The UK’s tilt toward the Indo-Pacific?

Hans Kundnani

Good evening to everyone that’s joining us from the UK and from elsewhere in Europe. And good afternoon to those of us who are joining us from North America, or I guess good morning on the West Coast. I don’t think many people will be joining us from the Indo-Pacific region itself, I make it 2:00am in Tokyo right now, but maybe some people in the region will be watching the video afterwards, so welcome to you as well.

My name’s Hans Kundnani. I’m a Senior Research Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, and I’m delighted to be moderating this panel, which just consists of my colleagues, which is quite unusual and quite nice. There’s been a lot of discussion about the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, especially since the publication of the Integrated Review just under two weeks ago. This phrase ‘East of Suez’ has even been thrown around a lot. What we’re going to try and do, in this panel over the next hour, is sort of separate the hype from the reality and talk about how significant the tilt is, how it’s seen by others, particularly the US, and one thing we might talk about is what, if anything, the UK’s tilt has to do with the US pivot to Asia that began under Obama. Also, how this is perceived in China and what the implications of the tilt are.

We don’t have anyone from one of the UK’s partners in the region, like Japan, but I’m sure we’ll, at some point, talk about how it’s seen in some of those countries as well. So, as I say, this is an all-Chatham House panel, so I don’t think I need to introduce the panellists. You’ll all know Robin Niblett, the Director of Chatham House, Leslie Vinjamuri, who’s the Head of our US and Americas Programme, and Yu Jie, who is in our Asia Programme.

This event is on the record, so you can tweet. We encourage to tweet using the #CHEvents. In fact, I think Robin just tweeted, and you can ask questions through the ‘Q&A function’, and that’s how we’re going to do it in this webinar. The raised hand function is disabled. So, indicate in the ‘Q&A’, in the’ Q&A’ box if you’d like to ask a question, and we would love for you to ask it yourselves, live as it were, if you’d like to, so perhaps maybe put ‘live’ in brackets or something when you type your question into the ‘Q&A’. If you prefer not to, I can read out the question for you. And finally, the ‘Chat’ function is open, you can use that for sort of side conversations, as it were. I won’t really be closely following it, so as I say, if you have a question that you want me to see, then do put that in the ‘Q&A’, the ‘Q&A’ box.

Okay, shall we start with you, Robin? Can you maybe just tell us what the tilt is, how significant it is, as I said, and how you see the implications of it?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks, Hans, great to be with you and my colleagues on this panel, to be able to talk about this important issue. And just to be quick, I’ll just rattle through, I suppose, five things, what I think it is, and five challenges, concerns, and then hopefully, that’ll give us then plenty to pull off from my remarks for the Q&A and so on.

I was struck by the language on the tilt to the Indo-Pacific in the Integrated Review, which came out a couple of weeks ago, and I’m just going to read it out, ‘cause I think it’s worth listening to what the commitment is. “By 2030, we will be deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually beneficial trade, shared security and values.” And later on it talks about being, “We will have a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country.” And those are ambitious statements, but they’re all prefaced vis-à-vis Europe and European partners, which in itself frames it, and I think is a reminder that as with the whole Integrated Review, actually, I think it’s quite measured. A lot of people expected the Indo-Pacific tilt to be one of those defining kind of strategic realignments that this Integrated Review – it doesn’t at least strike me to have played that role.

So, what does it imply? And to me, I think the first thing to say is that obviously is a balance to the golden era emphasis of the David Cameron/George Osborne government, which put so much emphasis on China. And this is a reminder that Asia isn’t just China, it’s the Indo-Pacific, it’s a bigger space. In fact, it is not owned by China, so we’re going to call it ‘Indo-Pacific’ along with other countries who also wanted to enlarge it in that way. Asia is bigger and more complex.

Second point, however, to my reading and understanding, this tilt is not anti-China. It’s not about containing China. It’s not about, as I said, a formal strategic realignment. The Integrated Review talks about a European security being the precondition for British security. But it does see the Indo-Pacific not just at that critical area for British economic interests, 40% today of world GDP, obviously a growing amount, but only about 17% of UK trade, and we have a deficit within that percentage. It’s also, I think, described in the Integrated Review as a frontline of the open societies battle. That the Indo-Pacific is a space that is up for grabs, that is contested, and the UK wants to play in that space. So it’s not so much about anti-China as about trying to ensure that the community of open societies remains relatively large.

Third point, I take it as being pro-US in a subtle way. I don’t think it’s over-pandering to the United States, despite some commentary by some people to the contrary. Again, very, I thought, thoughtful language in the Integrated Review. The UK will adapt to the existing regional balance of power. Respect of the interests of others. I mean, that’s very careful language to use about the Indo-Pacific. The UK didn’t go hammering in, angling to become a member of the Quad, you know, along with the US, India, Australia, and Japan. There’s more talk about how it might be, as I said earlier, the leading European partner alongside them. And you, in your paper to – I think it was a couple of days ago, you and Alice Billon-Galland wrote about how the UK could team up with other European partners to really strengthen the European voice there.

So the key point I have to say about this is that the word ‘tilt’ is not the word ‘pivot’. The US can pivot, the UK is only tilting. So, it’s, in a way, backing the US rather than trying to sort of say, “Here we are with the US,” and I think it’s a really important emphasis.

