A storm in the Western Balkans

Danielle Sheridan

Okay, hello, everybody. Thank you for coming along this evening. I’m sure it’s going to be an absolutely fascinating conversation, discussing the security issues facing the Western Balkans, and we really appreciate you all coming down to Chatham House tonight.

So, to confirm, this is all on the record and it’s being recorded, and we just got told there are some King’s students having a bit of a party to watch, so I hope you guys are having a great time. And I’d also like to thank University College London for partnering to put this event on. Tweeting is encouraged, so there’s a hashtag #CHEvents. Please do use it. So, a bit of housekeeping. For those in the room, if you want to ask a question, just raise your hand once we’ve all finished speaking. There are roving microphones, and you don’t need to stand up. So, just take a seat and we’ll bring the mic to you, and then, I’ll take some questions from the online system, as well.

But anyway, I’ll start with introducing myself. I’m Danielle Sheridan. I’m the Defence Editor at The Daily Telegraph. I started covering defence when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the March, I was deployed to Kyiv, and I reported on the ground all the atrocities that had been committed by Putin’s people.

Since then, I’ve returned, I’ve gone to the South, I’ve been in Zaporizhzhia, I’ve been with troops in the Donbas, in order to have eyewitness journalism and report on the horrors that have been unfolding there. And I have seen first-hand how dangerous Putin is and the way he has sought to wreak havoc on his neighbour. And back in the UK, with my defence hat on, I have spent countless hours speaking with Military Chiefs and Politicians, who’ve stressed that the outcome of the War in Ukraine really matters, and that would be aggressors are watching extremely closely to see if Putin prevails, and they will be encouraged if the West’s support for Ukraine dwindles at all.

Now, we all know about the bloody wars that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s. Peace in the region should never be taken for granted, but recently, we have seen clashes in Northern Kosovo and protests in Belgrade. To this day, Serbia does not recognise Kosovo as an independent state and nor does its greatest friend, Russia. And while Serbia said it supports Ukraine, it’s not imposed sanctions on Moscow. Three of the countries in the region are members of NATO and all six have said they aspire to join the EU. Though recently, at Davos, Serbia’s President, Vučić, said Belgrade was “no longer enthusiastic about EU membership,” and hit out at critics of Putin, which is, of course, worrying.

Concerns have been raised about Russian disinformation in the Western Balkans, but with the UK having left the EU, how much of an independent relationship can it have with the region and how hard has it really tried? That’s something I’d look to get into with our panel this evening. I wonder if there’s an argument that since the UK has neglected the Western Balkans since the Dayton Agreement was signed.

So, with that, I’m delighted to introduce our panel, including Albin Kurti, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, who was elected in 2021 for a second time. Andi Hoxhaj, Assistant Professor of Law at UCL, whose research interests, helpfully, include policy of the Western Balkans in the UK and the EU. And Armida van Rij, who’s the Head of the Europe Programme at Chatham House, who specialises in EU enlargement and EU reform.

So, I’d like to start by asking the Prime Minister a question. In June last year, you sent ethnic Albanian Mayors into four Serbian majority towns, against the advice of the US, the UK and the EU. As a student activist, you were imprisoned by the Former President of Serbia, Milošević, and you’ve said that the current President will exploit any weakness that you’ve shown, if you show any, on the municipalities. My question is, is it possible for Kosovo and Serbia to ever have a healthy functioning relationship?

Albin Kurti

Oh, it gives me a great pleasure to be here today with all of you, and to have the opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts on this very timely and significant topic. Moreover, it’s an honour to be here at the Chatham House, a think tank with a tradition over 100 years, and being part of a new country that has its many benefits because the newness is inspiring and gives you the freedom to create. And I believe that our government, out of a big election victory three years ago, is an expression of that. But at the same time, being part of such a storied tradition gives you a sense of perspective that issues are greater than individuals.

We are, nowadays, at an ideological battlefield, with very concrete consequences. Some might argue about its division and how it is exactly split, but we cannot deny that on one side, there is an authoritarian threat. This side is working by manipulating people’s fears to gain and keep more power. The Western Balkans is seeing this dynamic play out very actively and vividly. There is a tendency to treat the Western Balkans like a [inaudible – 09:13], if it is a homogeneous region in terms of governments and people. But to understand the dynamics, I believe that we have to understand the differences.

So, the Western Balkan countries, although they share a lot of similarities, social, cultural, historical, are on their individual paths, and this depends mainly from their governments. You have democratic progress in Kosova, combined with economic growth and institutional stability. In contrast, in Serbia, our northern neighbour, under the rule of an authoritarian leader, you have a complete captured state.

In the last three years, our economy was growing in a steadfast manner, 6.2%, on average, of GDP in these years, and we have doubled both foreign direct investment and exports. And tax revenues increased by two thirds without changing fiscal policy. Because I guess when people see that there’s no corruption in the government, they are more ready to contribute and pay taxes. And when they are hopefully, they’re optimistic about the future, they’d rather spend than save, which is good for their lives and our economy.

Then, we have introduced social policies that didn’t exist in our country before. We have made public education free at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. We have introduced universal benefits for all children. We’ve tackled youth unemployment with a new government platform, strengthened aid to minorities, and for the first time, the office of the Prime Minister issues all communication in Serbian language, as well.

