Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism

Bronwen Maddox

Everyone, a second very warm welcome. Thank you for your patience. We now have the sound working with Keith, I’m delighted to say. So, a warm welcome to this discussion of Russia’s Aggression and the Crisis for Multilateralism, and to this conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. I’m Bronwen Maddox, Director of Chatham House. Very brief housekeeping arrangements. This is being livestreamed, it is being recorded, it is on the record, and please do tweet and promote this.

Minister, a very warm welcome to you. Let me give the briefest of introductions. We’re very, very glad to have you and I think everyone here, though, knows your record. You are Ukrainian Politician, Diplomat, Commentator, at age 38. Mr Kuleba was named Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs three years ago, making him the youngest ever Foreign Minister of Ukraine, and he began working in diplomacy in 2003, transitioned to the private sector a decade later, but after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in June 2014, went back into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been working there since, as we know.

I’m going to introduce, as well, Simon Smith, who’s joined us, who’s Head of our Ukraine and Chair of our Ukraine Forum here at Chatham. Forum was set up in 2015 as a response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and he had a – before that, a 35-year career in the UK diplomatic service, including, crucially for this, Ambassador to Ukraine at the point of that aggression, from 2012 to 15, but also, most recently, Ambassador to South Korea. A very warm welcome, and Minister, a very warm welcome to you, too. Minister, I want…

Dmytro Kuleba

Can you hear me?

Bronwen Maddox

…to start – we can hear you, thank you.

Dmytro Kuleba

Okay, good, then I’m listening.

Bronwen Maddox

Good. Let us start with Russia’s Presidency of the UN Security Council, about to begin in two days’ time, despite its violation of the UN Charter, despite ignoring all the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions about the invasion. What are the implications of this Presidency and how should other countries respond to it?

Dmytro Kuleba

Well, first of all, thank you for bringing all of us together, and we have a very capable audience here in Kyiv. These are young students of international relations and international law, of, basically, everything international. So, for them it will be a very important moment to follow our discussion and to pick it up in their future diplomatic endeavours.

The Presidency of Russia in the UN Security Council begins on the 1st of April and, frankly speaking, you cannot imagine a worse joke for April Fools Day. It’s the worst joke ever, that the country who systemically violated all fundamental rules of international security is presiding over a body whose only mission is to safeguard and protect international security.

I don’t think Russia will be able to change the balance inside of the UN Security Council during its Presidency. It will try to abuse its rights of the Presidency to push for its own narratives, but I doubt they will be able to secure the sufficient number of votes to make the council adopt decisions on that – on matters related specifically to Ukraine. However, this Presidency is a stark reminder that something is wrong with the way our international security architecture is functioning if a country that has illegitimately acquired a seat of a permanent member of the UN Security Council is presiding over a body while conducting a large-scale act of aggression against another sovereign member and another Founding Member of the United Nations. So, I think the best we can do is to take these months to actually highlight the problems that exist in multilateralism and the problems that Russia is exploiting for its own benefit.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that. The other question I asked you was, how you thought other countries should respond and from your answer, I think you’re saying that they should continue to be part of the Security Council, they should not, you know, protest, they should go along with that, but vote against, or block what Russia is doing. Is that the message you would give to countries, for example, the UK?

Dmytro Kuleba

You know, there is a very, kind of, peculiar body in international relations with – which is the United Nations, as such, and inside of the United Nations, there is the most peculiar body of the entire world, which is the Security Council. And it has its own dynamics, it has its own rules, it has its own, kind of, balance of relationship. So, of course, I wish all other members withdrew from the room and let Russia preside over an empty rule – room, but I doubt this is going to happen. So, what I expect from current members of the UN Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent, is actually, to corner Russia as much as they can, within existing procedures and rules, during its Presidency. Not to allow it to abuse the Security Council rules, and to continue pushing for – and pushing the narratives ,which tell the truth about this war and that Russia is conducting.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that. I want to move onto a slightly different argument, which is the argument that you and the countries supporting Ukraine very vigorously, want to make to the countries which have chosen not to – have been non-aligned, have chosen not to say that they support Ukraine. They might say, as countries – many countries in the Global South do, “This is not our fight. This is nothing to do with us.” Even, “We think maybe both sides were complicit in this,” and this is something that you hear, it was very audible at the Munich Security Forum, for example, but there are many other places. What is the argument you think needs to be made to them?

Dmytro Kuleba

The point is very simple. Yes, this war is physically taking place in Europe, but the repercussions of this war are felt all over the world, and I must tell you that I’ve heard far more – many voices saying that “This is not our war” in the beginning of the aggression, of the large-scale invasion. But after the food crisis broke out and as a result of Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports, the number of these voices arguing that this is not their war has significantly lowered, because people across the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, they all felt the impact of Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, be it with food security or energy, food prices, or the shortage of food or energy prices. So, this argument that this is not their war just doesn’t meet – you know, doesn’t stand the reality check.

So, we have to speak with those countries, we have to find – we have – and that’s what we’re doing. We have to identify what their, kind of, arguments are and what is the – what are the reasons – their reasons for these arguments? And that’s what President Zelenskyy is doing. He is talking with many leaders from all over the world and we take every opportunity to reach out to them to get a better understanding of how – not only what their problems are, but also how we can help them to resolve these problems.

Bronwen Maddox

Very interesting the way – absolutely rightly put on the food security and the sense of national interest that has brought some countries more to Ukraine’s point of view. The grain deal that was brokered by the UN was extended again this month, but only for 120 days. Is there any more sustainable solution in sight?

Dmytro Kuleba

Well, Grain Initiative brokered by UN Secretary-General and President of Turkey, is being used by Russia as a leverage, and this is the – what the whole cynicism of Russia’s policy is. While they argue that they defend the voices of the countries who belong to the so-called Global South, they simultaneously, put the issue of food security at high risk by using the functioning of the Grain Initiative as a leverage against Ukraine. So, this is the, kind of, the cynical element of Russia’s foreign policy, when you claim that you support someone with one hand, but at the same, create problems for the same actor with your other hand.

The most sustainable solution for that issue is, of course, the end of Russia’s invasion into Ukraine. We never had any problems with the – with exports of our grain to the world market. In fact, when I did the African tour last year, in one of the countries, my colleague, a Foreign Minister, said, “Listen, it’s only when the food crisis hit us that we realised how important Ukraine is for our own stability and security, and we never realised it before because everything worked just perfectly. It’s only the Russian aggression that interrupted the chains of supply in the exports and created all of these problems.” So, there is really no other sustainable way out but for Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine and for Ukraine to restore its full expert capacity in grain and other agricultural products, which we are willing to do, of course.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that. Let me ask you about the Global North, if I can use that phrase, about one country in particular, and that’s the United States. I’d like to ask you directly whether you feel that Ukraine can win this conflict without continued US support and whether you’re concerned that US support may not continue after the next Presidential election?

Dmytro Kuleba

Well, of course, you know, as Diplomats, we always have to be far looking and looking over the horizon, but the reality of war teaches you that the longest strategy planning you can do is probably after lunchtime, if you are making your plans in the morning. The question, I think, should be put differently, why would the United States abandon Ukraine? Why would they cease to support Ukraine? I don’t see any good reason for that, because what is happening in Ukraine, it’s not only about Ukraine, it’s about the entire World Order.

If Russia is allowed to succeed here, then every other country in the world who is bloodthirsty and looking at its neighbour, will receive a completely wrong message, that yes, it is difficult, it is painful to occupy your neighbour, to wage a war, but in the end, you get away with it, so it’s worth trying. And this is something that is very simple, but that will ruin the entire world and will turn everything into chaos.

So, from the strategic perspective, I think the support will continue and we appreciate every piece of support that we receive from every country, most notably, of course, from the United States, but everyone should always remember one thing, none of our partners who are providing support now, including the United States, believed that Ukraine would survive the first big week of the Russian full-scale invasion. So, while we shouldn’t underestimate the support that is coming, you shouldn’t underestimate the capacity of Ukrainians to fight, either.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you. Let me ask you one more thing, before I come to Simon Smith, and this is about tribunals. Are – at some point, perhaps, prosecuting Russia for its crimes of aggression? On March the 4^th last year, you spoke here with Gordon Brown, our Former Prime Minister of the UK, about the need for “special tribunals.” Where has that got to, in your view, and what needs to be done in order to make those work at some point in the future?

Dmytro Kuleba

Well, the first time we raised the issue of the tribunal, the response coming from our closest friends was rather sceptical, to say the least. Now there is a growing consensus that there must be a tribunal and the issue that we’re discussing now is what will be the format of that tribunal? And this is the progress that we have made in – that we made in, like, something about a year, which is good dynamics, given the complexity of the issue at the table.

I’m confident that there will be a tribunal. I’m not ready to say in which format it will exactly take – what will be the exact format of that tribunal, but the purpose – we should not be gui – we should be guided by the purpose, not by the forum. And the purpose is to put President Putin and his closest entourage, including Foreign Minister Lavrov, at trial for the crime of aggression. It’s a complicated task. It’s not easy from – there’s hundreds of legal questions that need to be answered, but we have to do it, not only for Ukraine, but for the entire world, because this will be the best way – one of the best ways to prevent further aggressions.

