Russia invades Ukraine

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, welcome, everybody, to this members’ event on Russia Invades Ukraine. We’re delighted to be able to see you here, although it’s such a worrying time. My name is Patricia Lewis. I’m the Research Director at Chatham House for Conflict, Science and [audio cuts out – 02:07]. Before we start, there’s some housekeeping I’d just like to introduce. First of all, this meeting is on the record. Please do tweet and communicate this information out there as much as you can, under CHEvents, #CHEvents. We have a Q&A box, so please say in your questions that you want to pose, please say if you want me to read out the question or whether you would like to say – speak it yourself. We can unmute you. And we’re also keeping the ‘chat’ box open so that you can make comments, in addition to questions, and maybe have a discussion amongst yourself and make it as interactive as we possibly can.

We don’t have much time, and this is a very fastmoving situation, so I’m going to turn straight to our speakers. We’re very fortunate to have three of our Chatham House experts to speak with us today. So, first up, I want to talk – I want to turn to Orysia Lutsevych, who’s the Head and Research Fellow for our Ukraine Forum at Chatham House. Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much, Patricia. Thanks for joining us in these, indeed, very disturbing and dark times for Europe. As we are convening here today, there are already fights on the outskirts of Kyiv, with Russian Paratroopers trying to take over positions, you know what – in what is a full-fledged assault on the capital of Ukraine. And my colleague, Mathieu, will talk about the – what it means militarily and strategically, but I’ll just say that the way Ukraine sees it, Kyiv sees it and Ukrainian citizens see it, that the world is observing from the sidelines. You – we – Ukrainians who are quite sombre ahead of these escalations, always understanding, where the majority of the population understood that they will have to put up the fight against the quite aggressive revonsist [means revisionist] and brutal Russian aggression, but they also counted on much more support and assistance that will be delivered, other than “putting boots on the ground,” as it was said. That is not an option from the very beginning.

So, Russia attacked Ukraine and from yesterday, we already have 56 people dead, 169 wounded. They are targeting, also, civilian infrastructure, the hospitals were targeted. So, I think it’s very important to ask ourself the question, taking into account Western response to now, what is the risk of no support, no resolute support, Kyiv falling and Ukraine falling for all of us on the European Continent? And number one, obvious, we will strengthen quite aggressive revisionist Russia. We will create humanitarian disaster in Europe. There will be a zone of chaos and instability right here. There will be massive disillusionment with the West, that the West was not standing to defend what is an emerging democracy in the – in Eastern Europe and what is, I saying, start of an encroachment on Eastern Europe itself and Eastern flank of NATO.

I mean, Putin is a fan of geopolitics. I’m sure he knows Mackinder’s theory, why Central Europe is viewed as the gate to Europe. It’s no wonder, then, the history of Ukraine by Serhii Plokhy is entitled exactly like that. So, what’s Putin after? He’s after shutting the door to the Eurasian Continent by taking control over this territory. This is nothing to do with Russia security concerns, it’s about the territorial grab.

Now, the response has been, so far, mild, lukewarm and here is a few pointers that I would like to make specifically on assisting Ukraine, because I think this should be our first preoccupation, how to assist the victim and how to inflict cost on the aggressor. So, on the Ukrainian side, Ukrainians are actually demanding setting up immediately the International Fund for Defence of Ukraine, that will open credit lines to procure necessary armament to defend Ukraine. There has to be assistance, that Mathieu will talk about for the military, but also humanitarian assistance. We have to be thinking about airlifts and land bridges that we will be able to ensure civilians and not be taken again by surprise. Ukrainians will be putting up a fight. How long I cannot tell you, but the country cannot be subjugated easily, and this is very clear.

Now, on the Russian sanction side, we need much harsher sanctions and I’m saying that because Putin is after Kyiv. He’s not after Eastern Ukraine. He’s not after even land bridge to Crimea. He is after installing a pro-Russian Government, not even government. He is after installing military regime in the capital of Kyiv that will control the country. So, we need a Russian freeze on Central Bank, all of its assets. There has to be a sanction on Russian military industrial complex, including companies that are supplying to those companies. Russian indexes has to be taken out of composite indexes of J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch. There has to be a restriction on ruble clearing and sanctions of all oligarchs who are not publicly declaring their disagreements, like many Russians people did declare yesterday, protestings on the street of Moscow and St Petersburg.

I will finish by saying that Ukrainians are dying, and I will tell you one reason why they see the purpose of these purposeless deaths. That is to put an end to Putin and that should be our geostrategic objective, to play on the crippling of the Russian imperialism and what led to this conflict is not, again, NATO enlargement or what Ukraine did. What learn – what led to it is a U-turn in Russia, and if you don’t believe me, listen to what Andrei Kozyrev, Garry Kasparov and Navalny are saying, what led to this war is a U-turn in Russia, where the top leadership comes from the uncovered KJB affairs by very dangerous people, with nuclear weapons, ready to use very devastating airstrikes against peaceful cities in the centre of Europe. I’ll stop here, thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, Orysia, thank you very much. I’m next going to turn to Mathieu Boulègue, who is a Research Fellow in Russia-Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Mathieu, you’re going to talk to us a bit more about the military situation and the Ukraine response, so over to you.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Patricia, and I wish we didn’t have to make such an event today, but we had the warnings. We failed to see them and we ignored them and there we are. This is Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Where we are militarily now, fights have been engaged in a lot of Ukrainian cities. Kharkiv is now highly contested. We’ve seen troops potentially move in into Kyiv at this moment and Paratroopers landing around Kyiv, so the – we are going to be seeing the battle for Kyiv, which has started in a way, with the airstrikes that started yesterday, landing Paratroopers and now, reportedly, troops moving in, which it has not been confirmed.

