Understanding the role of Iran in regional escalation

Dr Sanam Vakil

Good morning and good afternoon, depending on where you are. Welcome to a Chatham House webinar, where I am very pleased to be joined by three experts, to make sense and try to understand and unpack Iran’s role in the region, regional escalation, particularly since the Gaza War began on 7 October. My name is Sanam Vakil. I’m the Director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, and it’s a pleasure to be with you today.

We have a lot to talk about, so I’m just going to dive straight in, and welcome my guests that are joining me from around the world. I have a good friend and colleague, Dr Alex Vatanka, who is the Director of the Iran Program at Middle – at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Alex is an expert on Iran’s foreign policy, having published widely, with a number of important books, and one very key forthcoming book, “Iran’s Arab Strategy: Defending the Homeland or Exporting Khomeinism?” So, thank you, Alex, for being here.

Alongside Alex, I’m really pleased to welcome Dr Farzam Divsallar who is a Adjunct Professor at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, in Milan, and a Non-Resident Fellow also at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Farzam is also an expert in Iran’s regional foreign policy, broader relations. He has also got a new book coming out this summer, “Struggle for Alliance: Russia and Iran in the Era of the War in Ukraine.” So, Farzam, thank you for being here with us, as well.

And last, but certainly not least, I’m joined by my Chatham House colleague, who isn’t located in London, but a great expert, Tara Sepheri Far, who is an Associate Fellow here with our Programme, the Middle East and North Africa Programme, and she’s also a Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch. So, welcome to you, Tara, and thank you for being here, as well.

Just to give a little scoping of where we’ve been, across the region, of course, there has been a growing anticipation that the War in Gaza is regionalising, with many Analysts and some policymakers suggesting that we are in the midst of a regional war. There has been escalation, of course, on the Lebanese-Israeli border, with a, sort of, uptick of attacks in that space. Iran and Hassan Nasrallah has – have consistently messaged that they weren’t involved in 7 October planning, and that they don’t intend to directly engage in the war, but, of course, over the past number of months, we have seen escalation spread.

There are now very clear strikes that have taken place against IRGC Commanders in Syria. Sayyed Razi Mousavi was taken out around Christmas. Over the past few days, five IRGC members, including General Omidvar, was taken out. And Iran has responded, also, to a terror attack in Kerman on January 3, on the anniversary of Qasem Soleimani’s death. But – to terror attacks that killed over 80 Iranians, and the Iranians responded with missile strikes directly targeting Idlib, Erbil, and also Pakistan, targeting supposed ISIS stronghold areas, but also, in Erbil, Israeli intelligence operations.

There have also been strikes in Iraq, a uptick of back and forth between the US and groups – Hashd al-Shaabi groups in Iraq. And of course, last, but certainly not least, the Houthis are in direct back and forth with the US, having shut down shipping through the Bab al-Mandab, and the Houthis have most recently also been sanctioned and designated by the United States.

This is, sort of, the regional landscape, and at the same time, Iran is about to, sort of, commemorate the 45^th year of the Iranian Revolution, while its economy remains very fragile, sanctions continue to be weighing down the economy. There’s, sort of, at the same time, an uptick of progress in its nuclear file, and Iran will also be holding parliamentary and Assembly of Expert elections in this year of elections that we’re witnessing across the globe.

So, there’s a lot on the table and a lot to talk about, and I’ve only, believe it or not, addressed some of the issues. Let me start with you, Alex, bring you into the conversation first. I’m very curious how you’re seeing Iran respond and react to the events across the region. I’m struck by many conversations I’ve had where the perception is that Iran is capitalising on the, sort of, chaos across the region since 7 October, that Iran is being – or, sort of, benefiting from the regional chaos. And in some cases, in some circles, some people might think Iran is winning from what we’re seeing take place across the region. How do you see it?

