Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world

Dr Patricia Lewis

[Pause] Well, welcome, everybody, it’s been quite a day today. It’s been quite a – yeah, and it’s my great privilege to Chair quite an unusual meeting at Chatham House, one in which we are putting on stage my colleagues and sharing our own expertise on the – Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. And what we’re looking at is not only the whole issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but also how it’s changed the world.

So, we’ve got people from different parts of Chatham House with different expertise. We’ve got Leslie Vinjamuri, who’s the Director of the US and Americas Programme, and the Dean of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership and International Affairs, well-known, I’m sure, to everyone here. We have Creon Butler, who’s the Research Director for Trade, Investment and New Governance Models and the Director of the Global Economy and Finance Programme. We have James Nixey, who’s the Director of the Russia and Eurasia Programme and we have Orysia Lutsevych, who is the Research Fellow, Russia/Eurasia Programme and Head of the Ukraine Forum.

My name’s Patricia Lewis. I’m the Research Director for Conflict, Science and Transformation and the Director for International Security and as I said, today’s been quite a day. We’re here to talk about what’s going on with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine and the impact that it’s had on the world. And today, we heard a long, very long, State of the Nation Address from President Putin and yet another treat – nuclear treaty blow, with a suspension of participation and a threat on another treaty. And a very short, I thought, passionate rallying speech of solidarity from President Biden in Poland.

So, so much has happened in the last year and we thought that this meeting, which is on the record and please tweet about it, and I welcome everybody who is online, and please put in your questions, we thought we’d have a look from the different perspectives, from each of us, and I wondered, perhaps, if I could start with you, Orysia. You’re very much engaged in what’s going on in Ukraine. You have an extraordinary experience and I know that perhaps for you, this is – this war has had the hugest impact of everyone on the panel. So, perhaps we could start with your views, your vision and what you think has happened.

Orysia Lutsevych

Thank you very much, Patricia. It’s unusual, indeed; I don’t think we’ve ever been on the same panel as James…

James Nixey

We should be…

Orysia Lutsevych

…as speakers, although I’ve been here now for ten years and started the Ukraine Forum almost nine years ago, when Russia annexed Crimea. And what it is called now in Ukraine was the first Russian-Ukrainian war. Now Ukraine is fighting the second Russian-Ukrainian war and it has been, you know, of course, the dark times. The dark times in a way that there’s vicious irony, where Russia is erasing its own imprint in South East of Ukraine, where indeed, when Putin spoke today again about gathering of these what he calls “historic lands,” he is erasing everything that has been, to a degree, achieved through colonisation of a Russian Empire to South East of Ukraine. He is destroying cities, Ukrainian cities, like Mariupol, Volnovakha, Bakhmut, Enerhodar. He’s bombing Dnipro, Kharkiv, where there’s mainly Russian speaking population that lives there, that he, himself, in his twisted mind, says he is trying to protect.

And all this results in an silver lining, kind of, the bright side of this, where it is actually destroying – putting the nail in the coffin of the Russian world, and what it means, it’s this, kind of, now Soviet, nostalgy, historical manipulation of what has happened and why Ukrainian nation doesn’t exist. It’s this imperial grandeur that Putin very much wants to make his own legacy, that is completely collapsing in Ukraine as we speak, as walls and, you know, windows of Ukrainian houses are collapsing.

So, it became very clear what Ukrainian nation stands for and it became an immense accelerator of that process. So, he – today, in Ukraine, almost 70% of Ukrainians believe that Soviet Union was a totalitarian state that pursued state terror and then, that specific legacy of the Soviet regime reincarnated itself in Putin and must be put to justice, brought to justice. They support sanctions on Russian clergy and complete split from the Byzantine Russian type orthodoxy and creation of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is not a fifth column of Russia in Ukraine. They support a Ukrainian language as the only language of communication in state affairs and we see a dramatic shift, for example, of those who were saying that Ukraine should be bilingual, to those who are saying that Ukraine should actually have that identity protected.

And most importantly, I think Ukraine shared this complex of inferiority that Russians were so hard instilling into Ukrainians over centuries, I would argue, and Ukrainians see for what Russia is. And I think one of the best description of it, is “the colossus on clay feet.” There’s no fear of Russia, despite all this destruction, because they know it’s a weak state and they understand that the days of that regime are numbered. When Putin invaded Ukraine, it was clear that he, in a way, was unleashing the beginning of his end. Ukrainians are very realistic, they don’t expect that end to happen in one or two, perhaps, years, but they know that this is imminent, and they believe that this is a fight worth pursuing.

So, just to say that, of course, there has been a lot of unexpected things about Ukraine and one of the unexpected things, including for me, is how functional Ukraine is and throughout this year, you have railways running. We were just discussing, you know, even high-level officials taking Ukrainian trains, including President Biden yesterday. Banking system is working, economies remain digital, the internet connection is working, anticorruption agencies are working. And I think this is something I’d like to point to, because Ukraine, you know, has this negative image for corruption and, you know, throughout this year, what just happened within that sphere is that there’s new Anticorruption Prosecutor that was appointed and the High Anticorruption Court reviewed almost 30 verdicts and actually returned to the state budgets almost £27 million of various assets that were acquired in a corrupt way, to support Ukrainian armed forces.

So, there is a determination of Ukrainian, both senior leadership and society, to pursue that, and Ukrainians are, in a way, determined to also fight until they restore territorial integrity. I think it’s very important to understand why this emotion to fight is so – remains so strong, despite the suffering, and it’s mainly because they understand that Russians will not stop at whatever territorial concessions they get and they will pursue a new invasion, and also, because of all the war crimes that they are committing. And something we have seen throughout the year, documented by both international human rights, UN Human Rights Council, the High – the Criminal Court in The Hague. And Ukrainians understand that this is the war of extermination, and they will fight for every inch of Ukrainian territory and for every Ukrainian citizens.

So, just to wrap up, I think what Ukraine achieved this year is clearly – it has won its place in the transatlantic security. It has demonstrated that it belongs, because of the values, and just to – first, all of us to remember, for whenever in the future, Russia will say that it was NATO that was provoking this war. In December of 2012 there was 15% support for NATO and today, in October of 2022, 83% of Ukrainians support full membership in NATO as the only security guarantee against any future invasion. This is what Ukrainians will pursue. Whether they will be successful, it takes two to tango, but I think there’s a very clear understanding where Ukraine belongs. I’ll stop here.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah, I mean, Putin does remind us of a gaslighting spouse who says, you know, “You made me do it” after he hits his wife. James, onto you. I’ve just characterised Russia’s idea.

