Orysia Lutsevych
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. My name is Orysia Lutsevych, and you’re joining today the War on Ukraine discussion, and we are taking a focus on the implications of this war for Europe. We have a great panel today to – they will bring different perspectives from Ukraine, from wider Europe, with specific focus on Eastern Europe and the neighbourhood, but also more of all the Europe and European Union as such. And we are discussing today on the record, we are producing a recording that will be uploaded on our website, so you can share it with your networks, and those who may be interested in this discussion.
This is a one-hour event with a lot of ground to cover, and obviously, we are still talking as the battlefields of Ukraine are very much in active war with the Russian Federation. Ukrainian armed forces are putting a very strong resistance, and in counter-attack in some areas in the East and South of Ukraine. We have seen horrific images of destruction of this war to date, with massive destruction of civilian infrastructure, housing, electricity, railways and enormous flow of people that Europe has not seen since the Second World War. Refugees are fleeing into European Union, but also a lot of them, around six million, are displaced inside Ukraine, across different communities.
And there are seismic shocks in the way European Union is reacting, in the way the global community is reacting, and we see, you know, in a way, the new response that perhaps we have not expected to see, especially from the European Union, in some supply of armaments, changing German policy towards supplying armaments to Ukraine, opening European borders to Ukrainians, triggering this temporary protection directive. We see Finland and Sweden declaring they want to join NATO, and this will be discussed in the upcoming summit, very likely, and of course the dramatic six packages of sanctions, with the final package of sanction in the making today, that will include a gradual embargo on oil.
Today, also in Warsaw, there is a large donor conference that is convening to launch the special Solidarity Trust Fund for Ukraine. So, as you can see, there is a lot to discuss, but what it means in the bigger picture, and we’ll start with Hanna Hopko, who is joining us from Warsaw. He is the ex-Member of Parliament, very experienced in foreign policy. She has led the Committee on Foreign Affairs for five years, after the Euromaidan. Since 2019 she, kind of, came back to the fold of civil society, where she became a prominent leader, and with a group of Ukrainian civil society organisation, they’ve set up a special International Centre for Ukrainian Victory in the first days of war, to really push for the right global and European response to the war.
And then Hanna will be followed by Professor Kataryna Wolczuk, who is our Associate Fellow in Russia and Eurasia Programme, and also a Professor at the University of Birmingham, at the East European Politics, at the Centre for Russian and European and Eurasian Studies. Kataryna knows really well Eastern Europe and also neighbourhood policy and EU-Ukraine relationship like nobody else on this island, I believe.
And then, last but not least is Hans Kundnani, who is the Director of Europe Programme at Chatham House, an expert on the issue of European Union, but also on the German power. He is the author of The Paradox of German Power, that was published in 2014, so we have a great panel today, and I will go straight to Hanna to ask her to give her view on how this is viewed from Ukraine, and how Ukraine is assessing its relations with Europe, its future with Europe and the region. Hanna, over to you.
Dr Hanna Hopko
Thank you, Orysia, and thank you for organising this very important event, and let me start my presentation from the first slide. This is really important, to talk not just about Ukraine’s victory as a strategic imperative for all of us. This is what Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss said, that return of geopolitics – that geopolitics is back, and this is why it’s very important that the West is helping Ukraine with heavy weapons delivery, training Ukrainian troops, sanctions, and I hope it will also include sanctions against Kirill, cutting off oil and gas imports once and for all, humanitarian aid and punishment for Putin regime through international tribunal.
But why I choose this first slide, and to say, is that it’s not just about Ukraine’s victory, it’s about Ukraine’s plan for victory, because geopolitically, it’s very important that Ukraine is winning this war military. It creates opportunity for safer world in the future. Ukraine victory is important for in the Pacific region, because Ukraine defeating Russia, it’s a signal to China. Also, Ukraine’s victory is important not just for us, Ukrainians, the bravest armed forces, heroic nations with resilience and demonstrations of resistance for more than 70 days, and within nine years of ongoing Russian aggression.
So, I choose this slide because this picture made me crying this weekend. I remember this cute girl during parade in Kyiv. I was seeing her in – and, like, a parade, and this small girl, her name is Hannusya, Hanna. My friends also like to call me Hannusya, and, you know, it’s – and behind her, her father, a famous Ukrainian hero. He was killed three days ago, so, now she lost her father, but look at her, how she knows how to – where to go, and behind her, Ukrainian armed forces. So, this is – in this girl, I see Ukraine, Ukraine’s rebirth as a nation with global mission to help the West to be back to values as a foundation of global security infras – architecture, and of course, this girl is a Ukraine, which leads the world.
Someone could say that she’s too young, but in her passion, look at her character. So, this is really important, to start talking about Ukraine’s plan for victory for democracy, victory for global security architecture, victory for not just Ukraine, because Ukraine’s victory means full restoration of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and there are different surveys showing that 93% of the population believes that Ukraine is winning the war, no concession, no compromises, and Ukraine military victory includes returning back Donbas and Crimea to the 1991 times.
And the second slide, if you just, for a moment, if we could see, so, I think it’s also important, because there an upcoming time of remembrance and reconciliation when everyone will say “Never again.” So, I think it’s really important to learn the lessons, why totalitarianism is possible in 21st Century, and why Ukrainian victory is crucially important to guarantee “Never again,” not just as a slogan, but as a reality for the future generations. Because there is historical parallels between fascism and Russism, and you know the situation now, with more than 500,000s Ukraine were forcible deported. More than 190,000 kids also were deported to Russian, and also, you saw the pictures, how they are stealing Ukrainian wheat, agriculture equipment. It’s the same what Stalin did during manmade famine in last century, through Holodomor genocide. So, I think it’s really important now also to mention that when the world hasn’t condemn genocide through Holodomor in last century, so, this is why we are witnessing another genocide through Denazification operation, or full-scale escalation. So, maybe next slide.
