Dr Neil Quilliam
Good afternoon, I’m Neil Quilliam. I’m a Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East North Africa Programme here at Chatham House and I’m delighted to host this event today and to invite you to our talk, our panel event on Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Balancing New Alliances in a Contested Region. Before I introduce the panel just a few housekeeping notes. Today, we’re going to suspend the Chatham House Rule, so the meeting will be on the record. We are livestreaming. Please do feel free to tweet and using #CHEvents. We’d be delighted for you to do that, but please do switch off you mobile phones to provide – stop any interventions into the session.
We’ve got a very strong panel this afternoon of four speakers. It’s unusual for us to have four speakers in an hour, but given the gravity, given the importance of the subject, we wanted to squeeze as much into the hour as we possibly can. I’m going to ask them to speak just for five or six minutes and I’ll do my best to keep us on time, so that we’ve got about – hopefully, about 25, 30 minutes for Q&A, which I’m sure there’ll be lots of that.
Anyway, what I’m going to do is just introduce one speaker at a time and then we’ll, sort of, kick-off. So to my left we have Her Excellency Lolwah Al-Khater, who is the Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Qatar. Lolwah, if you could give us five to six minutes, please, and I will try to, sort of, keep you to that.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
Sure, that’s very challenging, as you can imagine. Good afternoon everyone. Very delighted to be here at Chatham House, especially amongst friends and colleagues. I was just explaining to my colleagues here is that given the diversity of the panellists’ backgrounds and expertise here, I think what we will be discussing is really also beyond Qatar’s foreign policy, and if you allow me to start with that, to kind of portray the context within which Qatar’s foreign policy operates.
Last week or actually ten days ago, I was in a closed session and the speaker next to me was asked to give a diagnosis to what he thinks are the main reasons beyond the current Middle East crisis or crises and indeed, he listed a number of things, all very important: violent extremism, immigration, migration, and other topics. And as I was listening to my colleague speaking, I was thinking, well, are all of these really causes in themselves or are some of them symptoms of other problems? And if you allow me, in the remaining four minutes or so, to kind of look at what I think is the main root cause of the nested crises that our region’s going through, and that I can summarise in one sentence. It is the failure in the nation’s state-building process.
Unfortunately, unlike many European countries, our countries did not necessarily grow, develop organically. In the aftermath of the colonial era, a number of Arab Republics were born, as you know, and as we know in political science, the very essence of any nation and nation state-building is really the nature of the social contract, isn’t it? So the social contract, at the time, was merely premised on the entire colonial sentiments, right? So, these regimes, in many Arab Republics, gained their legitimacy through those entire colonial sentiments, but this legitimacy started to deteriorate, as the socioeconomic conditions of living for the peoples of the Arab region started deteriorating, and there had to be an alternative. In my opinion, it could’ve been one of two.
One is to develop into a more representative form of governors, and I’m being very particular here. I’m not saying, necessarily, democracy, I’m saying more representative form of governance. Or, the other option, is to have economic development. We see many Asian countries that are not necessarily democratic, but they are providing for their people. These countries failed to do either. They did not develop into representative gov – form of governance and they did not achieve economic development, and we reached the point of explosion, that is the Arab Uprisings in 2011. The best description ever I’ve heard of the Arab – the so-called Arab Spring is that it’s like an earthquake. You don’t ask whether an earthquake should’ve happened or not, do you? You ask how to deal with it in the aftermath of the earthquake and unfortunately, the responses to that earthquake, by many Arab countries, were not very intelligent responses. Some decided to deny that an earthquake happened in our region. Not only that, some of them decided to actually go after those who claim that an earthquake actually happened in our region and, once again, that was not necessarily the right answer.
Denying the problems and the accumulative issues we’ve been having in our region, such as failure in development, poverty, the right – the basic human right to dignity for the Arab peoples, denying that is not going to help us in any way. So the solution, the way forward, and I conclude with that, is to acknowledge that we have problems. We acknowledge that the marginalisation that was being consistently and systematically exercised by many Arab regimes, Police states is not the answer. We don’t need more marginalisation in our region. We need more inclusive policies in our region. We need to recognise the basic rights of the peoples in our region. We need the rule of law, we need checks and balances. This is the way forward.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. That’s a very clear exposition. I now call upon Abdullah, Abdullah Baabood, who’s a very good friend of Chatham House. You’ve been engaging with us for many years and a former Director of the Gulf Research Center and also, you were based at Qatar University, for many years. Abdullah, can you just package your five or six minutes and maybe give us your key talking points. Thank you.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
Thank you. Thank you, Neil, and it’s a pleasure to be here, again, at Chatham House. I – first of all, I want to echo what Lolwah has just said and that is, you know, the failure of the colonial and the post-colonial Arab State has led us to what we are now, and we’re just going around in circles, not being able to actually tackle the problem that is facing the Middle East, not just the Gulf States, but the whole Middle East. And the earthquake that you mentioned, as we know, earthquakes, you know, do come and go and they come back again. So, we’ll have to be careful that this, if we continue the way that we are and we keep failing, in all different socioeconomic development and political participation, etc., those earthquakes are going to come back to haunt us. So, you know, the whole region is actually threatened, but that’s not what I’m going to be talking about. I have to switch what I’m going to talking about now because of what Lolwah had just mentioned and I’m going to talk about the Gulf Co-operation Council.