James Nixey

Good one.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I don’t think that we…

James Nixey

No, no, I – yeah.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And, you know, what’s been going on in Russia? How has this impacted ordinary Russians? I think we all know, we read everything all the time, but what are some unusual takeaways, perhaps, that you might have for us?

James Nixey

Some takeaways, yeah. So, tough day, tough week, tough year. Leslie and I were just saying, “If you walked into a room,” that, you know, “where were you when you heard about the invasion?” I mean, it’s one of those very few moments in life, September 11, hmmm, I can think of a couple of others, perhaps, where you know exactly where you were. So, that’s testament to it, as well, and it has, of course, tested Western systems and structures and resolve and will continue to do so. And that’s, perhaps, the biggest imponderable and that’s where Chatham House comes together. I mean, Creon will no doubt talk a lot about himself from his, sort of, thematic point of view, it’s where Chatham House comes together very well, I feel, yourself not least, Patricia.

But yes, I thought I would try and be a good student and talk about how it changed Russia, I suppose, being the largest country in the world, still, and should continue to be, unless it breaks up. It’s not out of the question. I think this war, first of all, it’ll test Vladimir Putin. He’s spent 30% of his life being Russia’s ruler and his ability to control his own population and achieve domestic obedience is going to be increasingly difficult, and I’ll come back to that. But, also, his military is going to be tested, as well, and very – just looking at it from that point of view. 80% of Russia’s ground forces are being used up in Ukraine right now.

Overall, I think it’s probably fair to say they’ve performed poorly, poorer than expected, despite some recent incremental gains, but the difficulties of, say, taking Poltava, for example, that was quite a humiliation just recently, and it’s, you know, it’s not impossible. We even – you know, you and I have been talking a little bit about scenarios lately, Patricia, and – that you would see an implosion along the frontline, desertion, rebellion, something like that, and that would be disastrous for him.

Now – and it actually brings us back to a domestic resp – a domestic stability point, because obvious failure on the battlefield doesn’t just mean he has to scale back his imperial dreams. It would mean would – he’d quite clearly be at risk from an angry and increasingly impoverished population, and from a palace coup, if a significant cohort of people in the elite believe that Russia is headed down the wrong path. I’m not saying, just to be clear, that that is the most likely possibility, necessarily, but it does get more likely the worse that Russia per – Russia’s performance is and the more dissatisfied the population is, and that’s what we see.

I mean, it’s – in terms of how Russians are looking at the war right now, it’s insuf – it’s a difficult question. Because I mean, you can roughly look at it – it’s a big of a generalisation, but you can, sort of, look and if there’s 20% are very much rabidly supporting, or 20% are against it, quite firmly and there’s a, sort of, a 60% in the middle, and it depends on the question you ask, of course, and etc., but there’s a – that’s, sort of, where we are.

But I mean, I think, just going back to the impoverishment of the population, then Russia was never – it was never richer than it was the day before it invaded Ukraine in 2014, in fact, and so, then, it’s steadily gotten worse and now it’s in – now it’s got to get a, yeah, an awful lot worse. So, I mean, not least because I think these sanctions are beginning to bite. I don’t know if Creon’s going to say a little bit more about that.

Dr Patricia Lewis

President Biden said there’d be more this week, coming on from this one.

James Nixey

Exactly, and that – but I think more than that, but Russia is depleting itself in this war. It’s putting so much of itself into it and immobilisation of the economy. So – but that’s – so, that, you know, obviously, Russia has so much else, I suppose. So much is contingent on the outcome of this war and if you think Russia will be defeated, then the manner of that defeat, if you think Putin will leave, how he will leave, in a coffin, or going silently into the night, or having chosen his successor. I mean, you know…

Dr Patricia Lewis

Through an open window.

James Nixey

…and so, there’s more possibilities for that.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Hmmm hmm.

James Nixey

So, I think a lot is – a lot of what we say about Russia is contingent upon how this is going to pan out. But I guess in the context of this event, then my real point is, is that one of the countries that is most profoundly going to be changed by Russia’s war is Russia. And so, you know, possibly radically and possibly in a good way, with an opportunity for a new start, you know, I can see a silver lining. But I – but as I, sort of, joked at the start, though it’s not really a joke, you know, possibly leading to the federated states of a new Russia, the implosion and fragmentation of Russia, what we all feared back in 1991, or 1990, if you like. I don’t necessarily think so, but it’s certainly within the scope of the imagination that I wasn’t, you know, able to imagine, you know, before February 24th of last year.

So – well, there’s not much we can say for certain, but I do think we can say this. Win, draw, messy outcome, uncertain outcome, no outcome, frozen conflict, everlasting war, stalemate, Russia’s going to get a lot poorer. Partly because, as I say, of the sanctions and partly because of its deplete say – it’s depleting effects, and that poverty will lead to further oppression. I know it’s pretty bad right now. You know, we’re at the stage of book banning and legalised violence and assassinations and political prisoners, of course, and possibly further conflict escalation.

So, my takeaway, I guess, is that Russia’s going to change and that even though it’s entirely correct to be restraining Russia, even punishing Russia, don’t have an issue with that, it’s going to get a worse place to be if you’re unlucky enough to be a Russian citizen, I suppose, and a more difficult place to deal with.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks, James. Leslie, from the United States’ perspective and across the Atlantic, in the Atlantic Alliance.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, first of all, thank you for putting this panel together. I guess all my colleagues in the front row…

Dr Patricia Lewis

You can blame them.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

…who’ve done all the work. It is – it’s, sort of – you know, on the one hand, it’s been a long year. On the other hand, I feel like I need the disclaimer in front of anything I say, that, you know, our views and our understanding of this are rapidly developing. And one – when one tries to look back and say, you know, “What’s changed, what’s the same, what are the implications?” it’s inevitable that anybody who’s a thinking human being will develop and change their views, so don’t hold me accountable.

So, the first thing that it really struck me is, you know, we’ve had so many conversations, over the last many years, across the UK, across Europe, across the US, across the world, about the end of the rules-based order, the end of the liberal order. We’ve talked about – 2001 was a landmark moment, 2008 the financial crisis, 2016 the election of Donald Trump. But it does feel like 2022, the invasion, really did mark a fundamental transformation, a turning point, which might’ve been a long time coming, for multiple reasons, but the return of major war in Europe.

And for those of us in my generation that really cut our teeth and, kind of, came into the world of international affairs thinking about the wars in the Balkans, right, when people were saying, you know, “War in Europe,” it feels like there was a – you know, obviously things weren’t peaceful everywhere and obviously, there’s been a lot of instability in various forms. But the return of major war in Europe, the return of conventional war, hard power, geography, politics, geopolitics, the return of the state and the focus on really pretty normal historical things that are pretty awful, has taken us away from where I think we thought we were, which is that we just focus on the big global challenges and how to co-operate to tackle them.