Fourth point, as a lot of the paper talks about, it is the Review, it is seeking to leverage UK assets. As – and I think is says somewhere else in the paper, if not, it’s implicit, it is not a resource-dependent. It’s not like, the UK has to ramp up massively, in order to try to achieve its ambition. It’s going to use the Five Eyes relationship. It’s going to try to leverage the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, as well as Australia and New Zealand. It already has a 2+2 Defence Ministers, kind of, Foreign Ministers dialogue with Japan. It’s already exercising military exercises in the region and doing some important visits and it has this carrier strike group, which are about there in the 2021 plan. So, in a way, you know, it’s tilting, but it’s tilting off what it’s got rather than making some wild promises for the future.

And I think, last point on what it is, the ambitions on, I think it’s the nine points that come out later on in the paper, tend to sit more when you get to the specificity in the paper, is more about the economic and softer diplomatically, we want to become a member of the comprehensive progressive Trans-Pacific partnership. We want to complete our trade deal with Australia and New Zealand, an enhanced trade partnership with India. So that’s supply chain resilience. Using ODA more intelligently. Human rights agenda, open societies agenda. There’s just two references out of the nine to security specifically, and one is about cyber co-operation, and the UK has a lot to bring to the table, and the other is this reference to it being – you know, really contributing to maritime security.

So I suppose my take on what it is, Hans, is that it’s relatively carefully couched and not over-ambitious. I’m not going to go into the challenges in detail, I’ll just lay them out, and we can talk about them later on. Number one, you know, how values-aligned are some of those countries that the UK wants to partner with. You can do the economics and the values, look what’s happened obviously in Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam. You know, these are complicated partners, and I’m setting aside India, which has its own idea and vision of what it wants to be and has its own somewhat contested politics right now.

You know, if we’re going to be the European partner of choice, it’s a very integrated way of looking at Europe. As if it’s – the UK is up against lots of individual European countries, but all of those individual European countries will occasionally leverage the EU, and occasionally say they’re bilateral, and that’s what they do so well, France and Germany. The UK will have to be all UK. It doesn’t have the EU to leverage with.

Its military presence let’s see. Am I right in saying it’s going to have 20 frigates and destroyers by the end of the decade, I think was what I read? It’s got 19 now, that’s going backwards to go forwards. They’ll be probably, you know, better equipped, more modern and so on, but there are limits to what we can deploy militarily.

And my last point, whatever our tilt is, in a way we are at the mercy of the China/US strategic standoff, which could drag us into anything, from Taiwan to whatever. So however well planned this is, and to conclude, you know, it’s – I think it’s an intelligent way of putting Britain forward as a kind of mid-sized player, more flexible, more agile, as somebody described it, a strong expression of interest in the region, rather than kind of claiming it as a core part of its new strategy. But it is a very dynamic environment, and yeah, let’s see whether the – we can live up to even our modest ambition or our pragmatic ambition, I would say. Thanks.

Hans Kundnani

Thanks, Robin, that was a fantastic introduction to the pivot – the pivot, no, the tilt and the – some of the questions it raises. The point you ended on, on the China/US relationship as the bigger context for this, leads us seamlessly onto Cherry and Leslie. But before I turn to Leslie, since you said, Robin, that you know, this was very careful and not overly ambitious, how new is it? You know, you mentioned, for example, that the 2+2 meeting with the Japanese, which certainly predates the Integrated Review, and I think it even goes back to the Cameron Government, in fact. So, you know, how new is this tilt, you know, in what the Integrated Review has said about it? Is anything really changing?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

What’s new is the fact that the UK is committed. I mean, as we know, it’s held back, and have been slightly held back by the corona crisis and Brexit, you know, the Brexit completion, let’s call it, of the last year. So, you’ve had France and Germany – France, a while ago, coming out with their own papers on this journey, more recently the EU, it’s kind of folded into its concepts of European strategic autonomy. And the UK’s been strangely silent, partly because it almost had to be. a) Why I think it waited to see who would win the US election, and it decided how to frame it, and again, I’ll wait to hear what Leslie has to say about whether – you know, is this the tilt we would have had, you know, if there’d been a different result back in November? But to me, it matters, because whatever Britain says right now, it can’t escape from. Before what Britain committed was slightly absorbed into the larger EU context. And now, each choice, each statement the UK makes is weighed up and is going to be measured against the ambition and the promise of the UK as non-member of the EU.

So, as I said, while I think what’s new about it in a way is, it’s settled on a space, and where it’s settled, I think, is somewhere quite sensible, pragmatic. It’s sufficiently ambitious to stretch the government, and yet it’s not so rhetorical that in a way, it’s just a sort of empty vessel. But quite rightly, in my opinion, it has been relatively modest on its search. I think this is a government that’s learning to not overpromise and underdeliver but wants to make sure that it can say it got there, and their other allies start to recognise it.

I suppose the most important thing about it is where it sits in the Review, ‘cause it really sits cleanly as one of the two key regional supporting functions to the Europe-Atlantic focus. So, to my mind, the Review is about, “We are committed to that Europe-Atlantic core, and then we’re tilting out to the Indo-Pacific and to East Africa or I want to say Sub-Saharan Africa, are the main two pulls.” And that in itself is – it’s not what people expected. I think people expected a harder tilt or even the semi-pivot, and the fact that it hasn’t gone there to me is actually, is important, and yeah.