So, other leaders and other Politicians will think twice, if not three times, before pushing the button of aggression. It must be done. It’s really – if every time anyone says the word – you know, the wor – says about “fighting impunity in the world,” the first test that this narrative and this rhetoric has to pass, is actually, “Are you able to prevent impunity in the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine?” Because if the answer to that question is negative, then answers to all other questions will be negative, too, and that’s not something that we should allow to happen.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you very much for putting it so eloquently. Simon Smith, can I bring you in at this point? I’d love your comments on what the Minister has said and particularly, perhaps starting with this point about taking the argument to those countries that have remained non-aligned.

Simon Smith

Yes, I think it’s been a frustration for a lot of us who have supported Ukraine to see that, you know, we had – we’ve had several UN General Assembly votes with pretty resounding statements of condemnation for Russia’s aggression, a pretty clear position taken that what Russia is doing is in gross violation of the UN Charter and so on. And yet, those 140 plus votes have not really been converted into successful action in very many parts of the Global South to widen the coalition of support for Ukraine and to ensure that the real, kind of, understanding of what is going on here is actually taking root firmly amongst a wider selection – a wider section of the global community.

And I think that sometimes, we can say, “Well, the UN General Assembly, what does it mean? These votes, they’re meaningless, they mean nothing. Isn’t the UN performing badly?” And I think if we do that, we’re making a really big mistake. If the UN is performing badly, it’s not the UN’s fault, it’s our fault. It’s for the Member States of the European Union to make it – of, sorry, of the international – of the United Nations, sorry. It’s for the Member States of the United Nations…

Bronwen Maddox

Chatham House audience, again.

Simon Smith

…to make it work. And I think that there is something here, in that we do, as the international community, need to make the international organisations themselves work objectively to come up with the more convincing evidence, the more hard-hitting arguments, that will help convince others in the global community – you mentioned the grain deal.

There are still countries who are saying, “Yes, of course we recognise,” as Dmytro Kuleba has said, “Of course we recognise that we are suffering as a result of the war.” Great, that’s step one to get them understanding, but step two is to say, yes, and we also understand that the reason this is happening is because of Russia’s aggression. It is not happening because there is a, sort of, two-sided conflict between two countries, where there are rights and wrongs on both sides, etc. It’s happening because of Russia’s violation of the UN Charter and if those violations cease, then the grain problem will cease to be a problem for the countries suffering food shortages immediately.

And that’s the understanding, and I think we do need the help of internationalisations to push that through, with the objective evidence, but that’s, in a sense, the next stage we need to achieve, of understanding how this conflict started and how relatively easily, if the decision is made to honour the UN Charty – Charter, how relatively easily it could be resolved.

Bronwen Maddox

Have the international institutions failed?

Simon Smith

If they’ve failed – I think some of them have failed and I think some of them are failing, but again, I’ve always been convinced that if they fail, that’s our fault. We can make them work better. We are all members of these international organisations. We can give them the tasking. I just – one example, the International Atomic Energy Agency. They’ve not done a bad job, in my view, so far, in looking at this dire risk attended on the nuclear power stations [inaudible – 28:31], but it’s inevitable that they need to tread a very careful line.

Now, we need to do a lot more work for them to say, “Okay, here is more evidence. Here are the arguments that say the Nuclear Safety Agreements that all of us, as members of the IAEA, sign up to, are being grossly breached. Here’s what needs to be done about it.” And we need to do the work of recruiting other countries in the global community to say, “Yes, actually, we see this exactly the same as – way was you do. There is one violator here and this needs to stop.”

Bronwen Maddox

Can I ask you one final thing, before coming back to the Minister? The Foreign Minister has called for Russia to be removed from the UN Security Council, in an Op-Ed earlier this month. Not possible, desirable?

Simon Smith

It does seem to be something – I mean, this idea was around when I was serving in Ukraine eight years ago. I spoke to a lot of people then, but it seemed that almost every time you referred this proposal back to a capital, people would say, “Oh, oh, oh, well, hold on a minute, hmmm hmm, that’s going too far,” or “Once you open that box, you will open more boxes.” What I sense, actually, is that there was a lot more serious talk about this, a lot more serious thought to say, “Actually, let’s give this serious consideration.”

I’m not convinced that we would – I’m not convinced you would succeed in finding a way of doing this. I’m not convinced that the results would be brilliant. I would more strongly argue, and again, it – if – it – just back on the immediate question of Russia’s Presidency of the Security Council, on the whole, my preference is for participate and frustrate. I agree with Dmytro Kuleba, who said, that “This is an absurd joke that Russia should be chairing the Security Council,” but let’s bring out that absurdity fully. Let’s further expose Russia. Let’s “corner Russia,” as Dmytro has said, but let’s also expose Russia of the absurdity of the narratives that they’re bringing to the Security Council and in that way, again, actually, achieve some progressive degradation of the trust which rather too large portions of the global community still seem to place in Russia. That trust – I think Russians can, by their Security Council presence, I think they can do their own work in demolishing some of that trust over the next month.

Bronwen Maddox

Be interesting to see if you’re right, is something that these conversations might dig into in more detail. Foreign Minister, may I come back to you at this point and ask you one simple question, does diplomacy have a chance to end this war?

Dmytro Kuleba

Every war ends with an act of diplomacy, so – because there are people who sit down at the table and put their signatures on a paper. The question is, how do you reach that table? And I will be frank with you, today my job, as Foreign Minister, and I literally spent the whole day today, since morning, until I showed up here, working on how to bring more weapons to Ukraine, how to make Ukrainian Armed Forces stronger. And the entire team of President Zelenskyy, be Diplomats or Generals, is focused on this, and we are doing it – one could look at our effort from the perspective of the war. But there is also a diplomatic perspective for that, because we bring weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine reaches the table where peace will be negotiated, in the strongest position possible, after the successes on the battlefield.

And this is what we are now focused on. While of course, we have a clear vision of how peace can be achieved diplomatically, it’s formulated in the Peace Formula proposed by President Zelenskyy last October, at the G20 Summit, we have a diplomatic proposal, but unfortunately, everything Russia does on the ground speaks for one very simple fact, it doesn’t want diplomacy. It wants to continue fighting, and we are ready to defend our land.

And if I might – I may add just one quick – two quick points. One on the Global South, what Ambassador said is important. I think the most intriguing question in – of diplomacy is, how many countries do you need to win the war? And our – and the number varies from one case to another. So, the whole concept is not based on the premise that you have – you need the entire world around you to win the war. You have to be very pragmatic in that and measure and apply your resources respectively.

And on the United Nations and Russia’s presence in the UN Security Council, of course, we are all rational, but I think this whole thing should be handled – Russia should be handled in accordance with the principle of salami. And the first slice of that salami is to expose a very simple fact, Russia’s presence in the United Nations Security Council is the result of the largest diplomatic fraud of the 20th Century. We should delegitimise Russia’s presence in the United Nations Security Council first, by exposing truth to everyone and then, the moment will come when next slices will be sliced. But this is our goal, it’s very rational, it’s very visible and the strongest part of it is that we are speaking the truth that was concealed, went overlooked for decades.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you. I’m going to ask you one final thing and then, come to general questions and we’re going to have lots and lots of questions. One final thing is about China’s role and what your view is of the role that China seems to be playing.

Dmytro Kuleba

I think China is, at the moment, when it’s making up its mind on whether to continue with the current stance, as it has been the case for the last, like, 14 months, or whether it has to step up its involvement in the conflict settlement process. And we believe that one of the key reasons of the last visit of President Xi to Russia was actually to, kind of, test the ground and to see whether Russia is ready to make any changes in its current behaviour, and whether there are ways to make Russia change its behaviour.

So, the outcome of that conversation, of course, we will not know it from the public statements, but the announcement by President Putin about the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus may be considered as an indicator that this conversation with the Chinese leader did not go very well for him. Because the issue of nuclear securities is of utmost importance for China and when Putin made this statement about Belarus, it definitely something that does not correspond to Chinese policy on the nuclear – in the nuclear sphere.

Let’s see. We will see from real actions on the ground and moves in Moscow, Beijing and other capitals, on how the situation evolves. We are part of this exercise. There is no other country in the world that wants peace more than Ukrainians – than Ukraine, but we need real peace. We need just peace and lasting peace. We are not going for any other – anything similar to Minsk, Normandy or any format of that kind, nothing that protracts the conflict. Nothing that gives Russia more space and time to better prepare for another wave of invasion. We need to win this war and that’s what we are working on.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you. Let’s come to questions. We have questions here. We have questions from people with the Foreign Minister. We have many, many questions online, a whole stream of them. Let’s start in the room, here. Let’s go in the middle, here, and I’m going to take them in two at a time, because we have a lot. Please could you say your name?

Yasumune Kano

Yes, thank you, and my name’s Yasumune Kano, a Visiting Fellow at Chatham House, from Japan. Thank you, Mr Kuleba, for your remark. My question is about how you present or sell the proposal about the special tribunal. I mean, are you presenting the special tribunal at just one of an unique case for the Russian Federation, or are you presenting that a rather more general example of principle for the future, including what happens in future in Asia or in the Pacific? Thank you.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you, and I’m going to take a second one, okay, over here.

