UK General Election 2019: Foreign Policy Implications

Tom Raines

Good evening everybody. My name’s Tom Raines. I’m the Head of the Europe Programme here at Chatham House. Thank you all very much for spending election eve with us, to discuss what might happen after the election for British foreign policy. We’ve got a great panel tonight, all from colleagues connected to Chatham House. We’ll have some short introductions. We’ll get into the issues a little bit. A little bit of a discussion on stage, and then I do want to split – leave plenty of time for questions from the audience. So, make sure you’re thinking of good and challenging questions for the panellists, while they’re speaking.

Just a couple of bits of housekeeping to kick off. As most you will probably know, this event is on the record, not under the Chatham House Rule, so you can use the – you are free to use the information in whatever way you like. You can also tweet about and we encourage you to do so. There should be a hashtag, which is on the screens there for you to do that.

I’m going to quickly introduce the panel and then frame the discussion a little bit, with a few of my just brief introductory thoughts. To my left I’m delighted to have John Casson, who’s just joined Chatham House as an Associate Fellow of the Europe Programme. John, before this, was a Diplomat for a long time, holding a number of senior positions in UK Government. He was, most recently, the British Ambassador to Egypt and before that, the Principal Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 10 Downing Street. So the closest Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister David Cameron.

On his left is Yu Jie, the Senior Fellow in our Asia Programme, focused on China and China’s international role. And to her left, Anthony Froggatt, who’s a Senior Fellow in our Energy, Environment and Resources Team.

It’s my view, and I’ve written about this over the last couple of weeks, that although we know that in elections foreign policy isn’t generally what people vote for, Chatham House members notwithstanding, that these elections matter a lot for the future of the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. I think you can see in the leadership of the two parties, some genuine and significant differences in policy and priorities in tone, in outlook, in worldview, and those are the sorts of issues that we’d like to explore today. How significant would a foreign policy, under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn be from what we’ve known, over the last period of the Conservative and Coalition Governments, but more generally, in the post-Cold War period. Would this mark something truly different and distinctive? What are the challenges and obstacles that would create? What would it mean for the UK’s alliances and relationships, with some key partners internationally?

I think John might disagree with that and so I’m going to handover to him to kick us off and give us his perspective on how significant this election is and what the wider context is for the UK, as we potentially leave the European Union.

John Casson

Thank you, Tom. I mean, I don’t disagree with you, but on the face of it, obviously, if you look at – I don’t know if anyone here has actually looked at the party manifestoes and what they say about foreign policy. But there are some bright dividing lines drawn, but I just don’t think what they say tells us very much about the conduct of what will really matter in British foreign policy, after the election. They – and since both the Labour Party manifesto and the Conservative Party manifesto, as I read them, are expressions of the, sort of, identity politics that’s at the core of the wider election campaign. So, on the one hand, you’ve got gestures on the Labour Party’s side, saying that our history is problematic and something to be ashamed of or apologised for, to some extent, or reviewed. And on the other hand, the sort of mirror image of that on the Conservative side saying, our history’s a glorious one, which we should be defending. And they both, sort of, offer gestures to particular interest groups, which is all fine, insofar as it goes, and they have some boilerplate language about the Rules Based International System, and other things, but I just don’t think that’s what’s going to matter, in terms of Britain’s posture in the world and Britain’s policy in the world after the election. And I would, thinking about that, I would start with the, sort of, bald fact that for me, British foreign policy is, as I was brought up to recognise it, came to an end in September 2013, really. And the point where David Cameron made a conscious decision to stop being an activist Prime Minister on foreign policy, after he lost the Syria vote in the Commons. And since then, it’s very difficult to name an issue on which the UK has made the running in the international space.

That’s partly because of Brexit, but it’s also because of deeper and more systemic challenges. We’re dealing with a world in which United States policy no longer sets out to hold the ring for everybody, in a predictable way, sending the right – sending, sort of, encouraging signals to allies and to others about what the norms are, under which we can all operate. Which is always something that gave Britain and other American allies, a lot of slipstream to follow on in. And it’s partly about the shift in the balance of power in a more multipolar world, and it’s about the absence of both confidence and consensus, I think, across the British political spectrum, about what it is that we think we can offer and achieve, in terms of shaping the world beyond our borders. And so, in a way, I think the policy vacuum is an expression of a fundamental political reality that there isn’t the same consensus behind Britain being an activist power that seeks to try to shape the international space, in the way that we used to think about it.

So given that, I think who comes into power, who comes into Downing Street, especially, but also, who comes into the other key roles in the Cabinet, will be crucially important. But it will be important in the way those individuals react to, first of all, to events, which always define foreign policy. And we can talk a bit more, if people want to ask questions later about what those, kind of, framing events might be, in the next few years. But then, fundamentally, for me, is how do we set about repositioning the UK and reengaging with a more concerted strategic – sustained strategic vision, once we know where we’re going on Brexit?

And just by way of a little anecdotal example of this, one of the most recent Foreign Secretary’s I got stuck in traffic in the back of the car with, and I said, “Given that all of us in the Foreign Office spend our time trying to make sure you don’t do anything different from what we always normally do, what is it that you think you’re trying to get us to do to leave behind as your legacy?” And this person thought about it a bit and said, “Well, I really think we should be trying to save the African elephant and we should be leading on the international illegal wildlife trade. I think it’s really important that we get girls into school, worldwide, and I suppose that one of these conflicts in this region we ought to be, sort of, taking a lead on solving it.” And then we had a discussion about whether Palestine or Yemen or Libya or Syria was particularly ripe for British intervention, which I say, I guess, by way of saying that there’s been a deficit of strategic thinking, both at the political level, but also in terms of the confidence of officials. Not just in the Foreign Office, but across Whitehall, to think clearly about what is the nature of the power we hold? Which is not necessarily the nature of the processes that we hold and we’ve always known how to pull the levers of certain bits of process, they don’t necessarily attach to power and outcomes anyway. But we see lots of actors, which are smaller than us, by most metrics, making more difference because they have a clearer eyed sense of their strategic intent and of the power they hold. And I think we need – whoever comes into Government, we’re going to need to think about that.