What this means, this acceleration of the sort of takeover of Kyiv is the fact that Russia’s accelerating the pace of its intervention. Kyiv, as a sort of, tactical takeover, would not have taken place if it hadn’t been for the heavy resistance of Ukrainian forces. So, it is taking place sooner because of Ukrainian resistance. It is, of course, a political strategic goal right now to go into the political decapitation of the civilian leadership in Kyiv, to occupy the country and create a bargaining chip to implement the demands, and the demands are basically the uncompromising political military surrender of Ukraine and further to the complete demilitarisation and dismantlement of the country. So, what we are seeing now is, basically, the first phase of a wider conflict, the timeline of which has been accelerated because of said Ukrainian resistance and the second phase could be, and will probably be, a sort of, follow-on ground invasion.

Now, I could be spending a lot of time looking at the doom of the conflict, but I actually want to look at the Russian limits, because there are a lot of limiting factors to Russia’s intervention. They are not all powerful and should not be considered all powerful, first, once again, because there is heavy Ukrainian resistance. They are successfully slowing down the Russian offensive on all the axis of advances and maybe less so from the Crimea Peninsula, but they are, basically, slowing down the in – what seems to be an inevitable takeover. So, this something remarkable as such.

Another point is that the aerospace forces of Russia are taking a lot of damage, because the air defence systems of Ukraine are holding, because Russia has a hard time establishing air superiority, and because Ukrainian is putting up a lot of fight, in terms of counter-contesting the aerial environment. Also, there is a Russian failure at this stage to cripple the command and control of Ukraine, which will allow Ukrainian force integrate more successfully on preparing a counter-offensive, but I will talk about it later.

The second, sort of, a limiting factor, from a military point of view, is morale and will to fight on the side of Russia. Don’t get me wrong, Ukrainians, as my colleague, Orysia said, will fight. They will fight and they will die until the end. On the other side, I would doubt, very much, the complete motivation and morale of Ukrainian troops. We’ve seen a lot of reports and unconfirmed reports, but still, a lot of information coming in from the Russian line, that they are forcing conscripts to sign contracts at the very border, to be fighting against Ukrainians, instead of just doing support operations. They are asked to go fight against Ukrainians and there’s apparently a lot of problem concerning morale, which will lead to mistakes, which will lead to tactical errors made by the Russian command. So, I see a more desperate Russia to win quickly than a completely self-assured Russia that will take over Ukraine in the coming days. So, this is something that should also be amplified in our narrative, Russia is not the all-powerful enemy we think it is.

The problem now is two things. There will be a massive onslaught of the Russian forces as the second phase unfolds, the sort of, land-ground invasion that will follow on in a few days, only if and when, and after, Kyiv has fallen, unfortunately, which will leave enough time for Ukrainian forces to mount a counter-offensive. Together with territorial defence units, with other forces, they will be able to mount a counter-offensive that will meet Russian forces as they move forwards across these three more strategic directions across Ukrainian territory. This will redraw the map of Ukraine. This will be the new military map of Ukraine, but this is where Ukrainians, at the moment, trying to regroup and retake the initiative, to mobilise and regroup and make sure that the cost of an occupation is tremendous. So, we will slowly turn from active warfare to more counter-insurrection, urban warfare or, sort of, counter-occupation warfare.

So, the cost of invasion will be high for Russia, and this is also important to assess. But what is sure is that this new military geography is yet undetermined. Your guess is as good as mine when trying to understand where this new border will be. Could be across the Dnieper, could be across several other cities, there’s no knowing at this stage. But all these limiting factors: Ukrainian resistance, Russian morale and our response, which I know my colleague, Katya, will discuss, as well, are very limiting and constraining factors for the Kremlin.

And the last point is that mistakes will be made from the Russian side and tactical errors will be made, which means they might be losing more battles than necessary. So, there is still a chance that this is not a done game, this is not a done deal, and so, this is important to remember, as well. Thank you very much.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, Mathieu, this is a very fast-changing situation, as well, so, you know, as we speak, we may have to even update what you’re saying. But – and so, let’s now move to the final speaker in our brief presentation today, Kataryna Wolczuk, Katr – to – who’s going to address the issues of diplomacy and what we can do, in terms of what the West can do and the meaning for Europe. Kataryna.

Kataryna Wolczuk

Thank you very much indeed and thank you to Orysia and Mathieu for introducing, bringing us, sort of, the situation as of today. I will take a step back and talk about how did we get here and what does it mean for Europe, and the – one of the sort of, things about stocktaking, why diplo – why didn’t diplomacy work? And I think it’s important, because we are still talking about diplomacy as the way forward and I think we’ve seen enough to be able to draw lessons. Diplomacy didn’t work because it could not work, in terms of, actually, demands vis-à-vis Ukraine and the West were such that they could not be met, sort of, in peaceful times.

So, what we’ve seen the Russian strategy is conditional acceptance of sovereignty of the post-Soviet states. They can exist as independent states only insofar if they are subordinated and controlled by Russia. Whatever form it takes, whether it takes – it’s Belarus, Armenia, and the perception in general that from that point of view, that Russia has very high stakes in Ukraine and the perception that, almost, Russia cares too much, and the West doesn’t care enough. And Russia has been waiting for that, you know, for Ukraine to become disillusioned with the West and they’ve decided to accelerate, to fast forward that disillusionment with the West by showing boots on the ground, who cares about Ukraine?