James Nixey

Thank you, Bronwen, thank you, Minister. Can I – James Nixey, Chatham House. May I turn to other multilateral organisations, please, involving security, the OSCE in particular, and NATO? How do you feel they have performed in this war? Thank you.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you. Okay, case for the special tribunal and how other institutions, NATO and OSCE, among others, have performed. Thank you.

Dmytro Kuleba

We see special tribunal as a special institution, ad hoc institution, for the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. But if history of international relations and international law teaches us anything, it’s that ad hoc precedents usually, kind of, transform – may transform into practice. And that depends on how the world will evolve and how this specific ad hoc case will be interpreted in a broader context. But as of now, we’re not looking at anything that – we are looking only at our own case, and we want people to be focused on that case for obvious reasons.

Speaking about multilateral institutions, you know, it’s always tempting to blame multilateralism for everything. It’s the safest way to blame anyone, in diplomacy it’s to blame an international organisation. It’s not always fair. Multilateralism works on many accounts, but it’s true, it fails on the issue of security, the most important one, and that if there is any war in the world, it means that multilateralism failed again. And Ukrainian – the War Against Ukraine is just one big obvious example of that, but there are many other conflicts in the world, too.

I think when it comes specifically to the EU and NATO, I think EU performed much better than it, itself, expected to perform in the first year of the aggression. They are facing some – they begin some difficulties now, but the latest decision on the establishment of the mechanism that will allow procurement and production of one million artillery shells for Ukraine, speaks for the fact that they’re still capable of making unprecedented and ambit – big decisions.

The next big test for the EU will be, of course, the decision to open accession talks with Ukraine in 2023 and we are all – Ukrainians – Ukraine and the EU are working on making it happen. But my pos – my general – I can have hundreds of complaints, but – because, you know, we are fighting a war and nothing is enough until you win the war. But in general, the EU has done much better than we expected.

On NATO, there was a lot of frustration with NATO, with the way NATO responded in the fil – in the very beginning of the war, and that frustration was very legitimate and well-grounded. And NATO started to, kind of, win back slowly and the Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, should be credited for making it happen. But on the issue of Ukraine’s integration into NATO, the alliance is still lagging far behind the European Union. That would be a fair assessment of the situation, and since I’m going to see both EU and NATO officials within a couple of days, I would like to make a disclaimer that they do not cancel the meetings for what I said about NATO.

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, thank you. I’m going to ask two more [audio cuts out – 42:52] floor and then, also come to Simon Smith on these. Just picking up, following this point about Europe, I’m going to pick up two online. One from Richard Wright, saying, “Ukraine is a candidate country to join the EU and a report on its readiness to begin accession negotiations is due in the autumn. What is Ukraine’s timetable to join the EU, and does Ukraine believe there is enough political seriousness within the EU to push for its speedy accession?”

And then, the second one, from Steven Erlanger, back on China, “Do you believe China is being sincere in its desire to facilitate a peace, or is it just doing Russia’s work? Is there any update on a President Xi call with President Zelenskyy or one you – with you?” These two, and then, I’m going to come to Simon and Simon, throw one more at you, as well.

Dmytro Kuleba

Let me picked it up where you left it. Sincerity is a very tricky notion in diplomacy, okay? So…

Bronwen Maddox

It’s one of the best quotes in Chatham House this year, I think, yeah. Thank you, yeah.

Dmytro Kuleba

Yeah, and again, when – but when you are fighting, what the war allows Diplomats to do, Diplomats of the fighting country, is to be far more sincere than others, and we are very honest and sincere in what we’re saying and doing, because we know that the truth is in our side. But I’m not judging other countries by their, kind of, level of sincerity. We judge them by their understanding of what is at core of this conflict for them and how to find a way to motivate them to behave in the way that benefits us and international law and order, or how to prevent them from behaving in the opposite way. And we built our dialogue with China and other countries based on that premise.

On the EU, I mention it already, we have to open the – our goal is to open accession talks in 2023. I’m not going to name you a year – to give you a year when Ukraine will accede – will become full member. I will only say that this is going to happen, second, this is going to happen much sooner than many expect. And third, all of this is going to happen if the European Union does not come up with any artificial, kind of, new conditions, demands or procedures to slow that process down. Ukraine has proved that it’s ready to do its homework much faster than anyone expects.

But what is really funny about this – about the European integration of Ukraine, is that for 20 years – it began in late 90s, and for 20 years the European Union was saying to Ukraine, “You have to reform yourself and we will decide then whether you will become a member.” That was, kind of, the premise. Now, tables turned in 2022, when Ukraine was granted the candidacy status. What we’re hearing now is that the European Union has to reform itself for Ukraine to become a member of the Europea – of the EU. So, while reforms was an issue in the first 20 years of Ukraine’s EU integration, we will not allow – we will do our best and we call on the European Union not to make reforms of the European Union an excuse for delaying Ukraine’s accession to the Union.

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, and then, we had China. Sorry, hmmm hmm?

Dmytro Kuleba

I answered…

Bronwen Maddox

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Dmytro Kuleba

…about China…

Bronwen Maddox

Totally.

Dmytro Kuleba

…in the beginning.

Bronwen Maddox

I thought we’d covered the China.

Dmytro Kuleba

Yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

We’ve covered the China, yeah, and then, Simon, and I want to also stir into that the – one from Monica Ingber of the – “Would delegitimising Russia’s role on the Security Council call into question the legitimacy of the other permanent members?”

Simon Smith

Just to take that one first. I think that there’s always been part of this reluctance to say don’t mess with the Security Council, because there are 45 different ideas about how to reform the UN, probably more, and just as many ideas about how to reform the Security Council, but over the years, nobody has really agreed. There’s been no consensus on which idea works best and so on. So, it’s very easy to say if you start unravelling one bit of it, then the rest of it will unravel very quickly.

Personally, I don’t think that’s necessarily going to be the case, but it will be quite a serious retardant factor to what sound like good, big ideas, to say this isn’t working, let’s change it.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you. Let’s come back out – into the hall, here. One here, here in the white jacket.

Nina Kuryata

Thanks a lot. Nina Kuryata, Tortoise Media. I’ve got a question for both Dmytro and Simon. My question is, there are voices, even in the West, saying that, “Okay, let’s probably feed Putin with a part of Ukraine and he will come down and we will make business as usual with Russia, as we did for ages.” But at the same time, Putin’s agenda is Ukraine is not the strategic enemy for Russia. Ukraine is one of the strategic goals to restore the Soviet Union, but the strategic enemy is the West. And my question is, does the West realise that because Putin sells the idea of this war to his population, saying that they are confronting US, NATO and collective West, which extent does the collective West understand that there was no friendship with Russia under no circumstances? Thank you.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you, and over here, the red jacket.

Mariia Zolkina

Thank you. Mariia Zolkina, a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and Head of Regional Security at Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. I have a question to Mr – Minister – to the Minid – dear Minister, can you please elaborate a little bit on the latest and newest attempt of Russia to blackmail again with the nuclear weapons deployment in Belarus? Do we assess the risk that Russia might use that kind of deployment on occupied Ukrainian territories, namely in Crimea, to prevent Ukraine from the occupation of all our territories?

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that, and I would just mention the question from Tariq Tahir from The Sun, of, “Does the Minister think Russia could still use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and what should be the West’s response to any such threats to use them?” Thank you.

Dmytro Kuleba

[Pause] I forgot the first question.

Bronwen Maddox

The first question was, does the West understand the way…?

Dmytro Kuleba

Yes, yeah, yeah.

Bronwen Maddox

Whoops, we have lost the link.

Dmytro Kuleba

It’s…

Bronwen Maddox

You can still hear us?

Dmytro Kuleba

…definitely – yeah, yeah. This understanding is definitely growing, and it has grown dramatically after 24th of February 2022, and the longer it takes, the stronger this understanding gets. The concept of concessions to Putin has two obvious problems. First, we should never forget that between 2014 and 2022 Ukraine and its partners did more, or had done more, than they could to find a diplomatic compromise with Russia. And where did it take us to? To the large-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine.

So, first, the strategy of let’s give something to Putin in order for him to, as the lady said, to be – to feel fed up and pacified, failed. This strategy failed and it is going – it’s going to fail again if anyone decides to resort to it again. And the second, purely rational, problem with this concept is that even if you decide to entertain that idea, the question is how much you should give to Putin for him to feel fed up. Where does that line go? And this is why Ukraine, in principle, rejects both ideas of anything similar to Minsk Agreements, that draw another separation line. And second, the idea that something – that any single square kilometre of Ukrainian land that is currently occupied by Russia can stay with Russia. No, it cannot. We are not claiming anything more that – than belongs – than what belongs to us, according to international law.

On the nuclear issue, I think I briefly spoke about Belarus. I think we should – the – but when it comes to the issue of nuclear – of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, I think what we should always remember are two things. First, Russia is using the nuclear argument to sow fear and to press others into concessions, so do not, you know, help them to do that one way or another. And second, the deterrence – the nuclear deterrence strategy of the West against the Soviet Union proved to be pretty successful, so why do you think that you can be less successful this time? I think the chances are very big that the threat of using the nuclear weapons will remain just a bargaining chip and not a reality. And nothing should stop us from doing the right thing, which is restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised orders.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that, and further message, the Minister kindly can go on a few minutes past the top of the hour, but only a few minutes. Simon, do you want to come back on this? And I’m going to take some more here, and, also, want to know if there’s any questions from the hall with the Foreign Minister. Simon?