As you know the Gulf Co-operation Council is one of the regional organisations that has been constructed to help the region to achieve peace, security, stability and development amongst the member states. The Gulf Co-operation Council is a very important regional organisation and it’s a rule-based regional organisation, as some people here in the E – in the UK would know, you know, regional organisation are of utmost important to their member states. They help integration, they help co-operation, etc., especially when you look at the Gulf State themselves and their economic dependency on oil and gas and their limited, if you like, other resources, apart from oil and gas, and their small market, etc., integration and co-operation between these countries is actually one of the tools for economic development and prosperity.
What we have seen now, for the last few years, is that the Gulf Co-operation Council is dismantling and it’s almost on its deathbed, as it were. So, it’s not just the GCC, which is the Gulf Co-operation Council, but also, if you look at all other Arab regional organisation, or attempts at regional integration, have all failed and it’s due – goes back to the idea that, you know, the failed – basically, the failed post-colonial state to deal and to know how things – how to develop from there onwards. And it’s a real pity because if you look at the whole region around the Middle East, you see it’s all in turmoil: Libya, Iraq, Syria, etc., you know, the list goes on. And the last part or piece of the Middle East that was still in some peace and prosperity, etc., was the Gulf States and the last thing you want to see is this turmoil actually comes to the Gulf States.
We need the Gulf States to be working together. We need them to be co-ordinating their policies together and developing not only for the benefits of their own citizens, but also, for the wider region and for the larger global prosperity. And what we have seen is now, because of this crisis that has taken place between members of the Gulf States, is this is not – no longer the case. The GCC is no longer functioning as a regional organisation. The GCC Supreme Council, which is like the higher decision-maker within the GCC, is not being consulted because of this crisis and was never even given a role to mediate in the crisis. The crisis were taken outside the GCC mechanisms, when it actually relates to the GCC functioning.
It relates, for example, for some of the agreements that has taken place, and one of those agreements is the common – the GCC Common Market, which calls for free flow of goods, capital and people, and of course, this crisis, as you know, has gone and stopped all of these free movements between the member states. So, here is a decision taken by some countries, part of the GCC, affecting one of the most important agreements that’s signed between the member states and taken outside the GCC mechanism. Basically, effectively, it brought the whole GCC to a standstill and not only that, this crisis – other countries that were not involved in the crisis, see that it is not just – and maybe it started with Qatar, but it’s not going to end up with Qatar.
There is some kind of an idea that perhaps there is going to be a redrawing of regional maps and redrawing of a regional structure that, you know, there are some people who want to meddle-up and meddle with the existing structure and change things, as they are and therefore, the crisis itself is much more dangerous, and not only for the countries involved, but the whole region. The continuation of this crisis, it doesn’t really help anybody and the quicker it’s ended is the better for all the people in the region, but also, outside the region.
I don’t know, how am I doing with time?
Dr Neil Quilliam
I think you’ve got about 20 seconds.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
20 seconds. Well, with that I would – I’ll say, we’ll leave it for Q&A, but thank you, Neil.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. You’ve both been very good timekeepers and you’ve, sort of, set out context and you’ve really left us hanging there, Abdullah, redrawing the regional map. I’m sure that the audience are going to want to, sort of, unpick that and sort of see what that means. So, thank you for, sort of, leaving it hanging there.
Next, we’ve got Courtney Freer, who is a Research Officer at the Middle East Centre at LSE. Courtney, I think you’re going to talk a bit about the Muslim Brotherhood, and I hope you’re going to, sort of, mention your book in that process.
Dr Courtney Freer
Yes, thank you. It’s great to be here and also, to talk about the role I think that ideology has played or has been perceived to play, especially in the GCC rift and especially when it comes to Qatar. I think that oftentimes, Qatari foreign policy has been inaccurately viewed through the prism of ideology. There’s this idea that Qatari foreign policy supports Islamists anywhere and for whatever reason and this is, of course, patently untrue. And I think what’s interesting is to look at how domestic experiences in the Gulf States with Brotherhood movements, inform their foreign policy decisions abroad and so, I’m just going to speak briefly about the role of the Brotherhood in Qatar and how that’s kind of informed decision-making or stances towards Islamism more generally. So, there’s no – actually no Brotherhood in Qatar at present.
The Brotherhood chose to dissolve itself in 1999. It started much like other Brotherhood movements throughout the Gulf in the mid-1950s. In particular, there are lots of members of the Egyptian Brotherhood coming to the Gulf to staff understaffed and nascent educational and judicial sector. So this happened throughout the Gulf and actually, Brotherhood members and the movement itself was welcomed by these leaderships, even in places like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, because this was a bulwark against Arab nationalism, which was, of course, the number one enemy of the day.
So you have, of course, Brotherhood movement coming in from the 50 – from the 1950s and then, through the 1970s, you have the establishment of the Brotherhood branches in Qatar and in the UAE. They were founded earlier in Kuwait and Bahrain and elsewhere. In the Qatari case, the Brotherhood never actually formed a political arm. It was mainly socially active and in terms of promoting Dawah and Tarbeya, and things of this nature, rather than forming, kind of, a political arm and asserting any kind of political stance. So, really, its role has differed, I think, from when we look at Brotherhood movements elsewhere in the Gulf, where they did become politically active. We see this with the Safa movement in the 1990s in Saudi Arabia in particular. We see Islah in the UAE taking on more and more, kind of, oppositional stances, in terms of wanting more equal distribution of wealth across the different Emirates.
