War on Ukraine: Evolution of the war

Mathieu Boulègue

Alright, welcome, everyone. Good morning, good day, good afternoon, wherever you are. I am Mathieu Boulègue. I’m a Senior Research Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme here at Chatham House. I am honoured to be chairing this session today to discuss the evolution of Russia’s war against Ukraine, as it is Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine. This event is on the record and will be recorded to engage with a wider audience.

Today is also a special and remarkable day, and I could not be prouder to announce that we are celebrating the eighth anniversary of the Ukraine Forum today. The Ukraine Forum is led by my friend and colleague, Orysia Lutsevych, and it is a unique platform dedicated to understanding dynamics in Ukraine, internal and external, so, huge congratulations to Orysia. This calls for a celebration. It’s a bit too early for drinks where I am, but the heart is definitely there.

In these dark times for Ukraine there is need for objective analysis on the situation and on the war itself, and the Ukraine Forum is uniquely positioned to provide it. Today we have a superb panel to discuss and address the evolution and the future of Russia’s war against Ukraine and what it means for Ukraine itself. I’m very pleased to introduce Nataliya Bugayova, who’s a Non-Resident Research – Russia Research Fellow, sorry, at the Institute for the Study of War. If you’ve been following daily the war, then you must have read the publications that Nataliya and her team are doing every day. Before working to – with the Institute for the Study of War, Nataliya was CEO of the Kyiv Post. So, if you’re interested in Ukraine, you must have read some things from Nataliya as well from the Kyiv Post.

The Kyiv Post, I remind you, is Ukraine’s independent English language publication, and Nataliya also served as an Advisor for the former Ukrainian Economy Minister after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

I’m also very happy to introduce Andriy Zagorodnyuk, who is a long-term friend of the Ukraine Forum as well, who served as Minister of Defence of Ukraine from 2019 to 2020, and is now the Co-Founder and Chairman of the security think tank, Centre for Defence Strategies.

I will ask both my colleagues to give opening remarks for about five to seven minutes each, followed by a discussion, after which we will open the floor to questions from the audience. Please submit your questions, throughout the events, using the Q&A box and Q&A function on Zoom, as you probably are all aware of. Please only use the Q&A box to ask a question, not to make comments. This means you must end with a little question mark.

If you wish to comment or share observations, please do so in the chat function. I may call on attendees to unmute themselves to ask their questions. If you prefer a readout of your question on your behalf, please indicate this when submitting your question, otherwise I will pick on some of you, in a good way, of course.

So, without further ado, let’s get started. Nataliya, please, the floor is yours to give a short presentation on how you see the situation and the war unfolding on Russia’s side, and then we’ll turn to Andriy to explain how it’s doing on Ukraine’s side. Nataliya, the floor is yours, thank you.

Nataliya Bugayova

Thank you. It’s great to be here, also a great time to have this discussion, given that we’re at another pivotal moment in this war. Before we talk about the evolution of the war, I’d like to start by discussing the Kremlin’s intent and briefly how we got here. I think it’s important to state that Vladimir Putin’s objectives remain the same for over the past two decades, and control on Ukraine has always been one of them. He tried to do it in many different ways, from trying to install political puppets to using his limited military intervention [inaudible – 05:00], to then to try to manipulate the West into giving up Ukraine’s sovereignty voluntarily.

None of these efforts really worked, and he resorted to a full-scale invasion, in fact, very early this year, and we can discuss separately why and how he has miscalculated it. However, despite the shortcomings and failings of this invasion so far, we see no indication of the overarching intent changing. In fact, one of Putin’s close associates, Nikolai Patrushev, only a couple of days ago, restated that objectives of the current campaign remain full demilitarisation of Ukraine, denazification, which is the codeword for regime change essentially, as well as neutrality.

I think it’s also really important to remember that it has never been just about NATO or neutrality or territory for the Kremlin. It has always been about control over Ukraine, in part because Putin does not believe Ukraine is an independent state, and he exclusively said that when he was justifying the full-scale invasion in this February.

The reason I’m starting with that is because the intent has been critical factor in the Kremlin’s campaign, and also, Russia has pursued means well beyond – objectives well beyond its means in the past, and in some cases, Putin actually managed to advance them by simply outlasting his opponents, including the West, and this is what he’s counting on in this war. Secondly, we should also assume, unless indicated otherwise, that this intent will also pass to Putin’s successor, again, until we see indication otherwise.

Now I’d like to talk briefly about how we have progressed in this war, and I’d like just to put up a map; let me know if you can see my screen. It’s one of the recent ISW’s control of terrain map that Russia team at the Institute for the Study of War is producing daily. A couple of points: Ukraine has defeated the Kremlin’s objectives in the first phase of this war. Ukraine has forced Russia to pull forces from Kyiv and won the battle of Kyiv. Ukraine also won the battle of Kharkiv.

The Kremlin then reoriented its campaign on trying to establish control over Luhansk and Donetsk region. He – Russia tried to do it all at once, it couldn’t, then it refocused specifically on Luhansk region and Severodonetsk. Russia overemphasised Severodonetsk compared to its actual strategic and military importance, just so Putin can score an optical win at home. And I’m emphasising that because Russia did manage to inflict major damages on Ukrainian military in that battle, but at the same time, it also exhausted, in large part, its own forces.

Now we’re at a point where Russia did – was able to secure control over Luhansk region, but Ukrainian offensive ha – defence has successfully slowed down Russia. You know, as you’ll recall, they started the advance towards Severodonetsk actually in late April, and started the offensive on the city on May 6th, to my recollection. So, it took them quite some time to be able to seize the city and then establish control of Luhansk region.