Alongside that, I think that this has shown a light on the reality, which is not new to many people or many states around the globe, that the international security architecture is not fit for purpose. The UN Security Council – and perhaps we’ll look back and say, you know, the heyday was 1990, when it came together to really call to account and to give legitimate authority to pushing back Iraq out of Kuwait. It feels like now it’s deadlocked and that any pretence that it had, and I recognise the profound critique that are very real, but any pretence that it had to being the legitimate authority that would decide when it was okay to use force, seems to be gone. And the ability to really use that body to decide on major issues of peace and security seems to have been, you know, in the most profound way possible. And recognising the very serious critique of 2003 that many people make, it now seems to be that that is fundamentally flawed and there’s not much to say about it.

Thirdly, on regional security, it feels like the game for security is back in the regions and that the US has clearly been pulled very much back into probably not where it intended to be when Biden was elected, which is into the game of transatlantic security. The importance of NATO has clearly been reaffirmed after many years of Trump bashing and many people believing that had he been re-elected, that he would’ve pulled the US outside of NATO. But it goes beyond that, and I would say that the importance of regional security and NATO and the US as a major security provider, is also confirmed by the fact that the whole conversation that had begun to dominate European corridors about strategic on – autonomy is gone.

It’s not that there isn’t a conversation that Europe can and should do, this. Many people are arguing that. But the real focus, say at our Berlin Conference a year and a half ago, Chatham House Berlin Conference, when Macron said, you know, “NATO’s braindead and we need to do the strategic autonomy,” that is just not where the conversation is right now. And the other component of this, and this, sort of, takes you in a slightly different direction on the regional security, is that the other two post-war, not post-Cold War, but post-war bits, seem to be very different. And that’s the role of Germany and its own position on defence and security and the role of Japan. So, pretty significant changes, not clear where they’ll go.

Fourth point, the rest. We all know that the rest, in terms of GDP and population, are not with the West on this war, but one of the real challenges is that, you know, the major players in the rest, China and India being two, have said for a very long time that what they cared about was sovereignty. And that does not seem to be where they’re putting their cards in this particular war, which leads me to believe that the tension and the conflict between the West and the rest is much graver than we think. Because if they’re not willing to back the UN Security Council resolution sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, a clear violation of the UN Charter and clearly speaking to one they’ve said matters most. Then, clearly, there’s a whole lot more going on that isn’t just about sovereignty. There’s fundamental contestation, not only over values, but over who’s going to control the globe.

So, going forward, I guess just a few quick thoughts. We know that there’s a fundamental question of whether unity will be maintained inside the US, whether unity will be maintained inside of Europe and across Europe and whether the unity will be maintained between the US and Europe. We have a big question mark about how much stronger the alliance will become between China and Russia. If that becomes stronger and the West becomes weaker, we are in some pretty grave trouble.

And then, a final comment, I guess, on the US and the big outstanding question is what happens in the US after 2024? I’m on the optimistic side, which I think is grounded in evidence, but I recognise that there’s a whole lot that could happen. A week is a long time in politics, but obviously, if there’s a fundamental change of leadership and any other number of things that could happen in the US, then the whole bit on the question of Western unity will also change.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, Leslie. I’m going to come back to you all with questions, but I’m going to restrain myself for now and turn to Creon. And Creon, if you could just take us through, you know, some of the international economic trade issues, which I think is a more mixed picture, right…

Creon Butler

Yeah.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…since a year ago?

Creon Butler

Well, thanks, Patricia and, I mean, I think it is – there’s lots of bad stuff that’s happened, but there are also some potentially positive things that could come of what we’ve seen over the past year.

I really wanted to make three points to start off with. Firstly, the picture we face in the – in terms of what’s happened in the economic world, is – I mean, it’s an obvious point. It’s really complex to try and trace through what is happening as a result of Russia’s attack on Ukraine and what was happening because of all the other things that have been going on, not least the global pandemic and even, you know, the legacy from the Global Financial Crisis of ten years, or so, ago.

Another reason it’s really complicated is that the impact of Russia’s attack has come through many different channels. So, first of all, you’ve had the fact you’ve got a major war in Europe and that creates economic disruption, and not just in Ukraine and Russia, but also in the region around, and that has an immediate impact economically. You’ve then got the unprecedented Western economic sanctions and I’ve worked on sanctions in the past. Indeed, I worked on the rather, sort of, very different type of set of sanctions in 2014. There are a number of reasons why it was really different this time. One was the threshold that Putin crossed, in the international security sense, meant that there was a complete unity among the G7, at least a very large amount of unity about what needed to be done, and that pushed the, if you like – their willingness to do a number of things much further than has been the case in the past.

And you had, I think, in practice, four areas that you could identify. First of all, excluding Russia from the financial system, essentially excluding Russian banks from the payment system, but also actions, such as freezing 50% or so of Russian Central Bank foreign exchange reserves, something that had not been done, really, for a country of the economic significance of Russia in the past and which has a lot of implications.

Secondly, on the anti-corruption side, I think – I mean, the latest figure I saw was 1,500 people have been sanctioned through anti-corruption, but also those who’ve been supporting President Putin in his action, and also, this is leading to further measures. So, we’re seeing in Canada, for example, a legislation that may enable you to freeze not just – sorry, and confiscate, not just the assets of people who’ve been involved in kleptocracy, but also people who’ve been involved in supporting war crimes.

Then you’ve got the sanctions that ex – sought to exclude and prevent Russia from accessing technologies, whether for weapons or across the whole board in terms of supporting their energy infrastructure or in terms of, you know, of the civil airline industry and the fact that you – you know, Airbus and Boeing, which account for 70% of Russia’s airline fleet and not supplying planes or parts, which has a major impact. And then, finally, really, really new area, which is the – in the hydrocarbon area, the idea of a price cap. So, this is not a sanction, in the traditional sense, it’s not intended to prevent Russia from exporting a product. It’s preventing – it’s, sort of, trying to prevent Russia from raising revenue from that product.

And not just the unity of the G7, but also the way in which these sanctions have interacted with other developments, like climate change, for example, have meant that a number of the moves have been irrevocable in the way that they wouldn’t have been present in – wouldn’t have been irrevocable in the absence of climate change, have meant that this is a wholly new world. I think – you know, I don’t have any doubt that this was the right thing to do, but I think there are a lot of consequences from what has been done, which we’re going to have to work through subsequently.