Alex Vatanka

Thank you, Sanam, thank you for inviting me. Thanks to Chatham House. It just hit me, I was an Intern about 25 years ago at Chatham House, so life really moves on, and great to be with this wonderful panel. I look forward to the conversation. Sanam, to answer your question, is Iran benefiting? Well, look, you could say certainly the Iranian national interest, it would be hard to argue is benefitting. You could make the argument that the Islamic Republic leadership around Ayatollah Ali Khamenei might be benefiting because they are running such an ideological regional agenda. And I think it’s important to make that distinction. You know, you’ve got national interest, where your average Iranians benefit from the conduct of a foreign policy of a country, versus, you know, an ideological foreign policy, which I think what Islamic Republic really has been about, in terms of its regional interactions.

But Sanam, if I have a few minutes, let me just give you a big, as you did, macro-level, sort of, view of where we are. As an Iran watcher, I’ve spent as much time looking what Iran is doing in the region, in terms of – but also, in terms of what the domestic situation looks like, as you, also spoke to. At one point around mid-January, as I was writing my notes down, on mid-January, it was very interesting to see that Iran was essentially in confrontation with four out of the nine nuclear powers on the world stage. You know, Iran was confronting Israel, United States and UK in the Red Sea, and has decided to fire off ballistic missiles at Pakistan on the January 16.

And you could only argue that one of these areas of tension directly linked to defending the homeland, when Iran decided to fire off the missiles into those alleged two bases inside of Pakistan. Because again, as you said, for the Kerman attack, and an earlier attack in Jask in December, where militants had apparently come in from inside of Pakistan, carried out attacks, and Iran felt that it needed to retaliate. That was the only case where you could say Iran was acting in defence of the homeland.

All the other areas of conflict in the region are by choice, essentially. Iran’s fight with Israel, Iran’s desire to push the United States out of the region, these are by choice, these are ideologically driven. One can really not make an argument how the enmity with the US going back to 79, or this position on that Israel has to cease to exist, how that serves Iranian national interest. You can only really make that argument if you’re looking at it purely from that revolutionary, militant ideology that has been adopted, embraced by the Islamic Republic since 1979.

What I just said to you is hardly a secret. This has been debated in Iranian media platforms daily. Anybody who speaks Persian can sit and listen in. It’s a hot debate, people know the consequences of Iranian foreign policy actions, but it really doesn’t matter. The debate is deliberately allowed to exist so people can vent, but those people in power, most notably, Ali Khamenei, he decides, and he’s been – he’s set the agenda since 1989, when he became Supreme Leader. He is set in his ways, he feels this is the way Iran should be behaving in terms of its regional agenda, and he empowers the Revolutionary Guards. These are the people that we all know about, that run Iran’s regional agenda, principally through the Quds Force, the external branch of the Revolutionary Guards.

So, a combination of missiles, armed drones, increasingly, fast boats in the Persian Gulf, and, you know, the proxy network, so-called Axis of Resistance, they have given the regime the sense that it actually projects power, that it has the ability to project power. And this is something you talked about earlier, Sanam, in your introduction, when you said, “The region thinks that Iran is winning.” Well, I think if you look at Iranian Commentators inside of Iran, that’s not their take. They think this strength is actually pretty thin. It’s not deep, it’s very flimsy in many ways. And the fact that, you know, in the next few days, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, will be travelling to Islamabad, to essentially apologise for the attack on Pakistan on the January 16, they know sometimes they bite more than they can chew.

So, I think the regime is in a very precarious moment right now. They feel that, you know, the proxies in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon – and I don’t necessarily agree with the argument that the Houthi movement in Yemen is an Iranian proxy, I think that’s an exaggeration. But even if they were a proxy, the question for Iranian leaders is, can they control their proxies, and b), to what end? What are these – how are these actions actually benefiting Iranian national interest?

And, yeah, I think the debate in Iran speaks for itself. People don’t think majority of the public opinion, and essentially, also, a good part of the regime does not think this is the right course of action. But the men who decide, the Revolutionary Guards, the Office of the Supreme Leader, they know nothing else. They are not Diplomats, they don’t believe in the language of diplomacy. Beli – they believe in the language of force, and, frankly, force has worked for them at home.

If you look at the, sort of, playbook of Ali Khamenei since 1989, he is not where he is today, 34 years later, because he compromised. He is there because he crushed every single opponent of his, and we just saw this week, he’s – they just disqualified Hassan Rouhani from running for the Assembly of Expert elections. It’s quite amazing what the man has done in terms of, you know, basically, suppressing anything that comes his way. And I think that approach seems to be what he believes he can pull off in the region.