And so I would just quickly give you five things that I think will be the defining things to look for. First of all, by far and away the most important thing for British power and British foreign policy, is to be seen to be making a success of our country. Which means to be seen to be making a success of Brexit, and because whatever else other people think of us, whether they want to work with us, or against us, follow our agenda, come to us for things, trade with – transact with us, they will smell the power of success, economic success, Brexit success, or its opposite. If we look like we’re in a mess, the rest of our foreign policy is where it becomes very hard to conduct. So making a success of our country in Brexit terms is one.

Secondly, I think we need to rebuild the brand. We have confused the brand. Are we an open country, which aspires to set an example and to set – to stand up for a certain type of norms and a certain type of influence, which is seen in our – everything from our Visa policy, to our investment approaches, to the way our universities conduct themselves. It’s not just about foreign policy statements, and I think we need to find our way back to a clearer narrative about what does Britain stand for in the world? What is our offer? What is our point of attraction? And what is our argument to others about what makes for the most successful way of organising the world?

Thirdly, I think we’ll need to be much more ruthless in thinking about and aligning British power to a more clearly focused and status sense of what our strategic objective is. What are we trying to achieve in the world? Are we trying to keep our relationships with Europe as close as possible, despite Brexit, if Brexit happens? Or are we trying to position ourselves as the, sort of, the best friend of the emerging powers? Are we trying to maintain, for as long as we can, the umbrella of an American led world and a transatlantic alliance? You know, this fundamental sense of where we get our leverage in the world needs to be clear, and then everything from our Visa policy, to our development policy, to who we choose to do our military exercises with, to how we incentivise our universities to partner internationally, needs to be aligned with that. And there have been some attempts, across Whitehall, to organise bureaucratically for that, but I think it needs to be a deeper exercise, in aligning to a strategic purpose that’s clearly communicated and imbedded in our bureaucratic culture.

And then the final two, one is to – I think we need to have a clearer conversation and a clearer consensus about what kind of world it is that we think is best for Britain and the best for everyone else in the world. And I think for me, that means going back to the sense of a generational – what I would call a transformational agenda. In other words, that Britain should position itself in the world as being the country that holds a lot of the, kind of, goods that people would love to have, in terms of education, in terms of creative industries, in terms of a research base, in terms of an open and flourishing multicultural capital city. We want to deploy that power and share that power with others to achieve that same, kind of, flourishing, which is by investing in human capital, for human flourishing, and that makes for healthier societies for us to engage with in foreign policy, over the generational perspective. But we have to set that and stick at it for a generation, and not change our minds every time the next wave of Arab Spring blows through or is crushed, or whatever else it is.

And finally, the final thing is, the Prime Minister needs to be on the telephone a lot and travel a lot and needs to see a big part of their job as having relationships with foreign leaders, for the sake of relationships with foreign leaders. And I think since Tony Blair, and perhaps since Gordon Brown, we haven’t really had a Prime Minister who had the capacity and the appetite to see a fundamental slice of their job, as being investing in those political relationships, which are fundamental, and it’s cost us, in terms of our foreign policy outcomes. And there are huge competing pressures. I know, having worked in Number 10 and being the person whose job it was to get these foreign leader meetings into the Prime Minister’s diary, it is a bloody battle, because the building is – Number 10, apart from the Prime Minister and the person doing my job, the building is full of people who think it’s a waste of time because it doesn’t win you elections.

But in terms of the national interest, we need a Prime Minister who thinks that building trust and building understanding and building an ability to see the world from other people’s perspectives and find the points of conversions, is a fundamental point of their existence, is really important. And I – you know, we only know, once people get into the job, but at the moment it’s not clear to me that we have someone like that on offer.

Tom Raines

Thank you very much, John. Very interesting, thought provoking comments. Can I just ask you one quick question? I don’t want to delay the debate, but I was provoked by UK foreign policy coming to an end in September 2013. I suppose my flipside would be to say, why do you think that the, sort of, Jeremy Corbyn critique of foreign policy adventurism has the resonance it does? Because there is a clear sense, you know, the implication of that view is that if the UK isn’t a, sort of, active contributor to international security or doesn’t, you know, participate in security operations, or doesn’t have – you know, play its role in alliances, and all the things that the UK has done in the, sort of, post-Cold War periods, that anything that isn’t that isn’t, sort of, proper foreign policy. And I guess, in a way, Corbyn is the walking rebuke to that. He says, “Actually, all of this has been – has run counter to our interests and, you know, it’s been driven, but for the wrong reasons, and it’s ultimately been unsuccessful.” And that critique is one that certainly has resonance with – I think it’s an important factor in his success within the Labour Party, in particular. But I think it has a wider resonance, and do you think that the, sort of, I don’t want to use the term ‘foreign policy establishment’, but I have done, it’s, sort of, reflective enough on some of those failures of the last, sort of, ten-15 years?

John Casson

Yeah, so when I said, “British foreign policy came to an end,” I didn’t – that wasn’t, sort of, a lament for the world of interventionism and liberal intervention. I mean, I – you know, I think, in a sense, that is partly a result of the catastrophe that the Iraq intervention was and I didn’t like it at the time and I don’t like it now, so, you know, and it was interesting being at Number 10 during the Libya episode, because you could see these – people were profoundly influenced by trying to learn the lessons of the past. And you could see the clash between two different camps. There was the group of people who – the Whitehall officials, who were basically scared forever and for whom the Iraq episode was carved on their hearts, and for whom the main purpose of life was never to have anything like that again, and were very cautious about Britain involving itself with the Arab Spring.

On the other hand, you had the people who were formed by their experience being in Conservative central office and in Conservative high command during the Falklands episode, and for them, standing aside while bloodshed happens on our – in our neighbourhood, is something that should never be allowed to happen again. And the Libya policy was fought out between those two instincts, so I’m not making an argument saying, we should go back to being a country that wants to intervene everywhere. I’m simply saying, because of the breakdown of the consensus, which was more nuanced by 2013, about where could we get purchase on Syria, and so on?