So, I think it’s really important that Ukraine, not just a breadbasket of Europe, it’s also a spiritual basket, and it’s really important – please go to next slide – to Ukraine recovery plan, because here in Warsaw, we have brave women from different civil society, and at the beginning of March we established International Centre for Ukrainian Victory. At that time I remember my conversation with State Secretary Blinken, that the West was lacking of strategy, Ukraine defeating Russia, so, now I think – could you move, go on through the presentation to the slide of Ukraine recovery plan?
So, I think it’s really important – next slide, please – it’s really important to start also discussing that this Rammstein meeting, as a historical meeting, when we are fighting for each other and the coalition of 43 countries, but I wish to see 141 who voted for UN resolution, with immediate call, demand to Russia for withdrawal of their troops. So, I think, for the future – so, first, it’s really important to win, military, the war. This is why we need more weapon, we need to protect critical infrastructure, no-fly zone through anti-air defence system is needed, Ukraine, to protect all our nuclear powerplants, citizens, ‘cause 9/11 is happening every day in Ukraine.
I just visited Kyiv a week ago, and Lviv, and I was the same day in Lviv, at five missiles attacked a city where I used to study, so, this is why still I do believe that after Rammstein meeting, the weaponry supply land-lease in the US, and next week the Congress will consider extra military support, this will be happen until victory comes. But we also started to prepare the Ukraine recovery plan, and thanks to Chatham House, they will disseminate this presentation, I will not focus on this, but what is also, I think, really important, to start thinking about ecosystem of recovery, and also using our network of communities, which are now working with IDPs, and starting thinking about not just humanitarian aid, but also creating jobs for IDPs, more than ten millions IDPs in Ukraine, and also providing Ukraine during the war six, seven billions monthly to secure financial payments for armed forces, for all social needs.
And today in Poland, in Warsaw there is a big international conference, so, I hope we will have great results, but I think why it’s important to start thinking about Ukraine recovery plan as a part of a bigger idea, plan for victory for democracy, where contribution from many countries, not just EU and NATO but much wider, will be a part of this making Ukraine stronger, and this is a part of post-victory agenda.
I probably start here, because there are many others, important issues I would like to raise, but I’ve seen already in Q&A box many questions, so, I think it works to have a discussion. So, thanks for having me, and I know that Ukraine’s victory has also geopolitical imperative for, like, for others, to help Ukraine to become EU and NATO members, and I don’t doubt that a recovery plan, and now this is the instrument. So, we belong – and, Orysia, just to finish, that we – or more than 1,000 years of Ukraine history just proves that Ukraine is a part of European family, and when Boris Johnson, before the full-scale escalation, visited St Sophia Cathedral, which was built at the beginning of 11th Century, when Moscow didn’t exist, and just to remind you that 300 years ago, Peter the Great renamed Moscovia, stealing the name of Rus. It’s also a part of how – of their ways, how to grab names to legitimise this, how to say, half empire, so deimperialisation of Russia, and we have to be ready for different scenarios regarding Russians’ future.
Like, Soviet Union’s collapse, and it’s now important to start thinking, what is the post-victory agenda, not just for Ukraine with recovery plan, but also what to do with Russia, and it’s not only the dialogue with Russian opposition leader. We have to extend the invitations to this dialogue to people who are in six republics of Povolzhye, Idel-Ural, Yakutia, Ichkeria and others. So, let’s be smart, and not to allow after victory another, how to say, imperialistic approaches in the aggressor state. Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you, Hanna, so, you’ve covered a lot of ground, from Ukraine being this passionate source of perhaps renewal for Europe. Will it, will Europe catch this sparkle of our re – you know, re – kind of finding its purpose, because we do know for a long time there has been a kind of a stagnation, there was been fatigue from enlargement, there was more soul-searching and coming back in the box, rather than being outward-looking. But also, I think, an importance of the implications of defeating totalitarianism in Europe, and looking to this post to the imperial recovery of both Ukraine and Russia, for the same matter, and we do not see a lot of discourse about the colonial dialogue in Europe. It seemed like in the past, but Ukraine is obviously bringing it back to the agenda of Europe.
So, I’ll now go back to our panel members, and we’ll ask Kataryna Wolczuk to give her sense of how are these changes and this war in Ukraine changing Europe, Eastern Europe, European Union, and where do you see this going forward?
Professor Kataryna Wolczuk
Thank you, Orysia. I will put my Central European hat on for this presentation, and I have to say, across many countries, you know, including Poland, there is this conversation, “Where were you when the war started?” And for me, I was actually scheduled to be back owned from Kyiv, and in Kyiv, I was supposed to discuss geopolitical Europe. And I was thinking, “Gosh, what we are going to talk about?” But there were lots of friends from Central Europe, so I decided to go.
Interestingly, the European Commission, which funded the project, didn’t have a position, whether we could actually have it in Ukraine, until the very last minute. So, it was so interesting, see when EU member states were already deciding what to do, the Commission had actually no position on this. So, geopolitical Europe has been on the agenda and, as Hanna out – pointed out, things are changing so much, but the – for the EU, really this is going a full circle, because the European project started to overcome war, hostilities and pensions from the European – and the European project has been perceived as so successful that actually it could become geopolitical. And now, because of what’s happening, because of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the, sort of, post-post-geopolitical Europe is born, and this is, you know, this also challenging the assumptions that we’ve heard about Europe, which has developed, you know, in our, sort of, bubble, that co-operation and dialogue, whatever differences we may have, they can be resolved by dialogue and negotiations, by agreements and the legal rules.