But let me say this, Sanam, and I’ll stop. In the region, it’s not the same as domestic approach. There are too many moving parts. Like we saw on the January 16, with the Pakistani reaction, Iran cannot bank on a nuclear armed country like Pakistan just sitting there taking it. Pakistan is not Iraq with its weak Central Government, or Syria, with a weak Central Government. So, the Iranians have real limitations, in terms of how they can use the proxy model, and essentially, being spoilers, how much that can take them down the path of regional domination, which some believe is Iran’s ultimate goal.

So, I think there are real natural limitations, both in terms of massive domestic opposition in Iran to what Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards are doing in the region. I mean, this is a regime that claims that it’s in the region to fight Iran’s enemies so they don’t have to fight those enemies like ISIS on the Iranian soil. But as we saw with the Kerman attack, Iran’s borders are open, so the regime is not actually delivering. And the one single thing it’s says it’s able to do is secure physical security for Iranian citizens, they’re failing on that, because I think fundamentally, the regime has been, for some time, and I would argue going back, actually, to 1979, pursuing the wrong priorities. The homeland has been forgotten and the preference has been to be out there and project power and God knows for what end.

Will love to talk more about it, and hear my colleagues’ remarks, but let me stop there, Sanam.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Alex. You brought up a real portfolio of really good points. I like how you describe Iran as ‘flimsy’. I think, actually, that’s a really good word. And I think it’s very important that you brought up a lot of the limitations, as well as situate Iran as seeing itself in a defensive posture, but still, you know, marching ahead in a quite determined way, to eject the US out of the region. But it certainly has neglected the homeland, and we’ll look at some of those weaknesses at home, the border areas are important, and, of course, the domestic dynamics are important.

I do want you to maybe consider how – if Iran is in a position of weakness, or if it’s, sort of, tactical and not really developing real wins, or real successes, you know, what are the, sort of, policy options for the international community? And particularly, you’re sitting in Washington, you know, how do you address Iran’s role around the region? But I’m going to come back to you, but I’m going to leave you with that to maybe think about, and turn to Farzam.

Farzam, you’ve been working on and watching and exploring how Iran, sort of, operates its foreign defence strategy, and one of those – I mean, the principal arm of that foreign defence is executed through the Axis of Resistance. And since 7 October, I would argue, but perhaps you have a different view, that this is the first time the Axis is operational in this, sort of, transnational grouping. Certainly, behind the scenes, they’ve been building capacity and sharing technology and working together, but we’re really seeing what they can, and maybe what they can’t, do.

How are you seeing the Axis of Resistance? What is Iran’s role in managing? Is it command and control? You know, my colleague, very smartly, the other day, Farea Al-Muslimi, said that Iran was “the WhatsApp Administrator of the group.” You know, is that a good analogy, however much we might like it, it’s lovely, or is there more to it? What is Iran providing the Axis of Resistance, and are certain groups more important? Who’s more expendable? Tell me what you know. Share with us your insight. Thank you.

Dr Abdolrasool Divsallar

Thank you, Sanam. I’m glad to be here and thank you for the invitation. Well, let me start by what Alex left and where he left. I mean, just to break down Iran’s military thinking, I think what we are seeing is a, sort of, demonstration of Iran’s military strategy. I believe there are at least three layers of this demonstration, which the first layer, as I understand, is, sort of, you know, trying to show that Axis of Resistance, as you brilliantly said, as its first, sort of, full spectrum usage, has a, sort of, a synergy, and can create a co-ordinated front against United States or other regional actors.

I mean, let me explain this a bit more. I mean, this concept, basically, is a, sort of – I mean, what Iranians try to do is, sort of, trying to counter the idea or the strategy of zone defence, which United States bank on. And that goes back, I think – the Iranian thinking, or learning of this, goes back to the Iraq War, where when they saw that Saddam’s army was completely dismantled, because of its concentration on one battlefield, or one area of force. So, what Iranians, I think, learned was that the United States is capable to create a synergy among different domains of its operation, and, you know, when the – some areas like the sea for – capability over the Air Force, or other domains, remain unengaged.

