Stronger together: A strategy to revitalize transatlantic power

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Hello ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House, if I can say that again, even though we’re obviously not at Chatham House. But delighted to have you all join us today for the conversation we’re going to have on one of the big topics for the beginning of 2021 and for all of the – this year and well into the future, but at a particular pivotal moment, the future of the transatlantic relationship. And we’re going to be tackling this topic, through the prism of a very important report that was released at the tail end of the last year, of 2020, in early December 2020, that was a partnership between the Belfer Center, the Kennedy School at Harvard University and DGAP, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Berlin. And delighted that to have this conversation we’ve got two of the Co-Chairs of the project and of the Transatlantic Strategy Group that they convened to convene its answers and its ideas, plus three of the Authors of the report of various sections, all going to be participating in the conversation today. The report is called Stronger Together: A Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power, and I think, obviously, the headline tells you what it’s going to be.

Before I introduce the speakers and the folks, we’re going to have with us today, let me quickly do a little bit of housekeeping for you all. Just to remind you that this is on the record, as you might expect. The event is being livestreamed, as well, so, feel free to tweet away on the back of it and share some of the good ideas that you hear through the conversation, or your reactions to them, as you will, with friends and colleagues. I also want to say that we’re really pleased to be co-hosting this event today with LSE IDEAS, a great partner institution of ours in London, and really pleased to be having, also, a lot of the LSE IDEA audience with us today, along with the Chatham House members.

Once we’ve had our conversation, we’re going to move into Q&A and into a conversation with you. Please use the ‘Q&A’ function to pose your questions. Do not use the raise hand function, which is not available today. We will be able to best monitor the questions if they come through ‘Q&A’. The ‘Chat’ is alive, but really, just use that maybe for sidebar commentary or conversation, if anyone wants to share some ideas as we go along. But as I said, please use the ‘Q&A’ function to be able to take this forward.

The colleagues that we have with us today, who I’m going to introduce now, who will be choreographed, I suppose, by me, through the course of the event, will be, first of all, Nick Burns. Nick Burns is the Professor at – of Practice of Diplomacy. In fact, he was the Founder and is the Faculty Director of the Practice of Diplomacy at Harvard University, at the Kennedy School there, and he’s also somebody who leads The Future of Diplomacy project, as well, for the institute, and one of the Co-Chairs of this project. He, as I think is known to many of you here, had a very distinguished career in the US State Department, ended up being Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, but he was Ambassador to NATO and held a series of distinguished positions there. He is also currently Director of the Aspen Strategy Group, which is, I think, a well-known group of very influential figures in the broader strategic community in the United States.

Nick is with Daniela Schwarzer, who is the Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, DGAP, as I described it earlier, and Daniela, having Co-Chaired this project, is bringing all of her wisdom, also, from the think tank community, in which she has participated throughout her career, also the German Marshall Fund of the United States, amongst other places.

After I’ve had a conversation with Daniela and Nick, at the beginning, just to get some of the first ideas onto the table, I am going to turn to Leslie Vinjamuri of Chatham House, the Director of our US and the Americas Programme, Dean of the Queen Elizabeth Academy as well, well-known to all of you. And after we’ve had Leslie discussing with us, I’m going to bring in Christian Mölling, also from DGAP, Torrey Taussig, Research Director of the Project on Europe and Transatlantic Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, who is Executive Director of the Future Diplomacy Project, along with Nick, and she’s also Executive Director of the Project on Europe and Transatlantic Relationship. All of them contributed: Christian, Cathryn and Torrey, to particular sections of the report and are, therefore, very well-placed to be able to discuss all of this with us.

So, with those introductions out of the way and hopefully I’ve covered everything, and obviously, we’ll get into Q&A after we’ve had a, sort of, conversation between the six or so of us at the beginning. And let me just say, do get your questions in early, because it would be nice to be able to fold some of those questions into the conversation that we have here with all of our participants in this group. And let me just say, I was very pleased to be actually a member of the Transatlantic Strategy Group that helped pull together these ideas and if you go to the websites, either of DGAP or of the Belfer Center, the Kennedy School at Harvard, you’ll be able to access the report and see all the other participants in pulling together the great ideas they developed.

So, that’s enough opening conversation for me. I certainly want to use up our remaining hour or so by turning, first, to you, Daniela, because I think, rather than asking you to give a synopsis of what is an over 80-page report and making you and Nick have to do that, what I thought I would do is maybe ask you a, sort of, slightly provocative question, because I noticed one of the key lines, for me, in the Executive Summary of the report is that “We cannot simply rebuild the ties of the previous era.” You put that warning line down right at the beginning, and I suppose you felt the need to. So, what did you find, kind of, hardest to bring together in what is, in the end, a transatlantic paper about the transatlantic relationship? Where did you find the grit in the oyster? What was difficult about getting the group together and some practical ideas for the future? Over to you, first.

Daniela Schwarzer

Thank you very much, Robin, for that question, but most of all for hosting us today and for – to LSE for being a partner in this event. It’s a great opportunity to engage with your audiences. We started working on the report a year before its publication and the hardest thing for us was to imagine the two ways the Presidential election could go in November 2020. And so, while we started working on the agenda that we thought, from a European and American perspective, should guide transatlantic relations and the next administration’s work, we, of course, we’re absolutely aware that whatever happed in the US election would crucially determine what would be politically possible after that. So, that was, kind of, the headline over all of the reflections, we have to think in two scenarios, and in a way, we had a very intense and engaged discussion, not only across the Atlantic, but also among Europeans. But it was really only after we knew who would move into the White House, we could really bring this to an end and have this report ready on time, at the end of last year, with, I think, a very substantive agenda of actual items, really.

And, you know, talking about the challenges, of course, we did not think one moment we could go back to Obama times or even times before that, because the world has, crucially, changed over the past four years, but also, Europe has changed, and the US has changed. So, the way we thought about transatlantic relations was really taking into account all the new dynamics and the new challenges that are out there, and we tried to be very, very realistic what can be prolifically feasible and what can bring us closer together again in a more effective way, not only to shape our relationship across the Atlantic, but also to be a shaping power in the world together. And we didn’t invent everything, because we do think there a few things to get back to and that is really one of the first things that our report, we did acknowledge we have to rebuild something and that is the bond of trust in the relationship, and, also, the power of democracy and the value base that should underly our joint action in the world. So, it’s not all new, but we do think we have to find new ways to make those norms and values and those approaches, which I just mentioned, effective in the partnership, in the relationship, but also when we think about developments or…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And just one very quick follow-up question before I turn to Nick. I mean, do you think that the fact that you had to spend this year balancing between these two futures and those two futures seem to be so potentially different and extreme, do you think this has ended up having a, kind of, scarring effect on the transatlantic relationship, even though the outcome is one that I think most leaders, certainly, across Europe, found the positive outcome they wanted? Most; we can come to those that didn’t later on. but do you think there’s been a, kind of, scarring effect which meant you had to limit the ambition, almost, of what you put forward?