Now they’re in the pause and setting conditions for further attacks in Donetsk region, and specifically Sloviansk. How fast they’re able to advance and how much they’ll be able to take will depend on, in part, whether they will allow their forces to rest and replenish their units. However, Russia is facing a larger challenge, because it did exhaust its manpower, it did degrade its combat-capable manpower that’s available, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able to seize much of anything substantial beyond Donetsk and Luhansk region in the short to midterm. And I’m emphasising that, sure, of course, Putin calling for full mobilisation, and even that has caveats of how fast that could kick into the fact, and how fast it could actually make a difference on the ground.

Secondly, Russia’s also having issues with control over the occupied territories, as it’s facing resistance from Ukraine that is becoming increasingly effective and co-ordinated. So, therefore, Ukraine still has a chance to win this war. However, we are in the moment of vulnerability for Ukraine as well, for a number of factors.

The first being is that Ukraine is expending a lot of its Soviet – old Soviet equipment, but it hasn’t fully transitioned onto the Western equipment, and that transition must be accelerated by the West in support of the Ukraine. Secondly, the economic factors are starting to play an important role as the damage that Russia’s inflicting on Ukraine’s economy is starting to accumulate. And third, it’s actually Russian information operations, which are a poor capability that the Kremlin has developed over the last years, are now specifically targeting West and Ukraine unity and Western support to Ukraine.

Kremlin cannot win this war if two factors persist: Ukraine’s will to fight, as well as Western support of Ukraine’s operations at the scale and speed necessary, and matching the objectives on the ground. So, Putin is targeting this specific centre of gravity, in part with the information operations, to erode natural erosion of the Western will to resist Russia over time, and I really want to emphasise that.

Therefore, to conclude, a couple of points. I think, to help Ukraine win the next phase of this war, and also this war, it’s essential that two things happen. One, that West not just supports, but commits to sustained support, and a more comprehensive approach to the defence industrial complex needs in the West in support of this war, but also in Ukraine, as well as the longer-term strategy for the force replenishment and training.

And secondly, more, in this concrete moment, support for the counteroffensive and broadening out of the Ukrainians’ ongoing counteroffensive in the South, to help Ukraine challenge Russia’s gains there, but also expel Russia’s forces before Putin is able to solidify his control and annex that territory, because he is setting conditions to do just that. It is critical to expel, because otherwise it’s going to be a permanent threat, and not just to Ukraine’s sovereignty if Russia is able to keep any gains. But also to the broader security of the Black Sea region, as well as NATO.

So, I’ll open with that, and pass the floor to Andriy, who I’m sure will talk very granular about how this war evolved on Ukraine’s side. Thank you.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Thank you. Thank you.

Mathieu Boulègue

A great transition. Go ahead, Andriy.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Yeah. Yes, thank you very much. So, good to see you. Thank you, Chatham House, for invitation. So, I’ll be very concise, because there’s a lot to say in a short period of time. So, we have no doubts about the objectives of Putin. These are not about the NATO, these are not about the, like, a battle with the West or whatever, as they sometimes portray in the information campaigns. Of course, they do consider the European events as the – as a, sort of, battlefield between Western world and Russian world. But nevertheless, it’s – this whole thing is clearly about occupying Ukraine, continuing occupying Ukraine, their strategic objectives did not change.

They will try to do whatever they can in order for, to destroy our country, and so, for us, obviously that leaves no other option, but to – us to defend, and we don’t have a plan B on that. So, currently we have a – I think we are between a couple of scenarios right now, probably three. So, one of them is that Russians are slowly moving with the invasion. They complete Lugansk area, then they complete Donbas, then they will think where to move next. They have some options, but nevertheless.

The other option is some sort of a stalemate. It can only be possible in the case if Russians don’t feel that they have forces to move. So, they will just get stuck, they will stop, but they will never change their strategic objectives. And then, and the third option, obviously, which we try to achieve is that we go for counteroffensive and they take territories back, and the critical deciding factor, like, critical enabler of that scenario is the weapons, which we expecting to receive from our partner nations.

So, of course the past month was very difficult and past two months was very diffi – were very difficult for Ukraine. But at the same time, I think our forces did a great job, because they were outnumbered in a number of cases, and they were certainly outgunned and, as you know, they were sometimes outgunned as ten to one or 15 to one, and at the same time, they managed to make sure that the Russian movement is very slow, and very – extremely painful for them.

We started to receive already the new equipment from the West. We’re talking about hundreds of Howitzers, already working in the frontline, so, it’s a substantial – they play already a massive role. There are already units, which just with the Western equipment, and this is great to see, because we know that there are some tens of more, and probably hundreds of more in – on the way. So, we do see that, sort of, replenishment of the Ukrainian inventory, weapon inventory with the Western weapons, which is what – exactly what we expected, and that transition was the most – and it still is happening – it’s the most dangerous period. It’s logistically most dangerous period, because it’s when their old equipment goes away and phases out, and the new is still not coming; that’s exactly what we had over the last couple of months, and that’s – that was tough, but nevertheless, we see this period is slowly getting over. We’re getting over there.