Hans Kundnani

Great. So, Leslie, Robin said that the tilt is pro-US, but in a subtle way. Do people in America appreciate that subtlety?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, thank you, Hans, and it was really good to listen to Robin’s comments, and of course on the back of his report earlier this year, and your work, Hans, in the expert comment. So I would say, first of all, I’m still coming – I’m still grappling with this. So, all of my reflections will be early, preliminary, short and not fixed. My sense right now is that obviously, there was very close co-ordination and thinking among certain people in the US foreign policy establishment and those architects of the Integrated Review. But more generally, even more generally in the US foreign policy establishment, I think that the US has not focused on this. I don’t think that people understand it. I don’t think that they’re very aware of it. And I think it will be some time before they really understand the complexity behind – not only that the tilt, but also the Review itself. And I think it is therefore being read in ways that probably don’t reflect the real thinking and the real intention behind the report. So I think there’s a disconnect, and so this panel and the conversations that I hope that we will be having, not only with Europe, with the UK’s European partners, but with the US partners, I think will be incredibly important to sorting this out.

The – my second reflection is that, you know, I’ve sort of been debating this a little bit with Hans and with others, you know, whether – and to Robin’s comments, is the tilt, the pivot, is the Indo-Pacific strategy the same? Is it fundamentally different? It certainly seems, at first glance, that the US has been in this game for a lot longer, obviously, the pivot, you know, is an Obama-era policy, which was seen to be, if not wrongheaded, certainly wrongly labelled, and I think there’s a lot of critique for using the language of the pivot. So I’m not even so sure that people are talking about a pivot in any case anymore. But I think that it’s very clear that in the US case, this was solely about China. Obviously now, much more strategic than it was in the Trump years, thinking about productive competition and co-operation through the Quad, but I think there’s no glossing over the fact that in the US case the pivot, the move, the focus on the Indo-Pacific is clearly about China.

And in the UK, as Robin said, it looks to be about something very different, and I would make two arguments here. One is that in the US one gets the sense that despite the current focus on foreign policy for the middleclass, that the origins of the shift were clearly external to the US. And the way that I think that the tilt to the Indo-Pacific will be read currently by those in the US who are watching, will be that this is about global Britain, but this is about Brexit, that this is about an exit from the European Union, that this is about something that’s very domestic, very local, not actually nearly as global in its origins as the US shift has been. There’s a sort of different sensibility about what this is really about and that it’s Britain searching for its new role in the world.

It’s also clearly – and perhaps not understood how different the institutional manifestation and engagement is of the US engagement in the Indo-Pacific for the Quad and the UK’s engagement through CPTPP and through ASEAN and other forms. So it’s, you know, it’s all very different in origins, in timing, at least at the sort of superficial reading of it. And the language, and more generally in the Integrated Review, is very different from the language that’s been in the US right now, and I would point in particular to the use of the word ‘sovereignty’, which I think Robin and I know, from an article that we worked on that in its early days talked a lot about sovereignty, and my God, did the Americans not like that, because sovereignty has become such a tainted word, in the context of Trump’s America, that the whole focus on the Indo-Pacific is not really discussed in light of sovereignty, and that language of sovereignty is – agility, but also sovereignty is so central in the Integrated Review. So I think there are a lot of things that are just framed very differently.

The next point I would make is – and again, Hans and I were discussing this, is that, you know, as the Biden administration now talks about the Indo-Pacific and everything else that it talks about, it’s all through the lens of delivering to the middleclass, to delivering to the United States, to Americans. And I think, you know, we will see that connection being very clearly forged, even in something as far away as the Indo-Pacific. And if you look at, you know, what came out of the Quad, the vaccine strategy might be harder for ordinary Americans to grapple with, but the focus on climate and on public health certainly isn’t.

So that say – that sort of comparison with the UK, I think, is actually quite different. Where the focus on the tilt to the Indo-Pacific doesn’t seem to be joined up in an obvious way to the levelling up agenda, to the domestic agenda, to the concerns that I think certainly are evident in Britain, but I think are evident in Americans thinking about the UK, that Britain has become parochial, small, focused on, you know, very divided internally, and needing to repair those divisions. And I think that when people read and look at the Indo-Pacific tilt, it reads as something that isn’t joined up to that very serious domestic set of problems that is evident, not the same, but evident in the US, that’s been much more – that linkage has been much more clearly articulated.

So a couple of words on reactions. In addition to the, you know, largely people just being unaware of what’s going on, and even very intelligent, engaged people being unaware of this. Not because they don’t care, but because they’re just so much more focused on some really big issues, not only China, but Afghanistan, Iran, etc. There’s also, you know, some who we’ve seen – Jeremy Shapiro, who’s a friend of many of ours, very dismissive of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt, who argue that this is Britain not being aware and truly cognizant and reflective and self-aware of its middle power status, that Britain should stick to the Euro-Atlantic, it should stick to NATO, it shouldn’t try to, you know, reach beyond, that this is an evidence not only of overstretch, overreach, potentially, but also of trying too much to ride America’s coattails. I think that that is, you know, one critique that comes out, in a variety of ways, and I think it’s largely misplaced and is a reflection of, you know, not having really looked very carefully at the way that the tilt is being drawn out, which is why I think it’s so important to have these sessions.

I think in reality, the concern for overreach in the Indo-Pacific is one that’s been articulated by many who are prominent in the US foreign policy debate, in other words, a concern that the US is overreaching by talking about the Indo-Pacific and not just North-East Asia. And what is actually – what many in the US are actually trying to do and many in the UK are actually trying to do is actually more aligned, which is to work in partnerships, to secure that part of the world, to keep it open, to keep it free, to talk about new issues, to cyberspace, free and open waters, airspace and etc. But I think so much of that is largely lost. So I think at the heart of the strategy there’s tremendous scope for alignment, but it’s largely missed.