Daniela Schwarzer

I don’t think the ambition is limited, but on the European side, of course, there is more caution when thinking about the US and what the US can mean for Europe in the future. And I would say, you know, despite those four very difficult years, there is something positive in this, because Europeans have realised, they need to bring more to the table to be an attractive partner, but also to be more powerful in themselves, as Europeans, in shaping the relationship, but also, in preparing for a potentially – a potential next phase, where the US may have less interest in revitalising and re – sort of, reliving this transatlantic alliance. And that was one of the very interesting points among us Europeans, but also with our American friends, how do we conceptualise this European role? And obviously, the terms out there are strategic autonomy, European sovereignty, European capacity to act, and we had very good and intense discussions on precisely the term, not because we want to get lost in concepts, but because we realised, first of all, we want to be practical. So, it’s about the capacity to act and we made practical suggestions.

But we know that the terms are not only divisive among Europeans, because some in European actually think if we speak about strategic autonomy, this may drive the US away from us, but also, in the American group, there were some who share the concern that if Europe is too affirmative in the sense of raising, potentially raising the impression that Europe is turning away from the relationship, this wouldn’t help in the inner debate in Washington.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, exactly.

Daniela Schwarzer

And so, we chose, I think we chose very hands-on language and recommendations, because in particular, we at DGAP, we don’t believe we should be lost in those grand concepts. We need to come forward with very practical suggestions and you will find them throughout the report, whichever chapter you look at, albeit defence, be it China, and there are concrete proposals out there.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much and, actually, that’s a perfect segue, Nick, to you, because the question, I suppose, is to what extent the new administration is able to quickly rebuild the trust and do a reset, that was a dangerous term to use, I know, but to reconnect the relationship? And certainly, we saw in President Biden’s most recent speech at the State Department that real sense of commitment to alliances and the Transatlantic Alliance. But I notice that in your paper, you put in there, quite firmly, on – I’ll have to say our paper, but your paper, on the economic element, you know. There was a big emphasis on the need to get back to a normalcy and to get rid of some of the economic tariffs and just, kind of, sanctions that were put in place in its time. But it’s one area where the Biden administration has been pretty cautious and we can imagine why, but I’m wondering what’s your take, even from these first month or so in power, about whether the relationship is going to be able to reset and rebuild the trust as quickly as, you know, the paper has advocated?

Nicholas Burns

Robin, thank you, and first of all, thanks to you for being part of this team. You deserve a lot of the credit, and thanks to Chatham House and LSE IDEAS. I just wanted to say what an honour it is for me to serve on the Panel of Senior Advisors and to work with Robin and I really admire his work and Leslie’s work, and the team’s work. Chatham house is a brilliant institution.

I was really pleased that Daniela and I, and our two institutions, could coalesce here, because we didn’t want a report that was an American view or a European view. We actually had a combined team, and the differences did not break clearly among us, between the Atlantic, the – our side of the Atlantic and Daniela’s. I think we had people on both sides of those arguments and so, that was very good.

To answer your question, is there’s no question that President Biden and Tony Blinken are – Secretary Tony Blinken, are Atlanticists. They’ve been emphasising in every single utterance that the United States needs to rebuild these alliances. I think it’s sincere, I think we’re doing it in the Nor – in NATO and the US-EU relationship. You see it with our allies, Robin, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and our partnership with India in the Indo-Pacific. One interesting thing to look for, and we speculate on this in the report, is could the United States and the European Union and Japan, and I would add the United Kingdom to this, coalesce on the big trade differences that all of us have with China? That would be well more than 60% of global GDP, a real weight on our side of these negotiations, so, that’s one idea on alliances.

I do think there are some difficult issues ahead for the transatlantic allies. Once certainly, Robin, you mentioned it, are the many economic issues, trade issues, that divide the European Union from the United States. Digital service tax, certainly, is going to divide us. No question that Nord Stream and the German commitment to complete it and the American congressional action to sanction Germany and Germany companies for this, is a real problem in the relationship. And as we see the tech companies getting every – ever more wealthy and The Wall Street Journal had a fascinating report over the weekend on the extraordinary growth of the tech industries just – the big tech companies in the United States, just over the last year, European regulation of American tech companies is going to be sensitive. And so, what we call for in the report is essentially a truce, that the EU countries, the United States and the UK is going to have to be involved in this, as the recently departed member of the EU, can we actually try to diffuse some of these tensions and work out some rational solutions, or else, we might be back in mini trade wars on these issues? That’s the first issue that I think is going to be difficult across the Atlantic.

The second is clearly going to be China and here Gideon Rachman wrote a really fascinating article in this morning’s Financial Times about this. There’s no question that the Five Eyes: the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, I would say along with India and along with Japan, see eye-to-eye on China and what we should do on China. Very sceptical of the Chinese push for power, opposed to it in the Indo-Pacific, outraged by what the Chinese have done to Hong Kong and to the Uighurs in Xinjiang Province and certainly, all of these countries want to coalesce to exclude Huawei from our 5G networks.

Contrast that with what I think we found in our report is the lack of consensus in the European Union about how to look at China. Some European countries clearly not wishing to associate themselves with the US, the UK, on a hardedge view, a ‘competitive’ view, as President Biden has put it, that we have to have with China, and I fear that what’s going to happen here is this is going to be another problem in the transatlantic relationship. If a new German leadership, post-Merkel, but Daniela would have a much better view of this than me, and if the French try to play some kind of a middle game, where they prioritise their major company interests, you’ve seen the Germans do this with our automobile manufacturers, to preserve those links to China, I think the US is going to have no option but to really focus on our Indo-Pacific allies, on the UK and Canada, as our real partners here. And it’s another gap that opens up between the United States and China.

I just say two more things very briefly, and if we want to talk about Russia, Robin, this report is a contain Russia, at least I would use that word, manifesto, especially in the wake of this major hack of American companies and the American Government, the largest in cyber history. And a final point for Chatham House and for the Ditchley Foundation, and I’m a great supporter of the Ditchley Foundation, to think about how do we now reframe the US-UK special relationship? It’s very important for the United States to have a strategic relationship with Britain, and Britain is reeling from its, you know, ragged departure as – from my perspective, from the European Union. And can we have a consensus between our two countries, as we operate together in NATO and in the Indo-Pacific on China? To me, that’s very important to pull together.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Good points, Nick, and very important ones as markers for the future and the, kind of, risks for the future, as well. I think – and I know I’m going to bring you back in later on, and I think you’ve made a lot of good points there, and I want to maybe just get some first reactions in a second from Leslie. But to take advantage, just, Leslie, while you get ready for your thoughts and, just, comments on those opening remarks from Daniela and Nick, Nick, there was one question, actually, that’s popped in already into the Q&A. So, thank you for folks for putting questions in already. Let me just give you one right now, ‘cause it is a conceptual one. I think it’d be a good idea to have it right at the beginning. Haldon Sumard Stuch asks the question, “What is your leadership concept, Ambassador Burns, for NATO and transatlantic co-operation, if you have one, for the new era?” “What is the leadership concept?” which I think is a very interesting way of phrasing it. How could – how can we have a leadership concept behind the future of NATO and transatlantic co-operation? How would you answer that question? Then I’ll turn to Leslie.