And indeed, there are questions, which I think for – relevant, particularly for the G7 and the G20, about, for example, when you freeze a country’s foreign exchange reserves, that raises a whole bunch of new questions. Other countries are going to worry about that, probably quite – you know, for, in some cases good, some cases not so good, reasons. Do you want to just leave it out there as a, sort of, constructive ambiguity and say, you know, “You’ve got to pull a finger out for yourself when we would do the same thing,” or do you want to provide some kind of clarity on which a measure of this kind would be taken?

Just two other, sort of, quick points. I think, firstly, when this happened, if you look back to October 2021, we were predicting growth for 2022 of 4.9%. In fact, it’s turned out at 3.4%. So, the change is not – this is IMF forecast, the change is not as dramatic as might’ve been thought at the time. And I think there are – it’s been sharper, the impact in advanced countries, particularly because of the impact on Europe, than it has been in the emerging markets, and I think there are a number of reasons for this. One is the enor – surely, flexibility of the private sector in responding to shocks of this kind. I mean, you can see that, in terms of the energy conservation measures in Europe that have taken place. But also, you’ve had other events going on, such as China’s emergence and then COVID, which has, sort of, boosted world growth.

I think the final, given this, really, shortage of time, is in terms of the long-term impact from this, so what is the really important impact? I think it’s important to think through, really careful, each of the issues. So, if you look at inflation, there was an inflation surge. It got up to nearly 9% inflation in 2022, but the actions of central banks, the fact that energy prices have dropped quite dramatically, means that we may well be down, according to the IMF forecast, 4% by 2024. So, that probably is not going to be a major impact from this event.

On the other hand, if you look at the acceleration of the net zero transition in Europe, so saying this is a ratchet effect. Once you change from one form of energy system to another system, there’s no way you’re going to go back, because of the way that interacts with climate change. Now, if you look at previous examples of sanctions, you might well have had a reversion, but this is not going to be the case here.

And then, the final point I’d just make would be about global economic governance. So, this was – looked like it was in real trouble, in terms of the spring of 2022. A number of Western countries walked out of the G20 meetings. It looked like – it looks like there’s been a sort of, thought on both sides, actually, as to whether that was such a good idea, so that the Indonesians managed to produce an outcome to their summit in Bali.

I think from the West’s point of view, they said, “Actually, we need the G20 for broader discussions with China and others and, also, it’s very interesting that Russia, basically – that the thing they wanted more than anything was not to get excluded from the G20. In terms of everything else, they just stayed quiet, and it was very interesting, when you look at the outcome statements, there’s a bit which says, “One group of countries feels this, that they shouldn’t be in the G20, another group of countries feels something else,” and then, all of the rest of it, it’s the type of outcomes that you would normally expect. So, I think there is a big question, looking forward, for the global economic governments, whether actually, this is not in as bad a shape, if you like, as the international security architecture.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Hmmm, that’s interesting.

Creon Butler

I’ll stop there.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And I would say to – in connection with that, to Leslie, what we’ve seen is a huge transformation in the UN moving away from the Security Council, which was not the first time it’s been frozen for decades in the Cold War, but to the General Assembly, which is, again, a new type of governance on the international level, and actually has a lot more going for it, in some ways, than relying completely on the Security Council.

And I know we’re running out of time, but I wanted to quickly bring Orysia and Creon together to think about the reconstruction of Ukraine, and whatever happens at the end, hopefully, it will be over, there will be Ukraine intact, able to build itself again. Where will this money come from? Who will be paying? Russia will be paying, right? Will it be the frozen assets of the oligarchs, or the frozen assets of the state? How will this work? So, perhaps, Orysia, if we could start with you, what your vision for reconstruction would look like. Is it Build Back Better? Is that a terrible phrase, or what?

Orysia Lutsevych

Yeah, but…

Dr Patricia Lewis

But, you know, what is it?

Orysia Lutsevych

Well, I’d say the reconstruction already started in Ukraine. It’s not something that Ukraine can afford planning for later, but the thinking involved, the type of Ukraine that must emerge out of this war is here and it takes place across government, across business community, across civil society. And what is very clear is that it will be a Ukraine that complies and resembles the type of a European Union nation, that includes green transition, that includes decentralised governments, that includes power to the regions, that also includes quite strong logistics links with the European Union. That includes integration of Ukraine within the European energy system, [inaudible – 34:43]. And something that it’s clear now what makes Ukraine resilient today, is something that Ukraine wants to build on, but again, more and better, is digital economy, is IT sector, its – in addition to its agriculture, that is a powerhouse and that actually could drive a lot of growth and innovation around that.

Ukraine wants to keep that more modern – the type economy, and to be honest, Ukrainians have a very modernisation agenda, but we run the survey of civil society organisation late November/beginning of December, and most groups say, “We need to modernise Ukraine, not just rebuild it the way it is.” And this is the main message, and they see a European integration process, that very important EU candidate status that Ukraine achieved, as a pathway to building Ukraine – to rebuilding Ukraine after the war.

Creon Butler

Just say, I mean, I’m a real optimist about Ukraine in the long-term as an economy and particularly because of the accession track with the EU, but for many other reasons, domestic reasons, as well. And in a way, this offsets what is real deep pessimism about Russia, where I agree very much with James’s analysis. The thing I would, though, however, say is that, you know, the West is already – I think the latest figures, I’m looking at the Kiel Institute, Western spending is already 140 billion since the war began, and that’s both military and economic and other support, 50% of that is from the US.

Now, you know, to the extent that there is limited amount of money, which there is, I think it’s far more important the West spends the money now on enabling Ukraine to win, whether it’s through weapons supplies or through budgetary support, because I think once the war stops, there is a very positive economic growth model for Ukraine available. And that doesn’t necessarily need, nor will it necessary get, a lot of paid finance from the West at that point. There may well be – sorry, aid, grant-giving from the West at that point. There may well be finance and hopefully, as much private finance as possible, linked to the diaspora and so on. But to the extent that there has to be a choice, in terms of how the West spends money, I would spend it now, rather than later.

Dr Patricia Lewis

That’s a really great point, thanks a lot, Creon. So, Leslie, turning to you, you know, and we heard President Biden’s do a speech to the American people about what it – what Americans think, right? It was almost like he was rallying the United States’ population. Is this because he fears the debate coming up with the Presidential election? Do you think he’s, like, trying to create this backbone in the United States to not think about this as a – yet another foreign war in the way that some have been characterising it?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

I mean, the first thing I would say, and I think it was said far better than me by the US Vice President, Kamala Harris, who spoke very, very well at the Munich Security Conference and reminded people that Americans – as she said, “Across America, in places that you’ve – will never have heard of, are flying the Ukrainian flag.” So, there has been tremendous support across the United States, from all corners, for Ukraine. It’s been really phenomenally remarkable.