This has been – this assumption has been shattered, so, with long, sort of, notice that as a foreign policy actor, the EU has punched above its weight, but now it seems that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, sort of, is acting as a Midwife to delivering, sort of, or to this redelivery of geopolitical Europe. But it has a very special significance in Central Europe, and I would like to point out, because what we see are unprecedented changes, and there are just not what’s happening in the last few months or even, you know, four months or so.
It is about histo – reliving, re-suffering historical traumas in Central Europe, especially in Poland and in the Baltic States. If you go to Poland, I was there, Ukrainians are everywhere, in every public space. They’re about, sort of, 10% of Poland’s population now, and Ukraine is in the media. Poland almost, interestingly, turned into a backyard of Ukraine. For the first time in its history, Poland, the fighting is not on the Polish ground, but they know what it is like, and from that point of view, the, sort of, sense of “We know what it is like” is very, very strong. And, you know, as we are speaking now, the Azov steelworks are stormed, you know, there are Ukrainian soldiers and civilians killed, and for people from Lithuania, from Poland, those are the memories of actually Russian invasion, of Russian aggression, and Ru – for example, Lithuanian insurgents, partisans fighting ‘til the 1950s. And those are the memories, which are ingrained, sort of, almost in the Lithuanian and Polish DNA and, you know, Estonia, in terms of surviving Soviet prisons, infiltration camps and deportations. So, this is not just a war next door, this is what we know, what we’ve been through, and this means tectonic shifts in Central Europe.
For example, the illiberal duo, Poland and Hungary, their, sort of, alliance is, seems to be a thing of the past. I just cannot see, with democracy and the rule of law being so securitised in Poland, any sort of anti-EU, that the governing party, which I’m not a great fan of, could actually go back to its anti-European, anti-EU rhetoric, and Hungary being effectively marginalised and isolated.
So, that’s, sort of, an example of, for example, the forum for the four countries, Visegrad Four, being effectively paralysed. But there’s also realisation that the memories in Central Europe and their responses acco – you know, resulting responses are very, very different. And what is interesting about waiting for Germany’s leadership, sort of, waiting – there was a lot of coverage of Germany, what was happening, and a lot of, sort of, frustration and anger.
What is interesting now, that we actually don’t, that Central Europe doesn’t expect too much from Germany, and so, it realised that actually, they need to basically, in terms of rhetoric and actions, show leadership, and Germany is the country which follows rather than, sort of, when everybody does this. So, this is so interesting, in terms of actual realisation, and it’s a, kind of, sort of, Central European Maidan, you know, the place where you see who is who and what can be achieved.
And my final point will be just about the EU, because institutional ramifications of the war are very interesting, in terms of the institutional balance with the Commission being, you know, sort of, underlying and turning into a, sort of, leader, and for example, the European Action Service being quite, sort of, a follower, in terms of the institutional balance inside the EU. But there is no doubt that Ukraine still divides the EU, and what we saw in Marseilles – sorry, in Versailles in February 2022, it was – many perceived it as a missed opportunity to deliver this symbolic act of support, granting Ukraine the membership prospective. I really don’t want to go into technical questions, but, given what we’ve seen, I – it’s very hard to see how the EU is not going to promise the membership prospective to Ukraine.
Having said that, there is a lot of scrambling behind the scenes from Austria; we’ve seen three different statements from three different officials on Ukraine. If you multiply it by 27, that’s a lot of, sort of, discussion to be taken. But finally, what – the point which was already mentioned, the idea that dialogue, negotiations, rules and values will actually solve the problems in Europe, this is what Russia has shattered. Shattered the issue of trust and actually understanding that if you deal with a country, they say what they mean. With Russia we don’t – we know we don’t have this comfort, and that’s a new, sort of, zone of discomfort that we are – that we’ve entered now, but geopolitical Europe may emerge from it, and I’ll stop here. Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you. I think it’s just easier for this geopolitical Europe to emerge on the edge of Eastern Europe, while, as you have said, very clear trauma of living through authoritarian past and having Russian dominance on the ground, and, you know, we may all recall that famous essay by Milan Kundera with the words of Hungarian Editor-in-Chief saying, “We are dying here for Europe,” but Europe did not hear at that time Eastern Europe, and sometimes it’s similar to how Ukrainians feel. “We are the shield of Europe,” said President Zelenskyy in Munich, right, a few days before Russian invasion, and was calling for pre-emptive sanctions on Russian, but that call was not heard of. And obviously, it was not just the Putin miscalculating Ukraine, but also the West, in the way of projecting that Ukraine will fall in a couple of weeks to Russian military power. So, there’s a certain revolution because of the facts on the ground, but, Hans, do you believe Europe will emerge as this geopolitical player, or it’s just a paper tiger, making declarations, trying to follow United States in what it aims to do, and how do you see Europe emerging perhaps better off or worse off out of this war?
Hans Kundnani
Thanks, Orysia. So, I guess, to answer that question immediately, I neither understand what a geopolitical Europe is, nor do I think it’s a good idea, nor do I think it will happen, but let me come back to that, sort of, later on.