So, in the Qatari case it was fundamentally different and I think this has informed how the Qatari Government has thought about Islamism and about it not being fundamentally dangerous or fundamentally threatening, and I think that often the – actually, the influence of the Brotherhood and of Islamism in Qatar, in general, is more – it’s un-institutionalised and it’s often personalistic. So you look at someone like Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi who, of course, has been in Qatar, who came – arrived, I believe in 1961 from Egypt, has been in Qatar since that time and has had a very public platform, in the past, in the country. And I think, of course, his role as a Sharia Scholar and as an influential personality in general, in the Muslim world, affected his position in Qatar, but also, he did have a personal relationship with the former Emir, with Sheikh Khalifa who, interestingly enough, from what I’ve read, seemed much more politically attuned with, kind of, Arab nationalism than with any type of Islamism. So it’s interesting to see how that personal relationship played out.
I think also, in Qatar, so we see the experience with the Brotherhood at home influencing the stance, in terms of not being afraid of the Brotherhood, not seeing them as fundamentally threatening, but I think we also see a pragmatism and we see this desire to distinguish itself from, in particular, Saudi Arabia, which has vehemently opposed the Brotherhood, especially in recent years.
I think, for instance, hosting the – hosting, you know, the office of Hamas, hosting the office of the Taliban, as well as hosting online platforms like islamweb and IslamOnline give Qatar a platform that its neighbours don’t have, and I think this granting a platform is often misconstrued as support, when in fact, having these platforms actually makes Qatar part of the conversation, part of a global, kind of, Muslim conversation that I think the other Gulf States don’t have that kind of positioning. So, I’ll stop there and leave the rest for, kind of, Q&A.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. Thank you very much. Gosh, that’s great. So, next, finally, I call upon Helen Lackner, who’s a Research Associate at the London Middle East Institution at SOAS to give us five minutes, and you’re going to touch on Yemen and a few other issues.
Helen Lackner
Yes, I think I will talk partly about the country where the earthquake is ongoing and extremely long-term and, indeed, does possibly raises questions of geology because it shows no sign of ending. And I was basically going to say a few things about the history of the relationship between Qatar and Yemen, and the main activities were in the – about ten years ago, really, when Qatar, in its period of being very active in mediation, attempted to mediate between Saleh and the Houthis and, indeed, almost succeeded in doing so. And many question why it failed in the end, and one of the main answers about that failure, in 90 – in 2008, was that Saleh did not want any investment taking place up in the Houthi area, which was the reason – which was one of the parts of the agreements that had been achieved.
But I think, in retrospect, it’s also worth wondering, to what extent that agreement was sabotaged by the big neighbours next-door, who also didn’t really want to see anybody else interfering in their relationship with Yemen and so, I think that largely explains – you know, those two factors explain the failure of that set of negotiations. I think the other, second, aspect of the relationship prior to the war was that Qatar, in Yemen as in other places, invested and invested in some real estate and particularly in one project, which I personally think was somewhat misguided, but, in any case, it’s getting nowhere fast, so it doesn’t really matter. And the third aspect relates, I think, a bit to what Courtney was saying, was this support for the Islah Party where, again, it’s worth remembering that the Islah Party in Yemen is not a traditional Muslim Brother Party, but is this conglomerate between Islamists of a somewhat Muslim Brother relate – connection and Northern tribesmen. So, I think that prevents some of the past situation.
I think, in a sense, the – Qatar, the problem with the – rests with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, is actually – it has actually been a serious bonus, with respect to Yemen for Qatar, because it’s just managed and Qatar is no longer involved in this war, which is increasingly unpopular and increasingly, you know, gets increasing criticism from everywhere in the world and therefore, you know, it no longer bears any responsibility for this and can easily detach itself from it. And at the same time, it’s taken some very good measures, in terms of supporting, it may seek the United Nations humanitarian activities, and that is something that is very accepted by all and certainly, you know, appreciated by what now appears to be close to 14 million people who are dying of starvation.
The second thing I wanted to talk about, which is not about Yemen, is about Qatar’s relationship with developing countries in general, and there’s basically two aspects to that. One is, of course, the major aspect of the labour migration, with over two million foreigners working in Qatar, and I think, again, I think this has been possibly, it might have happened otherwise, I’m not in a position to know. But it happened, you know, thanks to the blockade that the agreement was made with the International Labour Organization, which is fundamentally transforming the conditions and the labour conditions of the workers in Qatar and vastly improving it and bringing them up to, you know, pretty close to excellent working conditions. And I gather that it’s not fully implemented yet, but I would personally say that implementing this not only will have a major impact on the workers and their families, and just if we’re talking about the case of Nepal, we’re talking about six million people out of 30 million. So it’s a very significant number of people who are – six million’s not the number of workers, it’s the workers, plus their families and all the rest of them. And their remittances, at the moment, are 2.2 billion per year, which is, you know, a very significant amount, in terms of the country’s national budget, and this is just one example.