We clearly see Russians are exhausted. We see them bringing old weapons. We see them running out of their precision guided missiles and generally precise equipment, they are – they bring lots of untrained personnel. They mobilise people from the newly occupied territories, they mobilise people from their previously occupied territories, like so-called LNR/DNR, and so on, and we – with that, sort of – and they obviously are capable only for – of attacking only in one operational direction, which is currently, like, Lugansk area, and that, and generally, like, the Donbas region, as it’s called. Which means that I don’t believe that they are capable for any escalation, any conventional escalation, and that’s what we’re hearing sometimes, as fears from the observers, from the Analysts, from Politicians, you know, about the escalation.

We – I honestly – this is – I think we are – we should be past that point of – but what they also do, they started to use – they continued to use, and recently we saw this, some sort of a surge, of the terrorist tactic, when they were clearly bombing and addressing civilian infrastructure with no military meaning. And one or two of these attacks could be explained by some mistake, or some, sort of, you know, a mission or whatever, but these are serial, and we believe that this was a conscious attack of civilians and with a political goal, which is a rough definition, broad definition of terrorism, because many of these objects, which they – apartment buildings and apartment blocks and a shopping mall, and other places like that, they were miles away from any military objects, and so, we don’t think that was a mistake.

So, yeah, and, as I said, that the equipment is arriving, and it’s – to Ukrainian armed forces, obviously it’s not yet enough. We have some of the types of equipment, which is more or less – we are in the numbers, which we expected, or at least in the ballpark, which we expected. Of course, with multiple rocket launchers we’re not, and we need more, and – but the use, the employment of those, that type of launchers, that type of weapons shows that the Ukrainian armed forces can actually learn very fast the engagement doctrine and how to use that, and because they already make some substantial progress in the battlefield.

We do see very encouraging goals in a – on various co-ordination events of the donors and of the supporters, particularly Rammstein format. We couldn’t, but notice the very clear and very bold statements from leadership of the key countries about moving heaven and earth in order that Ukraine wins, and types of, like, statements like that. We know that these are policy statements, we know that they are well thought through, and this is – so, we, of course, we’re encouraged by this. And we see that, you know, the equipment which comes, it’s basically a implementation of those policies.

At the same time, for the couple of months we heard from some other Politicians, a lot of these calls for concessions or calls for compromises and so on. I strongly believe this was a very misleading ideas, and some statements about that, you know, we could reach peace by, kind of, reaching some consensus. Putin is clearly determined to destroy Ukraine, it’s not about Donbas, it’s not about Kharkiv, it’s not about Mariupol, it was – it’s about the – everything. And so, luckily, these calls are becoming less and less these days, and we can talk about this separately, if anyone wants.

Yeah, so, essentially, we have one or two trajectories. One trajectory is that Russia is not moving with any modern production. We don’t see any substantial increase of their, like, technical capabilities right now, and Ukraine actually requires technical capabilities. So, we are in, sort of, crossing slopes, you know, and as soon as they meet and as soon as they start moving in different directions, we will see that critical moment, which – when the counteroffensive becomes possible. And we do believe the counteroffensive should take place.

There is absolutely no need for war of attrition. We’re in a unique window of opportunity for the counteroffensive. Russia is, as I said, is exhausting – is exhaustive, and unless we give them time to recover, we can start taking territories back, and, yeah, and essentially, as one of the bloggers and tweeters said, that time remains the ultimate enemy of the world’s belligerents. Ukrainian armed forces need to contain the Russian armed forces to the occupied areas, acquire more modern, Western weapon systems, train enough forces to turn the tide, and Russian armed forces want to complete as much conquest as possible before Ukraine can defeat it. That’s basically where we are.

Separate story, and I think we’ll return to that, is obviously on the Black Sea; situation’s tough. We doing – we do implement the strategy of the access denial, as you could see, with [Menei – 21:00], but of course, that doesn’t resolve the Black Sea opening of the ports and Black Sea, the blockade, which is a massive strategic challenge right now. Thank you.

Mathieu Boulègue

Wonderful, thank you very much, Andriy and Nataliya as well, for your initial comments. I think this is a very compelling assessment of what we have and the situation on the ground at this stage. So, as you can see, we are very far from any sort of peace talks, peace with a lot of caveats, or any form of negotiated settlement, what would they at this stage?

Before we open the floor to the audience and the questions, there’s a couple of things I wanted to ask you directly, concerning specifically Russia’s war termination strategy. I mean, no country goes to war without an endgame and a war termination strategy. I think Nataliya and Andriy were very clear on what the endgame is. It is to destroy and break Ukraine as much as possible, and on the tactical and operational side of things, you know, the end of the war, what does it look like?

We see a lot of frustration warfare as it is, in Donbas specifically, with Russian advances being slown down by the heroic resistance of Ukrainian forces and, you know, the smart adaptability of Ukrainian forces as well on a daily basis. But concerning this logic of attrition, there’s something I wanted to ask you. Is there a risk that Russia would actually be digging in inside of Ukrainian territory to try to limit the counteroffensives from Ukraine as they grow bolder and as they seize the initiative in the weeks to come? Is there a risk that Russia would actually prepare its line of defences, its no-man’s-land with mines, it second and third lines of defence, to try to contest as much as possible Ukraine and to try to achieve any counter-effects?

And then what about the future of these territories? We know that Donbas has already been occupied since 2014, we know Crimea is – has already been occupied since 2014 as well. What do you foresee in the South, specifically in Zaporizhzhia, in Kherson, in South Donetsk as well, in terms of the integration of these territories? There are already a lot of signals coming that Russia is probably preparing for a form of old-school integration of these territories. How do you see this playing out in terms of the ability of Ukraine in a way to seize the initiative and achieve strategic counter-effects in its counteroffensives against Russia?