You know, if you ask people in the Foreign Office now, what’s our biggest foreign policy achievement in recent years? They’d say, “Well, we managed to get lots of countries to expel Russian Diplomats after the Salisbury incident,” which was welcome and surpassed people’s expectations, I think, but it doesn’t amount to a proactive foreign policy strategy. And, you know, so I’m not trying to take sides on what kind of foreign policy it should be. I mean, you know, I suppose my worry about a Jeremy Corbyn policy would be that it would be strong on gestures, but weak on what I’m talking about, which is do we have a cold eyed sense of what our power really is? I think we have power that we don’t recognise.

You know, we have – when I was in Egypt, we had things that Egyptians looked to as world class and genuinely appealing and genuinely important, and really respected and admired. But we don’t deploy them as tools of national policy. The things we keep pulling on are our ability to do resolutions in New York or make statements and go to – E3 statements in Brussels and don’t particularly pull on anything real. So, I think it’s just a sense of, let’s have a more realistic, but optimistic and hopeful sense of, you know, neither hand wringing about our decline, nor a sort of nostalgic sense that we should continue to be able to do whatever we want. But a clear eyed sense of where is it that Britain has stuff that’s uniquely valuable, but we can then use to sustain effect over a number of years, to get things done that we need to do.

Tom Raines

Fascinating. It’s, sort of, a good point to segue thinking about the extent of Britain’s power and influence, to focus a little bit on relations with China and a little bit where the UK will find itself between a deteriorating China-US relationship?

Dr Yu Jie

Right, thank you so much, Tom, for having me. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I’m delighted to be here. I’ve lived in this country in the last 17 years. Actually, for the first time, I’ve heard the word of China being mentioned in this General Election. So, it comes as an extreme surprise to me.

Just to explain to you a little bit of the history lessons in here. So, China’s rise, in the last ten years or so, in this country, being considering as the journey could potentially economically benefit to this country, only if, this is a big if, only if the British Government would be able to handle the highs and lows, when they come to dealing with China politically. So, I think that old dilemma still remain in here. But given the recent years, given what’s, you know, bigger background of the US-China strategy competition happening and the UK ultimately have to stand in-between, and then try to make some kind of sounded and calm choice on what UK want to do. So I think the general line, for the next British Prime Minister, will be very clear.

China’s economic rise will be of benefit to the British economy, if possible, but also, with more cautious tone and how are we going to observe the Chinese investments in this country? And also, to what extent and how are we going to handle the enormous influence China would have present in everyday life, for the British society? So I think that’s really the challenge for the next British Prime Minister.

Now, when I come to seeing this view from Beijing, I think Beijing have made it very clear, irrespective Brexit or not Brexit, firstly, UK still we’re going to serve as a safe and secure home for the Chinese investment, and also, the way how China be able to acquire technologies and a long lasting brand with those British brand, with enormous values.

And secondly, given where we are with China and the United States entering this last 18 months bruising trade war, China is now looking for as many economic partners as possible, and especially for those economic partners, which cherish the economic globalisation and so-called trade multilateralism. So, again, this is the second thing, perhaps China and the UK are seeing each other eye-to-eye.

And lastly, and this is particularly interesting, this is also for historical reasons, and China generally can see the UK as being one of the superpowers in the past. And Chairman Mao mentioned this back in 1958, saying, “The United States and the UK are the two countries, are the two superpowers, China aspire to catch up.” So – and that view has not changed in eyes of Chinese nowadays, in the Chinese society. So I think there’s all three elements added altogether, we could sign up to some kind of neutral and more positive tone on the bilateral relationship with two countries. But of course the issue would arise, the time when it come to the certain strategy decisions or certain technical decisions, even how you say it, when it will come to the 5G debate on Huawei, and I think that’s really a classic example to expert this bilateral partnerships consists in different strand of economic benefit, vis-à-vis security issues and where UK is going to stand. And I would argue, where UK will stand and that will serve as a bellwether for all the rest of the G7s and to stand, in terms of US-China strategy competition, and the word is medium reg power and ultimately, you have to face the similar questions and to answer to its own electorate.

And another thing I would to mention here, China is interested in getting involved and getting in with the UK. Not just for the sake of particularly prestige, but essentially, for its own political economy. I mean, in the past three and a half years, after the referendum, China also had systematic change, when it come to a political system and then, of course, President Xi submitted its power, but also, within Chinese Communist Party, is a wider consensus, considering the current economic model, based on having an infrastructure investment, and low manufacturing export-based economic model is completely running out of steam and what China is actually trying to do, China actually would like to brand itself and shift itself towards more a service-orientated economy. And therefore, UK’s financial expertise, and also expertise on financial regulation, that will come into very, very interesting complimentary towards what China really want to be.

So, if we are talking about building up strong and stable government, does that sound familiar too, with you? Strong and stable, back to the General Election, back to 2017. Currently, half has the strong and stable government for this very time being for China, but if the economy’s not doing well, and I’m afraid that strong and stable will shift away. So, again, I think what China’s trying to do with the UK, again is out of economic necessity.

Now, other issues also remain, I mean, across Whitehall, across the British establishment, it would sense this so-called liberal international order, or the Rule Based International Order. To some extent, I would argue, China is not exactly just a revisionist power completely. But rather, a revisionist power by al a carte, revisionist powers by making choices and which part of revision China would like to make. So when they come to freedom of the negation, when they come to cybersecurity, and when they come to things on human rights, and [inaudible – 23:24] issues, and of course, China is the challenger, China is the disruptor. But then, on the other hand, there’s also wider issues, which Britain concern about on climate change and the reform of the UN and also, on certain global governance issues and development system issues, and China could potentially taking a leading role. So, I would argue, the two countries really have some areas to work together, but again, there are thorny issues remains there.