This progress has been recognised internationally by different prestigious organisations, like Freedom House in 2023 ranked Kosova number one in the Western Balkans, second in Europe and third in the world for advancements in political rights and civil liberties. We improved by 22 places in just two years in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index and jumped 21 places in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, since our government took office.

The accountability of the government and the drive for social welfare have made integration of Serbian community feasible. For example, the issue of licence plates, which was a very burning issue, it looked very tactical, but was not really, because technical things get easily politicised. Over 4,000 licence plates from the Serbian community were registered to Republic of Kosova’s plates, over 4,000. In preparation for the Schengen visa liberalisation, which came into effect January 1st this year, we also saw a rise in the application for Kosova passports, for example, over 5,800 in the four northern municipalities.

So, there has to be an adjusted approach to foster an incremental and merit-based closeness to the European Union. I don’t think it can be, or should be, all or nothing, and one country cannot hold everyone back. In my view, Serbia, with its authoritarian regime, is holding the entire region back. Serbia recognises de jure Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not de facto, likewise, Montenegro. In case of Kosova, the opposite is rather true. They recognise us at a large extent, de facto, but not de jure. And there is this general thesis that Serbia is keeping good relations with Russian Federation and China in order to use that in its aggressiveness towards Kosova.

But I would claim the opposite is not just more interesting, but more useful to understand the current state of affairs. Namely, Serbia uses – utilises its aggressiveness towards Kosova in order to keep good relations with Russian Federation and China, because towards dictators who trust no-one, you have to prove yourself time and again. And I think that this is what President Vučić is doing. With his aggressiveness towards Kosova, is trying to keep good relations with Kremlin.

Therefore, there is no wonder that Serbia is backsliding, or the backsliding of any country, for that matter, is not only about them joining the European Union, it’s about what is happening at home. It’s about, also, the security of neighbouring countries, too. The relation that you have with neighbours tells a lot about yourself. We have 381km long border with Serbia. The border that we have with Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia combined is shorter than the one that we have with Serbia.

That border was invaded by paramilitary troops in September last year. Serbian paramilitary troops opened fire on our Police and killed a Police Sergeant, Afrim Bunjaku. The military built up around our border was called and unprecedented by US Senior Officials. It took National Security Advisor, White House, Mr Jake Sullivan, to say to Serbia to ‘back up’. So, all these 48 forward operating bases that they have around Kosova, and where they brought modern technology that they got from China, namely systems FK-3, to withdraw a bit impartially. Otherwise, they were simply – what they have is a horseshoe. During genocide in spring 1999, it was an horseshoe just outside the borders of Kosova. Situation was very, very dangerous.

I want to emphasise that the threats or the ‘storms’, as we say here in this discussion, do not come from people, but from above. Democracy comes from below, but threats do not come from below. Threats come from above. It is these non-democratic, autocratic leaders who employs structures like Wagner wannabe, that threaten stability, security and peace. We have seized over €5 million worth in arms and military grade equipment, three times, altogether, last year, on 23rd of June, 5th of September and 24th of September. Last May, two organisations marked as terrorist ones by Kosova, the Northern Brigade and Civil Protection, injured around 90 NATO Soldiers. Some had to get amputations. A country that has witnessed a genocide in living memory cannot be subjected to these kind of threats to violence and violence.

So, Serbia’s strong allyship to Russia is not a theoretical threat for Europe and Balkans alike, which is part of Europe and should become part of EU. It is a real threat, and one that Kosova, but not only, experiences regularly. And through Serbia, we have seen a build-up of Russian presence in the Balkans, whether through media, intelligence or other forms of interference. In light of this, a signed agreement between Kosova and Serbia is more urgent than ever. Not signing of the agreement that we have is a clear sign of bad faith. So, we need bona fide in order to have legal certainty and implementation of what we have agreed upon so far.

And that also means when they reject to sign the agreement, that they want to keep an option open to invade Kosova. So, I cannot see any other substantial meaning to refusal to sign, other than the one to keep this door open, that there will be some window of opportunity to come back and do the aggression again. And no wonder that President Vučić referred to father and son leaders of Azerbaijan, Aliyev. Saying that “They were smart because they considered that they have to wait for a historical wind of opportunity, which showed up itself 27 years later.” So, I wonder now whether he meant 27 years from 1999, which would mean 2026, or 27 years from last year, which would relax us a bit, because then it’s 2050.

The security of Kosova and support for it is the bedrock on which our country can continue to grow, and of course, Serbia, or any potential ally of Russia, cannot hold the region back from the EU, because it would simply serve Russia in their attempts to divide the continent again. So, now it is the time for the EU to very carefully and deliberately reward democratic reform because that is the only way it will enforce it in the region.

It is true that these four Mayors in the North, four Albanians, have hollow legitimacy out of low turnout, but others have no legitimacy whatsoever. So, now we are on a legal path to have early elections and I look forward, as soon as possible, to have these early elections, so four Serbian Mayors will be in the North, but violent mobs, terrorist structures cannot get into office, thanking to their violence and destabilisation attempts. You must have a due democratic legal process, and as Prime Minister, I’m there to help them to have early elections and elect new Mayors there. So, yes, I acknowledge that legitimacy is slim, but others who want to replace current Mayors must have legality, legitimacy and only after new elections, taking office.