And this is – goes far beyond Ukraine. It is not only about Russia, but what we are seeing, and I would like to draw on Merkel’s words about “Putin living in a parallel universe, in a different universe,” Russia is taking us to a different universe, the one for which we have no language and for which we still have no, basically, we have no experience. What we’ve seen so far is what I call the feudal pre-modern regime, superlistic regime we’ve seen in Russia and this is their aim, basically. They’re clients or they’re enemies. Those are two categories and it’s turning Ukraine from the perceived enemy, into a faithful client and what we talk, it’s about ritualistic politics, about bringing Ukraine – the Ukrainian leaders – leadership, either the current or new puppet, sort of, regime, to plea for forgiveness and to pledge loyalty. So, from that point of view, we are not used – we don’t have the language and we still talk about diplomacy where we know that there’s no diplomacy, and as one of our colleagues at Chatham House said, “It’s dic-diplomacy and it’s diktat by tanks.”

So, we have the situation what has not been achieved by – in The Donbas, now this is applied to the whole of Ukraine, and this is not something which is going to go away, and you know, despite all the coverage of the protests in Russia, from my point of view, when reading the Russian opinions, it is the sense of fatalist, historical fatalist, that this is it and what can we do?

So, Russia is where it is. The aims are – but now let’s move to the West, because to what extent – one of the questions is to what extent it represents a failure? And insofar, especially as Germany is concerned, I mean, it represents a spectacular failure and what the Ukrainians are surprised, but it’s not just the Ukrainians, we are talking about Moldovans, Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, people in the post-Soviet countries looking at the West and, basically, wondering what’s the point with developing linkages and integration with the West if this is what you are left with?

And so, this is the issue of sanctions being very, very important, but they were factored in and they’re not sufficient. It is asymmetric, because our sanctions will bite in weeks and months. Ukraine is counting its time, in terms of hours, not even days. So, from that point of view, it’s really – and perhaps I may have missed something, perhaps I’m wrong, that there is a lot of covert, basically, help to defend Ukraine, but the Ukrainians don’t know about this and it doesn’t seem to be effective so far. So, we have a real asymmetry, in terms of the onslaught versus defensive assistance.

And from that point of view, we also can see that – perhaps that’s my final point at this stage, I mean, in terms of stocktaking, and I would like to use the new concept, which is solidarization of the West. In terms of us relying on economic links with Russia that it converts into political leverage and influence, we know that it has been a one-way street. Russia has influenced us and the West has not been able to influence Russia. So, what we see, it is this – really, the costs for us are higher than they are for the Russian regime for the time being, at least, and from that point of view, the time is in favour of Russia. We have the end, as it is, unless something changes, of EU’s Eastern policy and the, basically, demise of the soft multilateral institutions in Europe, in terms of the Council of Europe and the oversea.

So, this is the situation we have at the moment. So, Ukraine is not just Ukraine. It is a much broader challenge and for Ukraine, the final point is perhaps it is just not capitulation, it’s not demilitarisation. What we’ll be seeing is a rolling list of demands that Ukraine will have to meet. So, it’s diplomacy by tanks, this is what we have now, and I will stop here, thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you very much, indeed, Kataryna. I’m sorry for mispronouncing your first name, as well as your family name. So, I’ve got some great questions here. There’s an awful lot of them, as you might imagine. I’m going to try and take them and group them a bit together. So, there’s a – there’s quite a bit on the military side of things and I wonder if perhaps we could take a question from, I think it’s David Shofield [means Schofield], if he’s there, if that’s possible to unmute you, David?

David Schofield

Yes, indeed, thank you, David Schofield speaking. Thank you all for the excellent summary in such a short time. My question is, do you think that Ukraine could be Putin’s Afghanistan? In other words, as the Soviet leaders did at the end of the 1970s, is Putin now, potentially, biting off more than he can chew? And picking up Mathieu’s point about the limits on Putin’s power, might this contribute, in due course, to his downfall, combined, perhaps, with some resistance within Russia?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Sorry, I was going to, also, read out Alanna McLaren’s question, as well, to add into that, it’s, “How credible is the nuclear threat from Putin and will the perception of this threat lead to the West to sacrifice Ukraine by not intervening militarily?” So, perhaps if you could start with those two questions. I’ll start with you, Mathieu. If anyone else wants to jump in, let me know and put – by putting your hand up, thank you.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Patricia. I’d actually dodged a bullet on the nuclear one, ‘cause I think you’re the best-placed person to answer it, but just, you know, on that front, we’ve seen Putin himself toy around with the nuclear threshold and rhetoric that, you know, a Western – any Western response would be met with all options possible. We’ve seen the con – Russian conducting a Grom nuclear readiness check exercise since last Saturday, so we are evolving, as Katya said, in a completely different mental space when it comes to actual deterrents. We make – which makes the cost of entry into this conflict, from a Western perspective, extremely high, in terms of potential escalation.

On the new Afghanistan, it’s actually a very interesting comparison. It’s too early to say, because what we are – hear is, “Ah, it’s the initial period of war,” the first critical fait accompli creating situation in the 24/48/72 first hours, which have been accelerated once again. The timeline is accelerating because of the Ukrainian resistance and the hardships on the ground for the Russian Army, but this is just the very start of the tip of the iceberg of a massive and much wider onslaught, when Russia will have exhausted most of their precision guided munitions and will start doing indiscriminate, blind carpet bombing against Ukrainian targets and this is when “the real war,” in a way, will start. So, it is too early to say whether this will be a quagmire for the Russian forces moving in and what this new geography will look like.