So, let me throw all these questions to you, feel free to address whichever you want. Nataliya, Andriy, let me, you know, just start – whoever wants to start first.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Nataliya, yeah.

Nataliya Bugayova

Sure. I can talk about the – I can start with the second question. First of all, Russia is already trying to dig in both politically and militarily in all the places it occupies, and it will try to do everything to prevent Ukraine from expanding its counteroffensive; that’s what it’s trying to do right now. However, the question is, what it can do, what its capability is. And I think the assessment right now is that there is a limit to how much combat-capable manpower it can bring in additionally to do anything beyond Donbas significantly in the short to medium-term.

So, it’s not a question of if they are trying to do that. It’s a question of can they? And my assessment is that they have very limited ability to do so. That said, I think there is a major risk of Russia digging in militarily and politically, in the South in particular, and they’re of course, setting conditions for the annexation, and I think the ent – this, kind of, goes into your second question about the endgame. You know, if – the reason they’re trying to secure gains in the South so much is for several reasons. One, it will provide them a strategic military foothold in perpetuity if they’re allowed to keep any gains there, from which they can threaten Ukraine again in perpetuity. The people in those territories will live in perpetual fear of atrocities, as they are now, you know, Bucha was only a microcosm.

Third, we have to go back and zoom out to Russia’s larger objectives. Control of Ukraine was not only one of them, and we see what’s happening in Belarus, and they’ve had a campaign there for years to try to subordinate Belarusian military to Russian military structures; same goes for Moldova. So, if Russia is allowed to keep the gains in Ukraine, and especially economically critical region of South, and access – which provides also Ukraine access to ports, it will use that to, I mean, threaten not just Ukraine, but also the Black Sea region, and in future, after it has time to replenish and regroup, potentially Moldova as well. So, I’ll mention that before passing to Andriy.

Mathieu Boulègue

Yeah, thank you. Andriy.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

No, I agree, so, let’s start from the beginning with the endgame. So, Russia – you mentioned that nobody starts a campaign of that size without the endgame in mind, but they did not start that campaign of that size originally. They wanted to have a short, quick, victorious war, and that what was their – what the type of war which they’d been preparing themselves to, and so, everything which happened after was, sort of, much less prepared. And we saw a lot of haphazard movements, and we saw a lot of, like, momentary decisions, because they were not getting ready for – they didn’t have much of the well-developed plan B, C, D, wherever we are right now.

And that is partly the reason why they are struggling with bringing in new weapons and so on, because the – what is, what’s called the de-conservation of the weapons is a very – it’s a very, sort of, Soviet term. They conserved a lot of weapons, which is supposed to be as good as new, but obviously they weren’t, and, as it turned out, like, majority of the weapons couldn’t be put in operational mode, which was a big logistical issue, as far as we understand.

So, current endgame, I believe, for them is strategically the same. So, strategically they obviously want the whole Ukraine, that’s it, period, and – but operationally, I guess, they want to move in as far as they can, as they’re allowed and as far as they can, then making – taking operational pauses, recovering and then moving again. And understanding that Putin burned lots of bridges, particularly the bridge to the international community, to sit on the same table with the international leaders, ever. I think that, based on, at least on that, he understands that this is the last chance for him, and he, kind of, decided to go for either all or nothing.

So, for us, it’s a massive, huge challenge on all levels. It’s an existential challenge, and that’s why, for us, the endgame is to do exactly opposite, and move them out, because, as Nataliya rightfully said, and as some other Analysts are saying, that they are not able to – for any substantial escalation, they’re not able to do any serious advancements on any other operational direction, but the one they choose. And they have chosen Donbas, simply because it has a, some kind of a political explanation. It’s not that geostrategically important, as the – as, for example, there would be, like, occupation of the South. But it’s politically more important, because they can say that they are saving Donbas and whatever else, in their propaganda, they, kind of, are trying to say, and – but there – that’s it.

So, for us, we need to use that as a window of opportunity. That’s – sorry to repeat that, but that’s a massive, important moment. Thank you.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Nataliya and Andriy, for these great answers. I have about a million questions, but I’ll open it to the floor right now, to leave the audience a chance to ask their questions. There’s already a lot of questions coming in from the Q&A, so, thank you very much. Let’s turn it to the audience, so, please continue submitting your questions using the Q&A function, and if you wish to comment and share observations, do it in the chat function, not in the comments. I may ask you to unmute yourselves to ask your questions, so, if you’re not comfortable with it, please do mention it when submitting your question.

We have actually two joint questions that I will take now concerning mobilisation in Russia, more specifically, and all the discussions that we’ve seen around potential full-scale general mobilisation in Russia. How do you see it being possible, and how much would it have an impact on Russian offensive capabilities against Ukraine if there was the decision to mobilise, or is it coming, in a way, too late to try to turn once again the special military operation, into a, sort of, “general war with general mobilisation”? So, let me turn the floor to you, Nataliya and Andriy, if you want to take it.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Nataliya, would you like – do you want to start, as usual, or…?

Nataliya Bugayova

Yeah, I have couple of thoughts, and then I think you can talk about the effect it will have on the battlefield, from your assessment. But I think Putin has couple of problems at home, and there’s a reason why he’s been reluctant to call for a full mobilisation. First, it has to do actually with the information space and the framing of this war. In fact, framing it a special operation imposes certain limits on what – self-imposed limits from the Kremlin in this context. Specifically, you know, because Russia framed this war and Ukraine’s – and Kyiv regime as a small group of neo-Nazis, they’re incompetent and easy to defeat, it is actually a problem for them now to explain, why do they need to expand recruitment to defeat this threat?