Danielle Sheridan

And do you believe that – oh, sorry, did the audience want to applaud before I ask my question?

Albin Kurti

No problem [applause].

Danielle Sheridan

I’ve one [applause] – so, you’ve explained the, kind of, the state of affairs of Serbia, and so, I’ll just go back to my question, do you think that it is possible to have a functioning relationship with Serbia, while at the same time, living with the fact that there might be a threat of invasion?

Albin Kurti

I think it is possible. We have an agreement, normalisation agreement, basic treaty, which is modelled upon Two Germanys from 1972. Former Chancellor, Willy Brandt, Ostpolitik, “Live and let live,” mutual de facto recognition, we have to respect it and implement it. My impression is that Serbia said yes to the agreement in order not to sign, and now, they have the buyer’s remorse. They would love not to have said yes a year ago. It depends from the pressure of Brussels and Washington D.C. on Belgrade. I think it is doable, and what makes me optimistic for the Balkans in general is that in comparison to 30 years ago, there is no more nationalism of masses as a fuel for war machinery of dictators.

30 years ago, in the territories of Former Yugoslavia, if you would have brought a truck with Kalashnikov, you could – Kalashnikovs, you could distribute to population. That’s not the case anymore. You cannot do that. People will report you to the Police. That’s why I’m much more optimistic. So, there is no more nationalism of masses that will trigger conflicts and wars. However, criminal structures, I must say, not only in ideological sense, but the sociological, as well, people who are this – they do this kickboxing and then, in the afternoon, some smuggling. And, you know, some football fans who don’t really go to the stadiums for a football game and they get in touch with these criminal elements. There are certain patterns of behaviour of these people who, at some point, also get shelter in our ideology of authoritarian leader, which is nationalistic chauvinistic, who can be dangerous for the society. But not people as such, not masses, we’re past that.

To be honest, I see more of this phenomena in European Union itself than in the Balkans. We’ve gone through that in the 90s, you know, so we’ve passed that phase. Now, economy and justice are very important, but at the same time, we need EU, NATO, US, UK, to defend the region better and more from Russian influence, which is very malign, very active and they look for hybrid regimes for their hybrid warfare, which is not a substitution for the real warfare, but just the preparatory phase for it.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you so much. Armida, I think we could perhaps pick up on PM Kurti’s point there, talking about aggressors in the region. We spoke a lot about Russia, but how about China in the Western Balkans, and what has the EU’s response been to this?

Armida van Rij

Thanks very much, Danielle. Thanks very much, Prime Minister. It’s great to hear your point of view. So, you’re asking me about China, and I think it’d be useful to take a step back and look at why China and why Russia, who were certainly present in the region, have been able to make progress and step into the region. Part of that, I’d argue, is because the accession process of the Western Balkan countries into the EU has been so incredibly slow, and there’s been a real lack of commitment from both sides, let’s be honest, but also from the EU side, to really drive that forward and make progress on it, certainly before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Russia of Ukraine. Now things have changed a little bit, and now, we will speak to that in a moment.

But it was clear that there was a case of enlargement fatigue. Some of us might remember Juncker in – then European Commission President Juncker in 2014, who, effectively, downgraded enlargement within the European Commission, and therefore, signalled that it wasn’t going to be a priority for his Commission, 2014-2019. And the result, really, is that Russia and China have been able to fill this gap in the Western Balkans. We’ve talked a bit about Russia already and the way that it likes to cause chaos, that’s what Russia does, through disinformation, through backing of far-right groups, through using orthodox structures to present a particular narrative about Russia and about the West, which has been particularly successful in Serbia, as we’ve heard. There’s also the gas dimension, of course, where some countries in the Western Balkans are heavily dependent on Russian gas. Bosnia Herz – and Herzegovina is entirely dependent on one pipeline that runs through Serbia, straight to Russia.

On China, which is what you asked me, China’s really been focused on building its economic dependencies in the region. That’s its core, and trade, as well. So, under the Belt and Road Initiative, it is the second largest investor in the region, after the EU, and has been particularly – investing particularly heavily in Serbia and in Montenegro. So, between 2009 and 2021, China invested €32 billion in the EU. This is still dwarfed by how much the EU has provided in terms of funding, but it is a big number, and it is particularly important in specific countries.

The – kind of, what that means practically is that there’s a risk of debt traps caused by these dependencies on Chinese loans, and it also raises questions about the EU’s responsibility when some countries in the Balkans, or if some countries in the Balkans, are then not able to repay these loans, as Montenegro had a couple of years ago. So, while the EU is still the largest trading partner of the Western Balkan countries, there are very clear signs that China is catching up and is making headway, and that’s an attractive offer to Western Balkan countries. Serbia, again, signed a free trade agreement with China last year.

And I think you – the second half of your question was about the EU and, kind of, how they’ve responded to this, and I think it’s clear that the Russian invasion, the full-scale invasion in 2022 of Ukraine, was a wakeup call for the EU. To be absolutely clear, that wakeup call should’ve come after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, but it didn’t, and the EU – and well, the lack of a proper response by the EU or NATO, really, partially paved the way and certainly emboldened Putin to do what he’s done since then. But it also meant that it put enlargement back on the agenda in the way that it hadn’t been since 2014, because enlargement is a way that the EU tries to respond to Russian and Chinese influences in the region. Every single enlargement the EU has undertaken has been political, and this one is no different than that. But as we’ll talk about a bit more later, there’s been very little, kind of, concrete tangible results. There’s been great announcements and progress cards and report cards and things like that, but in terms of actual progress in terms of accession, it’s actually quite limited.