So, basically, the lesson was that the isolated fronts and isolated domains will be defeated much easier and faster by United States, because of the capability of the US Military to create this synergy. So, what Iranians would – were doing, at least for the last two decade, on the – their military thinking level, was to create and linkage all these possible domains of engagement with United States. That, you see it in the – for example, their activities in the Persian Gulf. You know, they create a, sort of – they try to create a, sort of, a complex threat environment, which basically, involves US on the sea, below the sea, on the surface of the amphibious forces, like – and the air defence forces. So, basically, a combination of the domains, to not let the United States remain, linking all its Axis powers in – and create concentration in one domain.

So, this was done for a long time at the internal, sort of, military strategy. What we are seeing, I think, right now, is a demonstration of this capability at the regional front. That means that what Iranians are doing are creating a, sort of, linkage between different geographies, linkage between different domains of battlefield, and you see that, for example, in the Yemeni case, that you have a very complex environment. You have anti-ship capability, while, you know, there are complex passive defence, the disperse of the targets across Yemen. And then you have this connection from the Mediterranean to the land areas in Syria and Iraq, and to the very scattered areas across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and even Indian Ocean.

So, basically, the idea is that, you know, this way, probably Iran can, through mobilisation of its, you know, Axis of Resistance, can increase the cost. The idea here is not about winning the war or losing the war. The thing, I think, is about increasing the cost of not just operation, increase the complexity of the operation of United States, but also, making it more difficult to create alliances. You see that right now, you know, in the US challenge to create that alliance to secure the Red Sea. So, basically, the complex, the force projection of the US. And this is what I think, at least, what Tehran is thinking, or banking on that, is that this way it can shows that the post-Soleimani era has been successfully transitioned to the next Commander. So, this is one lesson that they want to let the Americans read among this chaos that they’re creating.

And the second is probably linking to the fact that, you know, you can, and are able, to mobilise across the region, or some concept of mass mobilisation that they were seeing. This was recently said a lot by Iranian Commanders, the Commander of the Navy, and across the forces, they were talking about this regional mobilisation. So, this was an very, sort of – you know, how operationally they are trying to, you know, thinking or trying to adapt with the situation.

But I think that in another layer, we see this process of internationalisation of the conflict. So, again, in continuation of the previous idea, the thing is that, which is basically, I think they learn it from the Russian operation in Ukraine, that it’s important that you try to show to international community that one local conflict will not remain at the loc – its implications, or its effect, will not remain local. So, it will have the capacity, they will have the capacity, to impose the cost beyond that territory that the local conflict is going on. So, this sort of internationalisation, which Russia did by grain deal, by shelling the nuclear power plants in Ukraine, Tehran is trying to orchestrate that through what we see in the Red Sea.

And lastly, and then I wrap up my point, is that I think, also, another part of Iran’s military thinking was playing with the concept of time. The time was important to their thinking in a sense that, trying to prevent either US or Israel from having ability to have a decisive victory in a short period of time. And that’s, basically, where it links all these elements together, in a sense that through this mass mobilisation, increasing the cost on internationalisation, you make it very difficult to de-escalate the conflict, to limit it in a time zone that the striker or the attacker or the first offender want to have it.

So, based on what I said, at least, I think what the Strategist and that – in Tehran are thinking, that – I do not say that that’s correct, but I try to somehow break down their way of thinking of the situation, is that they seems to be more confident that their model of security assistance and their model of regional proxies is working. And that’s, basically, what is one of the first, sort of, you know, conclusions that I think Tehran is taking. I will maybe later explain that, how that may links to the other areas of Iran’s military strategy and thinking, but I will stop here and would like to hear the rest of the comments.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Farzam. I think you provided a really good, sort of, overview of the principles. And I think it’s important to understand those principles, because repeatedly, since 7 October, there’s been I think a bit of a misunderstanding, or a, sort of, reductive understanding, of what Iran’s objectives are. And I think I’d like to come back to you on a few points, so let me just flag them from now, and, of course, questions are coming in, and we’re going to pick up on them, but, like, how do you see the Axis operating? Are certain groups more expendable? Who is more important than others? Is it that the Houthis – and Alex, sort of, intimated, and maybe you could both, kind of, pick up on this, that the Houthis are their own actor, but do they have more agency and more autonomy, and perhaps are in a bit of a stronger position, and hence, they can, sort of, increase pressure while perhaps Hezbollah can’t?