Nicholas Burns

Well, and I’ll try to do a speed answer, ‘cause I want to look forward to hear Leslie, as well. The United States needs to recommit to NATO and that’s what you see President Biden and Secretary Blinken doing, number one. Number two, we need stronger European leadership, much stronger leadership from Germany and France on the military side. Number three, here the United Kingdom becomes more important. The UK out of the EU needs a major place, and should have a major voice, inside NATO. And finally, I’d say the real challenge for us in NATO is to adapt our military technology to the militarisation of AI, quantum sciences, biotech. That’s where the Chinese are going and that’s where the Russians are going with part of their military modernisation. The United States is trying to – is going to keep power, I – and I assume the United Kingdom. I worry about some of the European allies, who can’t even get to 2% of GDP, much less completely convert their strategic thinking about the digital age. That’s a big challenge from the two authoritarian powers.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

A very clear point and very helpful. Leslie, again, you’ll get, I’m sure, at least two bites at the cherry here, but what, you know, what are your first thoughts and reactions from what you heard from Daniela and Rebecca – oh, I’m sorry, Daniela and Nick?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Well, first of all, I have to say what an honour it is to join the panel and that I was especially keen to join because Nick Burns is the last person that I saw at a conference in the flesh, in person, at Harvard and I’ll never forget it. But we only made it through the first day, because Harvard shut down its conferences after Saturday, so it felt incomplete, as great as it was, so, it’s really nice to be here with all of you, thank you.

I thought it was a – first of all, you know, I’ll say a few things. I thought it was an in – a really interest port – report, incredibly ambitious and I will be very honest, when I first looked at it, I went, “Oh, God, it’s another one of those reports. It’s going to say everything about everything and you’re not going to get much out of it.” But as I went through it, I was remarkably impressed, because it’s very difficult, right, to go after this many issues at this, you know, necessarily level of generality and actually be concrete, and the report really succeeds in that. And so, I highly recommend it to you in a way that I’ll be honest, I wouldn’t recommend many of these reports, ‘cause it’s just not possible to do this. But this really is ambitious, and it delivers, so you should read it. It’s also interesting that some of the – one of the things, at least, that it’s called for, has already been realised, which is extend the new START Treaty, so, you know, you’re on the right track.

But I did have a couple of in – a couple of what – I guess one big reaction and it, sort of, makes me think that we need a second report. Because, you know, the really tough things, and I looked at it less as, you know, the Transatlantic Partnership getting together. I thought that was done very well. I looked at it more as, okay, you’ve set out what needs to be done, but in many ways, now we need part two. And part two is, you know, how do you deal with the tough trade-offs? What – how do you deal with the questions of timing and sequencing and trade-offs? And, you know, I looked, in particular, at questions of democracy and human rights in the report. I noticed, interestingly, that human rights came up ten times, democracy came up 47 times. I think that was quite revealing, and that – I think that makes sense, since we all know that, you know, if you have democracy, you have a much stronger chance of having human rights. But it also raises, I guess, one of my big questions for you, which is that what didn’t – what wasn’t clear to me is, you know, what are the trade-offs and what is the sequencing? So, you, sort of, say, you know, we’ve got to defend democracy against the spread of Russia and China’s authoritarianism, but we all know that the really tough challenges is, you know, how do you co-operate with China on climate, on pandemics, on technology, on markets, while putting sanctions on them for the Uighurs, if you can get that transatlantic agreement? And I think what I wanted to see is, you know, in the next stage, is what is your recommendation, right? Do you do that upfront and at what price, and at what point do you delay?

And secondly, and very much related, is, you know, we had a conversation about this last night, is it the long game and is there a recognition that playing the human rights card with Russia and with China will necessarily have to be the long game, in the same way that the Helsinki Process was not intended to end the Cold War? Nobody ever thought that the Helsinki Process was going to be the thing that brought the wall down. But playing the long game was really, really important, and is there some sort of room for agreement in the transatlantic community, on the talk about human rights and democracy promotion, especially since we know we’re not going to do that with boots on the ground? You know, what is the time in question? What are the concrete trade-offs? What’s the recommendation there and can we make the case for the long game, or is that politically and morally untenable?

So, you know, those are just a few of my thoughts and I guess I’ll end with one more, which is that the democracy section I really like. Constanze wrote it. She has a really nice division between the state, the economy and civil society. She talks about emergency powers, protecting civil society, inclusiveness, the autonomy of the state, it’s fascinating. As you’re reading it, you know, you immediately see how different these things map out in the US than they do in the UK and the EU and across Europe. But I did notice that science wasn’t in there and again, and part two, I guess, and we’re seeing it, you know, put at the cabinet level in the US, it’s being promoted in the UK, and I’d say part two, you know, a really rigorous discussion about how the transatlantic community can really come together to protect and promote the role of science in public policy, not only in the transatlantic space, but far beyond. And that will do a lot, I think, for, you know, playing the long game on the question of human rights and democracy.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much, Leslie, for those comments and two very important questions. I think rather than go back to Nick and Daniela, as I know both of them want to bring in some of the Authors, this is actually quite a good moment to turn, first, to Torrey Taussig. Torrey, you wrote the – co-wrote/wrote the section on China and you could still – see a lot of the questions already heading in that direction in the chatline, as well – sorry, in the ‘Q&A’ line. There’s a lot of questions coming in, but some are about China. But I think to this challenge that Leslie just put down, how do you handle the trade-offs? Could you just say a word or two about that, either what was said in the paper or what you personally believe should be the trade-offs? ‘Cause I – it was a pretty firm recommendation that individuals should be sanctioned, yeah. I know, and I mean, you know, that’s the way the language reads. It wasn’t put gently, “should be sanctioned for what’s going on in Hong Kong and Xinjiang,” and yet, at the same time, there’s a recognition of how important China will be. This is the COP26 year. How do you think we managed and how did you grapple with this issue of managing trade-offs, triage, timing? The question that Leslie asked. Over to you, Torrey.