Afghanistan, as a comparison, in terms of urban warfare and counter-insurrection warfare, yes, but this has already been factored in by the general staff. They have not entered into a war without a clear war termination strategy and part of that war termination strategy has to do with counter-insurrection warfare. Of course, Russian troops have moved in knowing they would have to hold that territory, seize it, keep it and make sure they can keep capturing it. It’s relatively easy to capture a territory. The hard part is to keep it and make sure you really secure it, in a way, which is why you have a lot of Paratroopers, you have a lot of Chechen forces, for instance, moving in with all the brutality that we know of them, just as much as you have private military companies, whose job will be to conduct the most gruesome operations, in terms of warfighting. So, it is yet too early to say, but this – and this is definitely an interesting parallel that will have to be watched.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks very much, indeed, Mathieu, and on the nuclear side, I mean, I think there’s been quite a few of us for quite a long time who’ve been saying that, you know, the nuclear deterrents equation doesn’t add up, in that the way in which the Western nuclear weapons possessors see nuclear weapons is in retaliation to a nuclear attack, and quite rightly, but others see it quite differently. And so, the deterrents equation has been unbalanced for quite a while and, indeed, one would argue hasn’t worked at all, and doesn’t work. Convent – deterrents has to be credible in the first place and the overreliance on nuclear weapons in our defence strategies has probably been a big mistake, and if it’s going to teach us anything, I hope it will help us understand that.

I’d like to turn to the issue of diplomacy, but Kataryna talked a lot about, you know, the limits and the failure of diplomacy and Stephen Porter has a question that I’d like him to ask and, also, Kieran O’Meara as well, in terms of the potential for UN resolution. So, if I could go – turn to both of those, please.

Stephen Porter

Hello, yes, it’s Stephen Porter. I’d like to ask, doesn’t Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine represent a massive failure of Western diplomacy and a failure of NATO’s security strategy, and didn’t both Margaret Thatcher and Henry Kissinger warn against ignoring Russia’s historic paranoia after the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact?

Dr Patricia Lewis

[Pause] Thank you. Kieran, if you could ask your question, please [pause]. Can you unmute yourself, Kieran? Is that possible for you to do. Are we able to unmute Kieran? Oh, okay, so, let me find your question, Kieran. So, you’re asking about – I think what you’re asking about is moves at the moment, in terms of the content of a potential resolution in the Security Council and the way in which Russia can use their veto. But there’s also, you know, the possibility of doing things through the General Assembly, which of course, has a very different approach and indeed, uniting for peace and all of that would mean for the UN Charter. So, I wonder who wants to take that. I’m going to start with you, Kataryna and – sorry, and just see if we can, sort of, see if there are any potential moves ahead, in terms of UN diplomacy and other forms of diplomacy that might be able to take us further.

Kataryna Wolczuk

There is plenty of scope for multilaterals and diplomatic fora and initiatives. From that point of view, the UN is a splendid one. Obviously, because of Russian veto is a very difficult one to use, but nevertheless, there should be, really, a diplomatic assault, sort of offensive, in the UN. It’s very important to ensure that the Russian narrative and perspective is not accepted by other EU Member States. And it’s very important, it’s just not about going along what Russia does, but it’s actually about the credibility of the West and from that point of view, the NATO narrative, which is shared by so many people, that we’ve neglected Russia and Ukraine is attacked because of NATO, I think that needs to be – I can come back to this in a moment. But – so, the UN and the Council of Europe, oh, we have no options. The UK was instrumental in allowing Russia back to the Council of Europe a couple of years ago. The UK, Germany and France, basically, unconditionally allowed Russia because it paid its membership fees and they were too important. That’s a splendid example of solidarization of the West when we take Russian money and the leverage that it comes with it.

So, we have the UN, we have the Council of Europe, we have the OSCE. One of the things that we know, the sort of, monitoring missions have been spectacularly ineffective across the post-Soviet space, and this is something that we need to confront. Obviously, NATO cannot put boots on the ground, but there is nothing stopping NATO individual member states forming an informal coalition and doing its own, as France has done, you know, in Africa, its own missions. And this is extremely important, because this is symbolic. This is symbolic for member states of various multilateral organisations coming together and providing this assistance and as I say, it’s not only about containing Russia, but it’s also saving the reputation of the West, and this is as fundamental as that.

I will come back to NATO, perhaps, later, because this needs to be tackled head-on, but I don’t want to monopolise our discussion now. Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you very much, indeed, Kataryna. Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thanks. I think we have to be very careful how we draft this diplomatic onslaught or diplomatic track in addition to what is going on at the moment. We haven’t been good at it, you know. What comes to mind to many people in the region is 2008 French deal that was brokered with Russia, that actually was broken on every count and since then, Georgian territorial integrity was further and further violated.

President Zelenskyy says, and I literally quote, “Russia will have to talk to us how to finish aggression. The sooner they start, the less losses there will be for Russia, of course for Ukraine.” So, it’s important, then, there is a channel open, and here I would like to say what is so important, because also, the fate of Ukraine right now, regardless how painful it is or how perhaps for some people is acceptable, is in Ukraine’s hands, which means that any diplomatic effort around Ukraine should be carefully crafted, together with Ukrainians, to account for losses of life that Ukrainian’s armed forces and civilians are taken today on the battlefield in Kyiv. This is key; Ukrainian Foreign Minister has proposed several initiative, the UN Security Council, plus Germany and Turkey, Budapest, I think it’s eight, East – basically, it’s Eastern Europe, new member states of NATO, Baltic States, Romania, they are seeking different platforms. President Zelenskyy said, “Putin is not picking up the phone,” so – and if Biden said that Russia is “a pariah state,” you know, it’s a different reality we’re dealing it.

So, I don’t have a recipe for how this diplomatic front must look like, but I must tell you that Ukraine should be at the heart of it and in close with consultation with Ukraine, this should be designed wisely.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks very much. So, we’ve had quite a lot of comments in the – and questions on the issue of NATO. I’m going to turn to some quite different views, I think. First of all, if I could turn to Audrey Wells, who’s asking a question about NATO membership and Russia, Audrey.

Audrey Wells

…all of you for your stimulating, informative answers. Is there anything that will stop Putin’s invasion and the bloodshed now, or perhaps a bit a late? Is it too late to invite Russia to join NATO, provided Putin stops military action and bearing in mind many members of NATO themselves have invaded other countries?