Simon Smith

Just to add a comment on this question about Crimea and is Crimea somehow different or special? I mean, I think you’re right. The question was right to say that yes, to a certain extent, in the, sort of, trans – in the, sort of, Euro-Atlantic community, I felt, at the time of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, that there were a lot of people who thought, yeah, somehow, Crimea is different. And a lot of people very quick to put Crimea into the, sort of, bargaining chip box. That’s going to be the, sort of, key, because we think the Ukrainians perhaps don’t really care as much about Crimea as other bits of Ukraine. That idea was around. My sense, it is that just as the Minister has said, this idea has radically diminished, and I think one of the reasons is because people are looking more clear-sightedly at the implications.

If you tried to design a map of the region that said Crimea, or parts of it, or some sort of compromise is made, but some of it meant that Russia’s footprint was still there, then you have to start asking yourself some pretty serious questions about the implication that that has for your security, whether you’re in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine. And you have to start asking what opportunities it gives to the invader, the aggressor, to just do the whole thing again, or actually, as the Minister has just said, to give them time to think, to give them room to think and to say, “Right, we are now, on the basis of our occupation of Crimea, we are much better placed to make this – to make the third invasion of Ukraine a great success.” And I think that realisation has really taken root in much wider parts of the Euro-Atlantic community than was the case eight years ago.

Bronwen Maddox

Okay, thank you. I’m going to take – there’s one or two on the aisle, here, one here and then, one in front. Sorry, first behind and then in front.

Benny Hogan

Yeah, Benny Hogan, Fatherland Group, Nigeria. On the issue of the Global South, is it that the argument has failed, or is it that the Global South have failed to listen? And are there – is there new thinking that is going on in terms of persuading the Global South to shift its position?

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you very much, and right in front of you.

Member

Thank you very much, [inaudible – 57:41] Chatham House, thank you, Minister. In your initial remarks, you rightly said that we should not repeat Minsk and Normandy fallouts, given where we are now. In any prospective diplomatic engagement with Russia, what security guarantees and guarantors would you be insisting on? And separately, what would you like NATO to do in Black Sea now? What more NATO should do in Black Sea now?

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you, Global South, the argument and NATO. Minister?

Dmytro Kuleba

Yeah, on the Global South, when I was answering one of the – when I was making my remarks about the Global South, I deliberately used the world – the word ‘talk’ not persuade. You know, we are not in a kindergarten, where you have to persuade someone in a very simple thing, that it’s bad for one country to attack another country. Everyone is smart, African countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, they unders – they all understand perfectly what is happening. You don’t have to persuade them. You have to understand why do – did they take a certain stance, perfectly understanding what is going on? Why do they pretend that it’s not what it is and work with those arguments and talk to them?

And if – well, what I learned, from my conversations with Asian and Africa and Latin American countries, is that you don’t have to persuade them, you have to talk with them on equal, and this is the most crucial thing, to take them as equal partners who want to be heard and this should be an equal conversation. The moment they feel that you are trying to push on them and persuade them in something, they actually step back, and it gets more difficult. But the conversation has to continue and countries, they take their stance because – for various reasons. Some want to make money on this war, which is true, there are such countries. Others have strategic projects with Russia that they don’t want to lose, that’s also true. Someone else benefits from the presence of Russia’s mercenaries in their territories, others belong to political groups with Russia onboard.

Every country is different and frankly speaking, I don’t like the term – the notion of Global South, because it puts everyone on the global – on the equal footing and presents the whole situation as a standoff between the North and the South, which is not the case. Every country is special, every country should be treated on its own merits and there are very different countries in every region of the world when it comes to the way they interpret this war and support – and the support they provide.

Gosh, sorry, I’m so – and the second quest…?

Bronwen Maddox

Oh, on NATO…

Dmytro Kuleba

The security guarantees.

Bronwen Maddox

…and the importance of [inaudible – 61:19].

Dmytro Kuleba

The…

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you.

Dmytro Kuleba

Yeah, the best security guarantee, not for Ukraine, but for the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole, is Ukraine’s full membership in the EU and NATO. There is no alternative to it and anyone writing a PhD thesis on that matter should drop it, because it just doesn’t make sense. The only strategic response is Ukraine’s membership in both EU and NATO. The question is what happens between now and the moment when Ukraine becomes member of both institutions? And the answer to that is the document called Kyiv Security Compact, which has a list of things that countries can provide Ukraine with as security guarantees. To cut long story short, in a nutshell, this document is about everything but what Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is about.

Bronwen Maddox

We’re coming right to the end. I’m just going to ask you – because there are a lot of questions online and one particular aspect of the China point, which is what the Chinese response has been, the – again, over this point. What the Chinese response has been to President Zelenskyy’s offer of a phone call and what President Zelenskyy would like to say to President Xi.

Dmytro Kuleba

Well, I think we will keep it for the conversation what President Zelenskyy wants to say to President Xi. The official response of Beijing to our requests for – request for a call and for the invitation to come, for President Xi to come to Ukraine, is that they’re carefully examining the requests.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you very much, indeed. Simon, your last thoughts, briefly, and then, we’re going to have to wrap up.

Simon Smith

Just to say that, again, I think the Minister is absolutely right that there – you know, whatever happens in terms of the speed with which Ukraine moves closer to the EU, to NATO and eventually joins, there is going to be a period between now and then and I think that the essential thing to do is to focus on the practicalities. What, in practical, concrete, terms, is guaranteeing Ukraine’s security for the next few years? Because that’s also guaranteeing the wider security of the region, it’s also guaranteeing global security and that is a question we need to address whatever happens in the progress and the speed of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO and the European Union. What are the guarantees in place? What is the military support? What is the extent to which other countries in support of Ukraine have committed their resources on a permanent basis, I would say? That is going – those are going to be the vital questions which we need to be working on right now, however long it takes, or however speedy the process of accession may be.

Bronwen Maddox

Thank you for that. We are going to have to stop now. Foreign Minister, thank you very, very much for joining us. Everyone in the hall in Kyiv, thank you for sending in questions from here. Thank you for joining us online, thank you here, in the hall. Foreign Minister, again, thank you [pause].

Dmytro Kuleba

[Mother tongue] [pause – 65:13-73:57].

Orysia Lutsevych

My name is Orysia Lutsevych. I am the Head of Ukraine Forum that we’ve set up here eight years ago, to explore, actually, the Ukraine’s own power to reform and to build resilience, but also, Western response to Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in the East of Ukraine. It has been a fascinating first session with the Foreign Minister and Simon. I hope you agree that it gave us a lot of food for thought.

And now, we would like to continue for another hour and thank you very much for staying with us. We also have audiences in Kyiv, and we’ll continue that bridge. As you can see, they are, right now, back on stage and I’m very pleased to introduce, also, my co-Chair, Emine Dzhaparova, who is the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, and she is actually somebody who sp0ke here, on this very stage, in 2017. I was really pleased to welcome her here at our annual event dedicated to the annexation of Crimea.

I’m also joined here, on stage, by Dr Devika Hovell. She is the Associate Professor of Law at the London School of Economics and she specialises on various issues and her – she’s the author of “The Power of Process,” the book that was published in 2016. And also, another my guests that we are pleased to welcome is Professor Rick Fawn from the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. Rick is a specialist on international security, and there is also a panel in Kyiv, and we’ll continue that conversation and also, actually, a connection to New York. And now, I would like to pass floor over to Emine, also, to introduce who is with her in Kyiv. Emine, over to you.

Emine Dzhaparova

Yes, I hope you can hear me well. Thank you, dear, Orysia, and let me give you a joke, that while China is keeping on carefully examining our invitation, we continue our discussion with the best speakers ever. And here in Kyiv I have a group of students who are listening to us, and then, the speakers. The Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, Maria Mezentseva, who has been recently travelling the whole world, and not as a tourist, but as a messenger, to deliver one simple message that Russia should be defeated and Ukraine has to win, and there are many ways how Ukraine can win with the support of international community.

Then we have Mr Alexander Khara, who is a prominent expert in security and foreign policy issues. He’s a former Diplomat, now joining the Institute for Defence Strategies and also one of the best experts of the Crimea Platform Network, with his focus on the Black Sea security and the general security issues. And then, we don’t see him on the screen, but he’s always present in our hearts and minds, Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya, who is a prominent figure in multilateral diplomacy for two decades. He is a Former Deputy Minister, who was Deputy Minister for over six years, but also a Head of the Department for International Organisations at the Ministry and also a Permanent Representative of Ukraine in New York, fighting for our interest and actually doing his best to also vocal the messages that Minister Kuleba now came up.

So, I hope that we will have a wonderful panel discussion, but I also was requested to come up with several introductory remarks about the final part of our discussion, which is not only the crisis of multilateral diplomacy that Minister Kuleba was pushing for and speaking about, but also about the legitimacy, or illegitimacy of Russia’s presence in the UN Security Council. And yes, as he said, it’s a bad joke at the 1st April Fools’ Day, because while we have Russia as a country that usurpates the seat of the Security Council and the permanent seat of the Security Council, is actually being awarded with a veto right, meaning that he is indirectly – has a licence to kill Ukrainian people within impunity.