There are many others, but I took that one because, in terms of population percentage, it’s the most important, and it seems to me that not only is this important for these people and for possible development and economic development and social development in these people’s countries, but it’s also, a model, which the rest of the GCC will eventually be forced to apply, and not that they are particularly willing to do so, I don’t think. So, it’s a very fundamental transformation in the relationship between migrant workers and the host countries, as well as the impact this can have on the home countries. And I think that’s all I will say, so we can have more time for questions. Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, Helen. I really hope, during the, sort of, Q&A session, that we can perhaps probe a little bit about Qatar’s relations with Turkey and Iran and what that might mean for MESA. I hope we can also talk about its relations with its other Gulf-Arab State neighbours, but I won’t take the prerogative of the Chair ‘cause I want to use this 30 minutes, as best as we can and make sure that the audience can ask those questions. So I will now, sort of, turn to the Q&A session. What I want to do, as I’ll take two questions at a time. We have roaming mics, so if you could – when the mic arrives, if you could stand up, give your name and your affiliation and having been at Chatham House for five years now, I know that some of you will be very naughty and try to sneak in two or three questions, and I will stop you immediately. So, one question per person, please. No follow-ups and if you have a statement, you can keep it to 20 seconds, but then, no question. Yes, please, let’s see hands for questions. This gentleman here, please. Thank you.
John Gilheany
Hi, John Gilheany from The Risk Advisory Group. I’m a Middle East Analyst there. I wanted to ask, leading on from what Dr Quilliam just said about the new alliances that Qatar is engaged in, the changing alliances, given the events over the last couple of years, and how that has affected Qatar’s ability, as a foreign policy actor, in the world.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much and we’ll take a second question. Yes, please, thank you.
Michele Neubert
Michele Neubert from NBC News. I’d like to ask you about the current state of relations between Qatar and Saudi, particularly in event of the recent events in Turkey. Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, right. Who’s going to take which question? Would you like to take first or second question, Lolwah?
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
Sure, I mean – well, hard to pick, but I’ll go with the ques – the first one. When it comes to the alliances, you know, the term ‘alliance’ has a very particular meaning, especially militarily speaking, politically speaking. So, in that sense, I wouldn’t say that something changed dramatically. We still have our ties and relations, militarily speaking, with the US and with other countries, including the UK, France and other countries. Politically speaking, likewise, I would say. What has changed, I think, dramatically, is really the economic relations. I wouldn’t call them alliances. Very difficult to classify them as such, and in this case, I would say that Qatar has diversified its dependencies, when it comes to that, as you know. 90% of our food and medicine used to come through our neighbours. No longer is the case and even if things are restored, I think there is a strategic decision not to go back to the old supply chains. Now there is an outlook more towards Asia, when it comes to that. At the end of the day, Asia is importing most of our energy, most of our revenue, as Qatar comes from Asia, so I think there is, like, an extra effort to strengthen these relations.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Qatar and Saudi, do you want to take that?
Dr Courtney Freer
So you’re cheating because if you…
Dr Neil Quilliam
That’s my prerogative.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
No, absolutely. I don’t think anything has changed dramatically, Michele, is it? Yeah, I don’t think anything has changed dramatically, to be honest. What we see, maybe – we’re just hoping that there is a wake-up call for everyone and of course, our condolences go to the, you know, the family and the friends of the Journalist.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. Anybody else on the panel want to come back on any of those points? No?
Dr Abdullah Baabood
That, we’ve covered.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, great. Next questions, please. This gentleman here with the very nice keffiyeh, thank you.
Ali Lali
Hi, may name’s Ali Lali, I’m a Bahrain activist. Just a few points to Lolwah. You talked about the [pause] – so, should, too. Alright, so basically, I remember that the Qatar…
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sorry, use the microphone.
Ali Lali
Alright, so I remember, in 2011, when Qatar sent troops to Bahrain as a part of the Peninsular Shield and then – in Yemen, as well, when they were part of the war on Yemen. Now I heard Lolwah was saying that the earthquake that happened hasn’t been dealt with very well from all of the GCC’s country and I hardly find – can’t find that how Qatar have dealt with that. Now, the situation that I look at, Qatar is still doing that, as far as the media that’s supported by Qatar, for example, Jazeera news, they are still supporting the far-right oppositions in London, the far-right Bahrani position in London and that is making it hard for the situation in Bahrain to deteriorate. Now, the way I’m – the question that I’m asking Lolwah is this going to be continued after that crisis finished or if there is any strategy, from your side to help the – like, to stabilise the situation in our countries? Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. We’ll take another question. Yes, please, and whilst it’s great to ask all the questions, we do have three other fantastic panellists here and I don’t want them to feel neglected and to tell me off afterwards.
James Landale
Forgive me, ‘cause I’m going to disobey you on that. James Landale, BBC. I just wondered if I could push the Spokeswoman again on the Saudi issue. What action do you believe that the United Kingdom and other European countries should take in response to what has happened?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, sorry about that.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
I guess, I have to handle both questions, in this case. So, to Ali’s question, I would, kind of, revisit just some of the statements that were made, especially that you kind of, you know, asked a number of questions in really one sentence. In terms of the, like, participation, the alliance in Yemen, it is very clear that Qatari troops never, never entered Yemeni soil. I mean, it was part of this sense of solidarity, which was unfortunately, completely neglected as part of the GCC crisis, and I guess now, Qatar has more incentive to pursue its own independent foreign policy, regardless of what the neighbours think about this independent foreign policy. So, the very example you actually brought up is – gives us the reasons why we should pursue our own independent foreign policy.
To the question about the kind of reaction we would like to see. There was a statement that – a joint statement, which the UK, France, Germany, I believe, issued and I think this statement, for the time being, summarises all the actions that everyone wants to see. We would like to see a transparent investigation. We have faith in the legal system in Turkey, and I guess everyone is anxiously waiting to hear what is going to be announced tomorrow.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. Abdullah, you teased us, you talked about redrawing, you know, the regional map. You talked about restructuring the region, what did you mean by that? Can you just maybe unpack that a little bit for us?