I’ll say – I mean, there’s a lot to say and I’d love to respond to some of the other things that have already been said, but maybe I can do that in the discussion afterwards, and I’ll try to be brief so that we do have some time. I think, first of all, you know, as I was thinking about this, sort of, question of how is the war in Ukraine changing Europe, or how is it going to change Europe? You know, I think, you know, for me, I think one has to ask, “What is Europe?” You know, because, I – you know, and this isn’t – I don’t think this is a trivial, kind of, point.
For me actually one of the interesting things about what’s happened in the last couple of months is that it has, I think, opened up some questions around what Europe is, in all kinds of quite interesting ways. That’s partly about the, sort of, boundaries and limits of Europe, right? I mean, I think, to put it very bluntly, I think what a lot of people have, kind of, decided, and during the course of the last two months is that Ukraine belongs to Europe, but Russia doesn’t. And, you know, I’m thinking here in particular, there was a German think tanker who, you know, wrote on Twitter, you know, “The Russians may look like Europeans, but they’re actually not.” And I think this raises all kinds of really problematic questions about how one defines Europe, you know, what is the basis of that definition of Europe?
But I think – and, you know, also I think in the background here is, you know, the contrast between the way we choose to define the boundaries of Europe to the East and the boundaries of Europe to the South. I mean, obviously, I’m thinking here of the, you know, disconnect between the way that the generosity towards refugees from Ukraine, not just in the last couple of months, even before that, contrasted with the way that refugees from Afghanistan or Syria were treated, and I think here the Polish far-right government, which I’ll come back to as well, you know, embodies this, right, this disconnect. Even in 2015 they were saying, you know, essentially no non-White asylum seekers, perfectly happy to take Ukrainians.
So, I think there’s all kinds of questions around what we mean when we say Europe, but also, you know, I think this question of “what is Europe?” is important because, you know, there’s a tendency and it’s, sort of, already happened a little bit in this discussion, is to conflate Europe with the EU. And in this particular situation, that seems particularly unhelpful, because, you know, actually, I think, one of the big questions around European security that has been thrown open by – I mean, even more that it was already open – but, by the war in Ukraine, is, you know, who delivers European security, who secures Europe?
And clearly, you know, it’s not – you know, the EU has a role in that, but it’s not even, you know, the primary security provider for Europe, that’s NATO. And I can’t help but say also that, you know, the UK has obviously played a really important role in the last few months and even before then, it was one of the first countries to be training the Ukrainian military. And so, you know, I think we have to be clear about what we mean when we say Europe here, and it can’t just be the EU and, as I say, I think one of the big questions, you know, in the medium-term will be around what happens, in terms of the division of labour, between different European countries, but also between different organisations, particularly, but not only the EU and NATO, in terms of European security.
That, I think, could be one way in which the war in Ukraine changes Europe, is in relation to who secures Europe, but, and here’s the thing, I think all of these discussions we’ve been having over the last couple of months, whether it’s about the German Seitenbande, or whether it’s more broadly about European security, I think it’s really difficult to say anything very meaningful right now, because everything depends on what happens on the ground in Ukraine.
So, just to give you two scenarios, I mean, if this war ends relatively quickly, that’s, you know, one scenario, and then, I think, the answers to these questions, you know, look a certain way. If, on the other hand, this does escalate into a war, a direct war between NATO and Russia, that’s a completely different scenario, this looks very, very different.
And that brings me to, I guess, the second thing that I wanted to say, which is that I think a lot of people, and again, this has come out a little bit in the discussion already, are quite excited about how this might change Europe. I’m not, I’m quite worried about how this will change Europe, and, you know, I think that starts with, I think, the – it seems to me, there’s a huge lack of clarity about what our – and by our, I mean NATO essentially, our objectives are in Ukraine. In the blurb for this panel discussion, you know, there were three aims that were listed: support Ukraine, avoid escalation and, you know, guarantee long-term peace and stability in Europe.
Seems to me that very few people are willing to admit that there are real tensions and trade-offs between these different objectives, and when I listen to Hanna talking about what I think are very maximalist goals, in terms of Ukrainian territorial integrity and so on, which I completely understand from a Ukrainian perspective, seems to me, it’s quite difficult actually to, you know, have those things alongside these other objectives. In particular, I think, that does take you towards further escalation, which is in particular what I’m worried about. And so, again, you know, I’d want to interrogate a bit more this concept of victory and what that means, and whether this is the right kind of victory, whether we’re defining it in the right kind of way.
And then let me just finish by saying something very briefly about the EU, because, you know, that’s again come up and this, sort of, idea of, sort of, renewal of the EU, and a geopolitical Europe, which you started – you asked me at the beginning, Orysia. I think part of the reason why I worry about the way that this war in Ukraine might redefine how the EU sees itself in a bad way comes back to where I started, which is around the definition of Europe. I do worry a bit that even before the war in Ukraine started, I think Europe is being defined in an increasingly cultural or civilisational way, and I do worry a bit, as I say, you know, have in mind here, the way this war is being framed, sometimes in a slightly civilisational way, that that could exacerbate that kind of, what I call the civilisational turn in the European project.
You know, and again, I think, you know, one has to, sort of, you know – the fact that you have a far-right government in Poland that is leading in this, as has, I think, just been said in the discussion, ought to, I think, give us pause for thought. You know, if this is a redefinition or a renewal or a refounding of the European Union that’s led by a far-right government in Poland, that’s quite troubling to me. And then, and, you know, you said at the beginning, Orysia, you know, that, you know, the EU’s been struggling, you know, lack of purpose and so on. I think that’s alright, but the way I would say, sort of, finding its purpose through this war in Ukraine is actually rather an escape from those internal problems that the EU still has to deal with, around the eurozone and all kinds of other things, rather than a, sort of, productive, kind of, refounding or renewal of the European Union.