Torrey Taussig

Thank you very much, Robin, and thank you to Chatham House for hosting this conversation. As always, Leslie has brought up the provocative hard-hitting questions, which is why I love being in conversations with Leslie. And I’ll address your big question in two parts. The first is on the democracy and human rights front separate from the China challenge, and one of the broad arguments we make in the report is that we have to be just as rigorous with ourselves in defending democracy as we do, defending democracy from Moscow and Beijing. That means asking very hard questions and making tough choices when it comes to looking at democratic backsliding, declining rule of law in EU and NATO member states, such as Poland, Hungary and in Turkey, when it comes to NATO. It means abiding by these values and principles at NATO summits, maybe precluding these backsliders from holding NATO summits. I mean, that’s a big question, that’s a tough choice. It means asking hard questions of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament about what to do with Viktor Orbán’s party in Hungary. So, these are hard questions I think we need to ask of ourselves and our transatlantic community first, if we are to be credible in pushing back against authoritarian overreach from Moscow and Beijing. So, that’s a big point we make in the report, we need to focus on challenges here at home and make those tough choices at home.

Second piece is on the China agenda and I think if we look at the next decade ahead, we are going to be faced with trade-off after trade-off and hard choice after hard choice when it comes to dealing with China. We’ve already seen this playout, with the European Union and Chinese Investment Agreement, that was concluded at the end of 2020, on the eve of the Biden administration taking office. Of course, you know, we, in the United States, wish that the Europeans perhaps would have waited to consult with the incoming team, so that we could’ve had a more united front in taking on these shared trade challenges. That being said, this is a very clear example of Europeans deciding that they need to move forward on trade issues with China while, and this is an important point, while still being able to develop a robust transatlantic agenda with the Americans in dealing with shared challenges from China.

That means, in the months ahead, sitting down with the Americans and European partners in a robust transatlantic dialogue on China and asking hard questions about what we do to strengthen our investment screening mechanisms, particularly in the European Union, how we have a conversation around export controls, to defend our critical industries and ensure that Western technologies do not end up being used for surveillance and human rights abuses in China. And finally, how we use our collective voices to push back against Chinese human rights abuses we see in Xinjiang, in Hong Kong, while acknowledging that we have to work with the Chinese on climate change issues, on recovering from the pandemic. I, personally, do not see these are mutually exclusive and, actually, in the report, we acknowledge that we are going to maintain differences with the Europeans, while needing to continue pushing for this robust transatlantic agenda on China.

So, those are just a few overarching points, first on the democracy question, but then, also, how we deal with these hard questions on China.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

No, thanks, ‘cause those really are the most critical issues at the moment, and I think, as you said there, the – getting down to some of the nitty-gritty around investment screening and so on is going to be particularly important. There was a question right there at the top, by James Tudor-White, as to whether, you know, people felt that the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment had been a little bit naïve or not. But, you know, and maybe we’ll come back to that later on, but James, thanks for putting that question into the Q&A.

I just want to make sure I get all of the views on the table before I run this through too many questions. I’m going to turn to Christian next, Christian Mölling, in particular on the security front. You know, there has been this big debate as to whether NATO should pick up more of the security agenda or not, and I’m just wondering whether that’s something you’d like to make a comment? How do you differentiate between the immediate and proximate risks from Russia, as compared to the growing focus that we have on China? And a second point I wanted to make sure you could address was this issue, how do you square the democracy agenda that’s been raised already, calling out countries like Poland and Hungary, with wanting to keep a strong NATO together, given that, obviously Poland and Hungary both frontline states, and yet, each with very different attitudes to the government in Moscow? So, just a couple of provocations for you there, as you share a couple of thoughts on the security front.

Dr Christian Mölling

Yeah, thanks very much, Robin, thanks for having me. Let me say on your last question, if I – I think that’s the most important one, because that’s something we are struggling, in Europe and within NATO, of how do you deal with those countries who want to establish a new kind of standard or new status quo? But I think what we have learned, over the last ten years is, you have to have your house in order to be strong at home and to be strong abroad. It’s as simple as that. So, if we think that we are a community of rule of law, then this has to be apply because otherwise, this is an open flank that will be used by everybody against us. So, there is no other way than having a discussion. This is not about, you know, everybody tries to say, “Yeah, we have to throw them out.” No, this is not the way. I mean, there are so many facets about throwing somebody out, which is legally not possible, etc., so, of course we have to have a discussion with Poland and with Hungary and we also have to have an even tougher discussion with Turkey, which is, of course, even more difficult, you know. But otherwise, we can’t get our house in order. We have so many open flanks for the moment, that if we then look into the future challenges, like China, how do we deal with them, if we even can’t challenge with the offers, with the nice offers that’s come to these capitals from Moscow? This will get even to a higher level, so to say.

And I think this is the running – the interesting thing is that the security and defence part is less the, from my perspective, it’s less the old we need to get more capabilities, yes, but what for? I mean, the running topics are technology, China and EU-NATO co-operation, and this is not the gold old time of we have to do this because we all want to be good Europeans. This is because – and that what I’ve found is also streamlined within the paper, this is the biggest challenges that we currently see, not only for the security-defence part, but for the overall political dimension that this paper has in it.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you very much for that, and I’m going to quickly, just before I come to Cathryn Clüver to talk on the technology front, which I think is such an important theme running through all of this, just quickly, Nick, back to you. Having been, as you were, Ambassador in Athens, to Greece on behalf of the United States, when you look at the Turkey challenge, is that something that you feel this administration is going to have at the top of its agenda? Is there a near-term solution? Does it need a more muscular US presence to try to deconflict the situation in there? How would you be handling the Turkey dossier?

Nicholas Burns

I think Turkey is a major preoccupation for the Biden team, as it was for President Trump’s team, you know, given the fact they’ve imported the S-400 system, which we cannot hook up to the NATO Air Defence system, given the fact that they’ve been regularly harassing Greece and Cyprus, as well as Israel, on drilling rights for natural gas, both in the Eastern Aegean Sea, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean, given the lack of democracy. That’s a diplomatic way of putting it. More Generals in jail, more Journalists in jail in Turkey, than in any other country in the West, it’s a major problem.

You can’t expel Turkey from NATO, because we operate by consensus, and so, Turkey would just block the consensus, but you can side-line them, and in our report, we do advocate financial penalties for Hungary, Turkey and Poland, denial of NATO support funds, denial of the ability to host NATO military meetings and conferences. There has to be something that the NATO – that NATO and the EU do to these, in the case of NATO, three countries, in the case of the EU, two countries, which clearly, you can’t call, especially Hungary and Turkey you can no longer call democracies. And so, that’s a very bitter pill for a lot of people to swallow. A lot of people oppose this recommendation that we’ve made. “It’s too hard, it’s too difficult, you’re alienate them,” but Victor Viktor Orbán is undermining NATO, I would say as well as the European Union, by his autocratic tendencies.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks, and we’ve been able to answer Michael Harvey’s question by taking that on, so, Michael, hopefully, that touched your – on the question that you had addressed right there. Before I get into more of the questions, I, as I said, want to come back to Cathryn Clüver, who is focused on the technology dimension. I know Nick mentioned right at the beginning, Cathryn, that he thought that digital tact was going to be one of those areas that could really get crunchy across the Atlantic. But there are many other dynamics to this, as well, the science and technology agenda, which Leslie mentioned and my colleague, Patricia Lewis, at Chatham House, was also pleased to see featuring here. What would you say on the technology front, as to next steps across the Atlantic? Over to you.

Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook

Well, first, I’m, again, pleased to be with you and to do the second of a Chatham House event combination between us, the Belfer Center, and Chatham House within one week. So, it’s really a joy to be with you again and to have my alma mater, the London School of Economics, join us for this conversation, as well.

Look, I think we’ve already touched on all the cross-cutting areas in which technology is going to play a critical role, from China to defence, bus also from paramount things, like norm setting, in the way that we have seen over the past four years, China and Russia muscling into, whether it’s the Convention on Cybercrime, whether it’s at the heart of the United Nations system, where we, in the West, because of the divisions that Nick has already spoken to, our differentiating understanding of the role that technology plays in keeping our society safe and integrated, not just with respect to key components of our technological systems, 5G, but both you, Leslie, and Robin leaned into the idea of disinformation and what technology has done to erode the way that we relate to one another, the way that we trust one another, frankly.

So, I think you’ve put your finger on it. It relates to all issues of our lives and, first of all, setting that dialogue right, understanding what we are really talking about and how interconnected these issues are, is fundamental, and we suggest that this become an issue of Executive priority. And so, I think David Sanger, my co-Author and I, were already very pleased to see the Biden administration make cyber and technology issues key components of the national security agenda within the National Security Council, but also increasing the capacities of the US State Department to look at this holistically.

What we need on the Eur0pean side, and there I do think that the United Kingdom has an absolutely critical role to play, because on many of these issues, I think about the AI co-operation with the United States, that was actually an achievement of the Trump administration, needs to be extended to the European framework, so that the ideas of technologically – technological sovereignty that have been floated around the European Union, I think are a) unrealistic, unachievable, given the timelines and the race that China is putting up in technological issues. So, fundamentally understanding that in order to pushback against the overwhelming Chinese power and capacity, we need to get together on the R&D front and we can, with respect to 5G, this gets to Leslie’s point about science and technology, a better understanding of dual use technology, owning that, controlling it through standard setting within international bodies, getting on the same page there. And then, when it comes to critical issues, this gets a little to the digital tax issue, of privacy, and here, the United Kingdom, again, critical role to play to put together a privacy data management system that still reflects the openness that is quintessential to how our democracies work, will not be able to function, unless we do this with the United Kingdom and then, possibly, with other democratic partners around the world. Only then will we be able to pushback against the overwhelming capacities that China has been able to, not only use for itself, but put out into the world. I think, particularly, of what China’s been able to do and Africa and other parts of the world.

So, the first piece has to be that we have to get on the same page and then, we have to lean into the issues that we face. We have, in the Biden administration, and including with the Vice President, Kamala Harris, someone who is very concerned about things like data privacy and protection. So, when it comes to digital tax issues, I think you’re going to find a more open American administration, but of course, one that will also keep, well, the rights and the economic prosperity of their digital technology companies in plain view. We know that American digital technology companies have a critical role to play in global cybercrime and corruption pushback. Microsoft has been an incredibly vivid actor, so it cannot be done, without allowing these companies to flourish.

But Nick pointed out that what we need is a truce, this idea of coming together at the table and the year that it will take to implement and to move the Digital Services Act forward within the European Union should be a critical time of vivid exchange. And as we approach the negotiation tables again at the OECD, to do this at a global scale, we should be getting to a point where we can present a global front. And in all of this, United Kingdom, with its technological capacities, its R&D capacities and to Leslie’s point, its scientific capacities, has a critical role to play. So, in our report, much of this, as you will have heard from others, was introspective, about how we need to set our own parts right and how we need to have open and engage very forthright, very honest conversations, on the basis of a restored trust, and that is what I think we are ready to achieve, and we can truly lean into and look forward to optimistically, in these next few months.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks, Cathryn, thanks for those – reminding us of some of the very specific recommendations in the paper, as well, and yes, a big thank you for all of that hosting you did of our policy hackathon last week for the NATO 2030 Project, which was really fantastic, a lot of good ideas. And I might just throw out there one of the ideas that was raised by the Young NATO leaders, Nick and others, ‘cause you mentioned 2%, one of their recommendations was that “we should do away with 2% as a pure defence target, but the 2% should be a commitment to things that make countries more secure, which might be foreign aid, which might be cyber investment, it might be all sorts of things, but no, not just defence. I’m just saying they were brave enough to say that to the – to Secretary-General Stoltenberg right in front of them. So, you may want to come back on that point later on, ‘cause I know that won’t have been one of the recommendations. It was not one of the recommendations in the paper.

We’ve got lots of good questions and about 15 minutes left to get them in, so, I’m going to get my colleagues here to unmute a few of you. If you don’t want to be called on, you’d better write in the line that you don’t want to be called on, ‘cause otherwise, we are going to call on you. I’m going to start off maybe with two questions, as we’ve got a lot of people who could comment and answer on them, rather than just doing one at a time. Let’s get a couple of questions on the table. Alfie Darling, could you go first? You’ve got something on Russia, but I thought your question on the UK was particularly relevant and maybe would get to some of Nick’s and others’ comments as well. So, I’m going to go to Alfie and then Nick Sol, please. Alfie first; you should be unmuted, hopefully, by my colleagues. Yeah, we heard you for a second.

Alfie Darling

Yeah, hi.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

We got you.

Alfie Darling

Hi, all. Can you hear me? Thank you. The question was, who – with, obviously, Brexit now being finalised, effectively, with the historic deal and relationship between the US and the UK, if that, in the future, were to break down or weaken, who would lose out more, if that makes sense?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And I think it makes a lot of sense. Who would lose out more? That’s always the question and I’ve had it thrown at me, as I’m sure a lot of folks have Lon – in London, as well, about you know, who’s the demander and who’s the weaker player in this situation? I think it’s a little bit more mobile than some people think, but definitely look forward to comments in a minute from our panel. Just hold your answer for the moment. Nick Sol, you had a, I thought, a very good question, as well. Nick, would you mind coming in next?

Nick Sol

Yeah, of course. Thank you very much, indeed. I’d like to thank all of the panellists for what they’ve had to say so far. It’s been fascinating. My question is, basically, with regard to US public opinion and how influential you think US public opinion would be to rebuilding the, sort of, transatlantic relationship? And what role you think – I mean, it’s predominantly for Ambassador Burns, but how – what role you think Congress should play, or given the current internal American politics and political, sort of, introspection because of everything that’s been happening over the last few months, how much capacity you think Congress is going to have to play in influencing or helping to inform US public opinion about the importance of a transatlantic relationship? Thank you.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

A good point, and obviously, with Congress playing such a big role on the sanctions side, it, kind of, limits the room for manoeuvre, it seems to me, for the administration, in some cases. Nick, do you want to kick off on those two questions? And then, why don’t my other colleagues wave at me, if one of you wants to come in on the back of what he’s said, and that includes you, Leslie, feel free to come in, or Christian, or anyone. But go ahead, Nick, to you first.