Dr Patricia Lewis

And I’d like to then turn to Balhazin el-Barachi, I really apologise for my pronunciation on your – of you name, who wants to talk about the issue of NATO expansion and how it might be viewed. And there’ve been quite a lot of questions and comments on this and so, I think it – if we could turn to Balhaladin, that would be great, thank you.

Balhazin el-Barachi

I, personally, see that there was a diplomatic failure in the expansion of NATO to Russian borders and this should not have been made without – with total disregard to the perceptions of Russia, which we already very well know of. And I think this question is really linked, also, to the necessity of changing the perception of Russia towards NATO and maybe even consider having it as a member, so that it does not feel this antagonism towards it from the Western world.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you very much and there’ve been other questions, as well, which I think we should throw into the mix and that is, you know, whether or not now we’re going to see, for example, Finland and Sweden applying to join NATO. And I know there’ve been many questions asked as to whether, in fact, what President Putin has done in this action is actually strengthened NATO and, you know, increased the likelihood of many other countries applying to join. So, if we could just have a look at that whole NATO question. We’ve seen a lot of discussion in the media on, you know, whether or not NATO expansion in the first place was part of this, or whether or not, in fact, it’s going to be the result of this. So, perhaps we could address those questions head-on. I know, Kataryna, you would want to do that. I think you mentioned that you wanted to talk with NATO, so I’ll start with you and then, I’ll make – I’ll go onto Mathieu and Orysia.

Kataryna Wolczuk

Thank you. In terms of NATO, and I would out – ask an alternative question, where would we be without NATO expansion? I mean, if someone who comes from Poland and who knows very well what’s happening in the Baltic three states, member states, where would we be? And if we look at NATO, this is the discussion that we’ve offended Russia by exposing the countries, which wanted to join NATO. They wanted to join for a reason, for a very strong historical reason, and they’re seeing this reason again and again. From the Polish perspective, what we see in Ukraine is September 1939. The Baltic countries are seeing the annexation of them by the Russian troops during the Second World War, as well. So, the historical reasons are very strong and there is no doubt that NATO – this offensive really, sort of, plays on these, sort of, anti-NATO sentiments across Europe.

So, the changing perception of NATO is, I’m afraid, is a strawman, because Ukraine and Georgia have not moved anywhere vis-à-vis the NATO since 2008. This has not been on the agenda. They have been saying it, “And so what?” Something that changed is in Russia and this is something that well, takes us, you know, on whose terms are we talking about Russia? On Russia’s terms, then we’re talking about NATO, or are we talking about the – who is in the Kremlin? And from that point of view, the rational argument about NATO enlargement or not, and looking at the Eastern flank, is far too weak to – at the moment, as it is, even with, basically, additional, sort of, troops. So, NATO is not a problem, it’s an excuse for this, basically, Iron Curtain, drawing it back between what is now Central Europe and the post-Soviet states.

And that’s a very different type of discussion and so, I would like, you know, NATO to be kept in perspective, especially where – when we are talking about the countries which, at the moment, are basically people in the Baltic Republics are – states are petrified of what’s going to happen to them, despite NATO membership.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks a lot, Kataryna. Mathieu.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Patricia. I’ll just echo what Katya said. This is an event about war in Europe. This is about Russian war against Ukraine and its citizens. We have children dying in orphanages. We have citizens being killed because of Russia’s folly. Let’s not talk about, you know, all these myths about Russia-NATO expansion. We have consequences to deal with and lessons to learn on our own complacency, of course, on what, should, may or should’ve been done regarding Russia. Whatever the situation is, we can’t rewrite the past. We can debate all we want about the expansion of NATO on the one hand and, you know, the expansion of Russian imperialism on the other one as much as we want. This is not changing the debate.

We cannot deter Russian world view. This a world view that has been honed by the trauma of the end of the Cold War, that has been fashioned by state propaganda for 20 years with Putinism, now. This is something that has been shaping foreign policymaking as creating excuses, creating pretexts. This is undeterrable. You can’t deter a world view, so we also need to change our narrative around what could and what should be done. If you still believe that we did not engage Russia back in the day to discuss the expansion of NATO, then you are a Russian troll and you fall victim to Russian propaganda.

We actually published a report about a few months ago on exactly this, the myths and misperceptions that we have in the West around the Russian debate, because Russia owns the Russian debate and they’ve been pouring information warfare activities against us to make sure we understand the world, according to how they want. A world of fear, a world of misconceptions, a world where might is right, which is contrary to what we believe in, what diplomacy is and what the international rules-based order should be, and the very fact that we are discussing accommodations to Russians’ interest, massaging Putin’s ego on an event where we have a war in Europe, is exactly it, people. We need a strong wakeup call, because civilians are dying as we speak. Kyiv is being taken by Russia. This is a fratricide and this a war in Europe that will have decades of consequences, not just under European Security Order, but on everyone onboard who believes democracy is still a thing.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, Mathieu. Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

I would like to say comment to all for bringing some members of our audience up to the Stockholm Syndrome. Let’s remember what this signifies and be very careful, and I would like to square us back to what could be done to help Ukraine and to shorten the tenure of Putin in office. I really believe this is the best geostrategic objective we all could have in the West, jointly with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, countries that are – and by the way, Belarusian opposition, I would like to also mention that the territory of annexed Belarus is being used for the military attack on the Kyiv capital today. This is the consequences of us closing the eyes on Putin grabbing territory, bite-by-bite, in Europe.

So, my proposition is the following, in addition to what I have already outlined. As we were speaking, the orphanage was hit by mortar fire, children are dying. These are war crimes, so today, the West has to set up an international commission that will monitor all war crimes performed from the start of new – because there’s already one chapter of Russian black book, from annexation of Crimea to what they’ve done in Donetsk. Now, they are using it to a bigger extent. So, war crimes must be reported and there is a very vibrant human rights community in Ukraine that was helping Belarusians to report their crimes. Now they’re on the case of what Russia does. They need funding.