And then just finally on geopolitical Europe, I mean, as I say, I think, you know, one of the things that’s been puzzling me, in the last couple of months, is the way that people use this term, ‘geopolitics’, with a complete lack of clarity. It can mean at least four different things, I think, and it’s really not clear whether this is something we should aspire to, whether this is something we should avoid, as for example, the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, said. So, you know, I really struggle to understand what a geopolitical Europe is, but insofar as it means anything, seems to me that it has to be, you know, moving away from the, sort of, technocratic version of the EU embodied by the European Commission, which essentially sees its job as to enforce rules, and to create rules. And if that’s what a geopolitical Europe is, then I think the EU’s structurally incapable of making that shift, and I think, if you want one example of that, look at the way that the EU dealt with Brexit. It didn’t deal with it in a geopolitical way, otherwise it would, for example, have taken into account the fact that the UK is a secondary security provider for Europe, as has been demonstrated in the war in Ukraine.
Orysia Lutsevych
Fascinating. You’ve raised so many issues that I think we have to have a conference on it, not just one-hour discussion. But, you know it’s interesting about, how do we define Europe, and again from a Ukrainian perspective, I hear the possible definition that, you know, Europe is the place where violence is under control, and non-Europe is the place where you’re having this indiscriminate violence that is taking place by the state, vis-à-vis its citizens and, you know, in a way of – nothing is limiting it.
And Ukraine sits, in a way, between these two spaces of indiscriminate violence of Russian tradition and a European renaissance tradition, and Ukraine is trying to move towards a less violent environment and it sees this as a harbour, as a safe harbour. But I’m just saying, this is the way it’s viewed from Eastern European perspective and, you know, my definition of geopolitics, it’s a bit like weather, it’s there, you cannot deny it. I think in some moments of history it becomes stormy and more prominent, and in some issues or in some phases of history, it perhaps goes more to the background, but it depends to a big degree whether players are doing zero-sum game, or win-win strategies.
And there’s a lot to unpack here, and I want to perhaps give Kasia and Hanna also a chance to come back, because I think one issue – perhaps we’ll start with Hanna, and there were a couple of questions on this. What it is, if you can again phrase clearly what Ukrainian victory looks like and why, again, do you think it’s good for Europe, just in a short way. And then maybe, Kasia, if you can comment on this, if you agree or disagree, and I think maybe you can also bring in a bit Russia, because I think a lot of it will depend, and where Europe will end, at what kind of Russia we’ll have, and what kind of Chinese influence will spread over to the Urals and all the way to the Asian part of Russia.
We may see a dramatic shift also over there with that, kind of, weakened Russia, and increased Chinese influence. So, we’ll start with Hanna and then go to Kataryna.
Dr Hanna Hopko
Thank you, Orysia, and Professor Kataryna, and Hans, first. My heart is now with Ukraine, and especially with Mariupol, because the humanitarian situation there is terrifying. So, once-flourishing city is almost destroyed and people there are dying every day, and we have several friends there in Azov plant steel, kids, so, they are – but they are fighting until victory comes, they know that they are scarifying [means sacrificing] their lives, they never surrendered. So, this is how European values and our readiness to defend it, even if at stake, the biggest price; lives, lives of Ukrainian civilians, soldiers, armed forces.
So, this is how to explain what is the contribution of Ukrainian nation to the whole world, not just to Europe, because for all Ukrainian citizens, you know, it’s about values, it’s about dignity, it’s about respect of life, and so, does humanity end at the NATO borders? Does morality end at the EU borders? So, I think it’s really important to remind everyone, when one President said, “Don’t be afraid,” quoting Pope Ivan Pavao Drugi – sorry, so, every inch of NATO should be protected, and I say, every inch of Ukraine should be released from Russian troops, because everywhere where is Russian enemies, they are bringing war crimes, raping kids, and others.
This is why there is no debate in Ukraine of how Ukrainian victory should look like. It’s restoration of full territorial integrity and sovereign, which includes Donbas and Crimea. Of course, now it’s hard to say about tactical steps, diplomatical efforts, but within this 70 days, I’ve seen personally how the West, from predicting Ukraine falls in 72 days, if we trust your CIA or your intelligence service, we would be destroyed a month ago. So, this is why we, every day, Ukrainian soldiers are changing, faster approach and understanding why the victory of Ukraine’s important to Western civilisation. It’s not just war; the Third World War already started. The battlefield is Ukraine, so, let’s be very honest.
I’m very thankful to Poland because really, millions of Ukrainians, which are now here, the hospitality level is so higher, but it’s a marathon, and when compassion will be over, it’s really very important to explain citizens of Poland and in Spain and other nations that they’re helping Ukrainian citizens. I don’t even want to use refugees, because we need speed up the victory of Ukraine, that all Ukrainians will be back home. So, this is, let’s be honest, the actual European Army today is the Ukrainian Army, because our soldiers are defending Europe, they are defending values, which many European societies now, they are not ready to do this, and I am discussing about common victory. I mention in the Pacific region, they won, but let’s be honest, mention Moldova.
Orysia Lutsevych
Hanna, sorry, let’s keep the comments shorter, because I would – yeah.
Dr Hanna Hopko
But also Moldova. For Moldova it’s a great chance to restore their territorial integrity, for Belarus. I just came back from Vilnius, I met many Belarusian leaders of opposition, activist, so, they also dream about Ukraine’s victory, because it’s a chance for them to fight this Lukashenko regime. It’s also about Georgia, where we’ve seen Russian influence, very negative influence on their Euro Atlantic pass.