They’re – Russian propaganda is of course trying to reframe this war now as Russia versus West and the broader challenge, and they may very well succeed, but there is a why this window’s so important, because Putin hasn’t fully reframed this war at home at the level that I think he assesses he needs to. That’s number one.

Number two, you know, there’s always a question of, even if he fully mobilises it, how much that will actually matter of his – it would take time to train, it will take time to recruit, it will take time to incorporate, it will take time to form cohesive units before they actually become an asset rather than a liability on the battlefield. So, I think that’s another point to consider.

And finally, look, there is an important dynamic here about what Russian population has reacted to. It didn’t react as much as some expected to the casualties of the Russian Army. It did not certainly react to Russian atrocities inside of Ukraine, but it did react to Russian setbacks, and we’ve seen public outcry in social the media when Moskva ship was sunk, when Russian forces pulled back from Kyiv. Why? Because it actually gets to the one premise that Putin is standing on, is the promise of Great Russia, and that does conflict, at least at the moment, with the need for full mobilisation. I’m not saying it cannot be reconciled, and I do think time, you know, will help Putin do that, but right now, he’s in this limbo moment.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Right. From what I can say, that it’s tough to say whether it’s likely or unlikely, let’s just say, about the objective – some objective facts. So, right now, what – basically, the casualties which Russia has in this war are not actually distressing that much the Russian society. So, it’s not, like, really impacted with this, just from percentage perspective, so, they can – they watch this war on TV, they consume that sole propaganda work, and essentially, it seems like largely, apart from a very small, sort of, conscious part of the society, the rest of the society is, sort of, comfortable with how the things are going, particularly because they’re staying away from this and, you know, the number of families actually touched by that war are not that big, from percentage perspective.

Things will dramatically change if they call a mass mobilisation, of course, because people will be scared, and many of them, you know, would be much more concerned about that. And so, this is a great risk for Putin’s popularity and generally for his – for the regime. And as we have seen, lots of these great people’s wars, including in Russian history, ended up with a regime change, because the war didn’t go a proper way, and a great part of the society was dissatisfied with how it went, and so, it started to, sort of, destroy things at home. We have seen this in number of cases in Russian history, so, we need to – so, that’s one thing.

But then the other thing is, I think they’re currently not capable of doing effective mass mobilisation. So, they can call one million soldiers, but they need, you know, capabilities, not just number of soldiers, capability is also weapons, is also infrastructure, is also, like, transportation, logistics, you know, officers, which will work with those soldiers properly. And I don’t think organisationally they’re capable to create that massive bigger, big army with such – so many of the troops, because we see they’re struggling right now with much less requirement for equipment.

Imagine if they need to escalate it to, like, a double [inaudible – 34:57], for example. They would have a substantial trouble with a lot of components of the capability formula, just – not just with people, not just with the, kind of, like, a lower-level personnel, soldiers, surgeons and so on. So, organisationally, I don’t think they’re there, and that’s why, you know, I mean, that would be not a wise decision, to do that, to call the mobilisation, I mean.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, both, for your answers. Let’s turn on and group two questions concerning Russia’s naval strategy and warfare more specifically. One question, which is more tactical, related to Snake Island. “Do you expect Snake Island to play any significant role in the coming phases of the conflict, not least because it has become a, sort of, symbol of resistance for Ukraine?” But also on the wider strategy, in terms of freedom of navigation within the Black Sea, “How do you see things evolving within the region, not least for military purposes, but also for Ukrainian exports, extremely critical exports of grain, for instance, and the future of the Ukrainian economy as well?”

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

I can comment. Nataliya, do you want to comment, or…?

Nataliya Bugayova

Yeah, go ahead. No, you go ahead.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

So, Snake Island? I can’t say that’s a favourite topic, but we’ve been writing about that for years, about that island, in the various publications, and one of the – one of our articles was called Putin – Putin names Snake Island, was exact – like, published exactly a year ago, and indeed, it plays a very strategic role for the – if it’s invaded. So, if it’s invaded, then – and especially if it’s annexed to Russia, Russia can start talking about a different division and distribution of territorial waters, because it plays a big part in the territorial waters. Also, it has a substantial loca – like, a substantially important location next to the trading routes and with the loss of, like, the flagship cruiser and some other ships, Russia possibly considered that as a, some kind of a unsinkable cruiser, basically, which – where they could install the equipment, the weapons, and control the area from that location.

But the problem is that the access denial concept assumes that you can destroy everything, which is in your waters, if it’s an enemy presence, and of course, island is completely unprotected, so, the – to be honest, I mean, the destruction of Russian capabilities on the island was just a matter of time, and then, there was the question, why they still, kind of, tried to install it, why they still tried to keep it, because the risks of what actually has happened were almost guaranteed. Because Ukraine, in 2018, published its Navy strategy, where it says that, “While we’re building the fleet, while we’re building the Navy component of the, you know, maritime forces, we would execute the sea denial strategy, and have the weapons, which would be able to destroy the ships, which – like, enemy ships, which are coming to our coastal waters, or any attempts to do a land, like, a salt landing, and including Snake Island.”