And I guess the final point I would make to Robin’s question is, you know, would the UK have gone there in any case? Well, I think yes, I mean, that’s clearly what they’ve said, and that this was largely independent of the results of the election. But I think, you know, the fact that the US was already moving in that direction before the Biden administration, this isn’t new, it’s certainly been played out in a very different and I think much more constructive and intelligent way. But I think the alignment, at some level, was already progressing, and so I kind of believe what I read on the tin from those who have written the review, that this is not simply about following the US, it is something much broader and much more strategic. I’ll stop there.

Hans Kundnani

Really, really interesting points, Leslie, especially on the sort of similarities and differences with the US. I mean, it strikes me that if Jeremy is right, that this was partly about sort of trying to ingratiate ourselves, with the United States, then it hasn’t really worked, or at least not yet. Also, what strikes me is that, you know, Brexit was clearly seen in the United States in a sort of partisan way, and part of the aim of the Integrated Review was to sort of move beyond – I mean, domestically, move beyond the sort of Brexit civil war, as one official called it, and – but it sounds like in the US we haven’t yet quite broken through that way in which people are seeing this still through the prism of ‘Are you for or against Brexit?’ which is quite interesting.

Let’s move onto China. Cherry, Robin and Leslie both said that the UK tilt, unlike the US pivot, wasn’t about China. Do people in China think that it’s about China? And if so, how do they feel about that?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, thanks, Hans, for this question. I mean, people of China, I don’t know whether I’d be able to represent 1.4 billion population here. So, obviously, people from China could really shoot across all different aspects of the society. So, speaking from societal level, this Integrated Review really didn’t really raise much concern, or didn’t make headline of the Global Times, you know, obviously the nationalistic tabloid, at all. The only debate, which Beijing had so far about this Integrated Review is about, does this actually reminds the Chinese population, this is something back to the mid-19th Century that sense of the eight nations alliances and attack Beijing. So that is the – just a historical reference, among the Chinese society, believe somehow this British Empire return. But obviously that’s a very crude and very basic understanding of the British foreign policy among the Chinese public. It’s very limited.

But I think what’s in the Chinese political elites, and the views are very different. On the one hand, I think the Chinese policymakers aware of that, Boris Johnson, even though under the renewed pressure from within the Tory Party, did not declare a Cold War with China. So, this is something that the Chinese feel reassured about it. But on the other hand, I think this is also a test for the Chinese policymaker themselves as well, because the changes in the Pacific tilt is not just about UK-China relations, but largely it’s about UK, as a big country, a big economy, NATO member and UN Security member and also, with a significant soft power, and changes configuration of the world, and what would be Beijing’s response for that? And that is the most difficult thing to – difficult question for Beijing to answer.

So, Beijing’s response cannot be just to supply the relentless level of angry rhetoric, as what we have experienced last week. But instead, I think Beijing will really have to figure out how it’s going to pave the way to figure out the priorities for Beijing, the so-called forging a stable external environment to fostering its domestic economic development. I mean, if you look around the Indo-Pacific, it is very much about China’s external environment, China’s relations with its neighbours, and how China will be able to fostering that, to do even better, and perhaps there’s no perfect answer at this stage.

Just give you one number, that trade has really been at the heart of this China within the region. So I actually looked through all the different powers and economies across Indo-Pacific, and China seems to be the larger trading partner with all those members, apart from Bhutan, compared with the United States. So, China’s economic presence and significance are largely within the region, and what China can do by exercising that economic might?

Now, one way China could do it, and what I foresee China’s doing this right now, is what I call it, to become a norm entrepreneur. Which is not to abide in so-called liberal international order that has been set up by United States and the UK, but instead, China will be interested into exercising, try to searching for that norms, as possibly could co-exist with the Indo-Pacific economies and with various members. I mean, one example, which I could give, is the recent signatory of regional comprehensive economic partnership, I mean, covering 15 different economies. And that’s really – it is not exactly a China-led initiative, it is ASEAN-led initiative, but China, by being the largest beneficiary for that. It’s not just because of the sheer size of the Chinese economy, but largely, it’s because China will be able to set the rules of the game, set the rules for the regional trade, and writing the agenda for the regional trade. So, what I call it, China as a rule, and are norm entrepreneurs in this case. That’s really China’s purpose, for Indo-Pacific, on the economic level.

Now, on a military level, things will become even more interestingly. Apart from this Integrated Review being published by the UK, China also published its five – it’s 14th Five Years Plan, with a significant increase on the Chinese military budget, around 6.8%, according to the national GDP. Which is to say that much of the focus would be given to modernise the People’s Liberation Army and much of the focus will be given to modernise the Chinese Blue Navy. I mean, considering this is the country – considering this is the army, People’s Liberation Army has not had any proper military conflict back since the 1960s, and the People’s Liberation Army will have to prepare for that. Therefore, in the Pacific region, will become a good access – exercises ground for the People’s Liberation Army and Navy. So, that’s part of the reason why this tilt to Indo-Pacific, it is also important to China. So, it’s about testing China’s strength, it’s about testing China’s capability, but it is also about how to secure a reasonable economic growth for China itself. So, let’s leave the complexity over there.

Now, finally, what I’d like to mention in here is, even if we are talking about Indo-Pacific, talking about economic collaboration, talking about shared common values, and the one gamechanger for future for this region will be the vaccine. So, whoever the country, either China or United States, will be able to successfully rollout their own homemade vaccine to those Indo-Pacific economies, and that would really help to somehow fostering the relationship between these great powers with those Indo-Pacific economies. So, for example, if China Sanofi will be able to rollout this vaccine so successfully across different – across the region, then China will be – emerge as a winner. And equally, that would apply for India and that would apply for the United States. So, I would say vaccine, sooner or later, is going to be a gamechanger in here as well. So, I’ll leave it here, and look forward to hear your questions.