So, I think for Eastern Partnership countries it’s also very important, and for the whole Europe, and I agree with Hans about this bureaucracy in the EU, and all international organisation, including UN, OECE, the EU and others. They have to use the war in Ukraine for rethinking their mechanism and becoming more effective.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, you know, it’s interesting you mention Moldova, because the EU also is promising military assistance now to Moldova, in a – of course, on a smaller scale to Ukraine, but this was – this is new again, a new tool that Europe is ready to play, you know, to provide that security assistance that it was always accused of, at least in the Eastern Partnership, as not having any capacity to do. But I’ll go to Kataryna and ask again on this, would you agree with what Hanna is saying? And, you know, some from our audience in the chat say, this emphasis on victory, right, again, victory against a nuclear power, let’s be honest, we are dealing still with a very, you know, substantial adversary, is this a constructive approach in this, what they say, miserable situation, obviously? For Ukraine is losing, you know, hugely on its GDP, on its population, on its infrastructure, it’s a mass destruction, as I said. Do you think that is the right approach, or – and again, maybe you can say a little bit about this decoupling between EU, Europe and Russia because of this penetration that happened all of the time, is this good trend, is it possible to achieve this decoupling?
Professor Kataryna Wolczuk
Thank you very much. I’m actually – given that it’s not my son who is dying in, you know, my son is not in Ukraine, he’s not dying, I find it very patronising to tell Ukrainians what sacrifices they need to make. So, from that point of view, in terms of actually what are the goals, what is achievable, I think it is for the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian people to decide. And what I am really worried, that despite the fact that we are two months into this, there is still a lot of, you know, denying agency to Ukraine, then we need to decide what’s going to happen, and even in terms, how do we define the boundaries of Europe?
I mean, this – I don’t really – I’m not too keen on going back, you know, to the 1990s, to what extent Central Europe is Europe. However I dislike the winning part – ruling party in Poland, I cannot deny that that experience, that the rhetoric of the party has been shaped by an historical experience in Central Europe. So, from that point of view, the gravity centre, in terms of actually, definition of Europe, has shifted to the East. And from that point of view, geopolitics, it’s not something you prepare for really, because it’s how you cope when you basically – what you do when you don’t know what to do, and coping with uncertainty is something that, you know, the EU is struggling now to do, and there is no clarity about the project because this is, how many soldiers in Ukraine are prepared to die?
Goals were very different in February, they are different now, they are moving targets because we are learning about Russia. And I would like to emphasise the final point perhaps about Russia is, there was a fork in the road in mid-March, that Russia could de-escalate. The decision was taken to push the full way, and from that point of view, we are learning about Russia as we are going, but ultimately, seeing what’s happening, you know, in Moldova, Eastern Europe is not going to be secure while, sort of, the current regime and Russia is acting. So, we are all actually, we cannot be strategists and hope that we can take, you know, a year off and deliberate on this. We are now Behavioural Psychologists, looking at actions rather than rhetoric from Russia, and seeing what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine.
Orysia Lutsevych
Yeah, so, no grand strategy, but just every day reassessing what is feasible, because that depends, to a large degree, like you say, on Ukraine’s capacity to stand, and also on Russia’s fragility or vulnerability, and the willingness of the EU, United States to exploit it actually, to achieve some of those goals that were stated in different way.
But, Hans, you mentioned in the start that it’s not just about EU, and I want to pick it up from here, because John Peat is actually asking about UK’s involvement. Do you think it’s a good way for a certain UK-EU rapprochement, as the opportunity to forge stronger links on foreign and security policy, and would EU welcome such idea? What’s your take on it, around Ukraine, or around this bigger war?
Hans Kundnani
I think that’s an open question. I think there’s a fundamental problem about doing what John suggests, which is that the tendency, I think, of the EU is to essentially, when you think about what co-operation between the UK and the EU might look like, the instinct of the EU – and, by the way, this brings us back to this question of a geopolitical EU and whether it’s possible, even – the instinct of the EU is to try, at least partially, to reintegrate the UK, or any other country, for that matter, into its own structures, you know, in other words, to partially reverse Brexit, and that’s just not going to fly, I think.
But I think there’s a – on this point, I want to come back to this question of the distinction between Europe and the EU, ‘cause I think it’s really important, especially when Hanna talks about European values, because, you know, what does that mean? Again, European values? I mean, first of all, are these, you know, are these values that we think that Europeans, however they are to be defined, somehow share, or are we talking about values that the EU is somehow meant to embody? Because those are two very different things. In other words, are we talking about EU values, or are we talking about broader European values?
If it’s broader European values, and, Hanna, you went back to the Renaissance, right, you know, the idea that some – or, sorry, that was you, Orysia, I think.
Orysia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Hans Kundnani
The idea that somehow peace is a European value going back to the renaissance is absurd, right? So, now, if we’re talking about the EU, if we’re going to be more precise and talk about the EU and what the EU’s values are and what it stands for, sovereignty, national sovereignty is not one of those values. It’s literally the opposite of what the EU stands for, and, you know, the broader West, you know, has been, sort of, you know, qualifying and restricting state sovereignty in all kinds of ways since the end of the Cold War, right?
But Europe, in particular the EU in this sense, has been anti-sovereigntist, so, the idea that by trying to, you know, stand up for its own territorial integrity, i.e., sovereignty, that Ukraine is somehow defending European values, I just think, this is another illustration of this complete lack of clarity we have about these concepts that we’re using: geopolitics, Europe, European values, and so on. And I have to also – can I also just add something on how this conflict fits in with what’s going on in the rest of the world? Because Hanna has, sort of, suggested, you know, in a way, the whole world, or at least the whole of the free world, I guess, you didn’t use that term, but somehow depends on Ukrainian victory, and it’s much, much more complicated than that.