A second one, we need to talk to Russian people about what Russia is doing. We have seen an array of protests. We should not be shy. You know, there’s a joke in Ukraine that all the Russian armies in Ukraine, Russians should raise up and there aren’t that many military left in Russia. So, let’s be honest and have a strategic communication to the Russian population about Putin’s game that is in not Russians’ national interest, but just purely, and there was a question about the endgame of Putin, purely serves the preservation of autocracy with the nuclear power in Europe.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks very much, indeed, and indeed, Nils Ameral is asking, “At what point is a – is there a threshold at which decision-makers in Western countries may decide that enough is enough? And I think that’s a really important question. I’m going to turn now to some questions that have come up about what the UK can do. So, Esther Naylor asks, you know, “What can the UK do, what are the specific things?” We’ve heard some of them earlier, but maybe some other discussions. We have Matthew Rosenstein talk about a ‘no-fly zone’, is that possible? We heard Ben Wallace this morning seemingly to rule that out. And if I could turn to Carl Wright, if he wishes to take the floor and talk about, you know, what impact this could have on alignment in policy post-Brexit, so Carl.

Carl Wright

Yes, thanks very much and good afternoon. I’m really looking a little bit forward in what’s going to be a brutal new geopolitics and wondering if these really – developments don’t really require the UK Government to start seriously aligning its foreign policy aims with the EU, not just some Russia sanction, which of course, is very critical and is happening to some extent, but more generally? So, I’m looking at the slightly longer-term consequences in reacting to, not just, obviously, Russia, in the first instance, but more generally, given the reluctance there has been post-Brexit to work more closely with the EU on foreign policy. Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks very much, indeed. So, this is taking, sort of, a specific British focus just in this round of questions, if people have anything they want to add on. I’m going to turn to you, Orysia, first, ‘cause I know that this is something that you’ve obviously been looking at.

Orysia Lutsevych

Well, we’ve been thinking and UK, honestly, has been one of the forefront of providing Ukraines with the defence weapons. From what I hear from the Ukrainian military experts, Ukraine is in deficit of armaments to combat airborne Paratroopers. They need stingers, sniper rifles, Javelins. They need much more to prevent Russian tactics and Mathieu can enlighten you on that. But we also need logistics, communication equipment, hospitals, evacuation, medical materials. There’s the list that is big.

An interesting question is whether UK could engage in responsive cyber. What could be done on the cyber part to retaliate, actually, Russian activities? We know there’s no problem of attribution at this moment who is an aggressor and I think, seriously, we should contemplate, I mean, what Kasa suggests, about peacekeeping or deployment – peacekeeping deployment to the part of Ukraine that is still peaceful, in order to place that further deterrents on Russian aggression. I know it’s a controversial issue, but I think if Ukraine falls, we’ll all have consequences that will cost us more than this taking – risk-taking today. Another option, and because we are talking about defence of Kyiv, could be sending a cargo aeroplane, accompanied by jem – by the jetfighters, to land in Boryspil today to provide all these armaments that are needed. Yes, it’s risky, but are we helping Ukraine to defend Ukrainians without putting boots on the ground? Here’s one option.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you very much. Anyone else got anything they want to add onto the UK’s position? Kataryna.

Kataryna Wolczuk

Yes, I would like to emphasise to what extent the UK has been a role model for many countries in Central Europe and Ukraine, as well. There was a bit of, sort of, dip on Monday this week about the weak sanctions and there is still more that can be done. But in terms of the rhetoric and in terms of actually understanding what’s happening, this has been unparalleled, especially when we compare with Germany and France, where really only yesterday, we could hear the words, which realistically described what was going on. So, the UK has really been exemplary from that point of view and there is so much that can be done, because the UK has this enormous experience of actually diplomacy and working and – at the international level, which many countries, which are prepared to, and happy to, support Ukraine lack. So, from that point of view, the leadership role from the UK is very much needed in Europe.

And with Germany and France, they are, sort of, in the waking up phase, it takes time. So, on the – so, from that point of view, insofar as can be nudged, and I’m quite concerned about this continuous, sort of, feeling that the economic costs for – have to be mitigated for Russia and especially when it comes to the SWIFT system. We need symbolism. We cannot have defence; we need symbolism, and it is one of those aspects.

And finally, the point – you know, some of the questions are about regional wars, this is normal, this is Europe, and I think this view of Ukraine being some kind of Russia’s Gabon still prevails and it’s actually very difficult to see what is going to change it, and if this doesn’t change, we certainly do not understand, many of us, the significance of what we are seeing in front of our eyes.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, Kataryna. Do you – Mathieu, do you want to add in, or shall I go onto the next question?

Mathieu Boulègue

Yeah, just very quickly on the no-fly zones, because this is something that comes back a lot and it’s – it would be, you know, a good idea. That looks extraordinarily hard to accomplish and sustain on paper. So, it’s a good idea on paper, that’s actually hard to do in reality, for several reasons. The first one is that you need to look credible and the more you look credible, the more it increases potential escalation against your then enemy, which would risk Russia turning the rhetoric that the, you know, United States, the UK, or anyone doing or attempting to do no-fly zones, is a co-combatant with Ukraine and, therefore, should be treated as such. So, that is also risking further escalation and I’m thinking about horizontal escalation to other theatres.