Now come to the very last point, when you’re actually dealing with Hong, and this is going to be extremely tricky, not just for the UK, but also for China, because China’s going to be facing a rather hostile, younger generation in Hong Kong, in the next 50 years or so, and how that could resolve. If I’m going to be betting on the biggest uncertainty on the bilateral relationship between China and the UK, and I think Hong Kong, at that thorny issue, will remain. So, I’m ending here. Look forward to hearing your comments and questions.

Tom Raines

Thanks very much, and just on that, do you think there’s a more significant risk? I mean, John mentioned gesture politics, and one can imagine a Labour Government would put more stock in public declarations around some of the concerns that the UK Government has had in China on human rights and on the rights in Hong Kong and on democracy. Do you think there’s a risk that that, sort of, approach, which perhaps is at least partially designed to meet a domestic audience in the UK, would have? You know, how would Beijing respond to that, if there was a UK Government which was more vocally critical on some of those topics?

Dr Yu Jie

I think that certainly would propose as an uncertainty, I mean, given what Jeremy Corbyn advocated for, and also a part of, if we are having plenty of Chinese investment in this country, is this country prepared to have a proper regulatory framework and firstly, to guarantee the labour rights? And also, is this country have a proper framework for the foreign investors guaranteed the environmental standard? And these are two things that I’m sure a Labour Government will be advocating for, for certainly.

And also, when it come to human rights, of course, a Labour Government will do whatever they can to hoping this change happening in China. But however, I would like to draw your attention is, it’s very hard to change the world largest political party. So, Labour Government may do whatever they wish, but I think China will just carry forward to do what it has to do.

Tom Raines

The Chinese Communist Party isn’t looking to Jeremy Corbyn for advice on reform.

Dr Yu Jie

No, but they did have a hattrick in the state banquet.

Tom Raines

Yes, they did, yeah, yeah, absolutely. Thanks very much, Cherry, fascinating comments. Anthony, perhaps I could just turn to you now. Your work focuses on politics of energy and climate change, is obviously a huge year for international action on climate change. Next year, which the UK is going to be, or should be at the centre of things, how do you see the next year playing out, and how might the election change that?

Anthony Froggatt

Yes, and thank you. Good evening, everyone. Yeah, so, I mean, I guess following on from the great issue about elephants’ tusks and a Foreign Office question. So, the climate change? I mean, I guess if you look at the manifestos, there isn’t a huge difference between the major parties, or I would argue that there isn’t. I mean, in terms of what’s happened over the last year, you’ve seen climate change significantly change, in terms of the public today, in terms of the political debate. And obviously, Theresa May introducing a relatively rapid pace, the sort of, net-zero target, so in June of this year. That’s reflected through the manifestos, and so you have the Conservative manifesto saying, “We’ll go with the net-zero,” so that means the UK, as a society, has overall – greenhouse emissions are, overall, zero by 2050. The other parties have gone further and faster. So the Greens are doing 2030, Liberal Democrats 45, Labour, I think, 2030, Scottish Nationalists 35. So, you can see they’ve stacked it quite nicely.

I think, in real terms, it doesn’t make a huge difference, in terms of that date. It’s about what happens in the next few years, and so it’s about delivery, and so, whether or not the Conservatives do it by 2050, it’s important we need to do it faster. But the key question is, will it occur at the scale that is genuinely needed, because net-zero is such a radical transformation, that we’d need to see a significant shift in the next five years. So, in terms of target, I think it’s less important.

What I think is significant is the change over time, in terms of if you look back to the 2015 manifestos, for example, the Conservative manifesto said, “We need to decarbonise, but it needs to be economic.” So, it was always couched in language about, well, we can only do this if we can afford it, and that has changed, and I think that is a major shift, and I think that’s for two reasons. I think one is the economics of decarbonisation has changed, in terms of the acceptance that renewable energies, offshore wind, solar, etc., are cheap and are as cheap, if not cheaper, than fossil fuel, in terms of generation. And I think also, in terms of the urgency of the situation, and I think that is fundamentally changed, in terms of the IPCC, in terms of the climate strikes, etc.

And maybe just to reflect upon that, I mean, there was – and it leads into the foreign policy question, because the World Meteorological Organization published its report last week, and if we look at it from a foreign policy perspective, two figures jump out at me. One is, they said that in 2000 – in the first half of 2019, there was ten million displaced people, additional misplaced people, seven million of which were to do with meteorological conditions. So, it – and the other thing was about just impact of food scares, and they were saying 33 countries were impacted, in terms of food security, and of those, 26 weather conditions were a major change – driving force. So, we will start to see really global shifts, in terms of food pricing, in terms of migration, etc. So we might look and see, actually, do – are any of the manifestos sufficient to meet the challenges that we’re looking at, in terms of climate change?

So, I think, on the one hand, things are moving forward, but if we look at what we actually will have to face, even if we meet net-zero, a lot of the heat is already baked in. We’ve already increased by 10 and even if you stopped emitting now, that will continue to go up and you’ll continue to have these problems. So, in that way, I think it’s insufficient, and I think all of the parties will suffer the same.

In terms of the, sort of, optimism, yes, the UK’s hosting the next big Climate Summit, so this week is in Madrid, and every five years there’s a big one. So it was Copenhagen, then it was Paris, and then it’s going to be Glasgow. So, it will be a major achievement. It will, I think, point to some of the questions that John raised, in terms of what’s the UK’s role in the world, going forward? Can it pull this off? And I think it is a major test, given the fact that we will probably still be in the midst of the Brexit negotiations. We’ll still be, will we or will we not leave by the end of next year? And they’ll have to be organising a major international conference. So, it is going to be a major diplomatic challenge, but I’m very glad that they’re doing it, ‘cause I think it is an opportunity for us.

Interesting you mentioned, has the UK led in the world? I think you can argue, climate change, they’ve done a huge amount. Probably not done enough, but in terms of domestic legislation, in terms of willingness to put money into climate change, in terms of international financing, the UK has been very strong and very bold, and that should be recognised. But, as I said, there’s much more to do.