I’m curious to see how you see the operations side of it. Also, because there are more joint command operations in Lebanon, and also in Yemen, perhaps, and in Iraq, and so, there are players that are clearly unseen, but are very important. And clearly, the Israelis know that they’re there because they’re trying to strike at some of the tentacles of what they describe as the ‘octopus’, with Iran being the octopus head. Additionally, of course, we have to talk about the nuclear programme, but we’ll park that for a moment.

And let me turn to Tara. Thank you so much for being here, and want to bring you in on the conversation, because unfortunately, so much focus over the past few months – I mean, the Gaza War deserves our focus and attention, but so do domestic dynamics in Iran, really, because there’s been an uptick of repressive activity that I think also deserves attention and mention. We’ve seen a increase in executions more recently, at an alarming rate, and not getting, I think, the attention that is needed. Of course, we are hearing more and more, you know, beyond that, that the economic crisis continues. Iran is really in survival mode, and ordinary people are really struggling to survive. And at the same time here, we’re marching into yet another round of elections, where, you know, the audacity of the system is really on display, where they’re barring a former President from running for the Assembly of Experts.

So, how do you see things? Is this – you know, aft – maybe, you know, after the protests from 2022 to 2023, you know, the regime, you know, perhaps got itself to a place where it felt in control again, are things a bit more destabilised inside, or tell us what you see?

Tara Sepheri Far

Sure. Thank you, Sanam. It’s great to be among colleagues. Just as a point of comparison of where we were last year, with regards to the attention to the domestic situation, versus where we are now with the focus on regional issues. Today, 61 pol – women political prisoners are starting a hunger strike in protest to the last execution that took place a few days ago. And my thinking is that unless you’re paying extreme attention to these issues, you’re not going to see the headlines anywhere. So, that the shift has really happened in terms of focus on domestic issues versus the zoom out lens, to the – on the situation in the region.

But I think it’s important to understand that the escalation on the regional front is happening in a domestic context. In the domestic context, Iran is in the post-crackdown phase, still in the post-crackdown phase, of the movement that started last year. It is known as the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, and it posed a serious challenge to the authority of the Islamic Republic. And I think it’s worth explaining with a sentence or two what I mean by challenge, because usually the challenge is understood from outside observers as, like, is it going to topple the regime, or not, in a month or two? Or is there a unified opposition can take over or fill in, or not? Those are usually the point of interaction with movement activities in Iran.

But I think the significance of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement should really be understood as how it redefined the confrontation between public and state, kind of, realigned forces, around many issues. People who join the protests have a range of grievances. But really, the flagship idea of Women’s autonomy and their right to choose their clothing, which was, kind of, closing the circle on the centrality of the role of women and women’s rights in any kind of transition, was a development that the Islamic Republic will have to struggle with for years to come. And I think it’s important to understand that this redefinition of public versus the state is not the only realignment that has happened, and the transition that is happening.

As I understand it, it’s really that the change is what is being resonated, not just at the national level, but also way beyond just the cities and through families. So, really trying to repel the protest, the street protest phase of it, and really the activism, is just a surface of the transition that has been underway for many years in Iran, and just had this very visible manifestation, and is continuing to evolve. And it will make – it has made a lasting impact, and it will continue to do so.

But back to the current situation. The crackdown continues with a very special focus on punishing any form of activism that has ability to mobilise. So, as Alex was explaining, venting is okay, venting is encouraged, venting is sometimes even provide – like, the space is provided for venting. But any activity that has the potential to bring together a group as small as ten women’s rights defenders in north of Iran to commemorate the anniversary of the protests where families were outspoken, that is not tolerated. And it has always been the case, but, like, it’s the heightened case of trying to prevent any sort of mobilisation.

