Council of National Reconciliation, and to what extent have you been able to work with countries like the United Kingdom to secure some resources? That’s question one to you. And the second part is, to both you and to Ambassador, has Istanbul replaced Doha, and what are the implications? Why Istanbul, why not Doha?

Dr Mustafa Mastoor

Okay, Ambassador, you would like to be first or [pause] – anyway, the resources issue, that is really a challenge everywhere, but you know that the High Council for National Reconciliation was established based on the political agreement between the top two election runners. And since this establishment, the budget for that wasn’t a big issue, because there was always a tendency in the Palace that how they could also control the peace process.

For this fiscal year, still the HCNR is not accepted as this independent budget entity and all the budgets should come through the – back to the Office of Administration Affairs of the President. And today, that we are at the end of our fifth month of the fiscal year, just today, our colleagues received their salaries of the third month, the same for all other operations. It’s a big issue.

Ambassador remembers that in December and January and also February, we presented a proposal to all partners, and saying that if we resource well the High Council for National Reconciliation, for all the programmes that we collectively make, the opportunity cost will be much, much lower for all of us, how much we spend on all security-related issues, if peace comes one day early, how much we save.

Currently, the HCNR has established 13 consultative committees or commissions, with mainly Human Rights Commission talking to all those pioneers including the Shaharzad Akbar that earlier Baroness was mentioning her, Women’s Affairs Commission, Youth Affairs Commission, Media, just to name them. They all come together and discuss and main – the main two topics what we have for these commissions, what they want from the peace process and how they can contribute, they only dealt that too. We need to access, to have outreach to the provinces, it should not only be limited to the cities. So, for all of these things, the resources are an issue, and if we really would like the peace process to go faster, the issues related to the resources of the institutions related to peace have to be managed. On the other issue, maybe I will go after the Ambassador.

Hameed Hakimi

We’ve got very few minutes, and I know that a couple of you have to go. But anyway, maybe I can ask – we can leave that question with the Ambassador. Ambassador, has Istanbul replaced Doha?

HE Alison Blake CMG

No, the concept of Istanbul, as I now understand it, is that it would be an opportunity to bring together slightly more senior delegations from both parties to agree on a set of shared principles and a roadmap for going forward. There are many different, sort of – because it’s not quite happened yet, and the Taliban haven’t fully engaged, but, you know, the Republic side has brought forward a set of – a paper responding to some proposals the Americans put on the table, and now we’re waiting to see what the Taliban will bring.

But the idea was that you would get a more senior delegation together, Istanbul would be an opportunity to bring a bigger gathering of internationals around this, to encourage the process, and then it would create a, sort of, framework and more momentum that would then go back to the teams in Doha to work on putting flesh on the bones. So certainly, at the moment, the idea is not that Istanbul replaces Doha. There would be a danger, I think, if suddenly we had many different peace processes and different routes. We still think the best way has got to be a single inclusive process, Afghan-owned, Afghan-led, Afghan-managed, possibly internationally facilitated or mediated, to help the parties, but that’s the concept.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you. If I can move to Baroness for the last question before I close the session. Baroness, my sense is that, you know, you’ve had such a wide-ranging engagement with Afghans in this enquiry. To what extent can you assure them that your committee will be available for continued engagement with them if they invite you, for example, to be a voice for them through your work, and a voice for advocacy for them within the UK? That’s – some of the questions I’m seeing here relate to that issue, but also stuff that I’ve heard.

Baroness Anelay of St John’s

The role of our committee is to ensure that we hold the government of the UK to account for their policies. We can only do that when we hear evidence from those who are on the ground in Afghanistan, and those also who are delivering the services there. And therefore we always welcome any evidence, any information, that is based on the relationship between the UK and Afghanistan, so that we can then look at that and present it on a regular basis to the government.

For example, what we do is to review our reports every three, six, nine, 12 months, so watch out government, you can expect that we’re going to come back, but we do it in a very constructive way. Our job isn’t just to pick things to pieces, what we want to do is to ensure that there is peace in Afghanistan, that, as the Ambassador has said, has been negotiated by the people of Afghanistan on behalf of Afghanistan, but with the assistance and goodwill of the international community. And the Parliament of the UK, both houses, feel that we’re part of that international community, wishing Afghanistan a safe and secure future.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you very much, and thank you Baroness Anelay of St John’s, Her Excellency Alison Blake CMG, British Ambassador to Kabul, Wazir Sahib Dr Mustafa Mastoor, Special Rep and Senior Advisor to the High Council of National Reconciliation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Thank you to the participants. Apologies if I didn’t pick up every question you wanted to ask.

As always, Afghanistan-related events kick in such adrenaline, you know, it’s a really important conversation, lives depend on these conversations, and that’s really, really important to have a takeaway of that, sort of, policy then, but hopefully we’ll see some peace, and the efforts pay off. For those of you who celebrate Eid, Eid Mubarak, for those of you who don’t, have a wonderful day and we’ll be in touch soon, hopefully we’ll have you again on one of our next events. Thank you very much, take care.

Dr Mustafa Mastoor

Thank you very much, Mr Hakimi.

HE Alison Blake CMG

Thank you, goodbye.

Hameed Hakimi

Thank you.