Hans Kundnani

Great, thank you, Cherry. I will take some questions in a minute and do keep writing them in the ‘Q&A’ box. Before I do that though, Cherry, just could you just spell out how – I mean, and I won’t ask about the entire Chinese population, you’re right, that’s too many people, but do Chinese policymakers see Britain as a significant player in the region? I mean, you distinguish between the military and the economic. So, for example, the fact that, you know, Britain is joining the CPTPP, does that matter? Does that make a significant difference? And then similarly, on the military side, you know, if Britain is sending, you know, HMS Queen Elizabeth to the South China Sea, does that matter, or do Chinese policymakers think that, you know, the only real actor that matters in the region is the United States, and Britain is a bit-player, and it doesn’t really matter what it does?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, the reason why I listed both economically and militarily is just to show that of course UK is a major economy, is a major economic player within the region, and part of, you know, why the UK want to join the CPTPP is also China’s aim as well. China suggested itself interested in joining this trade pack too. So, UK is considering as a major economic player within the region. But when they come to military, that – I think the Chinese policymakers, considering that UK is such a close ally with United States. So, irrespective, whatever UK does within the region, it is actually just to closely follow with the United States.

Hans Kundnani

Great, okay, let’s take – we’ll take three questions to start with, and I hope – I think they can all ask their questions live, and let’s start with Jeremy Greenstock.

Jeremy Greenstock

Do I unmute myself? Right.

Hans Kundnani

No, you’re okay.

Jeremy Greenstock

I think the Integrated Review is going to be very subject to events and look quite stale in a relatively short length of time. One of the big issues that is going to grow over the next period is US-China rivalry compelling countries to choose one side or the other. And the UK is not going to be able to make easy choices in that context, on the basis of what it said in the Integrated Review. It’s got to go beyond that, actually to make policy. And I want to throw Taiwan into the debate in this seminar, because it’s rising up the scale of international concern and it has to affect the environment, as you put it, of international stability, Jie, and does the UK have anything relevant to bring, if Taiwan rises up the scale, in terms of a US-Chinese confrontation?

Hans Kundnani

Thank you. We thought Taiwan might come up. There’s also a second question in the ‘Q&A’ on Taiwan, “Do we really understand China’s intentions on Taiwan? Is it really serious about reabsorbing the territory?” Before you answer that though, let’s take a second question from Simon Webb. Hopefully Simon can…

Simon Webb

Yeah, I’m – can you hear me?

Hans Kundnani

Yeah.

Simon Webb

Good, yeah, I’m perhaps a bit of an old defence hand perspective on this. I wonder whether we shouldn’t feel pleased qua the sort of Kissinger thesis that the rise and fall of great powers needs to be actively addressed. But that actually, we should be present where there are risks to stability, you know. We should work on the subject, so not ignoring the changing strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific region is the right thing to do as a Security Council, as a Security and a NATO member. Rather like what, in a sort of way, what’s going on in the Baltics, where NATO has made some deployments to sort of remind Russia that, you know, there is a group of countries who stick up for democracies and who care about international stability, and it’s not particularly threatening, but it’s certainly been quite an effective measure.

I worry a bit that this debate lacks understanding of naval and maritime stability. I’ve been depressed, over the last week by how most of the comments on the British security statement has been about the Army, when actually, there’s some really interesting things happening about navies here, which perhaps we ought to discuss some more. And a Japanese Admiral got up at 2:00am recently to join a talk I was on, and to say, “There are only three exits from the China Seas into the wider oceans, and it’s a doable job to contain that.” And if we are in some way saying, you know, not that we’re going to take this over or that we have – I know, from the sort of 1967 Defence Review, how phenomenally expensive it is just maintaining the assets in the Pacific. But to send a signal that with perhaps adding a bit to the Quad, that actually, if China was thinking of pushing out naval forces, actually, it’s a containable, in maritime security terms, and there’s a sort of a bit of a discussion there, which I think we ought to be thinking about rather more.

Finally, we are of course still a nuclear power, and introducing any nuclear power, whether France or whatever, into any situation, is a factor. Thank you.

Hans Kundnani

Thank you, and then Richard Bridge.

Richard Bridge

Thank you very much. Excellent talks and some very good points made. Going back to, in particular, to what Leslie said, as I’ve put it in the question, the UK might want the Indo-Pacific, but does the Indo-Pacific want the UK? And I quote there one example of a former Senior Civil Servant in India saying, “Well, thank you very much, Britain, but you’ve done enough mess in the sub-continent, so please keep out of here,” and you know, you are, as they put it, “A power with a diminished status and an imperial nostalgia.” So, I’m just wondering how easy it’s going to be and that, I think, might be amplified by the way that we’ve treated the European Union, which is we’ve pulled out of it. So, if you wanted to be an ally of the United Kingdom, you can look at how we’ve treated the European Union and you might be cautious.

Just on the Review, a couple of comments. There are several examples here of ambition up and spending down, whether that’s for science, for aid, for resources for the Army and the Navy. I’ll stop there, thank you.

Hans Kundnani

Great, so sort of interesting contrasting views of the tilt and of the Integrated Review. So, we have Taiwan choosing between the US and China, military strategy, and the maritime stability, and interestingly, the attitude of partners, potential partners in the region. Cherry, do you want to maybe go first on the Taiwan question?