And there is a need, certain need, for a frank conversation, not only in Ukraine, which we do domestically, but also in the whole world, with one simple question. If Russia is a troublemaker, if Russia claims to be the second largest army in the world, if Russia usurpates avoiding all of the necess – all of the procedures in taking its seat in the P5, so, the question is, what should we, the international community, do with that simple fact? Isn’t it we who decide the current moment that is defined in the future? Because for decades, Russia has been exploiting not only United Nations as such, but also all other international foras, to actually bleach out its own crimes, to justify its crimes. And then, the Cold War revolt in 2014, it’s – and even before that, by attacking Georgia, and even before that by different other saboteur actions, that Russia’s nature is aggressive and that the regime that is there is aggressive and it’s still – the Russian leaders has to be – and has to bring accountable for their crimes.

So, without further delay, I will give the floor to Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya to elaborate the issue of, let’s say, Russian illegitimacy and illegal presence in the Security Council. Dear Sergiy, the floor is yours.

Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya

Well, thank you very much, indeed, and I’m very happy to be part of this important event. I have regularly worked and as the [audio cuts out – 79:52] has already said, and I’m very grateful to him for amplifying his messages now and again, which may come to our partners eventually change their position.

When it comes to the issue of the presence of the Russian Federation in the Security Council, we have not reached the point when other P3 members are ready to discuss effectively removing the Russian Federation from its current position, and there is a whole gamut of reasons for it. What I often say, here in New York, that we don’t really need a legal resolution of these decisions, because the Russian Federation had assumed its role in the Security Council, bypassing all illegal requirements.

Therefore, since the de facto decision to allow Russia to occupy the Soviet seat in the Security Council was not legal, but political, a decision taken behind the closed doors by a very limited number of the Security Council members, then the ultimate resolution should be of political nature. We think that that will be the part of the eventual comprehensive and holistic settlement after the military defeat of the Russian Federation in the middle ground, but more importantly, when there really is a chance that a more democratic, more aspiring to become democratic, government may appear in Moscow.

I would like to recall to finish the – that part of my intervention, is that the Security Council, in June 90 – in June 1992, had sent its Annual Report to the General Assembly, which the Security Council must do every year. And in that Annual Report, the Security Council put the letter of Yeltsin, dated December 24 1991, in which Yeltsin expressed the intention of the Russian Federation to be the continuator state for the Soviet Union. The Security Council reported to the General Assembly that that letter had never been formally discussed in the Security Council. So, it is a matter of fact that that issue had never been discussed, neither in the Security Council, nei – nor in the General Assembly. Thank you very much.

Emine Dzhaparova

Indeed. Thank you, dear Sergiy, for your intervention. Absolutely, we – the Ukrainian position is clear, saying that Russia has been bypassing all the procedures, because Article 23 of the UN Charter, with at least the P – the permanent members, doesn’t have the country, Russian Federation. It has the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. And then, the procedure that UN Charter envisages, when it comes to the accession to the Security Council, is that upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the decision should be taken by the General Assembly. And then, Russia is actually referring to the famous letter of Yeltsin, of President Yeltsin, which in a – kind of, in bypassing the procedure, that Ambassador Kyslytsya has said. So, of course, Ukrainian narrative is based on the legal procedure that was not followed.

The second position is that Russia has lost its moral light – right to be a permanent member by actually violating and tearing into shred the very basic document of the United Nations, with – which was the UN Charter, by barbaric acts of war, of aggression and crimes that it’s been committing in Ukraine.

Orysia, I will now give the floor to you so that you could introduce our next speaker.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much, Emine. I would like to, actually, bring in Devika to – when you hearing this case, as an International Lawyer, what would you like to respond to that, but also, anything that prompted your thinking when the Foreign Minister was speaking in our first session?

Dr Devika Hovell

Yeah. Well, thank you very much, Orysia. It’s such a pleasure to be here. I’m delighted to hear that students with you, in Kyiv. I see it in my memory, is Ambassador Kyslytsya, on the 24th of February 2022, appearing before the UN Security Council. Russia does, indeed, have impeccably absurdist timing as to when it assumes this Presidency of the UN Security Council. We’ve heard about its imminent 1st of April assumption of the Presidency.

But again, back to the 24th of February, a visibly shaken Ambis – Ambassador Kyslytsya was appearing before the Council when President Putin announced his invasion of Ukraine, which point, and this is a clip I like to show whenever I speak about the problem, the UN problem, if you like, Ambassador Kyslytsya appealed to the – through the President, of course, of the Security Council, saying the words, “It is the responsibility of this body to stop the war.” And he was right in terms of our collective security framework under the UN. But he was interrupted in his remarks by the President of the Security Council, with the clarification, “This isn’t called a war. This is called a special military operation in The Donbas.” Of course, the President of the Security Council was the Russian UN Ambassador, and with that, we saw this Janus face of the Security Council. The problem that the Ukrainian Ambassador and the world was forced to confront, that Ukraine was expected to direct its plea through none other than Russia.

So, when I hear this discussion, I’m very, very conscious of the problem, but in terms of this discussion of expelling Russia from the Security Council, or rather, regarding its place as illegitimate, I am torn. And this is in my role as an International Lawyer, forgive me, rather than someone who is so invested, of course, in this horrific conflict, that actually, Russia’s position on the Security Council is not a legal right. It’s not something normative that they’ve earnt. It’s a political faction that, absolutely correct, was the statement that the UN Charter provides in Article 23, that “The Council’s permanent members of the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America,” and there is the argument that the USSR no longer exists.

However, there are 30 states that have changed their name since the UN was established. There is an international legal mechanism for this to happen. There’s a distinction between the continuities, debt continuity. So, India-Pakistan, for example, India assumed the seat, Pakistan had to reapply. And the dissolution of states, so Czechoslovakia, for example, might – Senegal, for example, were actually both states – oh, sorry, I should say South Sudan and Sudan were – you know, that’s a continuity with Sudan assuming the state. Then, Czechoslovakia, where both have to reapply. And so, with the Alma-Ata Protocols, we have a situation where the Russian Federation assume the continuity and then, the other 11 states had to reapply.

So, I – what I’m worried about this argument, and again, this is more obviously an International Lawyer intervening in a very important political discussion, is that this is a distraction. And I have a lot more to say about the Security Council’s role here, that actually, what is at issue is the legitimacy, then, of what is done by the Council and what Russia can do on the Council. And at the moment, in fact, a lot has been deflected away from the Council as a result of Russia’s behaviour. The Security Council does not have the power here. It’s been given to the General Assembly in a quite, you know, radical change of power dynamic within that setting. I’ll leave it there for now.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much, Devika, but I think there’s also a very clear trend of Russia Federation violating, consistently, its international obligations. So, obviously, we have a problem of this particular organisation, as UN, but some preliminary calculations, as of 2019, Russia violated 36 out of the 58 international treaties. So, we have this consistent pattern of a country, the nuclear country, the D:5 country, that is violating its international obligations, actually unsettling the whole system of some kind of equilibrium. It wasn’t perfect, but some kind of international equilibrium that existed.

So, I’d like now bring back to Kyiv, before we continue, Emine, and let you introduce the next speaker.

Emine Dzhaparova

Yeah, absolutely. Just to add to your words, there, by – for example, by invading Ukraine, Russia has violated more than 407 bilateral and more than 80 multilateral agreements with Ukraine in 2014, when it invaded Crimea. And moreover, if we speak about the UN Charter, I have to be justful, saying that Russia, up ‘til today, has not ratified the Charter of the United Nations. The State Duma, which is the Russian Parliament, has not ratified its documents. So, of course, it’s important notion when we speak about fairness and justfulness.

So, my next speaker is Maria Mezentseva. As I said, she’s a Member of the Parliament, but moreover, she is a Head – a Captain of the Ukrainian team in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. And we all had a successful story, with expulsion of Russia from the Council of Europe, as such, and we believe it was also a very decisive step of the countries of the Council of Europe to do so. And then, the question, Maria, I mean, you’ve been travelling a lot. You talk to Members of Parliaments of many other countries. Could you please share with us, what have you already done and what is your feeling, if there is reciprocity, or what is the vision of other countries in terms of the expulsion of Russia from the United Nations, and what is your formula? How do you see what should we do to bring justfulness in this case?

Maria Mezentseva

Yes, thank you, dear Emine, thank you, Your Excellencies. Thank you, dear participants and dear current and future International Lawyers. I think we have bridged the moment when we can say that Ukraine indeed sets new trends, and not only practically, but also in theory. Why has no-one thought about this mystery of the century for 30 years? And now, after the, I would say second time aggression, or as European Court of Human Rights recently said, finally, that the aggression started in 2014, why have – are we started thinking about it right now?