In terms of the elections that you mentioned, we used to understand the elections in Iran as not free or fair but contested, and that has been changing for a while. There’s been consistent effort over the past two decades to disempower electoral politics in Iran and co-opt it in many ways. But really, I think – and actually, forces who have – political forces who have encouraged participation through elections have been having a much more difficult time convincing the public that anything good can come out of this participation, really from the 2018/2019 protests, amid the duration of economic condition. But really, the election arising marked a very clear indication of no interest in the contested part – the system that is getting – like, is at all-time high confrontation with the West in the region, getting ready for transition, is just not interested in introducing an element of risk, even though the margin for policy change has narr – been narrowed down.

But more surprising than I think disqualifying the former President, and I think that those who follow Iran know that if you want to have a political future, presidency is not a good job to apply for, ‘cause almost everyone falls out of favour afterwards, is the disqualification of Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Who started, sort of, his career on the panel that handed down death sentences for political prisoners in the 80s, ended up as – in various ministerial positions, most recently in the Justice Ministry, and that doesn’t even get him to sit on the panel – on the Assembly of Experts. That may play a marginal role in transition, post-Ayatollah Khamenei, in some sort of future that may not be too distant.

So, in that sense, I think the system has been very, very clear that they want to be in control, and are not introducing – they’re not interest – those who are controlling power are not interested in sharing it with anyone. And it appears to me that over the past six months or so, those who have had any marginal role in trying to calm down and devise the vision of repression that is very much about reducing confrontation while building a system that is comprehensive, through economic coercion, for instance, we can talk about the bill on compu – the bill on enforcing hijab laws, that have been, kind of, the hallmark of the post-movement era, in terms of legislative efforts, are not always the one in the lea – ones in the lead. Because the way the executions are being conducted, they are not just to reduce confrontation, they’re actually there to send a message.

The last execution that happened this week, execution of a protester who was diagnosed by a mental health condition, and his case had gone all the way to the Supreme Court, was done in a way that resembled very much the rush of execution last year by passing all the domestic safeguards, the minimal domestic safeguards that exist to slow this down. To basically show the audacity – like, the level of, like, “We will do what we want, and there’s nothing you can do about it.” So, there’s this intentional message that’s also being sent to discourage and disempower those who have been resisting. But it’s not to say that they feel fully in control, ‘cause if they did, they didn’t have to go to this length. And with every round of these measures, the redefinement and the realignment, kind of, gathers together and reshape the conversation.

The difference is that the attention that was being paid to the movement and the domestic struggle internationally, is completely gone. So, there is a whole rethinking within the opposition forces, particularly those who believe that if the world hears us, somehow things would be different, is really a reckoning, again, among the political forces of, like – in this situation, and in a world that can shift its attention with an instant headline in a different part of the world. And with all the tools of repression that exist, both domestically and regionally and internationally, where can we possibly go? And I think that’s, kind of – that, kind of, describes the mood.

But it has – just ending on a positive note, it hasn’t deterred many of the individuals who are willing to still risk and pay a very high price not to go back to before September 2022.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Tara. You really very quickly gave us, I think, a really effective dive into the landscape across Iran. And I would like to come back to you and ask for you to think about where and how there are entry points to make life better, or to empower individuals inside the country, particularly, as I hear frustration or a sense of abandonment, or – so many different sentiments across Iran. And, of course, it’s important to remember that Iran is a massive country, it’s 85 million people, diverse and quite spread out, and by no means, can we speak for all of these people and give voice to all of these sensitivities. But I’m just curious, as you’ve worked in this field, where you think policymakers can make a difference, can they make a difference? But we’ll come back to you on that.

I’m going to just open the Q&A, ‘cause so many different questions have come in. And Alex, if I may, I’m going to start with you and throw out a few for you to pick up, specifically, because I know you’ve worked and written a book on Iran and Pakistan. Fabio Marazzi is asking about the role of “India and Iran,” and “What about that relationship is important to know? And how is that influencing Iran and the region?”

Nick Smith also, sort of, questions your point, “Is it really accurate to highlight the Kerman terror attacks as an example indicating that Iran has failed in ensuring domestic security? It’s certainly been more successful than other neighbouring countries, like Iraq and Syria, in ensuring the defence against ISIS and other similar groups. Western nations, such as France, Belgium and the UK have suffered terror attacks. Can they be considered as having failed ensuring their domestic security?”