Dr Yu Jie

So let me go through the Taiwan one and also the wider impacts on BRI as well. Yes, I think the chance for having, put it this way, minor military conflicts of Taiwan, between mainland China and Taiwan is increasing, if not decreasing, by any chance, at all. And part of the reason is really signalling from the recent Premier Li Keqiang’s work report, one of the paragraph referring to Taiwan, for years, that China has always saying, suggesting that the wishes of peaceful reunification of Taiwan. And now suddenly, from last year, the word of ‘peaceful’ has dropped completely. So, this make many Chinese Policy Analysts wonder what will come next. So, that’s one major concern.

And secondly, it is also because what’s in Taiwan, that view towards mainland China become far more hardened compared with in the past. So this opposition and also the incumbent government has a very hardened view towards Beijing as well. So that really put Taiwan into this flashpoint. And whether United States or Biden will choose to escalate this, the entire Taiwan strait issue, I doubt it, because the stake is so big. Because one of the founding principle, the fundamental principle of the established and diplomatic relations between China and the United States back from 1979, it is to recognise One China policy. So, yes, the chance is high, but I think the stake is too big for both side to take any further action on this.

On larger picture, within the Pacific region, that China had this very strong sense of the so-called ‘besiegement’, you know, that sense of being encircled by the American allies. And also, China felt itself that its sense of the BRI ambition, the Belt and Road ambition, being hugely disrupted by this Indo-Pacific strategy as well. And China’s interest is not about Asia period, but I mean, I use the word ‘recalibrate’ the Belt and Road Initiative. And the word ‘recalibration’ will go, that recalibration will go to Asia-Pacific, and therefore, that is something China deeply concerned within the region.

Hans Kundnani

Thanks. Leslie, any thoughts on any of those?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Yeah, I thought you were going to go to Robin next, for sure. I guess, you know, on Taiwan, clearly this has been a debate in the US, again in the US foreign policy community, about whether to move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, as Richard Haass so very openly has called for, which would be an acceleration, and many people feel a dangerous move. But I think that Yu Jie is probably right, that the stakes are so high, that you know, the key thing is to maintain deterrence as much as is possible, but it’s certainly not a giveaway, and it’s seen as right up there at the top for the big flashpoint for a potential conflict, which is to be avoided at all costs.

I think the question about choosing is really, you know, Jeremy Greenstock’s question is, you know, the one that’s been on so many people’s minds for so long, and it certainly looks like, you know, if you believe, as I’m sure Jeremy does, that diplomacy can make all the difference, then we’re certainly in a better position now, with the current leadership, than we were just a few months ago. Nonetheless, it does feel like there is a – that a hardening will inevitably present certain partners with a choice to be made. But I’m not so sure that it’s a push factor as singularly, I think it might also be a pull factor. In other words, I think before we thought it was the US pushing, and now it feels like maybe there’s actually some more alignment, because the situation’s got so much more intense. I really want to answer the question in the ‘Chat’, but I’ll wait until the Chair asks it.

Hans Kundnani

Okay, before I turn to Robin, Cherry, just on this question of choosing between China and the United States, do you have the sense that Chinese policymakers want to force Europeans to make that choice? You seem to imply that they think that because of the economic relations they have, that’s s – that they feel quite confident that if they – that they can force countries to make that choice, and they will choose China.

Dr Yu Jie

I think it’s not necessarily to force a country to choose whatever, I think it’s their economic – the post-COVID economic reality that try to make each country to think about its own position regarding economic recovery, but also on the supply chain. I mean, the one thing which I didn’t mention is that within the region, we’re talking about RCEP and it is about the Asia supply chain for Asia. So exactly, it’s each individual country it’s thinking its own economic independence away from the great power competition. So, China can’t force any country to choose, but it can only use its economic might to somehow project its influence.

Hans Kundnani

Okay, Robin?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, lots of interesting points. Just a few thoughts. Yeah, does the UK bring anything to Taiwan, given the fact that as an answer to the question that was there in the ‘Q&A’, I think from my understanding of it, it’s usually been this – and China is very serious, over time, to absorbing Taiwan into China proper when it can, and it can find a way to do it. I think it actually becomes very important that the UK is seen to be, again, tilting to the Asia-Pacific, and therefore tilting to its P5 responsibilities to, I think it was Simon’s, or maybe it was Jeremy’s question. If – what you want to be doing, in terms of signalling to the Chinese Government, is that it has to really work out whether allies are going to be coherent in standing up to any acts that China may feel it has to or wants to take in the future. And all you can do is change the calculus or try to influence the calculus. The UK standing alongside the United States and others in America’s commitments to Taiwan, which are in themselves a little bit ambiguous, does change the calculus. It’s not really to do with the forces, military forces, that the UK brings to bear, but as a P5 member and as an ally, I think that does count, to Jeremy’s point.

I don’t know enough about, you know, naval strategy and so on to know, and understand what’s, you know, how containable China is, given the layout of the islands and the Straits of Malacca and all that stuff. What I would say is whatever the UK does, in terms of its tilt to the Asia-Pacific, has to be done with partners, and the carrier strike group operation for later this year into the South China sort of Sea area or the Asia-Pacific area, is going to be all about its partnership with allies. Obviously, it’s going out with the United States, the US jets on its deck, with the Dutch in tow as well, and that’s a good sign. And as Alice Billon and Hans noted in their paper, there’s a lot that the UK could do, alongside with the French, to give some meaning, but in a modern way to the Lancaster House Agreement by both coming together, the two countries, with real commitments in that part of the world.