And it’s not just us, dear friends and colleagues. I would like to refer right now to very concrete steps what can be done with UN Security Council. Indeed, General Assembly is a very powerful tool, but to send mostly political messages and political support. We know that the decisions mandatory are only in the Security Council. So, I would like to refer to the Cambridge Professor, whom we had several endeavours with, it’s Thomas Grant. He’s a Professor in Cambridge and he suggested a very, very simple three-step formula, which is based on the current Article 17, what can we do with the – all the breaches that happen by, and violated by Russia? I would like to remind it happened more than 151 time, when Russia misused its power in the vet – power of veto in the Security Council, and he suggests further three simple steps.

Step number one. He says that one of the 15 members of the Security Council must initiate an objection to the credentials of the Russian Federation. You know that every year, as in every international organisation, as it happened in the Council of Europe, in February – in March 2022, the credentials of the Russian Federations were not ratified and Russia was expelled. Based on numerous breaches of the mandatory things by the Russian Federation, it can be done. If we find nine members of the Security Council who support this initiative, then the power of veto of Russian Federation cannot be executed.

And step number three, once we have these nine members of the Security Council, we see that Russia would have to vacate the USSR seat and be representative of some other state, would take a new seat as of a new member in the Security Council. So, basically, it sounds very simple, harder to implement, because all relies, indeed, on political support, as we have seen it recently, when we were talking for nine years, “Let’s exclude Russia from the Council of Europe because it, indeed, breached the Charter itself, all the provisions of it.” We not – we – I’m sorry, I’m saying it very generally, we were looking with the partners for a form of a dialect. When it was completely impossible, we expelled Russia.

What Ukrainian Parliamentarians are doing globally and together with the, of course, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which had a separate document on this issue, Ukrainian Parliament has passed, with a vast majority, a resolution stating that Russia has breached all its provisions within the UN, but also within the UN Security Council and addressed as many international as – organisations as we could. But before that, last year, again, in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, we have already passed a resolution. One of the amendments to it was specifically on the way how can we deal with Russia in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Security Council?

This is interestingly to say, but 46 member states of the – or the current 46 member states who are functioning in the Council of Europe, all of them did support this initiative. What does it say to us? It tells us that there is a – already, a geographical wide support, because Council of Europe goes a little bit beyond the subcontinent of Europe. It tells us that we have a strength, and I think we have now, arguments, also, on a legal basis, to gather the support of the Global South, as to, say, South America – sorry, Latin America, African States, Asia and Far East. And that is essential, because the support – the point number one, finding nine members within the Security – the UN Security Council, is point number one, but then it will lead to other resolutions, as for instance, with regards to special tribunal for the crime of aggression, or any other initiatives.

We have seen the recent vote, with a very high and vast support of the peace plans of President Zelenskyy, which was backed, of course, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and you did tremendous support to collect an – his Excellency Ambassador Kyslytsya and his team, to collect the support of 141 countries. It was not very easy. We will be facing more obstacles in the future, but let us come back to the very core, essential legal thing. They do not have a right to reside in the UN. Moreover, I think the more articles, the more innovative approaches we will see, the more public the discussion will go, and today’s discussion is, of course, contributing to it, the more chances we will have. Because UN remains one of the largest forums that is taken into account in various political/social issues and issues linked to peace and security. Thank you.

Emine Dzhaparova

Thank you. London, the floor is yours, Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

…Emine. It’s fascinating, I have never worked in this format before in Chatham House, so I don’t know if it’s necessity, the mother of invention, and there’s always a silver lining. I wish you could all come to London, but I understand how travel now is complicated, but maybe we’re inventing something useful and productive today.

I would like now to bring back here, Rick, who is also an Author of a book called “International Organisations and International – and Internal Conditionality: Making Norms Matter,” that was published in 2013. That’s maybe for students if they’re compiling their reading list of today. I mean, Rick, you’ve heard about the Council of Europe. You wrote in your book about both Council of Europe and OSCE. Interestingly, the Minister, in the question, obviously, he didn’t really touch upon it, but my question, beyond normative principles and what is actually correct and – what do we expect these organisations, also, to do, in a particular way in – with this conflict? How can they actually help resolve the war? What kind of power we want to endow into them and what is missing?

Professor Rick Fawn

Thank you very much. I mean, that’s a great set of questions. I feel very privileged to be able to speak to this. I mean, the book that you kindly mentioned was asking the question about organisations that are fundamentally normative and that don’t have coercive power and don’t have a lot of incentive power for states that are already inside, and that’s what we’re dealing with. And I think part of the answer to that question is to suggest that we have already worked up a division of labour, a de facto division of labour, among a number of international organisations. And that division of labour has to do with a principal question, the question of in or out? Do we keep a country, or countries, inside a body when it has so clearly violated the fundamental principles of that body, quite apart from terrorising civilian populations, at that?

My suggestion would be that we have created a division of labour where we have the expression of revulsion through expulsion. Council of Europe features here and I think that’s very, very appropriate. The Council of Europe, after all, admitted Russia in the height of the First Chechen War, when we knew that civilians were being killed indiscriminately, including ethnic Russian people. So, there have been huge trade-offs, and the argument there was, “We can make change by having them in.”

In a broader picture, we have it twofold. We expel and that’s a statement in itself, but I think there should be, also, retention, and that’s perhaps for both, and I may be contrarian in this, the UN and the OSCE help us. And when you ask, very rightly, what can these organisations do? I think something like the OSCE has done a great deal to be able to document, to be able to chastise and the tremendous work, dare I say, of Ukraine’s Diplomats, has been exemplary in doing that and winning over opinion, and making the world, Court of Public Opinion, aware and really decisively, on that. This is very, very high value, I suspect.

Much more of that could be said, but perhaps for openers on that, and I would just stress that I think the OSCE, which was in a great deal of trouble about this time last year, and some of the most senior Diplomats, and that is both in the United States and in Russia, who were involved in the negotiations in the 1970s, were extremely despondent. I think there’s a huge risk if we lose that organisation, and we need a platform to deal with pan-European, Euro-Atlantic security questions. It would cost us an enormous amount if we had to recreate it, and I don’t know it could – if it could be recreated, and it’s extremely important here for other actors, too. Russia shouldn’t be allowed to destroy something that is of benefit to others. So, much that should be kept, I think, there.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much. Thanks for being so succinct and maybe it will help us leave more room for questions. But an interesting fact, as well, is that in the recent survey that was conducted by Open Society Foundations about the global assessment of Russian aggression against Ukraine, there was a clear dissatisfaction with the UN in more, you know, rich North countries, where, you know, 25%, for example, in France, United States, Great Britain and Japan, were not happy, you know, how – actually, were happy, only 25%. And there was quite satisfaction with UN in Kenya, Nigeria and Ukraine. 50% of respondents were, overall, assessing it as a positive and possibly because of the grain deal and Secretary-General Guterres being present in Ukraine. So, you know, it’s a tough balance to walk, where it – there’s a utility and where there is a grave, I would say, hypocrisy of – that Russia’s Chairmanship at the UN Security Council, especially.

And now, we’re coming back to Kyiv. We have one more speaker there.

Emine Dzhaparova

It resembles me the Eurovision Song Contest, you know, by passing the floor from one capital to another one, and by the way, we’re going to celebrate Eurovision very – in the nearest future in London, so we’re happy to dis – to have a disclaimer, yet another one, for Minister Kuleba.

So, you know, the question that Rick has mentioned is whether Russia is going to be in or out. I think it’s the biggest question that we have to be very clear and frank about, and I will give the floor to Alexander Khara, who is an expert of the Centre for Defence Strategies, with this question that, look, I mean, since 2014, we’ve been talking to Russia. We’ve been trying to find proper words, proper leaders who might him listen to, I mean, President Putin might listen to. We had Minsk, we did our best Russia to hear us, but I think that Russia took it as weakness. And today, since 24th of February, obviously, Russia is an elephant in the room, and the question what should be done to deal with this situation? What should international community to do with this, because the whole architecture of security has been broken by the permanent five country. What is your perspective, as an expert, what should be done and how we can treat this situation with this elephant in the room?

Alexander Khara

Thank you. I think it’s the most bizarre thing to have the criminal, the war criminal, and he fills Lieutenant’s chair in the most sacred body of the United Nations, which is supposed to prevent wars, or prosecute criminals. So, that’s why I’m – certainly, Russia should be out, or kicked out, from the UN Security Council and actually, there isn’t precedent. I mean, I’m not talking about Taipei and other things, but I’m talking about the Soviet Russia being kicked out the League of Nation after the invasion of Finland.

Secondly, I can understand why there was this illegal and illegitimate decision made after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia was a democratic hopeful, armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, and certainly, it was absolutely wise to keep Russia within these legal limitations and especially arms control. But look at Russia now. Russia is a totalitarian state and I would say fascist state and it’s not a big, bad word. I am referring to the definition of fascism by Umberto Eco. So, Russia completely fascist state. Then, the remaining, still, let’s say, strategic arms control agreement, was postpone – was suspended, even though there is not such a thinking in the new START treaty.

So, there is no reason to fear Russia that it’s not – it is going to violate some strategic arms control treaties or behave in such a, let’s say, it’s collateral way, because it’s – Russia is doing this already. So, that’s why within – to stop discrediting the United Nations, because we understand that even though there are some opinion polls that have been mentioned, the UN has no really good, let’s say, appearance and support across the globe. We should do this, and I absolutely agree with my colleague and friend, and Honourable Member of Parliament, that Ukraine suffer in this war. Ukraine is fighting for its sovereignty, its existing sovereignty and independence, is a reason for the world to revise something. If there are some gaps in legislation, in international law or institution, we need to fill it.

