Central banks have emerged from the financial crisis as a pillar of unelected power. This is symptomatic of a broader international trend of delegating law-making powers to regulators, under a form of undemocratic liberalism. What principles are needed to overcome the risk of a democratic deficit, and so preserve the values of representative democracy?
Drawing on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking, Paul Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate and effective.
How can the solution fit with how government is structured, and how can their political overseers be incentivised to make the system work effectively?
How can central bankers emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become successful models of dispersed power?
And what are the limits to unelected power?
Sir Paul Tucker, Senior Fellow, Harvard Business School; Chair, The Systemic Risk Council; Deputy Governor, Bank of England (2009-13)
Chair: Adam Ward, Deputy Director, Chatham House