France, because of its territories and population that are out there under its sovereignty, I suppose, to use that term loosely put, and the UK with its commitments to fight power defence arrangements. There is real capacity for it. So, I think, yeah, again, I think the UK can make a difference. But to Richard’s question, does the Indo-Pacific want the UK? Yeah, as you would expect me to do, Richard, I would break that up. Japan clearly would like to see more of the UK in that part of the world. I think the South Koreans may be a less forward-leaning on the defence side of it but are very keen to see the UK involved more broadly in energy transition and some of their kind of softer humanitarian and green and development agenda, stuff that they promote quite actively.

And for India, I think, having heard some of my colleagues talk about this at Chatham House, they noted that, you know, with the Biden administration in, it’s a more complex proposition for Modi. The UK was pretty irrelevant when Trump was in the White House, and then it was all the love-in between the strong leaders. But with Biden in the White House, and a slightly more cautious approach to the kind of politics that Modi is leading, Boris Johnson still very strong bilateral lead towards India, has got to be useful, from India’s standpoint, and whether they believe it or not. Even instrumentally, it’s helpful. They don’t have to believe in Britain’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific as a strategy for them to find Britain’s desire to try to demonstrate the relationship with India has real economic benefits. That’s something that gives India the chance to leverage, whatever our positions about Pakistan and Afghanistan, that always cause some of those edgy elements. So I’ll stop there.

Hans Kundnani

Thanks, Robin, and I guess it’s worth emphasising that there are different views in India as well. I mean, there are certainly some quite, you know, Indians who are very hawkish on China and would quite like the UK, I think, to play a bigger role. But I suppose the danger, and Cherry sort of hinted at this, is that, you know, the more countries you have, including the UK, playing a role, contributing, as you said Robin, it does potentially increase this Chinese fear of encirclement that Cherry talked about, which is quite worrying.

We’ll see if we can squeeze in three more questions. I think, again, they can all ask them live. Tricia, we sort of dealt with Taiwan, but do you want to ask your question?

Trisha de Borchgrave

Thanks, Hans. Yes, you did answer the question. But my – just my concern hearing you and just reading about it, ‘cause we’re not there, is I get the impression that, you know, it is – Western countries are very, very far away, apart from Australia, obviously, that are very, very worried about Taiwan, and yet countries and islands within Oceania are not as worried as we are. And they are the neighbours, and they, I think, would be less concerned with that reabsorption of the territory. So, I’m wondering where this balance is really going to come out in a productive way, if you like. You know, we seem to be fighting a battle very, very far away, and I don’t know how many allies we will genuinely have within, you know – I’m even thinking Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar. I don’t think they’re particularly concerned about Taiwan and certainly Tonga and all those islands, the Solomon Islands, etc., are not as concerned as we are. So how does that play out? Cherry, if you’d like to have a stab at that. Thank you.

Hans Kundnani

Thank you, Trisha. Matthew Oxenford, a former colleague of ours.

Matthew Oxenford

Hi, thanks, Hans. This is sort of similar to, I think it was Richard’s question, in the previous round, but looking through the Review, obviously China has a significant amount of coverage, Japan as well. Also ASEAN seems to have been relatively heavily focused on, which sort of seems – which I’m not quite sure where the sort of geostrategic element of that is. So, I’m curious how much of this is around geostrategic, geopolitical questions in South-East Asia, or whether or not this is more sort of an economic deepening of ties that sort of pervades the entire report but seem somewhat relevant there. How much of this is just looking for new trade deals, which obviously the UK has had that policy for quite some time, including the CPTPP, which may also be relevant here.

Hans Kundnani

Right, thank you Matthew, and then finally, Brian Babcock-Lumish, the question you were waiting for, Leslie.

Brian Babcock-Lumish

Ah yes, thanks, Hans. So, Leslie, do you think the United States will actually value this UK policy for what it is? Or is there a danger of the UK being taken for granted?

Hans Kundnani

Great, and I’m going to throw in one more, which is whether the British economy and consumer is more or less dependent on China, compared to its dependence on the US, India, Japan, Australia, and Europe? I’m not quite sure which way round that was, whether it’s the comparison of how dependent Britain is compared to these other countries or – anyway, it’s in the ‘Q&A’. Cherry let’s start with you, and particularly on that question of whether we are overestimating the sort of desire of allies to have – or how hawkish allies are, I guess, and partners in the region?

Dr Yu Jie

Well, I mean, just to answer Trisha’s question, Oceania neighbours, I mean, this seems to be the elements that many Western powers ignore, that China actually engaged with Oceania powers back to the 1960s and back to the 1970s, and to make the PRC return to the United Nations, back to 1971. So, I think there’s already longer-term established engagement there already. So of course, one of the principles to engage with China is One China principle, and that won’t change. Under the reasoning of the recent years, there’s a sense of the Belt and Road Initiative being introduced in the region, that China was able to offer generous loans towards those Oceania powers, and of course, by using its financial resources, buying political influence. So, I think that’s part of the reason why most of the Western countries, the so-called G7 members, more concerned about the current status of Taiwan than compared with many of the developing countries within the region, as well as Oceania powers. So, I think that’s part of the reason – part of the answer to Trisha’s question.

Now, on British consumers depending on China, I think even the Chinese consumers themselves who were asking themselves whether one day, whether Chinese manufacture will one day have to move out of China to go somewhere else, because the labour cost is just how it’s going enormously high, and therefore, even the Chinese consumers can no longer rely on ‘Made in China’ anymore. So let alone British consumers. So I think that question is really about the – it’s about profitability rather than a particular country that consumers will have to rely on, rather than particular individual countries.