That’s why we want to have this special tribunal for war crimes, because it’s not possible to prosecute those who planned and gave an order and committed the most terrible crimes of all times. That’s why the – Ukraine should be – it should be Ukrainian contribution to the international community that on our example, or with our case, we should fill these gaps. And the same thing with the illegitimate place of Russia in the Soviet Sea, because no, we have – open up the UN Charter, you see the Soviet Union, who is the Permanent Member of the Security Council.

So, I believe we should talk about it, and not just among us, I mean, those who are – for whom these principles adhere, or the so-called Global South. And I think that Ukraine, here, is unique, as well, because of these – this war has several layers and colonial war, as well, ‘cause Russia consider Ukraine as a colony. And this is why we have a pretty strong argument to reach out to the Global South. Unfortunately, the Russians are exploring this Soviet legacy of anti-colonial wars and support and they are lying to their partners. I am not talking about those who they just bought with some proper – some money, or some projects or political influence, but there were some genuine nation who – I mean, genuine belief in some nations, including India, for example. So, I don’t know if we can change this as well and if the E – it would be Ukrainian contribution to restoring and to securing a rules-based order. Thank you.

Emine Dzhaparova

Thank you, Alexander. Indeed, nothing is impossible. This is the very motto that we’ve been guiding. I mean, all of Ukrainian Diplomats have been guided by this motto that everything is possible and whenever there is a will, there is a way. So, Ukrainian diplomacy is demonstrating extraordinary results, because we never thought that Russia could be expelled from the Council of Europe or from the Human Rights Council in Geneva. We never thought that Finland and Sweden would apply for NATO membership. We never thought that Russia would be expelled from other bunch of multilateral institutions. So, I think that we live in extraordinary times and extraordinary times need extraordinary decisions. And the question is, how should we come to this point where these extraordinary decisions might be taken? So, to conclude, Orysia, 12 points from Ukraine go to United Kingdom.

Orysia Lutsevych

And you can hear the cheer in the room. I think we still have about 15 minutes to include the audience, and if there are any students who would like to ask, you know, to our panellists here, or anybody from the panel in London would like to ask anybody in Kyiv. You just please direct your question to somebody specifically, as you need to make mine and Emine’s job easy and also help us to cover the ground. So, please raise your hand if anybody would like to come in here in London. Yes, there is a hand over there. I have one hand in London. I don’t know how many hands you have in Kyiv so far. So, please, my colleague here, and just introduce yourself, please.

Dr Talita Dias

Hi, Orysia, thank you. My name is Talita Dias and I’m a Senior Research Fellow here on the International Programme. My question goes to Devika and it is a legal question and it has to do with some of the legal hurdles to prosecuting war criminals in the context of the war. So, one of the main hurdles is Head of State immunity, right, for all the options that we have at the tab – on the table right now. And so, I was wondering, what is your take on that hurdle, and in particular, whether you think that states endorsing the, for example – Putin’s arrest warrant, means that they’re also endorsing that there’s no Head of State immunity for international crimes?

Orysia Lutsevych

Okay, do you have questions in Kyiv? Do you want to take one more from the audience there, anybody, or we’ll come here?

Emine Dzhaparova

Let’s finish in London and then, we’ll take some questions in Kyiv.

Orysia Lutsevych

Okay.

Dr Devika Hovell

Great. Thank you, later. So, I feel a bit like the New Yorker cartoon where there’s a man sitting in a bar with his mates, saying, “I’m a passionate man, but first a Lawyer.” So, in amongst all this incredibly important…

Orysia Lutsevych

It’s good to have a Lawyer.

Dr Devika Hovell

I’m not – I didn’t come as the Lawyer…

Orysia Lutsevych

But only one, only one.

Dr Devika Hovell

…to rain on the parade with some practical hurdles to these extraordinary times, when extraordinary measures are needed. But this has been extraordinary. I mean, the International Criminal Law shifted on its axis with the arrest warrants on the 17th of March against Putin.

So, Talita has raised a question of immunity, which is absolutely a hurdle and so, it does depend, in answering that question, on which court we’re talking about. But the practical one that’s presented itself, is, of course, the International Criminal Court. Now, International Criminal Court provides in its statute, in Article 27, that “There is no immunity before the International Criminal Court.” So, yes, pick, accept there’s a problem. The International Court is “Like a giant without arms or legs,” as Cassese, President of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunal once said. It relies on states to enforce its arrest warrants. And unfortunately, one might say, states are bound by immunity within their own states should they arrest, or wish to arrest, either President Putin or Mr [means Ms] Lvova-Belova.

Now, the Head of State, immunity, therefore, is going to be an issue. It’s a very complicated answer, and I won’t indulge myself by talking too much about it. There has been a judgment from the International Criminal Court saying that, basically, there is no immunity in that respect, either, that that would be going through the backdoor, in a way, in imposing immunity in that setting. But that judgment by the ICC is described as very controversial.

One wonders whether there is time now for an advisory opinion to the ICJ on this question of immunity, because actually, it is a question, really, for International Lawyers and international law, and some clarity would be welcome. For the time being, though, again, from a political perspective, perhaps it’s not a good idea. Perhaps that uncertainty is good, because the arrest warrant has symbolic value. As our speaker has said, actually, President Putin is now not merely the Head of State of Russia. He’s an accused war criminal, and for that to be on his business card, detracts heavily from his legitimacy as the Head of State.

And there’s a lot to be said, as well, in terms of the credentials, that again, was raised. One way in which Russia may be suspended or in some way lose its voting rights in even the General Assembly, is if the government, the Putin government’s, credentials are not accepted by the General Assembly. And my colleague, Rebecca Barber, has written a lot on that issue.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much. So, is there a question from Kyiv?

Emine Dzhaparova

Yes, thank you, Orysia and…

Orysia Lutsevych

From the panel.

Emine Dzhaparova

…Devika. Indeed. While there is a very complicated discussion among Lawyers and International Lawyers on the questions of immunity, credibility and so on and so forth, it doesn’t change the reality in Ukraine. And of course, Ukrainian people are very sensitive, because our citizens have been killed, the missiles have been showering the rooftops of Ukrainian houses. The children of Ukraine have been forcibly deported and abducted. So, of course, there is this question, what should be done and where is the international community reaction to what we have, and as we classify as a war crime?

And we have a question here, please. Pose it in English.

Jan

Yes, thank you, I will be in English. Jan [inaudible – 113:33], The Youth Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I have a question to you, panellists, from the Ukrainian side. And as we know, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has proved multiple times that nothing is impossible. When our partners didn’t believe that we would last for one mon – one week, we proved that. We proved that we can fight this war and that we can persuade other partners and make the political decisions on the highest levels possible, even though they seem not really like that.

So, from your experience, while you were working with our foreign partners from different countries, is there a clear understanding among them that Russia must be suspended from the UN Security Council since it doesn’t have the right to reside in it? Is there a clear understanding, or there is a lot of more work to do for us to persuade our partners and friends? Thank you.

Maria Mezentseva

Thank you very much. I think it’s the process and the process. We definitely have to tackle different countries differently. So, for instance, explaining the war of aggression in the legal term. In Indonesia, Jakarta, we’ve been using the peninsula of Crimea invasion in 2014, stating that more than 100 of religious building, including in Crimea, were destroyed, including those where Muslim population is going to pray, showing the videos how, for instance, Muslim population is joining Ukrainian Army to defend Ukraine as a union state. And then, it’s a totally different message in Department of State in D.C., for instance, or a completely, totally different message in the Hague, when we were discussing the immunities.

And if I may link these two important questions, we don’t have an issue with a war – with the ICC recent warrant on war crime committed by Putin and his, sort of, Ombudsman for the – for Children, because it is a multiple war crime which has a genocidal nature. This is one bunch, huge bunch of crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes with genocidal nature. Totally different thing is a crime of aggression, which is – which has an immunity issue, which has to be treated not via ICC, and thank God for the whole year, we’ve been persuading our partners that ICC cannot do it. Thank God there is a dot in this legal question. They cannot because Russia hasn’t ratified Rome Statute, never will, etc. So, Article 8, this 8, is not applied, which tells us about aggression.

However, we need an international broad geographical agreement, the broader, the better, and not a sort of, hybrid format, definitely not, because it will drag us back to national law of Ukraine, Ukraine versus Russia. That’s we don’t – that’s what we do not want. So, international case, international court, which will deal with the crime of aggression. If that crime would never happened, we wouldn’t have 72,000 plus of the war crimes registered, including 16,700 plus official registered cases of deported Ukrainian children to the territory of Russia in occupied territories, temporary occupied territories of Ukraine.

Sorry, I – it – I might sound a little bit, you know, jumping from topic-to-topic, but it was very important how do we link all that? And sometimes, friends, we feel like we are educating each other, from time-to-time, because something I’ve been reading in the books in the University of Kent, in Canterbury, is not working today. This is just not working today. We are filling these gaps, and I totally was – agree with Alexander. We are inventing things that are up-to-date. We can’t rely on charters and documents since Second World War, because we’re living in the 21st Century, with hybrid threats, threats including to the international law, and that’s why the instrumental part, approaching to different partners, has to be different.