So, anyway, if they read that, they would understand that that would be our plan. So, that’s why I think that right now, it’s going to remain like this. I don’t think any substantial troops will be placed there, because Russian – Russians also can attack it, and which they did, actually, tonight, and few days before. So, I think it’s going to stay probably deserted for some time, while we are deciding how to resolve the Black Sea crisis.

Resolution of Black Sea crisis is either possible with the Russian consent, which is not coming for free, because why should they remove that, like, a serious, sort of, serious pressure point from Ukraine for nothing? Obviously, they would be trying to get something, some concessions about the sanctions and so on. I have to warn everyone who is interested in the subject to watch closely their demands on the inspection of the ships, because if they’re going to demand inspecting the ships, that’s certainly going to be abused, as they did this in the Sea of Azov for years. They’ve been inspecting ships for, like, three weeks, four weeks, totally demotivating the shipowners to actually, you know, use those trading routes, and so on. So, anything with the Russian consent is, obviously will have lots of traps, otherwise why would they give it?

The other option would be, do this without the Russian consent, but then there would be needed some access denial and essentially, some kind of a no-fly zone protection over the area from Odessa to the Romanian waters, which would assume that there’s some coalition of the willing coming up, installing some capabilities like, for example, the – some air policing, which would assume rules of engagement, and that obviously something which currently West is not ready for, because of the potential direct confrontation with the Russian capabilities, with Russian forces.

Because of Montreal Convention, you know, without Turkey, it’s – it will be only Turkey, because Turkey has closed the straits, rightfully so, for the – for using its right, according to the Montreal Convention. So, that’s why it only could be done with their policing, and I don’t see this happening any time soon, and that’s why we’re in this, sort of, indefinite situation we are right now in.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Andriy. Nataliya, do you have any words on this, or…?

Nataliya Bugayova

No, that’s fine.

Mathieu Boulègue

Alright. Fantastic, so, thank you very much. Let’s move onto another topic. We’ve had, well, a few questions coming in on the very subject of the use of non-conventional means, and more specifically the fact – Andriy, several times you said that “Russia’s potential for escalation was over,” but one point that it would be interesting to look at is non-conventional escalation, notably discussions around chemical weapon attack, or even worse, tactical nuclear use. Do you see – do you both see the possibility in this, or is it coming a bit too late again? What would be the circumstances Russia might resort to the potential of non-conventional escalation, and more specifically, tactical nuclear weapon?

And then, in a way, is it also – could it be leading to a form of Western self-deterrence, in terms of stopping or slowing down the delivery of weapons systems if Russia was to resort even more to nuclear escalation and non-conventional escalation? And then the counter-argument, there, that, sort of, counter-question from my colleague, Valeria [inaudible – 42:11], “What should the West and NATO do better to try to deter and contain Russia’s actions in Ukraine, whether it is militarily, politically, and more specifically, when it comes to nuclear threshold and nuclear escalation?” So, Nataliya, do you want to take it first, and I’ll turn to Andriy?

Nataliya Bugayova

Yeah, I can start. I actually think there is a two-part question, in the sense that Russia’s own assessment of how and when they’ll culminate may be different from ours. And I’m mentioning that because they’ve obviously underestimated and overestimated their own capabilities and capabilities of Ukraine and the West in the beginning of the war. However, I’m not sure that that analytical supply chain, intelligence supply chain within Russia has been fixed. And from everything we see, they’re still – continue to advance their objectives conventionally, and Putin is also preparing his country for a long war.

Again, whether he’ll succeed or not, that’s a separate question, but from all the reactions and statements, I think they’re still very much in – believe that they can advance through the way they have been now, and that they can outlast primarily the West in the information space, and essentially, help erode Western national erosion of will to resist, before they need to consider any non-conventional means.

Secondly, I do think we cannot rule out at this point them using weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine. They have been setting conditions for nuc – for chemical and biological attacks for quite some time, through various information operations. In my assessment, we are not there yet, for them to do that, because they’re still pursuing a number of staffs. However, I don’t think we cannot fully rule that out.

The question is, final question is, you know, what will it do to the battlefield? It’s, of course, a much larger conversation, but the primary purpose of use of such weapon would be to break Ukraine’s will to fight, which so far has proven to be very resilient.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Nataliya. Andriy, do you want to jump on that one?

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Yeah, so, on chemical, I fully agree and I will not add much more. The question of nuclear obviously is a massive topic, probably a separate conference altogether, you know, because it’s a huge game theory, sort of, analysis case. Whether Russia is going to or not, it’s difficult to say, because sometimes they’re not acting rationally, as we could see, for example, from the beginning of the war. Lots of people thought that, you know, the – essentially, the, you know, they can put, like, the whole analytical, kind of, groups were – there were two key groups. One was saying that, “Yes, they will start and Ukraine will fall within the next few weeks,” and the other one was saying, “No, it’s – they’re not going to start a full invasion, they will do a series of local because they have only 150,000 troops,” and they have chosen a third scenario. They had only 150,000 troops, and they started a full-fledged war, which, on the first phase, like, ended up with a total disaster for them.

So, what they’re going to do with nuclear, it’s tough to say, but absolutely clearly, we should not amend our policies and we should not amend our course of actions because of this threat. Because if we do that, they will definitely be using this rattle with that nuclear stick over and over and over again, clearly understanding that the world is afraid.