And maybe just finish up on two points: one, in terms of Brexit, it has an impact, in terms of the UK and climate change and energy. It’s relationship with the international community, currently we have – our contribution is done within the EU, as we leave, what will that look like? What impact does that have on the EU? I mean, that’s the other big question, the UK has been a driver of climate change policy in a positive way within the EU. As we leave, will it roll back? Looks not likely, in terms of the Green New Deal that was announced by the Commission today is very strong. But I think that dynamic is important to look at. Also what it means for our energy relationship with the neighbours. We obviously, import-export energy and electricity from our neighbours, how will that change is really important, and also, then, the future relationship on energy, a lot of that’s done through the EU.

And then, just my final point is, not mentioned in the manifestos, but trailed today in the Financial Times and other places, is the question about the future relationship or the future role or existence of DFID, Department for International Development, it’s important for development issues, it’s absolutely crucial for many environmental issues. That being – if that’s moved into the Foreign Office, does that become a lot of the ODEI money, is it morphed into something that’s more about business and gaining foreign contracts, rather than maybe some of the key deliveries that is currently in place? So I would flag that as something that I don’t think the Labour Government is intending to do, whether or not the Conservative Government, we’ll have to see, but I think it would be a significant impact, in terms of environment.

Tom Raines

Thanks, Anthony. Really interesting comments. I’m going to not ask any more questions of the panel, ‘cause I’ve already taken up too much time doing that, I think. So I’d like to go out to the audience and get questions from all of you. Please try and keep your questions relatively short and to the point, and then that’s easier for the panel to engage with. There’s so many issues that we haven’t yet talked about. We haven’t really talked much about, sort of, Russia or some of the security issues beyond the comment around Skripal. There’s lots of other issues in the Middle East that we could discuss, as well. We haven’t talked too much about the relations with the US, under Trump, and how that’s a factor that, sort of, might change the calculation for the UK over the next five years, if there’s a second term of the Trump administration. So there’s lots of different issues. I would encourage you to raise new things, as well as to respond to what the panel have said. So, I’ve got a question here, yeah.

Kate Hayes

Kate Hayes and I’m a Chatham House Member. The biggest, sort of, pressing issue at the moment is Brexit. One would have thought that the pro-Brexiteers would’ve actually got some, sort of, policy, including a foreign policy, about what our new relations are going to be with whichever part of the world they would choose to be the one that’s important, after Brexit, which after all, is due to happen on January the – next year.

I cannot remember any particular iss – comment, by either party, on precisely where we are going to go, in our foreign policy relations, what are the priorities? Who are we going to even trade with, as a priority, when Brexit comes? I am assuming, at this point, that Brexit will come because otherwise, it would probably be unwise.

Tom Raines

Alright, thanks very much. Brexit and foreign policy and I mean, your complaint that the Brexiteers didn’t have a plan for foreign policy may have not been the only thing on which there wasn’t a full and complete drafted proposal ready. It’s an interesting question, though, and this idea of about, sort of, rebalancing some existing relationships. John, is that something that you, sort of, think about, and I suppose it fits in, in a way, with some of your comments, which are about us having a clearer sense of purpose and direction and strategy, as a country?

John Casson

Yeah, and I think the fundamental foreign policy challenge is about relevance. You know, how – you know, I feel like I was very parochial when I spoke, and listening to my colleagues here, and I – you know, we’ve got a world with some planetary issues and some big international system issues, and are we going – entering into a world of US-China competition? Or some new way of convening an international order and then some big regional issues, a new Middle East that’s coming to birth after 100 years of the [inaudible – 36:08] system. And the question is, how do we make ourselves relevant? I think the evidence recently, has been a – it’s been a bit haphazard, you know. For example, you had Boris Johnson making speeches about the cult of the strongman and wanting to stand up to human rights abusers, in certain situation and then, in other situations, popping up and sending contradictory signals to that. And I think what will happen in reality is that that stuff will be worked out, in the end, primarily through the lenses of the Brexit trade negotiations. That’s going to be such an overwhelming priority for our country, that everything else will probably, for the medium-term, take – to have to become a function of how we’re getting that done, I would guess.

Tom Raines

It’s a really interesting question, actually, which hasn’t got that much attention, which is, how will having an independent trade policy affect our foreign policy? How will it shape our relations particularly with emerging parties? Can I just ask you, Cherry, and from China’s perspective, do you think – you know, what’s – how optimistic can you be about changing that or enhancing, from a UK perspective, the trade relationship with China, given there are so many other complex issues around level playing field, around intellectual property, around market access? You know, how ambitious can the UK be and what, sort of, strings attached to that might there be?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I think UK can be quite ambitious, in this case. Partially, it’s because the particular structure of the British economy. I mean, I did remember, while the UK was being one of the major proponents, was in the European Union, a greater granting China market economy status. And the reason why, it’s because the Chinese economy, by no way, it’s in the same competition level as the British economy, because one is very much service oriented and the other one is very much manufacturing export driven. So, this potentially posing a very positive note, but however, I think Beijing is quite cautious, in the last three and a half years, or so, just considering they cannot really – Beijing could not really negotiate a proper trade deal, or investment agreement until they know the landscape between the European Union and the UK is clear. I mean, I think that would be really a major concern for not just China, but also for Japan, for many other trading partners in the world. They have to know what is the pecking order first, and in order to negotiate whatever they could negotiate on a country-specific level.

But I’m – what I’m really more interested in is to look into whether UK and China could potentially negotiate a bilateral investment agreement, and that’s where when they come to talking about investment regulation, when it comes to labour’s right, and when it come to whether the Chinese investment could safely and suddenly leaving this country, or something to do with national security. I think two side really have to putting their agenda very clearly on the table to talk to each other, rather than just saying everything’s nice and rosy, but underneath we’ve got so many problems.

Tom Raines

Yeah, thanks very much. There’s a question here.

Rhona

Hi, good evening. Rhona from the UAE Embassy. My question is about the implication of the foreign policies and one of the parties, I don’t know, can be Labour or Conservative, toward the Middle East and Gulf countries, what do you think the major changes that we’re going to see on the foreign policies? Thank you.