Dr Abdullah Baabood
I was hoping, Neil, that you wouldn’t ask me and press me on that, but as you know, we have – the countries in the region are new, you know, in terms of their independence, yeah, etc. And when the British withdraw, there were a lot of issues, you know, regarding borders, etc., and this goes back to what has been said earlier, you know, the whole issue about the nation state and what it is and where are the borders, is still not resolved. There are lots of historical antagonism between the Gulf States, since we are talking just here about the Gulf, but it goes beyond that to the whole region. There is – you know, there are dynastic competition between them. The borders are still disputed, and this crisis, basically, showed that it is – you know, that these problems are still there to haunt us. They’re not – they have not gone. You know, they haven’t settled down their differences, they haven’t gone beyond the fact that we accept each other as we are and let’s move on and develop some kind of relationship that is co-operative for the whole region.
What we are seeing is that, you know, they’re going back to the old style of, you know, deceit and conflicts and even borders, you know, you’ve heard about what – the issue about the canal. That they want to cut-off Qatar from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, which is, you know, to my mind, it’s a big joke. But also, you’ve seen that some of the maps that were drawn on the region, where Qatar was actually taken off the map and even parts of Oman was taken off the map, and these are not necessarily isolated, innocent incidents. There is – there are lots of things that are going on that still haven’t, you know, come up, but it shows that the – this crisis is much more about domination of the region, about the countries stopping them having independent foreign policy, maybe redrawing the maps, restructuring the whole region. It’s also, it’s – this is part of the counter revolution, if you like, of the anti-Arab Spring, you know, they – we – they don’t want another earthquake in the region and – but – and they’re following these policies, thinking that they’re going to put it down. But in fact, this is going to even create more tremors in the region if they continue with these policies, because the whole region is being fragmented and the cost to it is not just – it’s not just a Qatar, Saudi, Emeriti, Bahraini, Egyptian issue. It is much more than that. It’s the whole region that is suffering from it, but also, the security of the region and also, the alliance. The allies of the region are also having – facing issues of how to deal with this region, you know, whether it is in business, but it’s economics, but also, military issues, you know, they’re talking about confronting Iran, for example.
How can you confront Iran if your whole region is this fragmented? You’re talking about this Middle East-NATO issue, and again, what is this about. We’ve heard so many different proposals, in the past. Yeah, I’m sure some of you are old enough to remember the Damascus Declaration, the enlargement of the GCC to bring Jordan and Morocco into it. The deepening of the GCC to have a GCC Union and now we have a NATO-like alliances between odd-bedfellows, you know, they’re not even talking to each other. So, how could you have an alliance between people who are not working with each other, and they don’t trust each other? So, you know, we are going through a very, very difficult period and the implications of which is not just for the region, I think it goes beyond it because of the strategic location of this, and importance of this region.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, Abdullah. I’m glad I asked the question. I have a question just here on the end and then, the lady next to him, please. So, we’ll take those two questions together.
Dr Renad Mansour
Hello, Renad Mansour with the Middle East North Africa Programme. My question as well to Abdullah. You mentioned – well, these are two half questions, so it’s not two questions, it’s two half questions. You mentioned that…
Dr Neil Quilliam
And take your time, that’s fine.
Dr Renad Mansour
…the GCC united is better for regional stability. I wonder when the GCC was united and when the GCC unity actually meant regional stability? Can you, kind of, unpack how a united GCC could actually lead to regional stability?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, and if you could just pass it along to the lady next to you there.
Samira Kawar
Thank you. , This is really a follow-up question to the one that was just asked and I’m Samira Kawar from Argus Media, and whoever would like to pick it up is welcome. We’re still talking about the GCC as though it still existed. Does it exist or is it completely fractured and is it fractured beyond repair? We’ve just heard that Qatar is going to pursue its own independent economic policies and supply chains, and that politically, it’s also going to pursue its own foreign policy, whereas before, the GCC seemed to be going, at least in some aspects, towards a union, customs union, currency union, what have you. Is that all dead now, for good? Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. Abdullah, do you want to, sort of, spearhead the answer and then we can ask colleagues to come in?
Dr Abdullah Baabood
Does anyone want to do that? Well, I – we can blame the GCC for a lot of things, and there are a lot of shortfalls that the GCC can be blamed for, and the list goes on. I mean, I can talk about how the GCC has not functioned, in many ways. but you could say the same thing about any regional organisation. Regional integration takes a long time. It’s not easy and you’ve seen it here in Europe and, you know, it just not took a long time, but there are countries who want to come out of it, as you know, with Brexit. So, just to say a few things about what the GCC has achieved, in terms of regional secu – stability and security. And first of all, it has created this free market, this space for all of us. We can travel together, we can travel to each country with our, you know, ID card. We can invest, we can work, earn money, work in Qatar. I didn’t have to have a Visa. I didn’t have to have any special permission. I can just go there and work with my ID card, as it were, and treated as a citizen in the GCC countries.
The GCC, again, in short, you know, created some kind of a forum where they can talk into international organisations. They want to enter into a lot of trade negotiations with the EU, with China, with US, strategic dialogue. All of this has helped the GCC kind of to work together and create a semblance of regional security and stability and there is, of course, you know, the Peninsula Shield, there is a lot of other security cover. There is a lot of – there are a lot of other issues that actually, don’t hit the limelight and don’t hit the news that the GCC’s working on, in terms of harmonising policies, etc. So yes, it has helped and there is a lot of con – there were a lot of confidence within this regional organisation that it is going to, to succeed.