What we also know, and our colleague who is based in Washington, Bruce Stokes, published a piece with Chatham House, showing the data, that over time – he was looking at Americans. I suspect it’s true far beyond the United States that as – “The longer that wars go on, the more that they lose domestic support,” and that’s shown in Vietnam, that’s shown in Afghanistan. These are not all the same conflicts by any stretch of the imagination, but on this dimension of public support, it – you lose public support the longer you’re in a war. So, part of what President Biden is trying to do, for multiple reasons, only one of them is about the domestic audience, is to shore up that support. And I think what we saw at Munich, what we heard at Munich, what we all know, is that absent momentum, it’s going to be hard to get the kind of successes on the ground that will sustain popular support and infuse that through Congress.

But to your specific question about what happens as the US moves into – we’re still a little ways off, but a year from now, we’re not going to be very far off. We’re going to be in an election season, which is very hard to imagine, but boy, is it going to look radically different in the US, the nature of political debate. And it’s – I mean, I hate to say it, but it does seem very likely that partisanship around US spending and its impacts and its successes, and “What is Europe doing, and has Europe stayed the course? Has Europe stayed united? Has Europe paid its share?” I think that that debate is going to be fundamentally different if we meet again in one year’s time.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thanks a lot, and then, finally, James. Russian people, are they prepared for failure and how do we support the Russian population who’ve been lied to, misled and so ill-used by their government, once this is all over?

James Nixey

I thought you were going to ask me about Putin’s speech today, but you didn’t. That’s fine, I’ll answer the question. They are not prepared for failure, because that is not an acceptable outcome in the TV messaging in which they are fed. And victory, as with all propagandists, is a certainty and their rightness is foretold. I mean, the – it’s quite astonishing, for those of you who do suffer in – any Russian TV watching, you know, the dehumanisation, kind of, Ukrainians, followed by documentaries about the war, it is – they are – it is a – it’s quite a non-stop diet.

But then, on your question about, “How do we help them?” I think in a post-war situation, not now, obviously, we’re going to have to, as well. I mean, I don’t know, that does bring into some conflict about the question about Ukrainian reconstruction, because in a sense, if there is a different regime, a better regime, a more easier, liberal regime, if you will, if…

Dr Patricia Lewis

Might get worse, so…

James Nixey

Absolutely, of course, and then, we – but then, there’s not much we can do in that time. But then, I think we’re going to have an issue about rebuilding Russia. If – again, I’m – I know I’ve been talking a little bit about slightly speculous scenarios this evening, but if you do get a Russian leader who – you know, Khrushchev came after Stalin and, you know, the Korean War ended and, you know, there was a better time, you know, you – it’s not beyond the realms of possibility again, then, he’s going to come asking for handouts as well. And we’re going to be a little bit stuck, because obviously, people have always wanted to help Russia because of their numbers of nuclear weapons.

Would you like me to say a couple of words about the Putin speech, or do you want to move on? Yeah, I know – ‘cause I know I wanted to bat something back to you. What…?

Dr Patricia Lewis

I’ve…

James Nixey

I can do one minute, it’s up to you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Go on, then.

James Nixey

One minute, okay, because I feel I should’ve done. I promised you I would, and I lied. So, look, Putin’s speech today was, I suppose, impressive. You know, he’s 70-years-old, which is quite old for a Russian man. Presume he drinks these days; we’ve now seen him a little bit drunk. And he – so – and when you see some of the people in the audience nodding off or visibly bored, actually, and we’ve seen it all before. I mean, there’s quite a real suspension of reality here, obviously blaming the West, Ukrainians and historical obscenity, etc., etc. And combined with that, we saw the idea that he would make better on his promises to improve the lives of farmers, of teachers, of health workers, etc. So, that – but again, it’s very hard to see that when, of course, he’s quite obviously making Russians’ lives an awful lot worse by engaging Russia in this war.

The kernel of it, though, the hard bit of the speech, this is where I pass it over to you, was Russia’s suspension of its participation in New Start, and that does strike me as something new and I didn’t anticipate, and you were saying to me earlier, I hope you don’t mind, in the green room, that what you – what really affected you in this, and we were talking about the emotions at the very beginning of this, was the possible nuclear testing, as well, and then about your life’s work, Patricia…

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah.

James Nixey

…being slightly undone. And I’d love to hear a little bit more about that.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Oh, and thanks. I mean, I’ll just quickly address that. I mean, it – so, the – what Putin said was that they will ‘suspend’ their participation, not to withdraw. That hasn’t been said, as far as we understand the translation into English. And at the moment, since COVID, in fact, inspections have been halted and they haven’t got back on track. They tried in November last year to have a meeting and that was – because of the war, was postponed.

Nonetheless, throughout the whole of this, Russia has carried on the notifications under the treaty. So, the question is, will those stop? Because that would be a great worry, because those notifications are also about missile tests and you want those notifications because they keep everyone safe, right? And it means that they’re not misunderstood as a real missile launch. That’s really important. So, that’s one thing. The other question is, will they then abrogate the terms of the treaty and start building up their nuclear weapons again? And that would be again, another worry.

Then, the thing that really disturbed me was that they talked about nuclear testing. Now, Russia is a fully ratified state party to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and nonetheless, of course, like all of the nuclear weapons states, have kept a non-nuclear capability to make sure that the warheads are safe. So, they have, still, the test sites, which are non-nuclear tests, but he said that “If the United States were to carry out a nuclear test, then they would.” Now, the United States has no plans, no intention, of carrying out a nuclear weapons test, so is this another false narrative coming out, like we saw over the bio-weapons, over the dirty bomb, etc.? Is this another thing? So, that’s a real worry, from our perspective.

I’m going to go to the audience now, because I realise that we are running behind time. Now, what I thought was, because we’ve got quite a lot of people, I’m not going to ask for one question at a time, I’m going to go for three questions. So, that will mean please take notes, panel, so that we can – you won’t – don’t have to answer each question, okay. So, I’m – could we have this lady here, please, with the glasses, on the top? Thank you.

Terri Paddock

It’s Terri Paddock, I’m a Chatham House member. I work in social media, and I really worry that we are – the West is losing the information war. Today, and the day of two speeches, if you go on Twitter, for instance, and just type in ‘Putin’, the majority of comments are pro-Putin narratives. They are saying that NATO did start the war. They are saying that his assessment of Western culture normalising paedophilia is correct. Is this something that you track and how important do you think it is?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you. I think I’ll go to this gentleman, here, in the middle, please. If you could wait for the microphone, please. Thank you.