So, the result is that we now find ourselves in a situation where reform has been backsliding in countries across the Western Balkans. When it comes to challenges to democracy, media freedom, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, it’s been backsliding. At the same time, there’s been a rise in some authoritarian regimes in the Western Balkans, and particularly, and Prime Minister Kurti alluded to this, among elites, who want to maintain their power and want to maintain their positions. And there’s a perception among some of these elites that the costs of reform to be able to join the EU are too high, and actually, that the reward, which is EU membership, is too far off. And so, they’re not willing to make those investments, even though when it comes to financial investment, a lot of those costs for the reforms, obviously, provided by the EU through its instrument for pre-accession assistance to Western Balkan countries.

And then, there’s also the question of public opinion, and while in some Western Balkan countries, public opinion for EU membership has remained consistently high, in others, that has dropped significantly. And that, then, emboldens the leaders of those countries to say, “Actually, maybe we’re not so interested and maybe we’ll look elsewhere.”

So, there are now some really difficult challenges and trade-offs as a result, that we face. On the one hand – so, first of all, on the one hand, the EU needs to maintain merit-based accession to the EU, but at the same time, it also needs to prevent any further backsliding and Russia and China gaining a further foothold in the region, so that’s a trade-off. The second point is that the accession process altogether is undermined by just how long it takes. It’s too slow, and this is also important when it comes to discussions about Moldova’s accession or Ukraine’s accession. If there’s a perception, as what happened with Turkey a little bit, that it’s too slow, it takes too long, it will never happen, therefore, the country goes, “Well, actually, never mind, I’ll just do my own thing instead.” And that’s a problem, ‘cause that risks playing straight into Putin hand, that’s exactly what he wants.

Third, reform and enlargement discussions are as old as the EU is in and of itself, and to Former European Commission President, the last point of are we going for enlargement or are we going for integration or are we going for both? There are now countries, like France, like Germany, who may want enlargement, but they want it to go hand-in-hand with EU reform. To have EU reform, you need to look at the treaties and you need to look at treaty reform. There is zero appetite for that at the moment, so that’s not going to happen, which then goes back to the question of okay, great, so how do we make enlargement happen?

And then finally, and I’ll leave it here, this is all in the context of the European parliamentary elections, which are coming up in June of this year, which – in which we’ll likely see a vote increase, or an increase of the vote share for the far-right, who are not necessarily pro-enlargement at all and actually, some, not all, but some, are far more sympathetic to Putin and therefore, are far more likely to keep the Western Balkans at bay. I’ll leave it there.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you. Sorry, I made you applaud earlier, but I don’t think we need to do that every time. Just picking up on that point, then, about, you know, playing into Putin’s hands, I’m keen to bring Andi into the conversation. I mean, since the War in Ukraine, do you think the EU has changed its approach to the Western Balkans, and if so, how?

Andi Hoxhaj OBE

So, there was a lot of expectation that the European Union would change its approach to the Western Balkans, but, kind of, taking the step of technicality, usually reforms are driven by deadlines, because it will put pressure on political leaders in the Western Balkans, on civil society, to deliver in some of these reforms. Now, the European Union changes that are tangible that it has made, it has come out more clear to say that we will move towards a gradual integration, but it hasn’t quite clearly spelt out what that gradual integration would be. The idea now, from what the European Union has talked about, would be to join the EU single market first, where they could see how this economy could now deal with the market pressure of the EU and then become full members. However, in order to do that, you need to have some sort of timetable.

European leaders are talking about a timeline by 2030. We’re not quite sure whether Prime Minister Kurti could perhaps tell us in the meeting that they have, but that’s not quite clear. Now, the problem that you have with these, sort of, timetables is, if we look at the issue of migration, of the Western Balkans nearly 35-40% are already abroad. And if we look at the current trends, by 2030, nearly half of the Western Balkan population will be living abroad. And by 2040, if all of these countries have joined the European Union, the Western Balkan diaspora will be double that number, if we look at the growing trend.

Now, the two most effective country are Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina, and then, the others follow. So, we have to act, especially in the case of EU, fast, because if they want to do integration, it has to go hand-in-hand, also, to help the population there, because I can’t see how that’s being co-ordinated or mitigated the problem. So, having a clear timetable would put a lot of pressure on the Western Balkans to deliver, but also, in the EU itself, how it responds.

Now, the other issue with not having these, sort of, clear timetable, is what are we doing with the internal reform, because we have quite a lot of reform in the Western Balkans? Just to take an example on Bosnia. So, Bosnia, every year, in – since the pandemic, about 23,000 student leave Bosnia to study abroad. So, it’s a massive human capital that it’s left and in some of the polling that we have done at UCL, and then, looking at the brain drain on migration from the Western Balkans, but really do not want to return. And partially, now, it’s that don’t want to return prior was because of security issue and now, it’s for living standards. And that sort of pressure has to be responded in somehow.