The other risk is that Russian air defence systems and air superiority assets are, sort of, sandwiching Ukraine, from Crimea in the South, occupying Crimea, of course, and Belarus in the North, occupied Belarus, in a way, ‘cause we’ve had, sort of, the, sort of, illegal occupation of Cri – of Belarus for the past few weeks now. And so, this will make accomplishing air superiority and achieving no-fly zones for any Western assets extraordinarily difficult to accomplish in reality. So, this is also something we need to calculate and accept the costs, potentially and the UK can’t do it alone. This would have to be a mission, either a coalition, if they’re willing, and – or ideally, a sort of, NATO mission. But if we declare a NATO operation over, you know, contested skies, then this completely changes the game and this is not something we are ready to go towards, of course.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks Mathieu. So, I’m going to now turn to two – we’ve got – we’re running out of time, of course, and we’ve had fantastic questions and comments in the ‘chat’ and in the Q&A. So, I’m going to, now, talk – turn to two issues. First, I’m going to ask us to address the long-term spill over effects. Basu Unar asked about, you know, the issue of multilateral treaties, UN negotiations, the International Space Station and all of the collaborative work, whether or not these would be impacted. Michael Roberts asked about Georgia and Moldova, which I think you’ve partly answered, but maybe want to address again. But a number of questions, Chris Vitali, Nicholas Hammond talked about China and what China might be learning from this, particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan.

And then, I’m going to turn to you, Catherine MacKenzie, if I could ask Catherine if she would like to unmute herself, to talk about the wider international narrative and particularly looking at how this is, sort of, playing out in the Global South. Catherine [pause]. Can you speak, Catherine? Yeah, that’s got – that’s…

Catherine MacKenzie

No, it would seem not, unless you can hear me now.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yes, we can.

Catherine MacKenzie

Oh, good, thank you. Yes, I had trouble logging in, in the first place. But, no, I was just struck this morning, there was a statement from the OAU, which was cautious, but it did specifically mention calling on the Russian Federation. So, there was that, not exactly blame, but even in naming them, they were – it was critical, but it was wary and a lot of the responses to this, particularly from various commentators in the Global South, especially within Africa, were more buying into the Russian narrative that this is – the Russian narrative of it being Russia versus NATO, Russia versus the US and “we, in Africa, should not be buying into the Western agenda.” And I’m not sure, there’s that issue of how we shift the narrative, firstly, at the state level, since various questions have been talking about potential UN action, but also at the sort of, public opinion level. Because it’s clear to me that there isn’t a fixed position either at the government or the public level, because frankly, this is a shock, it is an upheaval and currently, positions aren’t aligned.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you very much, indeed, Catherine and I’d like to, as well, remind everyone how Ambassador Martin Kimani, the Kenyan Ambassador at the UN, spoke earlier this week about this situation. So, if I could turn to our panel, I don’t know who wants to take these, sort of, longer-term spill over effects that you might want to address, and the way in which, you know, we need to align our policies somewhat more clearly. So, who would like to go first? Orysia, you’ve unmuted. I’ll give it you.

Orysia Lutsevych

Well, not on this one, but if I – if you’ve let – maybe, some of my co-panellists, will address it. But I’d like to take a narrative issue, because I think it’s very important and I think something we’ve mentioned, we point to a lot of origin of this inside Russia and I think Russia – you know, we have a delusional view of the collapsing empires. I mean, Russia is still collapsing, let’s be honest. That’s why Russia is so preoccupied by these territorial expansions, because it wants to protect its own core. Russia, deep down, if you really ask – if you have access to Naryshkin and the gang, they will tell you they are afraid for the disintegration of Russian Federation. Let’s be honest and tell what is the real threat of Russia. So – and Ukraine is a former colony of Russia, so I guess the neo – the post-colonial narrative would be very effective, and I do hope that there will be a solidarity, especially in Africa and Latin America and other places, about this narrative, because it is an anti-colonial struggle. In Ukraine, this view is war – this war is perceived as the war for independence, very clear, be or not to be. There’s no choice, Putin will not tolerate 50 shades of grey.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I’m not sure I want to go there, Orysia, in terms of 50 shades of grey. Mathieu, Kataryna.

Mathieu Boulègue

Very quickly, if I may. I’ll probably let Katya end on this, but I just want to remind what my colleague, [inaudible – 57:02], also posted, on listening to this – the – what the Kenyan representative at the UN said a few days ago, these, you know, these words of wisdom, “Sending a clear history lesson and civilisational lesson,” you know, and enlightening us into Putin himself, which I hope, of course, he will not have listened to. But this is, you know, this is the very situation where we are now. This is, you know, the – this is the force of right fighting against the force of evil, in a way, so, he has a very Star Warsy kind of outlook, but this is very much where we are now, in believing that we are fighting for what is right, in our ability to protect the rules-based order and not let it degenerate into a form of chaos that the constructive power of Russia seems to be so hellbent on going. And the way that we shape our response in the collective community, not just, you know, the West, as we call it in general, but everyone onboard who stands for these principles, will shape the way the future, you know, world is shaped as well. And we are also going to be giving a lot of lessons learnt to China when it comes to contesting, potentially, the rules-based order, as well.

So, what we do now with Russia, we will have to confront in a few years, decades, and we don’t know exactly when, against China and what we do in Europe with Russia, we will have to face on the other side of the world because of geography in the Pacific, because Russia is also territory – you know, a Pacific power, a small North Pacific regional power, of course, but it is very much present. So, our response now will be absolutely paramount and crucial to the shape of things to come, in a way. The world has changed yesterday and it’s up to us to retake the initiative as well. I won’t say take back control, because that would be too politically incorrect, but this is very much it.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Kataryna, do you have anything to add?