Dr Chikwe

Dr Chikwe [inaudible – 46:34], I’m a member of Chatham House.

Dr Patricia Lewis

If you speak up a little bit.

Dr Chikwe

Yes, I’m a member of Chatham House. I have a personal attachment to what is happening in the Ukraine, because I married there, I schooled there, I spent the best era of my educational academic life in Ukraine and my two children were also born there, so, I have interest. But I’ve got a lot of questions, but I will make it brief and direct…

Dr Patricia Lewis

Just one question.

Dr Chikwe

…one question. Now, historically speaking, will what happening – what is happening in Ukraine, directly or indirectly, would it lead to something bigger that we have not anticipated yet, bearing in mind the alliance between Russia and China, with Taiwan in mind?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Excellent question. Right, so, the gentleman here, please, at the back, thank you.

Mikhail Ramos

Thank you. Mikhail Ramos, member of Chatham House. Just a quick question on the outlook in the US. Leslie, you said you were quite positive. I read yesterday articles in The Atlantic by Eliot Coleman and by Anne Applebaum. If people from that side of the debate were extremely positive about Biden’s symbolism yesterday and today, isn’t there much more reason, if we also look at Munich this weekend and the Senators from both parties, who were present there, to be very positive about the outlook on it?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, and there are many questions online, but one of them that is recurring is, “How much can we believe the Russian figures on the economics, the amount of roubles that Putin talked about?” “Do we trust the statistics coming out of Russia, or do you think that they’re, you know, presenting a different face, cooking the books, whatever?” So, there’s four questions for four people. Please choose one and go ahead. So, I’m going to turn first to Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

I can try with the disinformation, because I think Ukraine has been a lab for testing all various Russian disinformation tactics for a decade now, and it was something clear that they are preparing the ground for whichever harder security operations will follow. They start with the information operation, and they use these cycle of operations now, even during the war. So, for example, either around nuclear safety of free actors or about invasion from Belarus, to keep society, all the time, in very high mode of anxiety for what may come.

And I think it’s important that countries and democracies, both on the frontline and here, so to speak, deeper away from Russia, develop capacity to decipher, to monitor the content, and to pushback, where it’s possible, to inform the public about what is going on, but also builds cognitive resilience of the – on the simple – on the demand side, people who are going online.

For example, again, in Ukraine, there has been a in school wide programme for high school students about media literacy, but embedding it within the language, within history, within other courses, so it’s not something on the side, to understand the text, to distinguish fact from manipulation. And they have been quite effective, and I think we have to understand that our democracy’s eroded when citizens do not share common facts. We will not be able to build any consensus. And then, I think this is where, actually, Ukraine could contribute quite a lot of its experiences and share it with other countries within EU and outside.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Okay, James?

James Nixey

The Russia and China one, I guess, is that what you’d like, or…

Dr Patricia Lewis

If you…

James Nixey

…we all make – and don’t I get a free choice?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Okay, go on.

James Nixey

I’ll take China, yeah. Sure.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Well, China and the bigger conflict.

James Nixey

Okay, on Russia and China, I’m slightly concerned because my colleague Annette Bohr, who is in the audience and she gave an inside presentation at a members’ meeting on this the other day, in much more detail than I would be able to. But I would say this, I suppose a lot has moved on since then, Annette, and there’s been a flurry of Chinese diplomacy in the last – just in the last week. And I said – well, it was a week, yeah, and I would not have said, perhaps a week ago, that China wants to get involved, as it appears to be, in mediation efforts.

So, this is a new – almost a new element into the equation and a potentially concerning one, because China is talking about a) territorial integrity and its inviolability, and b) about security guarantees for Russia. And those two things are a contradiction in terms, at least according to Russia’s definition, but it was – anyway, you know, a contradiction to Russia. And I think that is causing conniptions in Kyiv and I think partly in the West, which does not want to see a negotiation at the moment. It’s too early for one, because Ukraine has not yet achieved enough on the battlefields to be able to have a successful negotiation, or an outcome of a negotiation. So, I think China’s insertion, or recent insertion to the debate, is of concern, but we have to wait – the devil’s in the detail and we don’t really yet know that, I suppose.

Just very briefly, can I say something on Russian figure – onto the Russian figures, or do you want – can you do it?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah.

James Nixey

Just very briefly, the answer is absolutely, we don’t know. Russians are withholding an awful lot of them right now, export figures, for example, and so, the way you can do it – I mean, so – but we do know now that – so, because you’ve referred to the oil price cap, for example, we do know that that means that Russian oil is do – is being – a lot of Russian oil is being diverted elsewhere, but at a discount, which is being forced upon it and it’s also more expensive to take it elsewhere.

And so, although the high price of oil last year was obviously having these unintended consequence, sanctions were having unintended consequences of forcing prices up, increasing revenues, then in fact, the reality is now that January’s figures are that actually, Russian oil revenues are down 49%, and that’s how it makes most of its money. And in – but if you really want to look at the figures, of course, Russia’s trade figures, for example, you can go from a partner data, where it is exporting to and then, you can see the figures, but not from Russia itself.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Must correlate.

James Nixey

Yeah.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Leslie?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, I mean, I think to your question about the US, absolutely, at this moment in time there is – it has been a tremendous commitment, effort, belief, to support Ukraine. Which doesn’t mean that, you know, there’s a clear vision that’s been articulated about what success looks like, what the outcome should, or will be, or the bigger question at some point, what is the new regional security architecture going to look like? And, you know, the international security architecture isn’t working, despite the fact the UNGA has passed resolutions, and that’s not insignificant, but it’s not going to do the job.

The regional security architecture is clearly going to be insufficient if Russia changes. There are just a lot of known unknowns that are really very radicle, but on the specific US question, we don’t know who the Republican candidate is going to be. If it’s Donald Trump, we know he isn’t going to take a tough line on Russia and that’s going to change the public debate. Even if it’s – even if it ends up being not Donald Trump, which I very seriously believe it won’t be, in the end, if he gets the nomination, he’s going to be in front of the cameras every single day telling Americans that we’re spending too much. And if the media do what they did before, give him tons of free airtime, he’s going to change the debate in the US and beyond the US.

I personally suspect, but can’t tell you how we get there, that Trump won’t be the nominee, that’s my view. But we don’t know where the other candidates stand and when we get into that moment in US history, they are going to be on television every single day and the perspective that they take, whether it’s DeSantis or Nikki Haley or Glenn Youngkin, or you know, somebody else, Pompeo, is going to change the public debate. It will not remain the same. So, yes, so far, but, you know, it is going to be dynamic and it is going to change.