But just to follow on, on that, does it still exist? No, I don’t think it exists now. It is really in its deathbed and I don’t think it will ever come back on the same way that it was before, because I think there are a lot of mistrusts and how could you – this is – GCC is a regional organisation, and regional organisation are based on rules, and if you don’t respect those rules, and you don’t follow them and act outside those rules, you will lose confidence and people have lost confidence, not only in Qatar, which is being subjected to this blockade, but also, on other countries and also, amongst the business people. How can they trust a GCC that can suddenly erupt like this and come up with a, you know, with a policy that changes everything that they have signed and everything they’ve agreed upon? So – and also, we’ve lost credibility and trust with our international partners, like the EU.
For example, the EU and the GCC were having a group-to-group dialogue, no longer is the case. The EU is now talking to each country individually, like if the GCC doesn’t exist. So it is a very serious issue and I don’t think this has been taken into consideration, when this crisis erupted. They did not know how the – what implication it’s going to have on the whole region.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
Just a quick anecdote on this, picking up from what Abdullah actually finished. Let’s take the European Union, I mean, does every country, in the European Union, have, to an extent, its foreign policy, it’s own foreign policy, yes. Is there this degree of independence? Yes, but then, collectively speaking, are there certain committees and institutions that are working together? Yes. So, despite all the challenges that the Europeans are going through, almost the vast majority believes that a world with the EU is better than one without the EU, and likewise, in our region, we still believe Qatar has been subjected to this illegal blockade. Yet, we still believe that a region with the GCC is better than a region without the GCC. Yet, having said that, I think that the very charter of this GCC needs to be revisited and the institutions need to be reconstructed again. Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. We have a question down here. Yes, thank you. Just wait for the microphone, and I see another hand down there.
Meitrish Danika
Thanking you. I – Meitrish Danika, I’m from Reuters news. I have a follow-up question for Miss Lolwah from the Foreign Ministry. When you spoke, you said that the development of the past two weeks and the killing of Khashoggi should serve as the wake-up call. Could you elaborate a little bit who should be walking up to the call and what exactly people should realise, as a result of this development? Are you referring specifically to Mohammed bin Salman policies and the western attitude towards them or it’s just more, a broader statement? Thank you.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much and there’s a gentleman down in the middle here with his hand, and there we go. Thank you.
Joseph Gabone
And hello. Joseph Gabone, Chatham House. You talked about redrawing the maps and you mentioned Qatar and you mentioned perhaps, Oman. I wonder, with the current situation you’re talking about and with the fears within the Royal – the Saudi Royal Family, is there any talk about the maps for that part of the world, as in Saudi Arabia?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Anyway not to take that question, you want to take this other question. I don’t know.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
And I’m just thinking about my colleagues as well like, the rest of us, yeah.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sure, yeah, and we will.
Helen Lackner
About the maps?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Please, the maps will be great.
Helen Lackner
Well, very quickly, there is what appears to be at least a step towards redrawing maps in the Eastern region of Yemen, with the al-Mahrah Government, where there have recently been serious clashes between the locals and some Saudi forces. The Mahrathi Forces have been turfed out and, you know, there are apparently, beginnings of the building of a pipeline that would go to the Indian Ocean. So, this could be regarded as a potential step towards the map redrawing, though I think many of us would hope that it’s not the case but, you know, if you talk about dismemberment of Yemen, that’s one option. You could then, you know, if you look at history, you can then have the North with Asir and Jizan, I mean, one can go into a number of fantasies ,which are, I think, largely undesirable, so I won’t continue.
Dr Courtney Freer
Well, in terms of, I guess, the effect of Jamal Khashoggi’s death, I mean, I think what’s interesting is, looking at some of the early reactions out of Saudi, Twitter and Press, was that this was a Qatari/Turkish conspiracy to disappear Jamal initially. And the fact that that story was circulated throughout the internet, initially, it just shows the extent to which this rift does still exist and is still very much in evidence and not likely to change too much, in the fact that that’s happening, kind of, with GCC member states accusing the others of, I guess – I don’t know what they were trying to suggest had happened to Jamal, but the fact that that was even bandied about, I think it shows the extent of the rift and the extent to which it’s not likely to be settled anytime soon. But as far as what should happen and reactions, I’ll leave that to my colleagues.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
Do you want me to answer…
Dr Neil Quilliam
Please.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
…that difficult question?
Dr Neil Quilliam
That’ll be nice.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
And I’ll be brave and do that. I think, if I understood it correctly, Saudi Arabia is a very important country to the whole region and to the Middle East, but also, beyond that. The stability and security and prosperity of Saudi Arabia is important for everybody and it is basically, the core of the whole GCC and also, you know, given its role in the Arab and the Islamic world, it’s very important that, you know, we all wish the best to Saudi Arabia and we hope that it, you know, it continues the way it is, in a, you know, in terms of being the locomotive of the GCC, pushing the integration forward. But at the same time, we don’t see that happening, you know, because of the crisis, because of some of the, you know, the new policies that has come up ,and it’s regrettable to see that, because no-one really wants to see any problems or any issues that can affect Saudi Arabia. So, we do hope that it will continue and stay as one solid state that can bring the whole region together in a much co-operative way and bring the whole GCC together. But I think there is need – there needs to be some kind of a change, in terms of how it deals with the smaller Gulf States, and gives room to everybody to function. But I will end up with – and have independent foreign policy, within a certain framework, because each country has its own different strategic calculations.