I have to say, Ukrainians are not afraid of Russians using whatever weapons, because there is nothing worse for Ukrainians than the Russian occupation, and as it was proven, in a whole number of cases, the way they behave with the people. First of all, there’s not many people left when they occupy some of the territories, because the way they occupy is that they destroy everything, through the multiple rocket launchers – with the multiple rocket launchers, with artillery and so on. So, sometimes when they get to the cities, then, like, 90% of the infrastructure is not there anymore, and – but they’re already doing some poll for the mobilisations in the newly acquired territories, already trying to send people to the war on behalf of Russia.

So, I mean, there’s absolutely, you know, there’s absolutely no plan B for us, except to continue what we do right now. If Russia decides to use the nuclear, obviously, they will put all their cards on the table, getting back to the game theory analyses, and at the same time, the West has not even started participated in that. At the same time – I mean, directly. At the same time, we do know that all countries in the world, perhaps even including China, are definitely against opening that nuclear Pandora box, because nobody wants to wake up in the world where nuclear war’s actually real. So, I believe that the world will be doing whatever necessary to demotivate Putin from those crazy steps, but we’ll see.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thanks a lot, Andriy, it’s very grim, but realistic assessment.

Let’s keep on the side of, sort of, non-conventional asymmetric capabilities, and notably one big question mark that happened during the war was the use of electronic warfare by Russia. It was a, sort of, great absent in the initial phases of the war, and now it seems to be coming back in full force. Can you expand a bit more, both of you, on how you see Russia using electronic or counter-electronic warfare capabilities, and then the resistance side for Ukraine, in terms of their assets in the field, and how they’re keeping up with electronic onslaught from Russia?

Nataliya Bugayova

Andriy, why don’t you start, and then I’ll [inaudible – 48:10].

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Yeah, they use it everywhere they can. They use the equipment in all operational directives. Currently in Donbas, so, basically jamming all signals possible, and there are still some technologies, which they cannot jam. Well-known, obviously, the Starlink, which has been a great symbol of the, you know, of the international support for Ukraine, because indeed they can’t jam that, but also some other signals they also cannot. So, that’s – but they try their maximum, and what Ukraine can do in return is obviously, except, like, first of all, to bring some electronic warfare equipment from the West, which we’ve been discussing with our Western colleagues, like, over and over again, but also to locate and destroy the equipment with the precise weapons.

And that’s exactly what happened in the Black Sea when you heard that oil rigs were destroyed. These weren’t oil rigs anymore, for eight years they weren’t drilling for any oil. Actually, they originally were drilling for gas, not oil, but that’s a bit irrelevant, but for eight years after the annexation of Crimea they were used as the military objects with some radars, with some groups of the Special Operation Forces from Navy Spetsnaz, and also the – and also jamming equipment. They put the equipment with jamming signals and trying to, kind of, prevent Ukraine from seeing anything behind, or around those installations. And from what I know, they tried to bring the same equipment to Zmiinyi Island as well, eventually creating a, some sort of a curtain, which would close the rest of the Black Sea from Ukraine. But, you know, that equipment is as vulnerable to the attacks as any other, so, I believe that’s not going to be lasting too long.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thanks, Andriy. Nataliya, if you want to comment.

Nataliya Bugayova

Yeah, I’ll just say that I think it’s an opportunity to also discuss the longer-term potential vulnerability that Russia has in its defence industrial base. Once again, in the short-term and the midterm they have plenty of stockpiles, as we could see, and they do have niche and advanced capabilities like EW. But there are issues with the overall capability of Russian defence industrial base in the long-term, because Putin, with his invasion, put it on a trajectory of power erosion, for a couple of reasons.

One is, of course, the access to Western electronics, and also electronics from Asia, which is being cut off. And secondly, there is also a question about the talent base, Russian, that’s already been eroded, and leaving for the last many years, due to Putin’s policies and overall strategic culture, but we’ve seen the flood of IT specialists and other technology professionals from Russia in the first month of war, and we look in the long-term. I think it’s a critical factor to consider, and as long as the West keeps – or not empowering Russia with access to its own technology, especially the advanced chips, and now that they’re required for some of the advanced weapons systems, you know, I think it will continue to be on this trajectory of gradual degradation.

Now, it still doesn’t mean they cannot use it successfully to degrade Ukraine’s capability in the short and midterm, but the long-term trend is such, as long as the West sustains this pressure.

Mathieu Boulègue

Yeah, absolutely. Thank you very much, both, once again. Let’s try to expand our geography a bit, and discuss more specifically adjacent countries, notably – are there any evidence of Russian intent to expand the invasion? We were discussing that they wouldn’t have the ability right now to conduct many more open fronts or open wounds, but in the years to come, right, what is the opportunity for the Kremlin or Putin to get bigger pieces of the cake, not just in Ukraine, but also two neighbouring countries? And we’ve been discussing all these things, for instance, concerning Transnistria and with Moldova, but also Belarus, and in a way, leading to a corollary question, what is your general assessment concerning the Belarus factor, in a way, in terms of state capture, as it is, or the ability of Belarus to join the invasion and what it could mean for the future of the country?

Nataliya Bugayova

I can start, or do you want to start, Andriy?

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

No, no, that’s okay. Well, I can, but go ahead, please.

Nataliya Bugayova

Yeah, I think a couple of things about the former Soviet states, you know, Putin has been trying, the Kremlin has been trying to reintegrated militaries, as well as other structures of the former Soviet states for years into Russian-dominated structures. Like, that’s another long-term effort that doesn’t – didn’t just emerge overnight, as efforts to control Ukraine. Russia has been trying to re-establish control over Belarus and dominate influence at least since 2015 and very actively militarily, but also, even before that.