You know, why do you think that so many people outside of the West aren’t committed to this war in Ukraine, and aren’t siding with the Ukrainians, and with the West? It’s because they look at this conflict in completely different ways, so, for example, you talked about China. Part of the reason that many countries, including India, you know, aren’t supportive of this is precisely because they have a completely different take on those threat perceptions, China and Russia, but also how they relate to each other.
So, you know, they don’t think that Russia has to be defeated because it would set a precedent that China would then follow. On the contrary, they think that we should be focussing more on China and less on Russia. We should have peace with Russia so that we can focus on China. So, there are many different ways to think about how this conflict fits in with, you know, broader issues in international politics, and, you know, so, I think we just need to be really careful about looking at this in too simplistic a way.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, I think you’re right that in the way, for Europe it could – and Ukraine especially, it could be existential, while for the Global South it’s more opportunistic. They see where they, in a way, also could not lose the positions or co-operation they have in Russia, or Russia as a deterrence against China.
Hans Kundnani
No, Orysia, they’re not being anymore opportunistic than Ukraine is.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, I mean, that also comes back to national interests and other, you know, determinants of states’ action and policy and positions, but, you know, I think it’s an interesting – perhaps we should organise event on the Global South and this war, and then how India or South Africa or Brazil, and why they are taking the position the way they are taking, to hear from those experts directly.
But I think we have, like, seven minutes left, and I would like to ask maybe a question from Neil Carmichael, looking a little bit about the future. He says, “What would be the three priorities for a war reconstruction, post-war reconstruction?” Because you, Hanna, mentioned this post-war reconstruction plan, and, Kasia, you understand Ukraine’s trouble with reform, obviously. Do you think this could be a way to renew Ukraine and give a new opportunity where things will burn, you know, in these very dramatic fires of war, and something new can emerge out of this, do you see this as an opportunity? Hanna.
Dr Hanna Hopko
Yeah, thanks a lot, and of course, when we are discussing about a recovery plan for Ukraine’s economy, how to build back better, with rebuilding infrastructure, I think it’s important how the cities, which are totally destroyed, how we bring with the new buildings a spirit of Ukraine? Because I discuss about the ecosystem of rebuilding Ukraine, and it’s also about culture, it’s about values, and now when we dis – we are preparing a twinning partnership programmes, not just with the EU but also with countries from G7 and wider global community.
So, I think post-war Ukrainian economy needs to be restored and enhanced, and there are three key issues: rapid industrial and economic growth, enhancement for investment, and better governance. And I think it’s also important to talk about investment in defence industry, bringing new technologies, and also considering Ukraine as a partner and member in the future EU and NATO communities. So, this recovery plan is an instrument of our Euro – achieving our Euro-Atlantic goal. And let’s be – and when we are discussing about the EU values and the European fundamental values or universal values, I could just remind you that there’s international law and restoration of full territorial integrity and sovereignty. So, it’s about respecting all international treaties and restoring that, how to say, internationally recognised borders of Ukraine.
It’s not about EU – the EU values and others. It’s about the international law, if we all want to live in the planet where international law matters.
Orysia Lutsevych
So, Kataryna, Hanna mentioned these priorities. Do you think European Union membership will enhance chances to achieve on these priorities? Or, you know, some people are saying now in Ukraine with war, there’s actual deregulation and a lot of shortcuts, and they’re questioning whether joining European Union, Ukraine would be ready to put back the scaffolding of regulation that is – European Union is known for.
Professor Kataryna Wolczuk
Thank you. This is a phenomenally big question. For me, the war is transformative, in the same way that it is for Poland, in terms of, actually any weakness can be exploited. So, I – you know, some people say it will be business – returning to business as usual. But what we’ve seen during the war is incredible human capacity, in terms of mobilisation and problem-solving and fighting. And if this is transplanted into the Ukrainian institutions, the people are there, the knowledge is there and I think incredible things can happen very quickly. So, despite having worked – or, rather because of I worked on Ukraine for 30 years, I’m fairly optimistic, in terms of actually this political will being there. But for that, we need the membership perspective.
We know that, you know, this bureaucratic fudge, which we’ve had with the Association Agreement, and, you know, I’ve spent a long time working on this, it’s not the answer. We need this, sort of, political messaging, and then very fast things could happen. So, I’m actually, I’m positive about this, and it’s regardless how long it’s going to take, the political stimulus is going the most – being the most important.
But let me just come back on this issue of geopolitical Europe, and I realise, I will be very briefly. When we talk about China, while we are dealing with what we have in Europe, there is a Polish saying which says, “Let’s look what under our nose, before we look what’s over the horizon.” For the EU to deal with China, you know, Chinese are watching what’s happening in Europe and in the EU. In terms of actually our credibility and capacity to stand on the international arena, this is going to be decided in Europe. And, you know, I’m just thinking, in terms of our capacity for European diplomacy, there were programmes in Russia where Ukraine was on a big map and discussion: what’s the best way to divide Ukraine? To what extent our European diplomacy in member states, in the EU has failed to actually act on the clear messages before, now China is discussing its – how would be a good – you know, what way to divide Russia?
So, this is the things, but this is going to be decided in Europe, and then we can deal with China, from my point of view.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, I guess, we have this war because what Europe called the shared neighbourhood was something that Russia never wanted to share, and here we are, where we are. Russia believes it’s its proper historic land, and it’s not fighting an aggressive war, but actually reunifying what it owns because of its imperial legacy.