Probably after the election in the European Union, if we can come up with some clear timetable, would be more easy to access. But on the other hand, I cannot really see a Western Balkan Government themselves responding to the issue of migration and how do they want to address? And publicly, they say they fear it, but if you look at the remittances, the Western Balkan diaspora contributes about 17-90%, on average, across to the GDP back home, which practically, it has substituted the social and welfare system, and the pension and so on. So, there is an incentive, actually, for the government, that they do like the migration away. But I think we can open to the conversation, and we have quite a lot from the diaspora here.

Danielle Sheridan

Great. Okay, we have some roving microphones. If anyone has a question, please pop your hand up and I – okay, I’ll take three at a time, I think. So, the lady in the white blazer and the pink polo neck in the second row. Thank you. We’ll start with you first.

Simona Leskovar

Thank you. Thank you very much. I’m…

Danielle Sheridan

Oh…

Simona Leskovar

…not a member of the dias…

Danielle Sheridan

…just to say, can you please announce who you are and where…

Simona Leskovar

Yeah, I’m…

Danielle Sheridan

…you’re from?

Simona Leskovar

…not a member of diaspora, but I’m a member of diplomatic corps here. Simona Leskovar, Ambassador of Slovenia. Prime Minister, you know the position of Slovenia regarding the EU enlargement. You also know well established relations between our two countries, but I would have a little wider political question that you were already asked at the beginning, and I will just try to turn into a different direction. In your opinion, so, how do you see the prospect of the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue in the future, in the light of the coming EU elections that were mentioned, that will probably change, also, EU Parliament, but will also – I mean, we will also have some other elections in a EU member state in near future? And also, taking into account the elections that were not member – not mentioned here before, that are the American elections. So, how do you see the prospect of the dialogue? And then, maybe a question for the whole panel. Is there any alternative for the Western Balkan countries than European Union? Thank you.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you. If we can just keep that on the backburner and we’ll go to this gentleman in the grey hoodie somewhere. Thank you.

Shad

Brilliant. Thank you very much. First of all, welcome. My name is Shad. I am a student at Royal Holloway University of London, and I’m also a Chatham House member. My question is – sorry, give me one second.

Danielle Sheridan

Just to say, if we can keep the questions quite short, ‘cause we…

Shad

Yeah, no, no.

Danielle Sheridan

…can cut down…

Shad

This one’s short and concise, don’t worry.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you.

Shad

Okay, so, my question is, given Kosovo’s own journey towards independence and international recognition, how does it view the aspirations of the Kurdish people in the Middle East, who also seek similar goals with regards to autonomy and independence? Thank you very much.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you. Again, we’ll take one more question, somewhere else. Okay, this guy here in the blue shirt first, thanks.

Christopher

So, my name is Christopher [inaudible – 38:24], I’m an Associate Professor at the Royal Holloway University of London. I have a question for Prime Minister. Considering the fact that China and Russia are very much involved in the region, and northern part of Kosova is still fragile, could there be another Banjska? If it’s happen another tourist attack in Kosova, what would be the Western position and would be Kosova’s position? So, it seems to be very hotspot, that could be potentially a border between Western and Russia and China. So, what is your view of this one?

Danielle Sheridan

Do you – would you like to start the ball off?

Albin Kurti

Well, thank you for these questions. Both European Union and Russia, they have history of enlargement, but when the Russian Federation does not hesitate to enlarge violently, European Union should not hesitate to enlarge peacefully. And integration into European Union has a great driving force among the people of the Balkans. If Brussels will talk more to people and less to leaders, I think would also boost its own self-confidence.

I want to emphasise that whenever EU is hesitant to help us more to do better and more in our region, I never get angry or bitter, because I notice that when EU does not trust the Western Balkans sufficiently, quite often, that is a expression of the lack of self-confidence. That’s why I believe that the only way for EU to enlarge is to think in terms of its own reform, and the only way for EU to reform internally is in the light of external enlargement. These two processes have never been more intertwined than now. This means that courageous leadership is needed, and I believe we will reach that point, but sooner, certainly, is better.

In terms of elections. Yes, we very much look after European elections. I will join leaders of Social Democratic Parties of Europe in Rome early March, in launching the campaign for social democracy. And I think that in my view, social democracy has best holistic answer to three burning questions of the continent and the world today, namely social inequality, climate change and security threats. Not to consider one at the expense of the other two, or two at the expense of the third, but holistic approach for all these three issues, I hope, will do well in the elections.

But as you in UK know very well, it’s not only US which impacts our continent. Also, our continent impacts US. First, we got, I remember, Brexit, then Trump, and now, these elections in EU will have an effect, I think, also, across the Atlantic, and it’s time to mobilise, to work hard, not to be fearful, to worry and never to panic. This is a great year, multiple crises, but great opportunities, as well. So, I think it is very important to see it in this respect, 2024. We have excellent relations with Slovenia, and we never forget your support 35 years ago, at [inaudible – 42:49], Milan Kučan supporting Miners of Trepča and Mitrovica. That was very encouraging, and we generally, made clear that people want freedom and centralist Yugoslavia is not the solution. That was the late 80s, when I think many of the things that we saw during the 90s were prepared, generally negative sense, but not only.