They succeeded in massively expanding their influence over the last two years, of course, using the protests again Lukashenka to, kind of, do the final attempt to control, and however, there are caveats with that. Because given how much Russia invested in this effort, the pay-off actually so far has been limited, because Belarus is the country Russia controls the most, but even that, Bel – Lukashenka still is trying to resist committing Belarusian forces fully into this war.

Now, Belarus did play a critical role by, of course, allowing Russia to essentially use its territory, its equipment, some of its forces participated in this offensive, it’s a party in this war. That said, you know, I think that there is a vulnerability there in the Kremlin’s grip, which is key, and we see also a situation between Russia and Kazakhstan, that Kazakhstan did not support the invasion through a troop commitment, which Putin absolutely hoped for, neither recognised DNR/LNR, and we see the recent economic spats between them.

So, I think it’s actually one of the things that Putin put on the line with this invasion, is not only his control over Ukraine, but his whole project to reintegrate the former Soviet Union, so, and if it gains – if Russia gains Ukraine, this symmetry goes the other way. If Russia doesn’t, that whole project is actually in question.

Finally, I mention that Russia absolutely plans to turn Belarus into its permanent military base, if it’s not denied that opportunity. And number two, it still has intent to regain dominant influence over Moldova. It cannot do so yet militarily because its plan to take Odessa has so far failed, but if again it’s allowed to regroup, take time, whether it’s a year or more, that intent will remain. So, I think Moldova is very much in question and the land bridge between Transnistria and Ukraine is still very much within the plan.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you, Nataliya. Andriy.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Yeah, so, first of all, they understand that – the Russians understand that the world fears, and especially Western leaders fear what’s, what was known as a World War Three, you know, which means that the number of countries, you know, fighting against number of countries. So, to work on those fears, Putin was definitely interesting in bringing more countries on his side, and to show this not just an effort of one government and one nation but, sort of, like, coalition, particularly when he have seen the coalition from the other side assembling to support Ukraine. So, for that, yes, he wanted to – he immediately went to Belarus and to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan said no, and it’s very interesting to watch the rhetoric of Kazakhstan leadership and generally what’s happening there, because it’s a very serious development in that region and shouldn’t be overlooked.

Regarding Belarus, of course, the integration of the armed forces of Belarus with Russians were, like, almost, like, complete, you know, then of course, the integration of security forces, probably even bigger. And of course, they may be even bigger than so-called Belarus President even comprehends, you know, because they go in parallel with his decisions.

But at the same time, they – it seems like, from what we know, is that they don’t want to participate. There was a serious threat of participation almost in the first week of the war, when there was – it was, like, on a brink of participation, but at the same time, when they seen that Russia started to lose in the fi – and their – and that campaign is not bringing any success, they were very careful about this. And essentially, it looks like they changed their mind, or decided not to participate.

Now, we see more pressure from Russia, so now, we are now again very close to the – to that decision. We see their changed rhetoric of Lukashenka, a very dangerous rhetoric, I have to say, ‘specially his previous statements. But what they need to understand is that if, like thousands of killed-in-action soldiers from Russia is not a big deal, Russia was not going even to notice those thousands. For Belarus, it will be a national tragedy, because Belarus society is much more connected and much more informed than Russian society. It’s not that compartmentalised. So, people will see those funerals, people will see those families who lost their husbands or sons, people will see that, and those towns would be mourning, and that – because, remember, Belarus never participated in any war since Soviet times. They never took part in any action.

And if the first time when they take part in action will end up with a disaster, and it will, because again, they don’t have much experience, and Ukraine is extremely resolved to kill any invader, wherever it come – gets from, then for Belarus, it could be that sort of trigger which will destroy Lukashenka’s regime finally, because they may start – he may start losing support, like, completely, in – around the whole country, including his own elites.

Now, his own elites don’t want a war as well, because everybody knows, especially military leadership understand that the war never goes according to the plan, and particularly if you don’t have any battlefield experience. And so, when they start to lose people, somebody would be guilty, and that guilty would be most likely the Generals, which would be responsible for that operation. So, those Generals are not interested, might be not interested in participation, because they will be all fired, and that’s the best case, you know, for them. So, that’s why, like, I – Belarus elites are not interested, Belarus people are not interested, Belarus military are not interested. Lukashenka most likely is not interested as well, but then, the question of his personal dependence on Putin, and that’s the, basically, the question number one. Obviously…

Mathieu Boulègue

Yeah.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Yeah, suggestion would be for them not to participate ever, ‘cause our people never had any issues between each other. We never have been in a war against Belarusians in thousands years of our history. So, our suggestion is that they stay away from that and we remain, you know, we remain peaceful with – obviously, they do participate through providing infrastructure, and that’s a different story, but at least with – not with land forces, not – don’t do that. Thank you.

Mathieu Boulègue

Thank you very much, Andriy, a very strong message, and we are running out of time, unfortunately. So, I wanted to thank you both, Nataliya, Andriy, for your comments, your expertise and your knowledge, and thank you very much for being with us. It’s been a, I think, a very good discussion. I’ve definitely learned a lot. Thanks a lot, as well, to my colleagues, Tom Chappell, and Lauren Cornwall, for making this event possible on our side, and the Events Team. Once again, a happy eighth anniversary to the Ukraine Forum; congratulations, Orysia. Looking forward to staying in touch with you all. Thank you for your engaging questions, and I’m sorry we couldn’t address all of them today. Stay tuned for more events and engaging discussions here at Chatham House. Thank you very much, and have a good day.