Tom Raines

Thanks very much. John, I might turn to you on this, having spent a lot of your career working on the Middle East. There are certainly some things, which are quite prominent in the Labour manifesto, for example, around arms sales, which has been a, sort of, important dimension of our relationship as a country with some Gulf states. How do you – how significant do you think things – a change might be?

John Casson

Yeah, I mean, I think the Labour Party manifesto says that they’ll suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia, is that right?

Tom Raines

Suspend arms sales, which are – which could be used in the armed conflict and also, a root and branch reform of the entire arms export regime.

John Casson

Yeah, and you might also expect Jeremy Corbyn to take a different approach to the Arab-Israel conflict, in particular, given his track record.

Tom Raines

You might well expect that.

John Casson

I mean, I go back to the general point I was making that the fundamental challenges is less that, sort of, calibration of values versus interests, or you’re, sort of, on the right or the left of the foreign policy debate, and it’s about relevance. And in the Arab world, I think that there’s a question of relevance or a, kind of, vacuum of – in western engagement in general, from the Europeans as a whole, and to some extent, from the United States. Although, obviously, the United States is a major factor, as well. But I think what you’re seeing in the region at the moment is a lot of actors like Turkey, like the Emirates, like Saudi, like Iran, like Russia, taking more of a lead and also being more of a – more disruptive as spoilers because there isn’t an overarching framework to align to. And I think, you know, the question for all of us is how do – if we wish to, sort of, recover western relevance, how do we get back to it? ‘Cause we could – you know, we could have a spat with Saudi over arms sales and we could have a spat with Israel over Gaza, which would consume a lot of political oxygen in the Foreign Office and in Foreign ministries in the region, but it wouldn’t equate to relevance. You know, I think there’s a – this is where I’m talking about needing to be clear about what it is we want to achieve and what levers we have to get there.

You can make a lot of political fuss, but it’s not necessarily the same thing as making a, kind of, contribution.

Tom Raines

Thanks very much. There’s a lot of different hands I’ve seen. There’s somebody at the front here and there’s a question there, and then I’ll try and redistribute to the back of the room. Yeah, just here.

Hilde Rapp

I’m Hilde Rapp, Centre for International Peacebuilding and I’m a Member of Chatham House. I think there’s a, sort of, underlying structure underneath all your three contributions, which has to do with focusing our minds perhaps because climate change is the ultimate, at the moment, multiplier for everything of the kind of relationship between ethics, economics, and human security. And if that doesn’t underly anyone’s foreign policy, we are having real problems, and I think China, in a way, has articulated that quite well for themselves because of the 5,000 years of, kind of, history and the confusion, sort of, backbone to their thinking. So, I’d be very interested to hear, particularly from you, about that, but from all of you about how you think about that. Thank you.

Tom Raines

Thanks. I’m not sure that there’s quite the same level of long-term thinking in the UK system as you’re implying there is in the Chinese one. I think this gets to quite a lot of your points, John, about having a, sort of, longer-term sense of direction and purpose and strategy. Anthony, do you have thoughts about that, in a climate context, about, you know, our capacity to think over the long-term and make these sorts of systemic changes to how our economy works, to meet this international challenge?

Anthony Froggatt

Well, it’s clear that that’s what – I mean, the government is trying to do and governments are trying to do around the world, is by creating a 2050 target. They’re saying, “This is our long-term direction.” Along that road you have to have – along that way you need to have milestones, to ensure that you can measure it on delivery. And maybe it’s the same, in terms of foreign policy, is being clearer, in terms of where you want to be 50 years from now, and how – what are the steps that you want to take it? But I would agree, in terms of you said, the overarching framework is climate change. I mean, if we don’t get this right, then actually, everything changes, in terms of domestic economy, in terms of relationship with other countries, in terms of where you get resources from. So, it – at least from my perspective, it needs to be the central framework for not just domestic policy, but overarch – and not just, sort of, climate policy, but overarching framework policy for governments in general.

It is one thing that the Liberal Democrats, I think, have put forward in their manifesto, is that they’ll be a special, it’s either a Cabinet Committee or a special Minister responsible for ensuring that climate change delivery occurs across the whole of government, rather than just in certain ministries.

Tom Raines

Thanks. So, there’s one question here, one there, and then all the way to the back. Thank you.

David Solomon

Thank you. I’ve a question, I guess, mainly for John, but for everybody in the panel. I want to turn the attention more to the behaviour of the United Kingdom and the Security and Council. So, particularly, I would like to ask what – based on the preliminary information that we have from the manifestoes and so on, how would you think a Labour Government would behave in the Security Council, particularly with respect to the deployment and downsizing of peacekeeping operations?

Tom Raines

Thanks very much. Could you just introduce yourself, please.

David Solomon

Oh, sorry, my name is David Solomon from the United Nations University.

Tom Raines

Thank you. So, on the UN, John, a specific question on the UN.

John Casson

I think I’m right in saying that the Labour Party manifesto contains a commitment to significantly…

Tom Raines

Increase funding, I think.

John Casson

Yeah, supporting…

Tom Raines

For peacekeeping.

John Casson

For UN peacekeeping operations. So, I think the Labour Party – the Labour Government would have an instinct, sort of, a very pro-UN multilateralist instinct. But I think any British Government would – will tend – it’s in the DNA of the Foreign Office to look to the Security Council as a place where we – you know, we have an asset there, which is we’ve inherited that somewhat extends beyond our current place in the world pecking order. So, I think there’s always an instinct to lean into multilateral operations, I think.

One of the reasons why we’ve struggled for relevance, in recent years, is that the Security Council’s not really been able to take any collective decisions on the key issues. So, I think that would be an instinct with particularly Labour, but both to use the UN, as far as it’s possible to do so, but that does raise the wider question of, how do we manage the international space so that there’s a basis for collaborating, particularly with Russia and the Security Council again?

Tom Raines

And there was a, sort of, slight dissonance between the, sort of, Corbyn Labour view, which is very against the use of force, except when it’s used by UN peacekeepers, under a system which contains a Russian veto. But quite against the use of force in other contexts to support decisions made by that body, I think it would be fair to say. Anyway, maybe others will disagree.