I think that 2030 is reasonable number to think of. President of European Council, Charles Michel, at Bled Strategic Forum, announced the Year 2030. On the other hand, President of the European Commission, Madam Ursula von der Leyen, she launched growth plan, €6 billion for the region. Combination of growth plan with 2030, I think it’s doable for those who want to integrate. In Kosova, 94% of people want to join EU. In Serbia, it’s 35%. You cannot impose EU. Two decades ago, when Prime Minister of Serbia was Zoran Đinđić, support for EU was 75%, now it fell to 35%. So, I think this is very important to note.

Independence of Kosova came out from a violent breakup of Yugoslavia, where a constitutive element of a former federation of Yugoslavia, even though we were not a republic. There was presidency of Yugoslavia, where one of eight seats belonged to Kosova, and when Yugoslavia was destroyed, Kosova ended up in a classical occupation of Serbia, with apartheid. Then we had national liberation struggle. Then we had genocide, which was stopped by NATO. So, declaration of independence of Kosova was a very sui generis case in this sense.

But again, as a Social Democrat, I want freedom of people, I want equality of all. However, I don’t think that you can copy/paste one case into another. There are chances for new attacks on Kosova, but I think that terrorists have to count on Police Forces of Kosova, on NATO Soldiers, who are ever less tolerant. And I believe that this is the main reason why we still don’t have another attack like Banjska, because just to revert a bit your question, you said, “What if they attack you again?” I answer with another question, why do you think they didn’t attack us again so far? And I think the main reason is because they saw joint patrols of Kosova Police and NATO Soldiers. And we have to work more to pre-empt any kind of security threats and we’re doing well with our allies in this respect.

Danielle Sheridan

Armida, please join the conversation.

Armida van Rij

To your question, Ambassador, thanks very much for coming, I just, I wanted to add to what the Prime Minister has said, which is the alternative for the Western Balkans, if not the EU, then what? It’s Russia. Russia props up authoritarian regimes. We have seen this in the Sahel very clearly. Russia props up authoritarian regimes. It does not take care of its populations. It take cares of elites, and so, those elites will then not deliver on public services and will not deliver on the benefits that populations need, and will not generally serve to provide peaceful and thriving societies.

So, the alternative, other than the EU, is not a very good in my opinion, but again, I’m conscious that we have actual Western Balkan representation on the panel, but I also want to flip your question on its head, which is, what’s the alternative for the EU to not have the Western Balkans be included? And I would see that as instability, and so, to me there’s a real question there, back to the EU, really, which is, do you really want to have that in your neighbourhood? I don’t think so.

Danielle Sheridan

Which prompts the question that maybe things should be speeded up because of the – as you said earlier, it’s this, kind of, dead period that allows aggressors to, kind of, infiltrate and take advantage.

I’m going to turn to some online questions now, and this was referenced in the audience, but – and this is open to any of you. How will the elections in America, and if Donald Trump does become President again, how will that impact the situation in the Western Balkan region? Who would like to take that? I guess also taking on the fact that…

Albin Kurti

The Professors.

Danielle Sheridan

Yeah. Trump has been vocal, hasn’t he…

Andi Hoxhaj OBE

I…

Danielle Sheridan

…about Ukraine and the…?

Andi Hoxhaj OBE

…think we can, sort of – if Trump becomes, again, President, I think we already have a bit of a track record of what the first term was. When it comes to the Western Balkans, we didn’t see a major change. However, with specific countries, there was a different approach, and in the case of Kosovo, the Trump White House did help with the recognition with Israel, which I know it was a big deal for Kosovo. However, it’s quite worrying in terms of the recent event, as well as remark when it comes to NATO, and we do understand that a number of Western Balkan countries would like to become a member of NATO. So, that is a bit concerning. But the thing with Trump is, what we learned, he – everything that he approaches is a business deal, so we’ll have to find out.

Armida van Rij

Jus…

Albin Kurti

Well, yeah, please.

Armida van Rij

Yeah. I was just going to add to that, again, Trump pulling out of NATO or suggesting that he may not, you know, honour Article 5, fundamentally undermines NATO deterrence. That – I mean, there’s absolutely no question about that. The impact of that is that emboldens Putin and that emboldens Russia, which we were talking about earlier. Russia is already treating the Western Balkans as its own sphere of influence and so, it will only accelerate that if Trump were to be elected and if Trump to – were to make true some of the things he’s been saying about the US’s commitment to NATO. So – and I think the practical reality on the ground of that would be further instability in the Western Balkans.

Albin Kurti

I think there will be quite some time now until we have next elections in US. I think we should follow carefully what will happen in the spring, and then, what will happen with elections in EU. And I believe that in summer, we will know much more than nowadays regarding November, which otherwise coincides with 160 years of second victory of Abraham Lincoln.

But not in terms of elections in US, but in terms of Former President Trump, I like what American Film Director, David Lynch, said about Donald Trump. I don’t know if you have…

Danielle Sheridan

What was that?

Albin Kurti

…followed it much. He said, “You cannot combat Mr Trump in an intelligent way.” He didn’t say that he was not intelligent. He said that you cannot be intelligent with him.

Danielle Sheridan

Right.

Albin Kurti

So, it’s not going to be easy [applause].

Danielle Sheridan

Not really [applause]. Okay, I’m going to take another question from online, and this is asking how “the economic crisis and the subsequent cost of living crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2092 has impacted the already strained relations between Balkan countries regarding availability to food and rising inflation.” Would anyone like to take that?