Creon Butler

Just – so, on the data, I mean, James is absolutely right. It’s much better not to publish the data, because there are consequences of lying to the IMF, as indeed, Argentina has found in the past. So, actually, the easier thing is just not to publish the data. At the same time, I’m not so surprised that, actually, the short-term impact of the sanctions has not been as great as some initially thought. I mean, there were predictions of 15% reduction. That’s partly because Russia has a very relative – well, a competent macroeconomic team and President Putin allows them to do their thing. So, the things they did were actually what you would rationally do in response to the situation. It doesn’t, however, change the, sort of, medium to long-term view of how bad the situation is likely to get to Russia, because of the brain drain, lack of finance, loss of access to technology and so on.

Just on China, very briefly, I mean, it’s really interesting, I think, two points. One is China clearly does not want its private sector companies to face the US Justice Department or secondary sanctions, more generally. And so, they have – although they’ve stepped up their imports to Russian energy, and there have been some additional, you know, deals signed with Russia on hydrocarbons, they’ve been very cautious about triggering the latter issue. I think, also, it’s just worth bearing in mind that Europe, having experienced Russia’s unreliability as an energy partner, you know, you really wonder whether China would want to experience that unreliability as well, and whether, in particular, they would invest vast amounts of money in new infrastructure to import Russian energy„ partly because of that unreliability and also, because they’ll be thinking about climate change in the longer-term.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And we’ve got some great questions online and I can see there’s many more in the room. So, I just want to turn to online first and then, go to in the room, okay? So, one of them is from Rogerio de Oliveira de Souza. Sorry about my pronunciation. “Hello from Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The feeling that we have from here is that Europe thought that Ukraine would fall fast. When Europe took notice that Ukrainian people would resist, the EU began to change its approach to the war, but it is still slow. Why not send heavy arms to expel Russian forces from Ukrainian territory?”

Okay, so, then I have another one here. There’s actually two from Tim Read that I’m going to merge together. One is about the issue of the Wagner Group and the role that they’re playing, and how does it actually work on the ground? What is the issue – how does it – how are the – what’s the chain of command? How is it in the field? And then, his second question is about the Ukrainian population in areas under Russian control and it – you know, how much of this is real, how much of it is involuntary, how much of it might actually be – are they truly serving?

And then, a final one from Dina Mufti, on whether or not – and I think this speaks to a previous question, but it’s slightly different. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has catalysed the growing alliance between Russia and China with a new world energy order,” and the sort of, “petroyuan weakening the US dollar, and what can be done from the US to mitigate that?” So, there’s some questions, there. I’m going to go back into the room and try to get some other questions. So, could we have you over here, please? I’m going to have – I’m not going to be able to get to you all, so just prepare yourself for this appointment, and I – if you could put your hand down in the middle, that would be great. Thank you very much.

Piron

I’m Piron, I’m a member of Chatham House, and I have a question for Dr Leslie. So, how has the War in Ukraine impacted the US-UK relationship, and is it the – is it same as before it was – the war? Like, that’s my question, yeah.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you, and over there, please, the lady in the scarf.

Mary Dejevsky

Thank you. Mary Dejevsky, Journalist. I’ve got a question for Orysia. I want to borrow one of Patricia’s questions. Ukraine has taken a very maximalist position on its demands. It wants borders reinstated as they were in 92, which includes recovery of Crimea. Is Ukraine prepared for failure?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Great, and then, there was a gentleman at the back, as well, please. Thank you, yeah.

Vincent Champion

Thank you. Thank you very much, Vincent Champion, private member and Journalist. Earlier on we were talking about regime change in Russia and it was almost as if this could be a positive thing, but I don’t see how it can happen. There are no intermediate sovereignties in Russia. There’s no democratic traditions, as we understand it, of course. So, who’s actually going to fill the void if Putin goes? The opposition’s either dead, fled or in prison. Okay, the fled ones can come back, the imprisoned ones can be released, but where’s the – where are the institutions for change in Russia that – I don’t see it? Thank you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you. I’m going to have to stop there. I know there are many people who wanted to speak and I’m really sorry, and we have – you wouldn’t believe how many questions we’ve got online and I’m really sorry, they’re all fantastic questions and I’m sure the ones in the room were, as well. But we are actually now, like, one minute to go. So, we have to have some quickfire rounds. So, please don’t answer every question. Please choose a question. I’m going to go in reverse order, so Creon, I’m going to go with you first.

Creon Butler

Thanks very much. So, firstly, just on – just a point I should’ve made earlier about the consequences of Ukraine’s resistance. This also changed the nature of the sanctions. It meant they had a purpose, which was weakening Russia’s ability to continue to fight the war. A lot of the initial debate was about, you know, “Is this sufficient punishment?” you know, “Is it deterrents?” But actually, gave them a real – very real and important purpose, which is to weaken Russia’s ability to continue, and that’s not the case in all other sanction situations.

Second point, just on the implications for the international currency system. I mean, this is really, really important and also really interesting. I think what the sanctions showed was that actually, there were very few in – alternatives. There are no alternatives, actually, at the moment, to convertible currencies issued by liberal democracies. And all those convertible currencies are, ultimately, linked via dollar swap lines and so forth. So, you know, if you are, for example, China or another country thinking about, “What are the implications for us of what the West has done in relation to Russian foreign exchange reserves?” is very hard to think of anything you can do, other than to try and devise a situation in which you don’t need to use foreign exchange reserves. And now, that could – you know, people could say, “Well, what about cryptocurrency?” but would you really want to hold $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves in cryptocurrency? I think probably not. So, I think this is a really important issue and one which, certainly, we, in Chatham House, want to do some further work on.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, on the US-UK question, great question, and thank you for asking. I think, you know, the US-UK relationship is grounded in deep history, with very strong fundamentals, thank God, because if it weren’t, it would be in real trouble right now. But, you know, obviously, the US – the UK role as a major security provider has been critical and important and apart from the real question, which is about Ukraine, it’s certainly been very important for the US-UK relationship in this window.

However, it’s undoubtedly the case that Americans are focused on Europe when it comes to responding to this conflict. They go to Brussels, they go to NATO, they go to the EU, and they don’t talk about the UK, frankly, very much. I hear it mentioned almost not at all, and – which isn’t to say that it doesn’t matter, but it’s not where the game is. The game is on working with Europe on sanctions, on security, on all sorts of things and the UK needs to be in that conversation, as much as it possibly can, if it wants to be shaping it, informing it, seen as influential, seen as a player. So, it’s not great, but we all know that.