But I will end up also, if I may, on this, with what happened to Jamal and it’s a wake-up call. It is a wake-up call. As a Member of the GCC, as someone who comes from the region and sometimes speak my mind a little bit more than other people, we are scared at what is going on. If this is going to happen to someone who doesn’t really oppose the Government, just a simple Journalist that can be critical sometimes about his own Government and some of its policies. If it could happen to someone like that, it could happen to any of us, and this is not just one isolated case. There are a lot of people who have been locked-up in some of the other GCC States as well. So, the political space has really been closing down on people to talk and speak their mind and – but whether it’s academics, whether they’re researchers or whether they’re media people or whatever. So, I think this is a wake-up call for all of us to say, well, enough is enough, you know, and we need the region to go back to where it was, where at least there was some space for people to air their views and their ideas, without having to fear for their lives. That’s all there.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you for saying that, Abdullah, and that – I mean, I think that’s a very, very important point and I think that took courage to say that and certainly, on a livestream as well, so really appreciate you making that point. Thank you very much. Courtney, I have a question for you. In my conversations with officials from Saudi Arabia and from the Emirates, I’ve often, sort of, probed away in talking about, you know, Qatar’s foreign policy and they’ve always argued, quite consistently, that we’re not against Qatar having an independent foreign policy, as we’re not – and they point to Kuwait and I point to Oman as having an independent foreign policy. But they then caveat that by saying, but the groups that they support because of the ideology, operate, you know, in the inimical interests directly against Saudi and Qatari interests in the region and in the countries. How do you square that with your, sort of, non-ideological foreign policy?
Dr Courtney Freer
Hmmm. Well, I think, really, if you look at groups that Qatar has supported, they’re not all of one ideological stream, so that’s kind of one way of looking at it. And I think, looking at domestic experiences with the Brotherhood, as I do in my book, Rentier Islamism, which I had to – forgotten to plug earlier, but in any case, I mean, I think if you look at the experiences, in these countries, it does inform their opinions on how dangerous they are in the region. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE for instance, Brotherhood movements were linked to movements for political reform and so, I think that makes them believe that they are fundamentally destabilising elements, necessarily in other parts of the world. And so I think that they think that Qatari support, or at least openness to engaging with Islamists will lead to, kind of, destabilisation more broadly. And I think also, that there is this fear of, kind of, transnationalism, that the Brotherhood is this transnational organisation and, you know, wants to destroy the nation state and create a caliphate and of course, the early Brotherhood tracks do use the word ‘caliphate’, which is unfortunate for us today, but I mean, this is not a policy point. This is not a goal of Brotherhood movements locally today and hasn’t been for, I guess, ever really. But I think there is this fear of transnationalism and fear that they could have power across borders and that supporting them from abroad kind of forms that transnational network, and I think that that transnational network doesn’t really exist. It exists, in terms of, kind of, personal ties and more so than any kind of structural organisation.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, thank you.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
May I comment on that? Because we often hear these arguments and I would like to, kind of, challenge this argument and deconstruct it by giving examples. I won’t defend Qatar’s position. I would like to test the validity of these arguments. Do we all recall when, you know, the Crown Prince of Saudi met LSF Party a few months ago. LSF Party just like, you know, mentioned by Helen is supposedly an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood. How does this work with this narrative, of them being so worried about any Muslim Brotherhood affiliate groups? How does this work with their narrative and rhetoric about Islamism? They support their own groups of Islamism as well, so I would like to challenge that very argument.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Okay, thank you very much.
Helen Lackner
I was going to say, if you look back in history, the Saudis were sponsoring, I mean, all these Egyptian Teachers you were talking about in Qatar and certainly in Yemen, 1,000s of them were all selected as being brothers and suchlike and they were financed by the Saudi Kingdom and that, so we’re talking about the 80s and 90s.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
Until very recently.
Helen Lackner
Yeah, yes.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. I will take two more questions and if – then I’ll ask the panel to, sort of, address parts of that or maybe just give us like a 30-second wrap-up ‘cause we’ve just got a few more minutes left. There’s a hand right over at the back there I can just see. The gentleman without the tie. Thank you.
Muhammed Habib
Hi, Muhammed Habib from ABCO. Question to Lolwah. You mentioned that you’re looking to the East for relationships now, building stronger relationships. What about other Arab countries that are not part of the GCC, has any relationships improved there and do you find that they have to choose either between you or Saudi?
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, and then this gentleman down here. Thank you.
Ghassan Ibrahim
Your excellency…
Dr Neil Quilliam
Sorry, can you just wait for the microphone. Thank you very much, and introduce yourself.
Ghassan Ibrahim
Yeah, my name is Ghassan Ibrahim, Journalist. Your Excellency, you mentioned that Qatar never sent soldiers to Yemen, but Qatar News Agency several time mentioned several soldiers, Qatari soldiers died in Yemen.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
No, this is inaccurate. Qatari sol – troops, soldiers never entered Yemeni soil. They’ve been at the borders of Saudi and Yemen and this is 100% accurate.