Nicholas Burns

Well, for Alfie’s very good question I’m going to give an answer that sounds diplomatic, like I’m trying just to be nice, but it’s actually what I really believe. I think the United States is going to lose a lot if Britain declines. Britain has always been, for the last 70 years, but even until, you know, recent years, our most important strategic partner, on intelligence, certainly, on defence in the transatlantic relationship, definitely. The EU is going to be weaker without the United Kingdom, less global within the United Kingdom, and so, should we not be able to form a new, a renewed US-UK strategic partnership, both in NATO and globally, we’re both going to suffer. The United States will suffer, not just the United Kingdom. And on public opinion, there is good news. The US public, during the Trump years, was very supportive of NATO, mainly because Trump kept attacking it so much. 75% of people in the Chicago Council poll in 2020 said they support NATO. You can’t get 75% of Americans, I’ll say this, to agree the sky is blue these days, but they agreed that NATO is important.

And I think you’re going to see this not just in the transatlantic relationship, you’re going to see it in China, where there is a Republican/Democrat consensus in the Congress, you asked about, Nick, about Congress, that we need to have a very competitive relationship. While we might co-operate on issues like climate or maybe on the pandemic, given how transparent the Chinese can be in the coronavirus, but we definitely need to compete militarily, economically, politically. I think there’s a consensus and Joe Biden will have a lot of support from Republicans in Congress to continue that competitive stance.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much, Nick, good points. Daniela wanted to come in and if anyone else wave, otherwise, I’ve got lots more questions to go to, as well. But first, Daniela, to you.

Daniela Schwarzer

Just want to strengthen Nick’s point that, also, the European Union, of course, loses with Brexit, and in particular, if we don’t manage to build a close relationship with the United Kingdom on some of the key issues that actually, also, our report touches upon, security and defence is one, intelligence co-operation is another, economic and financial affairs, as well. So, when we, in the report, speak about Europe, this, for our – for us, includes the United Kingdom, although we, of course, know that some of the competencies that the EU holds are EU competencies and not – of course, don’t include the United Kingdom. But we thought of this, really, in a holistic way and with a deep conviction that we all have to lose if the relationship keeps on souring, and we also spoke quite a bit about inner European dynamics, because with the UK leaving, of course, precisely this question of who is the privileged partner from the US perspective, in the European Union, gains importance? And what, from a Berlin perspective, I can share this, in the first weeks after the US Presidential Election, the question was out there, so, “Will Biden choose Berlin, or will he choose someone else? Will it be Brussels, or will it be Paris?” And I think it’s in the EU’s interest as a whole to balance this transatlantic relationship and not to have another privileged partner within the EU, but to build solid relations between Brussels and Washington, but also between all other capitals.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…very much for that, and I’m going to quickly move onto a couple more questions here. I’m going to bring in Ambassador Simona Leskovar first, ‘cause I think a very interesting question, and then followed by David Manning. So, a couple of ambassadorial questions coming your way, panel. First of all, Simona, to you, please.

Ambassador Simona Leskovar

Thanks, Robin, and thanks to everybody for this very interesting discussion. My question’s actually very short, but probably not very simple, but how can we trust that the US will stay a reliable partner, also, in the future, also after the next administration, whether it be Democratic or Republican? Thanks.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you, and I should say Ambassador of Slovenia, but – so, an important perspective to be able to get into the mix there. And David Manning, you’re on there as well, I think a very pertinent question for 2021, as well. Over to David Manning, if we can hear you, David. Otherwise, I’ll ask…

Ambassador David Manning

Thank you…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…the question on…

Ambassador David Manning

…Robin. I hope you can hear me, because my…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yes, we can, we’ve got you.

Ambassador David Manning

My link is very wobbly.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

No, we hear you beautifully.

Ambassador David Manning

So – well, first…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Go ahead.

Ambassador David Manning

…thanks to – thanks, first of all, to the team for producing this report. I hoped somebody’s reading it, who is busy doing integrated review in Britain, because there’s a lot here, it seems to me, that helps to answer the, to me, floating question of what ‘Global Britain’ means. There are all sorts of opportunities that the British could follow-up, I think, in this new phase, so, I think it’s an important report and it should be registered.

My question is, I would be grateful for a, both an American and a European view to this, do you believe in this idea of the Summit of Democracies, and if so, how do you decide who takes part and what is the risk that such a summit actually merely reveals all the difficulties and divisions between us, whether it’s trade, whether it’s defence spending, whether it’s China management, rather than produces the sort of display of unity which I presume President Biden would like to see and certainly I would like to see?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…you, thanks very much, David, two very specific questions. Let me bring a few people in on the question of trust, Simona Leskovar’s question about trust, which is so important and referenced, I think, right in the opening remarks by Daniela and Nick. Torrey, did you want to come in on that first and let’s get a few other voices in? If you want to make any comment about the summit and democracies as well, that would be great, ‘cause again, that’s – it’s hanging out there, people are wondering what to do with it.

Torrey Taussig

Thank you, Robin. On Ambassador Leskovar’s point about trust, something we grappled with in talking with our European counterparts was this notion that, okay, we have a committed transatlanticist back in the White House, the next few years look good, but what if we see a return to Trump’s America First posture in 2024, and therefore, shouldn’t we, as Europeans, be moving toward a more strategically autonomous position that does not lean into the transatlantic relationship as much? This is a back and forth we had often, and I think part of the answer lies in this earlier question about Congress and the traditional role that Congress plays in US foreign policymaking.

In recent years, we’ve seen the White House, in Democratic and Republican administrations, rely more on Executive orders to govern, and Executive orders bypass Congress and can be overturned by incoming administrations the next time around. So, I think something we’ll be looking for from the Biden administration is to govern with Congress and for Congress to legislate and to pass laws and legislation that cannot be overturned by an incoming administration to follow.

Tony Blinken gave some, I think, reassuring remarks in his confirmation hearing, when he said, “We are looking for Congress to return to its traditional and stronger role in US foreign policymaking. So, this all goes to say, I think in the years ahead, one way that the United States can work to rebuild trust is to actually govern, to work with Congress and for Congress to legislate that we don’t see this back and forth of Executive orders being overturned by differing administration that leads to a lot of unpredictability from our European partners.