And, you know, that days when we were cruising around, using same arguments, okay, “Give me the paper, okay, who are we meeting right now? Okay, we are doing the House of Commons. Okay, doesn’t matter, let’s do the same what we’ve done in D.C.” No, no, no, no, no, this is very precise, very strategic work. It takes hours and days and there are people in this room whom I highly thankful for the profiles that are being sent when we travel to different countries, for instance, our recent trip to Budapest, and congratulations, friends. Today, Russia has included Hungary to the non-friendly countries, what great news. But it takes time, and it takes – it has to have a professional approach to it, so everywhere, it’s different.

Emine Dzhaparova

You have to go to China.

Maria Mezentseva

Yes, and I’m – and I speak Chinese, so I’m ready.

Emine Dzhaparova

Orysia, we’re done with questions here. Please have in mind that we have Ambassador Kyslytsya on the screen with us, even though we can’t see him now, if there are some questions there.

Orysia Lutsevych

Yes, yeah, and yeah, go ahead, over there, yeah, microphone. We have – I have – we have one more question and then, maybe we’ll, yeah, we’ll bring in Rick after, as well. Andrew, please.

Sir Andrew Wood

My question is a little bit…

Orysia Lutsevych

Can you just introduce yourself?

Sir Andrew Wood

Oh, sorry, yes, Andrew Wood, well, this – Chatham House. It’s a question that hasn’t been asked. We’ve spoken a great deal about Russia and about Putin as though they do the same thing. Putin has locked himself in an almost impossible position for himself and he’s gone a long way to destroying a great nation, which is Russia. Does anybody in Kyiv, or elsewhere, expect any change in Russia, or are we making the assumption that it all will stay the same as it is throughout this year?

Orysia Lutsevych

Before I come back to Kyiv, Rick just wanted to make a comment.

Professor Rick Fawn

Well, it’s more a question, and I think we know that diplomacy has theatre to it, and we’re talking about life and death, I’m achingly aware of that. And I consider myself to be from Western Ukraine, that is Canada, and have visited Ukraine many, many a time, and I’m personally in great agony every moment as to what is happening there.

When April 1st comes, is there consideration to the idea of walking out? I mean, we’ve seen cases where Lavrov has addressed diplomatic forums, Diplomats leave. Are there televisual messages that are being planned to send when this happens? It doesn’t save lives, I’m aware of that, but in terms of the theatre and the potency that international forums can have, are there plans to that effect?

Orysia Lutsevych

So, maybe, Emine will take this question to Ambassador Kyslytsya, the specifically what Rick has asked.

Emine Dzhaparova

Yeah.

Orysia Lutsevych

And then, if I may ask you to answer the question about what are your hopes about the future of Russia?

Emine Dzhaparova

Yeah, but let us first go…

Orysia Lutsevych

Yes.

Emine Dzhaparova

…give the floor to Alexander and then, Ambassador Kyslytsya and I will conclude.

Alexander Khara

Thank you.

Orysia Lutsevych

Sounds good.

Alexander Khara

You know, the United Kingdom has done a great job of not – of seeing Russia in a face value, and not overestimating democratic course from the beginning of the 1991. And I believe that even the Russian opposition is not really – well, believe in the possibility of a rapid change in Russia, for various reasons, because, you know, you have the oil wealth concentrated in all fair – in hence of FSB operators. You have Security [inaudible – 121:39] who controls everything. You have persecution and a lot – and an outflow of the liberal minded people from Russia, and they are not going to re-join in the nearest future. And as I said that Russia turn into a fascist state if we have a look at the Ur-Fascism by Umberto Eco.

So, I’m sceptical about any chance of Russia turning to normal, because they’ve done their civilisational choice and actually, they sided with, as we call them, rough states, and China, as well, which is on the course of possible conflict in the Indo-Pacific. So, that’s why I don’t think that in our own – at least in our generation, we will see considerable changes if there is no drastic, let’s say, events happening to Russia, or if Russia exist in the same borders, if Russia exist with the same imperial mindset. It’s going to be a long-term security threat, and not just to Ukraine – not just to Europe, but the whole world. That’s why I don’t think that we – it’s time for us to talk about future, democratic future of Russia. Russia failed to be democratic, several times throughout at least 200 years, and that’s why I’m sceptical. I don’t think that you find, even of these Soviets, someone hopeful that Russia can turn back from the cold. Thank you.

Emine Dzhaparova

Thank you. Ambassador Kyslytsya, the floor is yours.

Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya

Well, thank you. I hold no hopes for Russia in the near future, and one of the reasons is because unlike Nazi Germany, then after the military defeat of Nazism, Russia is now going to be occupied by allies, and the occupation of Germany allowed Germany to undergo a very profound process of denazification that allowed Germany to become one of the most important pillars of democracy in today’s world. Therefore, I hold no hopes for Russia in the near future.

I would like to come back to the issues of Russian presence in the Security Council and in the United Nations. With all my respect, Maria, who is a very good friend of mine and a very – one of the most prominent Parliamentarians, I need to tell her that I am full of white envy when I listen to the Members of the Parliament, or to some Professors from renowned world universities. I am not a Member of the Parliament, therefore, I have to deal with the practical things.

I invite the students who would like to be successful in multilateral diplomacy to study carefully all the rules and procedures and the history of the United Nations. I have a book in front of me, you know, there’s more than 700 pages. Those 700 pages are about the rules of procedures of the Security Council, and you cannot introduce political ideas unless they are within the framework of very, very difficult rules of procedure.

But I would like to insist what I said and repeat it once again what I said at the beginning, Russia was allowed to assume a Soviet state in the Security Council in an illegal way. Therefore, we should not pursue the illegal way of removing it from the Security Council. It was purely the political decision, and we should really work very hard with all our partners so that they are ready to take that political decision. Unlike the Council Europe, unlike the OECE, unlike the European Union, the United Nations has no Parliamentary wing. The United Nations is intergovernmental organisation, and it is the governments who sit both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Therefore, they are not as flexible and they are not as creative as the Parliamentarians and the Professors with this – around the world.

The final thing that I would like to bring your attention to is that in 2015, which is almost the year after Russia invaded Crimea, when the Russians understood that the issue of their presence in the Security Council and in the General Assembly might have been raised by many, including by Ukraine, the Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, who was the Soviet Ambassador in December 1991, he gave the interview to the UN Information Service. And in that interview, he specifically made Western countries, and in particular the United States, accomplices to the crime of bypassing all legal requirements for the purposes of assuming the Soviet seat in the Security Council. And I would like to quote from that interview. He said, speaking about the letter that Yeltsin sent to the Secretary-General, he said, “Yes, the letter was definitely sent by the Russian President, but the wording, yes, it was recommended by Western countries, including by the United States.”

So, you see, the thing is that it is a matter of fact and it is a regrettable fact, as we look at it from the optics of today, that it was the decision of the most friendly to Ukraine countries, of the United Kingdom, of France, of the United States, back in December 1991, behind the closed doors, to let the Russian Federation to become the continuator to the Soviet Union. And it, of course, is politically difficult to admit at the moment, but I hope that the day will come when those governments will clearly state their decision was wrong and we have to address it so we would prevent any chance of the similar aggressions happening in the future. Thank you.

Emine Dzhaparova

Thank you, Ambassador Kyslytsya. Orysia, I’m afraid I don’t have time to respond the question, because we are running out of time. Just to conclude, it’s a very difficult and complicated question with regards to legal perspective, with regards to political push, but I think that it’s important to know that we are living the war and this war reveals drawbacks and flaws of international security architecture. And we have a country that is claiming to be the – or that is supposed to be the guarantor of the peace and security, but instead, it violates peace and security in pretending to be a peace-loving country.

And then, the question goes not only to Ukrainian people that are paying the highest price, because we die at this war, but the question goes to everyone, what is the responsibility, and will Russia be accountable for its crimes? And I think that we only started this discussion – of course, Ukraine doesn’t have time, as Minister Kuleba said, we are very frank, and the limits of sincerity in diplomacy might be different, but I think that the limits of Ukrainian sincerity is the highest one. And it’s like we are frank, saying that we have to do something about the fact where Russia, as a P5, usurpates this seat, exploits it in terms of bleaching out its own crimes and there is – obviously should be a respond that we all have to find.

Orysia Lutsevych

Yeah, and I think this event is a true effort in not settling into complacency. We understand that issues are very difficult, that solutions are not right on the table, but I think it’s a kind of, an effort to marshal the minds, the best minds in law, in international affairs, in diplomacy, in Ukrainian think tanks, in British think tanks, in political, Members of Parliament, in diplomacy. And I do hope we succeeded today.

I would like to, first, thank all the teams behind this, right, because there was a team in Kyiv, and a team here in Chatham House, too, and a team in New York, apparently. So, all of this make it happens. Thank you very much to all of my colleagues and all colleagues in Kyiv, all the speakers who came, all the participants. So, let’s join in the round of applause each other for this effort [pause]. Thank you very much.

Emine Dzhaparova

Thank you, thank you so much.

Orysia Lutsevych

[Mother tongue].

Emine Dzhaparova

[Mother tongue].