Ghassan Ibrahim
Okay, the question, now the question is, does Qatar have strategic policy or is just tactical? Once you’re aware with this order against that Houthis, now you are giving them big platform. In Syria, used to support or you support Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nusra, another type of Islamist as well, to fight Iranian militias, now you are the best of friend with Yemen. Do you have really, a strategic policy in the region? Thank you.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
So these – once again, many questions in one question, so let me, kind of, spell it out and unpack it for everyone. I think you made many statements that I would completely disagree with. The role that Qatar played in many countries, such as with the Houthis, was a mediating goal, so I think this is to be actually appreciated, rather than condemned. When it comes to, you know, the relations between Qatar and Iran, I mean, once again, the relations between Qatar and Iran, believe me, they’re not very different from the relations between Qatar and any of the GCC countries. Just to give you an example, any relations between any two countries. I mean, let’s speak mythologically now beyond perceptions and clichés. It’s either militarily relations, it’s either politically, and it’s either economic relations. Militarily, there is zero, nothing. Politically, well, we restored the diplomatic relations, which would – which we did cut off for the sake of Saudi that blockaded us and it was actually Iran that gave us access.
Now the third point, this is the most important point, please focus on it, the economic relations. The only passage Qatar has, as a result of this blockade, is through Iran. So it’s a relationship out of necessity. The question is, how does this relationship compare to our neighbour’s United Arab Emirates? 90% of the G – of the trade between Iran and the GCC is dominated by United Arab Emirates. According to Iranian statistics, UAE used to be, until last year, the second partner, economically speaking to Iran after China and today, it is the third partner. So, if anything, I think this question needs to be directed to our neighbours, rather than, you know, directed to us. There was a question…
Dr Neil Quilliam
There was another question.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
There was another question.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Yes.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
Sorry, I cannot recall the question, sorry.
Muhammed Habib
It’s about relationships with other Arab countries.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
No, absolutely. I mean, the relationship between Qatar and many other Arab countries, especially when it comes to food security, for example, are developing, you know, beyond the unfortunately, the three or the four blockading countries, I think our relations are just excellent and they’re developing with Jordan, for example, even though Jordan, you know, reduces, you know, the diplomatic ties during its crisis, Qatar actually, you know, announced aid to Jordan. 10,000 Jordanians are going to come to Qatar for jobs, as a matter of fact, despite the blockade. Two, 200,000 Egyptians are currently living in Qatar, still working, that our brothers were having, I think, beyond excellent relations with many Arab countries.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you, Lolwah. 30 seconds each, do you have – what are your sort of concluding points, Helen?
Helen Lackner
Well, I think the main concluding points, I think I would like to say is, I don’t want anybody to think that I was in favour of the blockade, when I was saying that it had, had some positive side effects. I think I regret, unfortunately, that I have to agree with Abdullah about the current state of the GCC, because I think for Yemenis, in particular, they were looking forward to the days when the GCC would allow them to come and work there. Thanks. I think that’s my 30 seconds.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you. Courtney?
Dr Courtney Freer
Yeah, I guess, I would stress again the extent to which ideology’s overplayed as a driving point for a lot of foreign policy. If we look back, just as recently as 2015, I believe it was a Saudi Foreign Minister who said, “We have no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood,” and today, of course, things have shifted quite drastically and there’s this idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is this terrible terrorist group and is, for some reason, linked to Qatar. And so, I think that this is more about power, it’s about the redrawing the map, things of that nature, more so than about ideology.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. Abdullah, and one thing you did say, and you mentioned like maybe another, an after quake or another earthquake coming. I don’t know whether you want to touch on that or you have something specific you want to say, but – but that was a very, sort of, poignant intervention you made.
Dr Abdullah Baabood
Well, the circumstances that created the Arab Spring, in the first place, have not gone. The fundamental reasons for it are still there, you know, corruption, mismanagement of resources, autocratic authoritarian regimes, etc., and the development model hasn’t worked. So, you know, sooner or later, this is going to come back to haunt us. People are going to ask for jobs and asking for opportunities and young people are increasing in the Middle East. So you cannot keep everything under the lid. It’s going to come back to haunt us, but I – what I want to say also, is that the region has had enough, it’s enough than its own share of crisis.
The leaders in these countries in the region, but also, the global partners need to stop meddling in the region and help the region to get together to work to overcome this crisis. We live in a neighbourhood that is, you know, quite hard and it’s quite difficult and this kind of competition, hegemonic competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, is not going to work. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia is going to be able to have a total hegemony of the regions. All the Gulf States, the smaller Gulf States will try and find ways to work and balance out each other.
Now, the best thing is, for the whole region is to think beyond conflicts and confrontation and to learn a few things from other regions in the world, particularly here in Europe and to see how can we move forward? How can we bring Yemen into some kind of regional integration project, and how can we bring other countries, but also, think the unthinkable and how can we engage with Iran? Iran is a neighbouring country and we’re not doomed to have conflict with Iran. We have issue with Iran, yes. We have issues and some policies with Iran, yeah, but I think the region has to think beyond that for the future of humanity.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much, Abdullah.
HE Lolwah R. M. Al-Khater
It’s just left to say that there is a need to have a new kind of security pact, understanding. I mean, we don’t even agree on our very threat perception, as the blockading countries themselves don’t agree on that. We really need to start a regional dialogue to, kind of, set our priorities, our threat perceptions, and accordingly, come up with a new – some sort of a security pact that would work for all. We don’t necessarily need to agree on every single issue, but let us agree on the priorities.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Thank you very much. I mean, I would love to take that further and ask what role internationals might play and what role the US might play, but I want to congratulate you and the audience, we haven’t mentioned President Trump once in that whole hour, and I think that’s the first meeting I’ve ever chaired like that. If you could join me in thanking our panellists, thank you very much [applause].