Kataryna Wolczuk

Final points? The discussion and based on some of the questions, brings it back something which an Editor of the Die Zeit from Germany wrote after the annexation of Crimea and occupations of Donbas. He talked about an “autoimmune of – autoimmune disease of the West.” Whenever there is problem, we actually accept and do soul searching and very, sort of, neurotic what went – what did we do wrong? And Ukraine what’s happening is not rocket science. Actually, it’s very straightforward, but it’s interesting that, actually, the strength of the West, the sort of, debate, free speech and, you know, this questioning just about everything, turns into a weakness, which is exploited. And Russia, with his sim – this simple narrative, actually shapes opinions amongst so many people in Europe and the Global South, so the anti-colonial empire destroying, this is what we are dealing with and that’s the best way. But it also means confronting our own sort of weaknesses that it’s Russia which saves the debate, the aggressor, and not the victim and where do we get our information from? And I’ll stop here.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, I’m not going to allow you all to stop now. I’m going to ask you to just spend the last minute or so each talking about Ukrainian resilience. So, we’ve had a question from Alastair Rabagliati, I’ve pronounced that probably wrongly, about the media and how Kyiv is still transmitting its media channels. And we haven’t had any discussion about cyberattacks, which really surprised me, but what is the resilience in Ukraine now, in terms of cyberattacks, given the long – the number of years in which they’ve been suffering with cyberattacks and coping with them? So, where’s the resilience in Ukraine and how can we draw some strength, perhaps, and some optimism from that?

Orysia Lutsevych

I’ll just bring two questions and then maybe Mathieu can take cyber and military. There are two very important sources of Ukrainian resilience and that is perseverance in the shadow of empires. The Russia Ottoman Empire from the East were the aggressive Poland for centuries. Ukrainians survived, that’s thanks to very strong national identity and idea of freedom, very strong. It comes across and that is a striking difference of political culture in Ukraine and Russia, that is the love for freedom. That freedom has been reflected, unlike some other values in Ukraine, in decentralisation, because yes, every country has wishes. You can look at Ukrainian public opinion poll. The trick is to make those wishes entrenched and multiplied in policy. Ukraine is decentralised country of very strong and proud cities and even if they take Kyiv, believe me, each city will be putting up a fight, because all Mayors in the cities, in big cities of Ukraine, were re-elected. They have high level of support, and this is where the resilience of Ukraine will come in this particular moment, together with the territorial defence units that have been shaped up [mobile]. Sorry, oh, done.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Great, thanks, Orysia. Mathieu and then Kataryna.

Mathieu Boulègue

Yeah, very quickly on the cyber front. So, we haven’t seen the, sort of, onslaught or bulk of Russian electronic warfare and cyberwarfare operations. We’ve seen the informational part of it, we’ve seen a few cyberattacks already, but this could only be the start, and there will be a moment, unfortunately, when the command and control of the Ukraine forces will be less able to operate, which means forces will be less, you know, coherent – less coherently managing communication movement at a – in time and in space, which will completely blunt the ability of Russia – of Ukrainian forces to communicate, to fight and to survive in an increasingly contested environment. And this is where the cyberattacks that will probably come will be critical for the Ukrainian command and control system. Also, for critical national infrastructure should Russia decide to seize more territory and hold these critical national infrastructure at risk of destruction as a, sort of, scorched earth policy, to make sure that Ukrainians also – civilians also feel that they have the sort of brunt of occupation when you start cutting power, gas heating, as well, in major urban centres and beyond. So, in a way, this is all part of this, sort of, informational and contested bubble or struggle that Russia will launch, and is already launching kinetically, with you know, the tanks, but also in a non-kinetic way through information, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Don’t forget, cyber’s a two-way door, Mathieu. Things can…

Mathieu Boulègue

Absolutely.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…go back, right? So…

Mathieu Boulègue

Definitely.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…Ukraine’s been developing its cyber capability for quite a while, so maybe Russia needs to think about that, too. Kataryna, I’m turning to you for – with a final word from the panellists, and we are close to running out of time.

Kataryna Wolczuk

Thank you. I’m not a, sort of, cyber person, but I’ll – as you said, Patricia, it’s a two-way street, and I’m not a cyber person, but we haven’t heard anything. Is it not happening, or it is happening, but we are not informed? And if we don’t know it, when it comes to actually lowering, sort of, Russian military capabilities, does it mean it’s not happening if we don’t hear – other people don’t know, as well? And from that point of view, it’s part of an information war, sort of, as well, I mean, it actually boosting morale that there is something done. So, from that point of view, I’m waiting for that to hear that that type of weapon is deployed and its relatively cost-free. You know, it’s not boots on the ground, why aren’t we hearing about this?

And perhaps there is – it’s happening, but I think we really are catching up here and it’s not only the last two months, but you know, we’re talking about decades, in terms of actually knowing what we deal with, and I wonder, you know, when it comes. And I just, you know, I think it’s incremental. It’s catching up process, but I’m really fearful that what we are going to see, you know, is it Ukrainian women being crushed by tanks? Is it what needed to, basically, galvanise and provide that assistance and, you know – or, you know, children orphanages being bombed? This is what we are dealing with and not being an expert, I would like to, you know, perhaps to find out more, but the people, not only in Ukraine, but across Europe, hearing more about this.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Well, thank you, each of you, very much, Orysia and Kataryna and Mathieu, for excellent presentations and for fielding so many questions. Thanks also to all of the participants, our audience, for also putting forward questions, comments, in the comments box, etc. We really appreciate it. Of course, it’s not long enough to discuss this, but we hope you’ve given the – we’ve given you some flavour of the situation, some flavour of perhaps some of the root causes, some of the ways forward, and some discussion about what we might take some heart from and how we might go from there. So, thank you all very much. Thank you for your support of Chatham House and we will be keeping you in touch. Please look on the website for all of our publications. There’s quite a few coming out on this, of course, and we’ve been producing quite a lot, too, and we hope that that contributes to your understanding and ability to discuss these things in the wider world. Thank you.