But, Hans, just to finish on – because I believe you think Europe has to be – go back in the box and stick to its technocratic process and, in a way, would not – would it be good to give this political perspective of European Union membership, or this would be undermining, perhaps, some of the partnerships with the Balkans, what happens with Turkey, how do you see this going? You’re muted.
Hans Kundnani
I’m rather sceptical of steps towards accession for Ukraine. I mean, there’s the issue that you mentioned, which is where that leaves other candidate countries, but actually I’m less worried about that than more the fact that at least four countries in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, they always joined NATO before they joined the EU. And I think there’s something very dangerous about, you know, taking further steps, as I say, towards bringing Ukraine closer to the EU without a security guarantee.
In fact, this, it seems to me, is part of how we got into trouble in 2014, was, you know, obviously there was the Association Agreement, which was a step towards integrating Ukraine into the EU, but it wasn’t backed by a security guarantee, and so I think, I’m slightly, sort of, worried that we’re – we’d be repeating the same mistake.
You know, I’ve also got concerns about, you know, I think many of us are reassessing the enlargement that happened in the 2000s, after the end of the Cold War, given precisely some of the internal problems that it’s now causing within the EU, Hungary, Poland, and so, I think that’s part of, I think, a justifiable enlargement fatigue. I know, in certain parts of central and Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe, enlargement fatigue looks like a completely unjustifiable, kind of thing, but actually I think there are very, very good reasons to be quite fatigued about enlargement.
Can I just say one final thing, though? Because I do want to come back to this, what I think is a real contradiction at the heart of the, sort of, the position that I’m, sort of, that I think both of you are, in different ways, kind of, presenting, which is that, Hanna, you talked about international law and the importance of international law. If that’s at the centre of this, then I think it, sort of, illustrates this, kind of, contradiction, which is that, on the one hand, you know, international law has been violated in all kinds of places, outside of Ukraine, over the last few decades, and so, we can’t then, sort of, describe Ukraine as being this, kind of, dramatic moment where everything changed, because these things have been happening in other parts of the world, and apparently we didn’t care that much when they happened in other parts of the world.
And I think part to the reason why I, almost emotionally, have a different attitude towards the war in Ukraine is that I went through some of what, I think, a lot of people are going through now over Syria, and there was nothing we could do about it in the end. Whereas I think a lot of people are now looking at Ukraine and thinking, we have to be able to do something to stop this. But why Ukraine, as opposed to other parts of the world where similar things have happened?
And secondly, you know, if international law is at the centre of this, Hanna, then I think this idea of, you know, geopolitics, that – it doesn’t make any sense, because, you know, it’s sort of the – you know, geopolitics is the opposite of international law, right? So, we’re talking, you know, we’re talking here about a contrast between, sort of, something like rules in international politics, and power in international politics. Geopolitics, one version of that, as I say, it’s completely unclear what it means, but one version of that is this to do with power in international politics as opposed to rules. And I don’t think we can say at the same time, “We have to become more geopolitical. At the same time we have to insist on international law.” Those things are virtually opposites.
Orysia Lutsevych
Right, so, we are running out of time, but because Hans, kind of, addressed Hanna quite a lot, Hanna, I’ll give you literally one minute to respond to key issues you think are important, just one minute, please, because we need to wrap up.
Dr Hanna Hopko
So, actually, when we are saying geopolitics is back, it means Ukraine restoring territorial integrity and the internationally recognised borders, because geopolitics is also about respecting the international rule of law, and this is the power of rule of law and respect to international law. So, this is how do we see, otherwise we will have a scene, not “Never again,” but happening new genocides, totalitarian regimes will be attacking democracies in hybrid ways, what has happened in UK with poison in open, and in Berlin, and killing others, meddling into the elections.
So, it’s also about democracies, not defending, but probably attacking or not allowing authoritarians. So, this is, I think, really important, and Ukraine, reverse of – or resurrection of Ukraine through dying people, innocent people, it’s a price we are now, like, paying for the world to wake up and start thinking how to make UN – because when I mentioned genocide, the League of Nation, at that time, during the genocide, Holodomor, they were kept silent, like UN, when State Secretary Guterres visited Kyiv, and the Journalist of Radio Liberty was killed during the missile attack the same day. So, I think it’s a time to rethink the international order, geopolitics, with the respect to international rules.
Orysia Lutsevych
Well, you see, ladies and gentlemen, how much is there to discuss, and we’ve really just scratched the ground and, you know, perhaps the tension of this conversation is also that perhaps this kind of revanchist Russia wants to put geopolitics so much prominently in our face, whereas everybody else in Europe and in Ukraine would like to play by the rules of the international law, but it’s pushed into this magnetic field too and will have to react.
I see, Hans, you haking – you’re shaking your head, but I’m sorry, I will have to close this discussion. Let’s do it again, let’s have another conversation about how our continent is shaping, as Ukraine is fighting Russian aggression, as Europe is trying to help Ukraine win, as you know, what kind of future there will be for Ukraine, for Russia, for the same matter, and for the European Union.
So, I would like to thank Hanna, Kataryna, Hans for sharing their views, all of you joining us in this conversation. Stay in touch with Chatham House, follow our research, join President Zelenskyy’s address tomorrow at 1 o’clock. He will be speaking on our platform, and we will be able to pick up from here. So, thank you, have a good day, and stay in touch. Bye, bye.
Dr Hanna Hopko
Thank you to the moderator.
Hans Kundnani
Thank you.
Professor Kataryna Wolczuk
Thank you.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you.