I’m going to – there’s a question here at the front.

Charles Emerson

Thank you very much. Charles Emerson. I’ve got two questions. The first to John. You raised the importance of long-term thinking, but rather depressingly suggested that neither of the prospective candidates for Prime Minister is likely to provide very much. Jeremy Corbyn might go towards gesture politics, perhaps, and is quite sceptical of the use of British power and influence. And Boris Johnson, perhaps, if there are trade negotiations with the United States, will be forced to essentially follow Donald Trump’s lead. Given that, is there, within the Foreign Office, within the foreign policy establishments so-called, is there an ability, sort of, endogenously, within that organisation, or set of organisations, to develop a strategic narrative for the UK? Or are we simply living in a world where bereft of political leadership, we just have to, sort of, wait it out?

The second question is, in terms of the framing issues, which John, you mentioned as well, what are the – is there a – are there framing issues coming down the track, over the next two or years, which really will change the way in which the UK is forced to operate? And that’s a question, obviously, for everyone.

Tom Raines

Thank you, Charles. Do you want to address that? I mean, there is a little bit of the Foreign Office, ‘cause I used to work in it, it’s called the Policy Planning staff, or it used to be, and now it’s the Policy Unit, and that’s supposed to do long-term thinking, at least in part. But ultimately, that needs political leadership, too, but John, what’s your view on the capacity of the system to deliver some of the, kind of, long-term strategic thinking that is so important?

John Casson

Yeah, I mean, I think this – my – the validatory cable I sent when I left Cairo was basically about this, ‘cause I think, you know, we often talk about the foreign policy as if there’s a tension between values and interests, if you like, or you know, ethics and interests. And that’s often how people frame things in the Middle Eastern context. But actually, very rarely does someone – is someone acting in foreign policy, basically either nakedly self-interested against my values or to be honest, the other way round, I’m being nakedly value-driven against my interests. I mean, you know, we have a short – take Egypt as an example, we – it’s in line with both our values and our interests that Egypt doesn’t fall into a flaming economic and security mess immediately. So, stability is within line with both our values and our interests. But it’s also in our – in line with our values and interests that in 20-25 years’ time it’s a more open and inclusive economy and society.

And so, the real foreign policy challenge is, how do you combine the short-term and the long-term, which often are often in tension with one another? And I think is the Foreign Office capable of doing it? I mean, yes, the human talent is great, but it does need to work – and the officials need to take their responsibilities and the political leaders needs to take their responsibility. So, I think it needs to be catalysed more than it has been and invited, and that needs some, sort of, states personship from the political leadership. But I think it’s not just this – I think one other thing I’d really like to stress is that Britain’s position in the world and pan-world is not just about the Foreign Office. In fact, the Foreign Office is only one small slice of it, and even what happens in government is not the whole of it, you know. In a sense, what we particularly hold in our hands, because of the country we happen to be, is actually much less state led as a set of power than many other countries.

And so thinking about it through the lens of what the government’s doing all the time, means that we miss a lot, which means it’s a challenge to mobilise society. And I think the long-term framing challenge is, are those kind of things that are very across the boundaries of our silos and across the boundaries of the world. You know, I would say the planetary long-term issues are climate, migration, and demography and, in a sense, they all feed off one another.

Anthony Froggatt

On the framing question, I mean, I think we’ve touched upon climate change, and the other side of that, obviously, is diminishing use of fossil fuels. And in terms of what may frame future international relationships, obviously, the Middle East reduced dependency on fossil fuels will change their importance in the world, for some countries. Likewise yeah, other countries that have other resources, in terms of copper or cobalt or other things that are necessary for a new equipment. So, I think we’re only just beginning, and Russia is obviously the other key example, what’s the future relationship with Russia, between Europe and Russia, in terms of reduced dependency on gas, oil, and coal? So, those new relationships and how energy will shape the, sort of, global politics I think is a really key framing question. And it will happen very quickly.

I mean, I think it’s not just the impact of levels of the import dependency, but the price of the fuel. So, if what happens when we start peeking global consumption of oil, what does that do to the price of oil, in terms of does that start to crash quite quickly? And what does that do for the revenues of certain countries in the world? And we know that they are those countries that are dependent on fossil fuel revenues, are very dependent on it, and changes in pricing will really affect their political and economic stability.

Tom Raines

Actually, I’m going to plug this as an excellent paper on precisely this topic from Anthony’s department about the future geopolitics of oil, which looks at precisely this challenge of what happens to particularly producer countries when demand for oil changes potentially quite dramatically.

Cherry, did you – there’s something you wanted to say on this?

Dr Yu Jie

If we are talking about framing issues, I mean, one thing which naturally come to my mind for any country in the world is in terms of economic inequality. I mean, I’m just arguing – I’m just answering this case for my own country has now become the world, perhaps shift it from the most equal society, into the world’s probably most unequal society. And I would argue, even for this election and how this – so personal income has been distributed and what are the tax policies, it seems to be so relevant, and that was also equally largely apply to countries like China. I mean, at the end of the day, we’re talking about different political system in here, but ultimately, will be the countability of the Governors and being governed, towards the government, which that really matters. And how to be able to relentlessly generating that source of income and I would argue, would be longer-term framing issue for any government, irrespective whatever political system we are.

John Casson

And that’s actually a better answer to the question on the Middle East than the one I gave. I mean, I think, you know, in the Middle East we’re all constantly dealing with these difficult binaries. You know, we’re being asked to, sort of, pick sides between a Shia-Sunni dispute or an Islamist against, sort of, military regimes dispute, and the binaries are problematic for us, ‘cause we don’t want to pick those sides and they produce dangers of conflict and extremism. But they, in a sense, are expressions and functions and symptoms of a longer-term issue, which is that the populist countries of the Arab world have a huge challenge finding ways to accommodate and employ and provide for their young people. And that, in a sense, that is the transformational issue that I would like us to direct our power at, as much as possible.