Andi Hoxhaj OBE

The rise of inflation started since the pandemic and so, in – and the impact is already there to be seen. What we have seen migration from the Western Balkan, and when we look at the different statistics, in particularly to what I mentioned, number one, it’s poverty and it’s lack to access to jobs. So, there is already quite a lot of strain with – when it comes to that. We have seen the EU providing this package for the Western Balkans, mainly in terms of mitigating, especially when it comes to energy. However, how useful that is, probably the Prime Minister can tell us in more detail. But when we see outside the trend, it’s having an impact, and particularly when we look at the migration counts.

Albin Kurti

Well, in January 2023, we had 12% inflation, but then, by October, it fell to around 3%. When we got into office, export-import ratio was one to nine, huge trade deficit. So, since we’re importing a lot of goods, we imported inflation, as well. Now, it’s around one to five. We still have a huge gap, but fast is going well. Definitely, energy prices, when we have to cover the peak during winter days, are of great concern. In Kosova, we can, now, like, at the best, have a one gigawatt hour of – one gigawatt of capacity, and we have to cover 1.4 gigawatts during winter, and sometimes, when we need to import energy, that’s very expensive.

However, this winter has not been that bad and we’re going aggressive with renewables. We have designed Energy Strategy 2022/2031, adding 1.2 gigawatts of renewable, half solar, half wind. It was just now – we entered a successful auction for solar park of 100 megawatt, six corporations from the world, democratic world competed, and we’re going to open another 150 in two lots, 150 megawatts for wind, a non-specific site, 15 years of power purchase agreement, 30 years of land lease agreement, with a ceiling on prices of €75 per megawatt hour.

So, we’re doing well with this strategy now and I think that every country should try their best with renewables. However, we need more solidarity with each other. Democratic countries, they need to co-operate more, because we see now how right-wing, extreme right-wing autocrats, they have an instantaneous, kind of, spontaneous, automatic solidarity, which is very worrisome. And I think that democratic countries should co-operate more, and in this solidarity, we should strengthen our spirit.

We should get the best of the struggles we’re in and perhaps fear less, because what I see today, what worries me most is that majority of the topics that Democrats discuss, they discuss with a sense of fear from Russian Federation, to the possibility of Former President Donald Trump coming back to White house. To – you know, it’s like there is too much fear in our discussion. You know, this is – fear is not a policy. Of course, there are things to be afraid in the world, but solidarity in our camp, democratic Western world, or those who aspire to, should be higher and at the service of self-confidence. So, let’s worry more and fear less.

Danielle Sheridan

Great, thank we. We haven’t [applause] finished yet. We’ve got five more minutes. So, I’ll take a few questions. So, okay, this – the gentleman sat right in the front row with the very nice suit on, and – we’ll come to you after, and then, I’ve got one more question online that’s just caught my eye, that I’m keen to put to you. Thank you.

Ian Cliff

Thank you very much. Ian Cliff, Former British Ambassador to Kosovo. Welcome, Prime Minister. Can I just bring you back to the subject of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, which I know is not necessarily your favourite theme? But you were talking about agreements that weren’t signed. Ever since 2013, there’s been this question of whether there should be an association of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. If you look at it from a security angle, do you see the establishment of such an association as a threat to Kosovo’s integrity or a way of reaching out to the Kosovo Serb population? Thank you.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you. We’ll take another question, someone from the back, perhaps. There’s a guy towards the back middle with a gilet on. Great. Thank you.

Roni Dragusha

Hello, testing, testing. Thank you. I just want to express my gratitude for all the speakers today. My name is Roni Dragusha. I’m an undergraduate at Queen Mary, and perhaps a question that will resonate with the youths in this room is, in your opinion – well, this question is open to all of you, what do you think the youth can do to “push for the independence of Kosovo going forward in the next 20-30 years”?

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you, one last question. I’m going to go to this side of the room, right at the back, with – the gentleman with his hand up. Thank you.

Max Tragos

Hello, Max Tragos, UK Civil Service. Could you describe some of the hybrid threats that are facing the Western Balkans at the moment, in more detail, please? Thank you.

Danielle Sheridan

Thanks, and I’m just going to pull this one from online. It’s asking “what the UK can do to better support stability, security and prosperity in the Western Balkans?” Which I think is important to look at what, yeah, we can do from this end. So, I don’t know who wants to – Andi, go for it.

Andi Hoxhaj OBE

I think the hybrid threat and the UK support, I could summarise it. So, one of the hybrid threat that is quite prevalent, it’s to do with disinformation. So, one of the polls that we have seen from our study, about 83% of articles in the Western Balkans are not properly factchecked, so only 17%, and that has a ramification in terms of how you inform the public. Not just Russia, but a number of countries are putting a lot of money into disinformation campaign in the Western Balkans. We have seen it especially with the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue, with the migration crisis and so on.

Now, the UK can help in a number of sphere. Firstly, the UK could bring back BBC Albanian Service, because there a number of countries in the Western Balkan that speak Albanian, and it could counter the disinformation campaign that’s going on. Already, BBC has opened the Serbian Service, but it would be good to have that balance. UK could probably be more vocal, because when it was part of the EU and the EU is trying to, kind of, tell the Western Balkan countries what’s not right, but they don’t say it in public, whereas the UK could be a bit more vocal. It could use its sanction regime quite more frequent. The UK has already sanctioned a number of individuals in the Western Balkans that are seen to align with Russia, but also undermine democracy and rule of law, and that’s something that the UK could do.