On the question of, you know, whether it just makes more sense to be decisive, because success breeds success, the question, you know, should there just be more arms sent? I mean, I think that is the number one question that people are wrestling with and, you know, we know the fears about evasc – about escalation. But I think it’s going to be where the debate sits in the next several weeks, and the concern that I heard expressed at Munich, and I think that probably many people, including myself, agree with, is there still needs to be a sense of what is the endgame, what is – what are the conditions attached, what is the goal? Because just, sort of, blindly, you know – and I’m not saying it is blindly – I think there are a whole lot of very serious strategic conversations that are taking place, but they’re all taking place behind closed doors, so we don’t actually know what they are.

So, we’re, sort of, operating as, you know, people who are informed, concerned professionals or public people, on the basis of trust, which is very concerning when the stakes are so high. So, that would be my, sort of, short answer to a very important question.

Dr Patricia Lewis

James?

James Nixey

Right, very quickly. How does Wagner Group actually work? Now, surprisingly, there are not large swathes of Researchers wanting to go out into a field in DRC and the Congo and to Venezuela and Syria and Eastern Ukraine, you know, and to interview them. I – and when it did happen, ‘cause it’s not a joke, then actually, they were murdered. So, that was the first point.

But more interestingly, perhaps, is that there does seem to be some tension between Wagner Group and the Russian military, between Gerasimov and Prigozhin, if you like, and it does seem as though Prigozhin’s star does appear to be falling a little bit. And certainly, Prigozhin has been, outspoken as he is, in Russian elite terms, has been very critical of the conduct of a Russian war and that maybe – and really on every other level, except for Puti – I think he’s been – and talked about “There’s been obstacles at the highest level,” I think is what he was saying. So, I think although, quite clearly, they – the two military operatives – or operations, are working, to a certain extent, in tandem, I think, quite clearly, this is – just isn’t working out as well as had been hoped and both sides are suffering. And Wagner has made – suffered some losses around that point lately.

Very quickly, then, on regime change in Russia, and I agree with your questions, I mean, that is the first point. I mean, institutions in Russia have been systematically dismantled over the past ten/12 years and in a way, Putin’s problem has not been how to stay in office, but how to leave office, in fact, because he can’t. I can see different scenarios. I can see a scenario whereby there is a much – where there is a Putin lite kind of person, who the West might just be able to see themselves doing business with. But equally, I can see – you know, the names of Kadyrov and Prigozhin, again, having just said his star has fallen, I know, but, you know, would presumably be much more worse, there is still this, sort of, pro-war party and an anti-war party. Again, it’s, sort of, a bit generalistic, but there are, you know, hawks and doves everywhere, I suppose.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Orysia.

Orysia Lutsevych

Right, so, very interesting question from Brazil. Yes, obviously, now we have, you know, the documented evidence of Ukrainian Diplomats going into the offices in Berlin and saying, “Why are you asking us for weapons? The government is going to fall in a few days.” So, that was – the operational presumption was that Kyiv will fall and somehow will – they will deal with the outcome of it, perhaps at the lower cost as what it is at stake right now. Perhaps some even wished, no, not wished, but they were ready to accept such an outcome, because the only way you could defend the country if the country is fighting for itself. I mean, it was clear that Ukraine has been fighting for itself for the last eight years before this full-fledged invasion and it was – put a lot of constraint on that capacity, actually, to repel Russian aggression, let’s not forget that. So, it was in a bit of a bootcamp for Ukrainians to train.

But just to say that, in the end, all these atrocities that Russia committed in Bucha, in Irpin, all the war crimes, the way Russia wages this war, has shaken the European Union. Has, for the first time in history, made European Union finance, you know, arms purchases for Ukraine. This has never happened and grant Ukraine new candidate status. This is significant, it is slow, but I think it’s what is at stake for – at the moment.

There was a very important question about populations on the occupied territories, Ukrainians there. There is all – again, a lot of evidence being collected and we have, on our website, videos from the cities that were liberated by Ukrainians, and what people had to go through. At the beginning, when Russians saw that people will be meeting them with flowers, they were staying put, but when they saw resistance, there was all kinds of torture, illegal, you know, deportations of children, that is qualified as a genocidal war.

And just to finish on Mary’s question, I mean, I would, again, put it back to you, would you be prepared for the failure of European way of life? Because if Ukraine fails, European way of life fails. This is not the conflict some way in a distant land. This is the conflict in the geographical heart of Europe, that will have an implication for Ukraine, for Russia and for Europe and I would say, at this point, Ukrainians are not prepared for failure and this is existential war for them and they will fight, even if there’s no support from the West. How long is the question? Even if there’s a nuclear attack on Ukrainian city, and there’s no appetite for any concessions, so I agree, we’re in the long haul, but we can shorten the distance if the right strategic decisions are made in Washington, Brussels, Kyiv and other capitals in the Global South come along. Because I think we need to understand that this is not just about Western way of life, it’s also about respect for borders, for countries and it’s putting an end to an imperial ambition in Europe that was drowning Europe in blood during the Second World War, and then I think this is the fight worth fighting for.

Dr Patricia Lewis

[Pause] So, that’s a great way – point to issue in. But I’m actually going to say what did we miss? Okay, we were talking about how it changed the world, but we haven’t really talked about the impact on Africa. We haven’t really talked about the impact on the Pacific, South-East Asia, impact on India, Pakistan. We haven’t talked about…

Orysia Lutsevych

Another panel, another panel, it’s fine.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I know, another panel, another panel, and on China, and so, we need another panel to look at this. But I think you will understand why, you know, at Chatham House, we are often struggling to get our work done, ‘cause it’s hard to get away from all these arguments and discussions that are going on. It’s a great place to work.

Can I just say that I think one of the things that may be happening that we’re not paying enough attention to is what China may be doing with Russia. Yes, we are worrying about China supplying the weapons, but China’s also supplying Russia with money and getting something back for it, right? It will get land, it will get resources, it will get safe harbours. It will get positions in the Arctic. Let’s be aware of what China will exact for its support of Russia, because I don’t think people are paying enough attention to that, and I take your question on that and in terms of the wider issue. I think it’s a really important thing.

So, I want to thank our colleagues for putting this together. I want to thank all of you for coming, thank everyone online for your great questions. It – this is being livestreamed, so I guess it will appear on our website and on YouTube, so if people can, please share it around. Please watch it again for anything you might’ve missed or want to hear something in more detail, and please stay in touch with us and follow us on Twitter and retweet everything that we tweet. So, thank you all very much.