Tom Raines

Thanks. I’m going to take a question from the back. We have relatively little time left, even if we started just a couple of minutes late. So, if I could take these two questions together and I’ll give the panel a chance to respond. So, yes sir, at the back.

Andrew Bruce

Andre Bruce, Member of Chatham House. And one possible scenario, in the coming years at the result of this election could contribute to, is the breakup of the United Kingdom. What implications could that have for foreign p0licy?

Tom Raines

Thank you for that can of worms. Now if you could just pass the microphone forward.

Sha

Hi, Sha from China. Just a quick question. What’s your prediction about the election who will win and are we going to see any black swans or after the election, do you think people on the other side of the Atlantic will send a telegram of congratulations?

Tom Raines

Alright, so, will the country stay together and who’ll win the election? Two small topics on which to finish. Now, I suppose, you know, we don’t need to do too much sofology here, but I would be interested and I think this question about the continuation of the United Kingdom in its current form, is a very relevant one, not least because were Scotland to become independent or Northern Ireland to become part of a Unified Ireland, that would be another massive constitutional challenge, which would probably make us a more inward looking and distracted country, rather than outward looking focused one. Do you have – I don’t know who to – who, unfairly, to start with on those last couple of questions. But Anthony, I’m going to start with you, just to say, do you think that’s a, sort of, issue that would – Scottish independence, for example, or you know, the continuation of the UK, in its current form, do you think that’s the sort of thing that really makes a difference in the, sort of, climate energy, kind of, social, economic transformation space?

Anthony Froggatt

Well, if the votes next year, it would be interesting, in terms of Scotland hosting an international summit very soon after it’s – anyway, I’m sure London would be very cross.

Tom Raines

Sure, whilst negotiating.

Anthony Froggatt

Yeah, but anyway, it will certainly change the dynamic, in terms of the role of sub-national governments in the negotiations. I mean, I think it’s – what’s interesting, and maybe the only comment I’d make, is in terms of Brexit, what we see in Northern Ireland, and again, maybe just from an area that I know best, in terms of energy and climate, is a very different relationship between the North of Ireland and the rest of the GB, in terms of the market, in terms of the future relationship. And so I think that – I would say that that sows the seeds for a potential move away, in terms of a United Ireland, and so – and I think that does diminish, or it may well mean that the UK looks inward again, in the same way that Brexit has. And again, there’s lots of other challenges that I think are much more important globally, or – and for the UK, in terms of some of the ones that we’ve touched upon today.

Tom Raines

Cherry, did you have a…?

Dr Yu Jie

Yeah, usually, Political Scientists will refrain from making any predictions. So I’m not speaking as a Political Scientist in here, but speaking purely as a foreigner, a foreign person who live in this country. It will be quite sad to see the breakup of the United Kingdom. I mean, obviously, we were talking about Great Britain, enormous brand and soft power and then suddenly, we had a breakup of a union and where does that soft power goes? Well, individual state or individual region be able to create that sense of soft powers? British – this country enjoy enormously, so it will be sadness.

Tom Raines

Interesting. I guess, conversely, there might be a soft power in managing that process well. That’s a serious point, as in this is a tension, which exists in lots of different – well, you know, you can see it Spain now, the way that – a process that doesn’t have – that can’t be managed perfectly through conventional diplomatic and constitutional processes creates enormous pressures. And it’s actually something that I’ve heard from people that the way that the Scottish Independence Referendum was managed and delivered, actually, I think, in the end, probably enhanced the UK’s standing because it was seen to be a, sort of, legitimate, democratic process, and there was a confidence in being willing to offer that choice, even if I’m sure it was very nervous in Number 10 at that point.

John, do you have a view on this over the longer-term?

John Casson

I mean, I think if the United Kingdom was to breakup, it would – there would definitely be some problems and it would be a huge reputational hit, I think. And so the section of Britain’s being a powerful entity that has its act together and needs to be taken seriously, and it would be a huge distraction of our time and effort. But I agree with you, I think there would also be an opportunity, because in a way, what Britain – one of the things I think Britain ought to see itself off in the world is demonstrating how to disagree well, in a world in which we’re increasingly thrown together, but through globalisation and information and everything else, and in response, people are asserting identity. You know, and Brexit is one function of the challenge that that poses for the nation state. How do you preserve the nation state that’s, on the one hand, weakened by globalisation, but wants to assert its identify?

Whether or not you’re in or out of the EU or four countries, or two countries, or one country in the UK, that problem still remains, and figuring out how we live alongside each other, bound together and yet, preserving our distinctiveness, is a challenge for every country. And I think Britain has the opportunity to model something good. And in terms of predictions of election results, I think an Ambassador’s always under pressure to predict elections.

I can remember being in – I was the Chief of Staff to the Ambassador in Washington during the Bush-Gore election in 2000, and I can remember people from Number 10 ringing him up and teasing him that he hadn’t made his prediction yet. You’ll remember this election was a dead heat, and is it going to be Bush or is it going to be Gore? And in the end the Political Officer in the Embassy predicted that Bush would win and claimed that he got right. The Ambassador predicted that Gore would win, who got the most votes and the popular vote, and the Ambassador claimed he got it right. I think Ambassadorial predictions are basically entirely worthless.

Tom Raines

Okay, let’s have a little – let’s do a little experiment in participation here. Who thinks there’s going to be a Conservative majority? Okay, that’s probably a majority. Who’s thinks there’s going to be a Hung Parliament? Who sees the Lib Dems sweeping to power in an unexpected pincer move across the country? Not a brave soul in sight. Okay. You know, I think learning to disagree well is a lovely message to end on the night before an election. So I’m going to draw things to a close there. I want to say a big thank you to the panel, big thank you to you all for coming and for your questions and contributions. Sorry I didn’t manage to get everybody’s questions in. This will not be the last discussion that we have here about UK foreign policy, UK power, all of these issues.

Big year coming up, and this is one of the reasons why John is joining us as an Associate Fellow, ‘cause we want to talk about these issues more. So, please come and join us in the future, and thank you for coming [applause].