On the second question of the Democracy Summit, this is going to be a really difficult question for the Biden team to handle. I want to take a step back and address whether we actually should see a Democracy Summit happen, because following the events of January 6th and this attempted insurrection at the Capitol, there was a big debate within the United States about whether we should even have a Global Summit of Democracies and whether we should be focusing inward and have a domestic Summit for Democracy. But I actually would like to pushback on that debate and say that I think it is vitally important that the United States, at this moment, lean into its support for democracy around the world, because events within the United States show that we have just as much of a stake in these issues as other countries do.

So, the question of who is invited and what is discussed is important and there are going to be critical challenges for the Biden administration, but I just wanted to put my thumb down on the side of this summit should happen, and even though we’re seeing democracy challenged at home, it shows it’s even just as important for the United States to be at these – at the table on these issues globally.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks, Torrey, important points, and we wanted a European perspective on this as well. Cathryn, do you want to come in on this, as Daniela has had a chance to say a couple of things already? Do you want to come in?

Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook

It’s always tough to switch hats midway, between my European and my American self, but I mean, if the Europeans were truly worried over the past four years, and I think they were, they should’ve still, as Torrey pointed out, should’ve still looked at the activity in Congress and the bipartisan continued support for all the critical elements of the transatlantic relationship that we’ve talked about. I mean, even when the President’s in, sort of, a last effort to, frankly, insult, in a non-strategically thought-out way, I think the German Government, by announcing a troop withdrawal, which this President has immediately put a halt to, you saw immediate action within Congress to try to, you know, curtail that kind of action. So, if Europeans continue to remain concerned, they should be looking to the heart of the US Congress, where, buffeted by everything that Nick said about public opinion, with regard to the transatlantic relationship, the report remains strong.

And one quick point on the Summit of Democracies. The German Foreign Minister was, well, perhaps ridiculed for his idea to say that we needed “a Marshall Plan for democracy,” and now Germany was going to turn around and “teach America a thing or two about democracy.” I think what he was trying to say is, really, these issues affect all of us jointly and the French and the Germans have tried to push that agenda through their alliance of multilateralism, which is, sort of, an undergirding internationalist idea on what democracies can do together. And I’m slightly less concerned with this idea of the summit, per se, if and how and when it takes place, revealing where we have differences, because that, too, is the critical achievement of democracy. It – the fact that we are pluralistic, we bring different views to the table, we listen, we allow diversity of opinion and engagement. That is the hard work of democracy and part of linking this American foreign policy agenda to the middleclass, as Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, has put forth in a paper for Carnegie, which I recommend to you. Those are the same conversations we need to be having with electorates all over Europe, as Germany enters a critical election year, France will follow right on the heels of that. If we don’t have an opportunity to make clear the opp – the value of those type of conversations in democracy as we try to broaden equality, pluralism, but also how we relate to one another in the global context, then we fail the basic premise.

So, absolutely, it should go ahead, and we should be thoughtful about how we steer these conversations and show, really, how democracy works, unvarnished, but functional.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you very much for those comments, Cathryn. Now, we’ve hit the hour mark, but as I warned, I thought we might go over just a few minutes. I’ve got two, I think, really good questions that I want to get on the table and then I’m going to give you all a chance to, kind of, chime in at the end. So, I’m going to turn, first of all, to Robert Moreland to ask his question, and then Fernando Herrero, who’s going to say some words that have not yet been uttered on this call, which I think are rather important. Fernando, do you’re going to go last. Robert Moreland first, Robert, please ask your question.

Robert Moreland

Thank you. I wondered if you think that there have been a number of things that have happened since the election, action taken by the EU, which perhaps, with looking back on, should have waited until after there had been consultation with the United States? Touched upon already is the deal on China, and I’m also thinking of the recent visit of the EU Foreign Spokesman to Russia. I could go on with a number of other examples.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yes, thank you. That was a – I just think that latter point in particular is a very good one to put on the table, Robert, thank you. And a final question, Fernando, to you?

Fernando Herrero

Is COVID a herald of what is to become geopolitically? What partnerships do we see emerging in relation to the pandemic? Who is doing a good job and who is not yet? Many thanks.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

So, no comments yet about COVID. I mean, I’ve been keeping an eye on it and I think Fernando raises a very important point, how is that going to, potentially, affect the transatlantic relationship and, you know, did you fold it into the report? I was – you were writing it through the whole crisis. So, let’s use that. I’m going to in a reverse order and you’ve got to be very disciplined on your time, ‘cause we are a few minutes over, and if no-one’s taken the questions by the end, the last person’s going to have to do both of them. But Torrey, Cathryn, Leslie, Nick, Daniela, in that reverse order. Torrey, you’re first.

Torrey Taussig

Thank you, Robin, I’ll just make a brief point that touch on our recommendations for the pandemic. It was one of the highlights of the report, given the environment we are all operating in. We argue, pretty forcefully, that the US, Europe and Canada should join forces to ensure that there is an equitable distribution of the vaccine and that, also, as we’re dealing with this transnational threat, we Build Back Stronger Together and that we align our fiscal and monetary stimuli to address the pandemic. Those are just two very brief points on the economic and the vaccine distribution front, but I think this was an area where transnational co-operation was lacking, under the Trump administration, and that will be critical to addressing the pandemic, moving forward.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, and it’s a space where maybe even discussing the disease transatlantically might help take some of the poison out of some of the intra-European stuff that’s been going on, as well, but we’ll see. Cathryn, to you next and…

Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook

I’ll do…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…thank you for playing European and American on this call.

Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook

Yes, I – so, I think this will bring these two things together on COVID, because I’ve been part of a lot of German discussions on this, because, of course, many Europeans are incensed at the lack of speed in the vaccine distribution and looking to the UK and US and elsewhere, where that, seemingly, has been handled better. Look, I think a very concrete thing that we could do transatlantically is share our contracts with vaccine providers. I think we need some transparency here that gets exactly to Torrey’s point, if we’re all vested and committed to COVAX, to the distribution of the vaccine, to ridding this disease across the globe, we’ve got to know what we’re dealing with and how we’re addressing pharmaceutical companies equitably, so that the production and all other logistical issues around vaccine delivery can be tackled together. And the first thing is, frankly, knowing what’s in the contracts, knowing who is paying for what and getting on an equal playing field there, and I think that’s a very concrete thing that the Biden administration and transatlantic partners, including the United Kingdom, could be doing, frankly, in the coming weeks.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much. Leslie, you’ve been listening to all of this, come in wherever you want on the various points.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, I agree with what’s just been said, so I’ll say one quick thing about, you know, should Europe have waited and one quick thing on trust. I mean, I certainly had a reaction when I saw the EU-China deal being agreed, that it would’ve been nice if Europe had waited, but I can promise you that if I were European and I had suffered through four years of Donald Trump, the last thing that I would do would be to wait, even with the electoral result that was seen, so, I’m very empathetic. And it’s not, you know, past yet and there’s plenty of room now for positive action and positive agreement, so, why in the world would Europe have waited? That’s my, you know, my pragmatic and realistic reaction.