Hans Kundnani

Very interesting answer. Robin, do you want to try and answer the question on ASEAN and the extent to which the tilt is economic or strategic, I suppose?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, I mean, just to – that one, and maybe one of the others as well. I mean, I thought – as I read it and as I understand it, this goes back to what I said at the beginning, and it’s in the paper, about the tilt accepting the existing balance of power. I think what the paper tells me is that the government understands that it needs to play the game of the region rather than come and say, “Here we are, we’re Britain. Notice us, we’ve got brilliant plans.” It understands the limits, you know. This is why I said, I think the paper is quite pragmatic. And ASEAN is one of the main games in town, even though the EU and others find it incredibly slow-moving and consensus-driven and lowest common denominator. The UK is trying to tip its hat and say, “We understand ASEAN’s the main thing. How can we observe? How can we help? What can we bring to the table?” And there’s this soft line that by helping on cyber, helping a bit on intelligence, by bringing its Navy over more as a confidence-building measure than as a demonstration of real power, it plays the ASEAN game. And if it plays the ASEAN game, then maybe they will look at it favourably on CPTPP. Because let’s remember, just ‘cause the UK’s asked to join CPTPP, does not mean it’s going to be accepted. I mean, we’re a long way away, there’s all sort of trade-offs that would need to be done to let the UK in. And if they let us in, there will be a whole bunch of other countries maybe asking to come in from further away. So I think it’s quite a clever move about playing the game and taking the long road.

Just quickly on Michael’s comment. The British economy is obviously less dependent now, and the British consumer is less dependent now, on China, compared to that big list you gave, especially if you add them together, and certainly compared to the US. But this is all about the future and you know, if the Chinese consumer grows the way – or Chinese consumption grows the way it’s meant to grow and likely to grow in the next ten, 15 years, then the UK ignoring that change is going to be a real problem. And you can see Germany trying to play it both ways all of the time, and the whole point of Global Britain was to keep the UK being nimble.

And I thought that Amrit Swali’s question about, “Can the tilt really protect human rights?” was a very interesting and difficult question, which I don’t have an answer to. I just wanted to recognise it, because I think it is – when we look at the way things are going in the region, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, it is worrying, but it makes Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the ones that have hung in there, feel all the more needy for partners. So, I think, you know, this is back to this idea that this tilt – sorry, the tilt and the whole push of both the United States and America is about protecting democracy rather than promoting it. I think – I speak for myself as much as anything here, I think the job right now of the UK is to be one of those countries just protecting what we’ve got, in terms of democratic countries. It’s not about trying to push it out more, and that’s an important role to play. Thanks.

Hans Kundnani

Great, and thank you for answering Amrit’s question as well. Leslie, final word to you, which is kind of where we started, really. Does the United States value the UK?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Just a couple of things. First of all, before I answer that, on that human rights. I mean, you know, it’s so important, but let’s be honest, as important as standing up for human rights is and human rights advocacy is, human rights rarely come as a product of advocacy. They come from things that have a lot more to do with internal factors, as we all know. So, defence of human rights as opposed to promotion of human rights, I think is also an important distinction, not least because of the capacity for a certain kinds of advocacy to have the opposite effect to that which very well-intentioned people would like them to have.

On the tilt being economic versus strategic, I mean, I have to say, I really reject the distinction. I think it’s really important to – you know, maybe it’s a very American view. It is a very American view that, you know, that the economics and the strategic and the national security are just phenomenally difficult to delink. And on the Taiwan question, you know, semiconductors, supply chains, that you know, delinking and decoupling is not where anybody wants to go, but it’s hard not to think that Taiwan is incredibly important, given the geoeconomics and the integration of our economic systems and our economic dependencies. And I think that that’s got to matter for the region, not just for the US.

But does the US value the UK? I mean, I think the thing I would remind ourselves is that Rebecca Lissner is sitting in the National Security Council. As she said, she has her pen on the national security strategy, the US national security strategy. And John Bew has made it very clear that she heavily contributed to his thinking on the Integrated Review. The US and the UK, as they currently sit, right, in those in power, those influencing those in power, are really, really incredibly aligned and deeply value each other. So I think at that level, that the strategic thinking is really, really closely aligned on the importance of openness, on the way of thinking about the Indo-Pacific. Whether that spreads out, whether that flows out from the centre and has a broader impact on the extent to which the US foreign policy establishment, the US public, value the UK, I think remains to be seen.

And I think that it’s not so much, you know, when – as you all know, frequently it’s – the US isn’t really focused on the UK. It’s not that it doesn’t value it or that it actively, you know, is dismissive, it’s just it’s not where the focus is, and so I think that’s as much a question as anything else. But I think even those people who think that perhaps the UK’s gone too far in extending itself beyond its middle power status with this Indo-Pacific tilt, will actually value what the UK does. The UK is, you know, a forever partner. At the end of the day, it matters a huge amount, for so many reasons. But I think right now, again, they’re very, very carefully aligned on the deeper strategic thinking, as reflected in the Integrated Review.

Hans Kundnani

Great, I think that’s a really good place to end. I’m sure we’re going to be talking about these issues much more as UK foreign policy evolves. I think what this discussion has also illustrated is that, you know, almost anything we’re going to be talking about in future in international politics is ultimately going to be about China and the US, or it’s going to involve talking about China and the US. In other words, more to come soon. In the meantime, thank you very much to our three panellists, and thank you all for coming, and see you next time.