The UK could also try to rejoin some of the missions in the Western Balkans, especially in Bosnia. It has already pushed the numbers up in Kosovo, and it could also help with trade and investment. I know the UK is working quite hard on the educational sphere, providing quite a lot more Chevening Scholarship which – that is a good culture approach, and I think that’s something really much missing, but is also not seen in the Western Balkan. We’ve talked quite a lot today about Russia, but there are other countries, like Turkey, like the Middle East and so on, who are investing quite heavily in the Western Balkan on the culture sphere. So, those would be some reflection.

Danielle Sheridan

Great.

Armida van Rij

Just adding to the point on the hybrid threats, because I think this is really important and obviously, we’re not just seeing this in the Western Balkans, we’re seeing this across Europe, really, and far beyond. This – the longer term objective, there has to be building societal resilience, because over time, while many hybrid threats are not necessarily an immediate big bang, over time, the impact of them is that they undermine democracy, they erode trust, they undermine public institutions. And that, then, goes back to what we were talking about earlier in terms of the necessary reforms that are needed in the Western Balkans, about ensuring media freedom, ensuring strong education programmes. So, all of this, kind of, goes hand-in-hand together.

Again, as I was saying, these are longer term objectives, but they’re all the more important because the hybrid threat dimension isn’t going to go away.

Danielle Sheridan

Thank you. We’re really out of time, so if you’re…

Albin Kurti

Can you just…?

Danielle Sheridan

No, I really want to hear what you have to say…

Albin Kurti

No, of course.

Danielle Sheridan

…but if you can keep it concise.

Albin Kurti

Regarding youth, it’s very important to have a qualitative education, but also linked with labour market, because we have huge skills gap in all the countries of Western Balkans, but in particular, in Kosova, country that I represent. So, it is important to bridge this skills gap by vocational education and training, and we have been doing this in the last couple of years. In this year, for example, we have 21 schools, 12 profiles in 14 municipalities all over Kosova, where pupils and students, they go two to three days per week at this dual system. And then, they go apprentice in a business, where they practice what they have learned in school. So, we are providing youth with non-academic professionalism, and I think this helps decrease migration.

On the other hand, you know, we’re not meant, as human beings, to speak only one language or to live in only one place. People will migrate, people will move, but they can come back.

Danielle Sheridan

Yeah.

Albin Kurti

So, we are focusing on programmes for brain gain, after brain drain. And you have two diasporas which are very interesting, Turkish and Polish diaspora in Germany. The retired people of Polish and Turkish diaspora, when they returned back home, they became a great economic factor, not only the remittances, but their knowhow, work ethics and so on and so forth, because people today, when they retire, they don’t die. They live another 20 years. So, it’s not like a century ago. So, I think we can make use of our retired elderly in diaspora coming back to Kosova, Albania, the entire region. So, I’m working hard to make Ausbildung the most famous German word in my country, that’s dual education system. Used to be Gastarbeiter in the 20th Century. Now, we move to Ausbildung.

A hybrid threat, for example, previous Parliament of Serbia, 250 MPs, 99 of them in the friendship group, Serbia-Russia Federation. You know, we have in Parliaments friendship groups, Kosova-UK, a dozen of MPs max, but not 40% of Parliament in a friendship group. Direct flights daily Belgrade-Moscow, a lot of businesses being open, and Sputnik regional base for the Balkans is in Belgrade. 100 miles from capital town of Kosova, Pristina, is the so-called Serb-Russian Humanitarian Center, with dozens of spies and Agents, who trained people for emergency situations. Over 3,000 people went into training in that centre in a bit more than a decade. So, who are these 3,000 people who went into that training?

Then, hybrid warfare is very much present in academia, in university. A Russian Ambassador to Belgrade invites to dinner parties students of Faculty of Law, Faculty of International Relations, Political Science, Sociology and so on and so forth. So, EU pours a lot of money and in the evening, they get the Russian fairy tale, how world looks likes and will be. So – and this is the problem, because European Union, unfortunately, believes that once they have relieved funds, the money will speak for itself. It’s not like that. You can give a lot of money and if you ask now, if you do a poll in Serbia, they will tell you that they are getting more financial support from Russia than from EU, which is absolutely false. So, ordinary citizens do not know, necessarily, where their aids and loans are coming from and here, we need to combat this disinformation with true information, you know. If they keep repeating their lies, we should not hesitate to repeat the truth.

And here, what worries me most is not necessarily fake news, because the awareness is much higher now than few years ago. It’s rather, fake histories. There is a big campaign of doing documentary films, long interviews, where see and hear and alternative history, and I don’t think that we’re paying sufficient attention to this. And history – how history is taught in schools perhaps could be rethinked a bit. It is very important not to allow youth to get diluted by these alternative narratives of historical events in 20th Century and early on.

Danielle Sheridan

I think that’s probably a good place to end it, and I’m so sorry because it’s been really great to hear. We have to say, we’re out of time, so thank you, all of you, so, so much [applause]. But if you’d like to continue the conversation, there’s some drinks upstairs in the Neill Malcolm Room, so please do come along, because I still have more questions. So, thank you so much.

Albin Kurti

We will continue [pause]…