I do want to say one thing about the trust question. I think there’s no reason for Europe to believe or assume that America will not go back or not become more serve and less co-operative, if a different administration comes into play. But I think the response to that shouldn’t be strategic autonomy, pulling up the gates and retreating. The response to that should be what Americans, on my side of the aisle, have been doing for four years, which is to fight as hard as you can for the eventuality, or the reality, that things aren’t the way that you want them to be and to develop transnational ties, to invest in student exchanges, in all sorts of partnerships, so that the die is cast against anybody who tries to pull the United States out of its European partnership. So, fight for it now, while there are four good years to fight for it, by developing really serious initiatives that make it undesirable for a broader number of people to pullback.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you very much, Leslie. Nick, I’m going to come, as I said, to you next, just to do a little editorialise, that point I was going to make earlier. I think some in London have watched, with some bemusement, but with a certain wry smile, the debates within the EU on the future of strategic autonomy, ‘cause obviously, the more the EU pushes itself into spaces and maybe it tumbles over its feet a little bit, and the Borrell thing is another example, the UK feels it looks like maybe a more trustworthy partner. Now, that may be heavily overplaying and overinterpreting and overthinking, but what did you think about the, in particular, that question about whether the EU has done a few missteps in advance and whether that’s going to have any damage on the transatlantic relationship reset that you’ve been discussing?

Nicholas Burns

Well, Robin, I look forward to Daniela’s views, because she knows a lot more than I do about how the EU is looking at this. I would just say that the big question marks for Americans are – pro-European Americans, like myself, would be, does President Macron really believe in strategic autonomy and what does that mean for NATO and the US-EU relationship? The other big question mark, and here Daniela knows tons more to, is what is German policy likely to be post-miracle? And that’s a difficult question. Now, I’d just say, in answer to the two questions that were asked, is China trying to drive a wedge between the US and Europe and the UK? Yes. The EU made a major mistake in going for – ahead with a rather weak agreement with China on trade and investment. They should’ve been with the UK and with the Joe Biden administration three weeks later. China will continue to divide us, unless we join forces to outweigh them at the negotiating table.

And finally, on the pandemic, China has a lot to answer for. Even this week, with the WHO visit, not being transparent about the coronavirus. The World Health Organization, I’m very happy we’re back, the United States, clearly underperformed in its basic responsibility back in January/February. But I’ll leave the greatest criticism for my own country, and that is the United States has so much to learn. Our performance has been nearly disastrous, with more than 450,000 people dead in our country. I won’t comment, Robin, on the UK, but I think the US and UK have so much we have to learn. With our very good public health systems, we could not summon the effort that Taiwan and Japan and Singapore and Australia and New Zealand were able, and even German, from my perspective, a better record. So, we’ve a lot to learn and we have – we should be humble about this and try to learn the lessons and be better prepared next time.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you, Nick, and thanks for Co-Chairing this project and bringing your thoughts with us here and with your final call for a bit of humility at the moment. It’s probably – I certainly endorse that call. Whether people will heed it is another matter, but I think it’s the right line to take on that point.

So, it comes to you for the final word, Daniela, and just one little intro point on that, to play of Nick’s comments about China and that Europe should’ve waited. I know you work a lot on international economic issues, and it is noticeable that the US has been – US Financial Services firms have been doing rather well out of the Chinese market, in recent months and in, even, years, and I know that some of the thinking in the EU has been, well, you know, we need to get a little bit of our gravy as well before things get too difficult. But what would you say about these two points about whether Europe has moved too quickly, whether this has damaged the next steps in the relationship and, you know, yeah, any last thoughts you might have beyond that? Over to you.

Daniela Schwarzer

Thank you very much, Robin. Well, the official explanation, as we all know it is, this is – this – these were negotiations with China that had been going on for years and finally, China made some concessions, which made the deal – the closure of the deal interesting to Europeans, so they pushed ahead, and the German EU Presidency was in the driver’s seat. Now, I tend to agree with Nick, this was a political choice to do so, not the necessity of the negotiations coming to a close just before the end of the year. It was a choice to do this. The European interest clearly was not to overtake the US in its relationship with China, not at all, but to catch up on a few points where there was the sense, we need to make sure we had comparable conditions, as the US have on some of the issues. But I do think the political signal was not a good one and it is very important now to make sure that the US and Europe, which may differ on some points, on the goals, but as much on instruments how to deal with China, make clear that there is a shared fundamental interest across the Atlantic. And one of them is clearly that both partners want Eur – want China to play by the rules and we want to make sure that China doesn’t divide us, as Nick has underlined, not only the transatlantic partners, but also Europeans among themselves. So, there are, I think, very, very strong arguments for a joint transatlantic strategy towards China.

But the important thing is to acknowledge that some EU countries, and Germany is one of them, have dependencies on – because of close economic ties with China at this very moment, and it will take some time to be able to increase the margin of manoeuvre and to actually deal with China in a good way across the Atlantic. But I think it’s a key strategic question and everything we have said about tech, about the undermining of democracy, about the reform of international order and the future of, let’s say, the international rule of law, they all depend on whether the US and Europeans manage to design a joint strategy that makes sure that together we have the power to actually shape this new world order as it emerges. And I think that’s an argument enough to make clear that this is bigger than any other smaller interests that individual countries may have.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Oh, very wise and important words to finish up with. As I say, Leslie said in her remarks at the beginning, you know, “Sequencing, timing, becomes so critical when you have these very good ideas on the table” and I would encourage those – and we still have most people on the call still, even though we’ve gone close to 15 minutes over, but I just want to say that if you have the time to take a look through the report, it has the benefit of being meaty and having gone into each of these issues and pulled them apart and dug into them, rather than just being a series of top line comments and recommendations.

So, then, taking that specificity and thinking about triage, timing, leverage, is, I think, going to be the next, you know, challenge, both for Belfer Center, the Kennedy School, thank you very much. For our think tank colleges at DGAP in Berlin, thank you very much as well, for both your leadership on this project and getting a really strong set of ideas in on the table nice and early for this administration. And a quick thanks to my colleagues at Chatham House for putting this meeting together and to LSE IDEAS and those of you who joined us from the LSE IDEAS side for this conversation. It’s been really good, great substantive conversation to kick off, still, this early part of 2021. Thanks very much all of you. I hope to see you again in future events, but again, thanks to our speakers today for doing a sterling job. A lot of information in very little time. You can’t all applaud, but I can. Thanks very much, guys, see you soon.

Nicholas Burns

Thank you, Robin.

Daniela Schwarzer

Thank you, Robin.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you, thanks, Daniela.

Daniela Schwarzer

Thank you. Thank you, Nick.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Bye.

Daniela Schwarzer

Bye.