And within that context, let me just throw one more in that I saw catch my eye about the US and the Iraqi Government, talking about the “US withdrawal – military withdrawal from Iraq. Is that going to be an issue for Iran?” Because the last time those discussions took place, and the US did begin to draw down, oh, way back when, Iran had to deal with its own security crisis known as Da’ish, or ISIS. So, how can you, sort of, weave all of these things together? Conscious that the India one might be a little bit different.

Alex Vatanka

Well, thank you. Great questions there, and thanks for those. Look, I mean, let me take that India one. It takes me back to a basic reality that has been true for so long for the Islamic Republic. When Iran offers its relations to neighbouring states based on, “You have, me, Iran, or you have the West,” in this case, the United States, we’ve seen neighbouring states, almost all of them, pick the United States, for obvious reasons. The same is true for India. So, India does see much strategic appeal in being closer to Iran. I mean, you know, Iran could be the conduit for Central Asian trade, not just to Afghanistan, lesser today now that Taliban is back, but, for a long time, the Indians looked at Iran as the conduit to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

There is the energy trade. India has been traditionally a importer of Iranian oil. Iran, as you pointed out, is a pretty big market, 85 million people. So, India has invested intellectually in seeing itself move closer to Iran, but then, yet, the issue of Iran’s relations with the United States has always prevented India really getting that close. Instead, what we’ve seen, for example, India, most recently, you know, getting signed up on this India-Arabia-Europe transport corridor. The sort of thing we didn’t talk about ten/15 years ago, because we were talking about the Chabahar port in Iran being the conduit for Iranian trade to the north, to Central Asia and Russia. That never happened. Sanctions had something to do with it, but lack of Iranian economic vision really is the bigger issue.

Again, folks forget, Islamic Republic of Iran leadership have never, never, never prioritised economic development. They have never thought in those terms, they proudly will say so. When they talk about economic development, it’s doing the bare minimum to keep people the bread they need, so they don’t come out in the streets. They don’t have the sort of vision you see Arab countries on the other side of the Persian Gulf articulate. They don’t have Vision 2030 or 50, or whatever it is, that other countries in the neighbourhood are coming up with.

And that is a reflection of their foreign policy, Iranian foreign policy has, basically, really killed off Iran’s economic potential. It’s been true for many years, and not just India, countries across the board see that, and that’s why they don’t invest in Iran. I mean, let’s take India’s biggest rival, Pakistan, a country of about 240 million people, it trades with Iran for about a couple of billion dollars a year, right? It’s amazingly small. It just shows you that this is not just an India related problem when it comes to where relations could be and why they fall short. It’s something Iran suffers from across the board because of its foreign policy.

In terms of the other issues of Kerman attack, look, you know, one can make comparisons. I think the comparison to post-2003 Iraq, or point – post-2011 Syria, after Arab Spring, these are not necessarily where Iran likes to be compared to. I mean, Iran likes to be compared to, you know, if you will, a normal country, and normal countries usually don’t have the amount of violence that Iran experience within its borders. And my argument is, a lot of this is invited by the policies of the regime. So, when you are out in the region creating enemies, don’t expect that they’re not going to come back at home looking for you, and that’s increasingly happening, right?

I mean, ISIS Khorasan had picked the day of Qasem Soleimani’s death – Qasem Soleimani, you know, was the man who was proud to have said he destroyed ISIS. ISIS is just one example of enemies, but there are many other enemies that Iran has created. With ISIS, I don’t think Iran should sit down and talk, because it’s such a terrible organisation. But Iran does have diplomatic option vis-à-vis other neighbouring countries, where you can seek diplomatic solution to some of your differences, and unfortunately, we don’t see much of that happening.

Sanam, let me just point out something else. I mean, I don’t have figures here, but I bet you if you looked at the data, Iran has spent more in Lebanon on Hezbollah, and in Syria, elsewhere, in the last couple of decades that it has invested in Balochistan, in the Iranian province of Balochistan, the most impoverished, or in Kurdistan. There were some real impoverished pockets in Iran that are being neglected because of all these shortcomings that I’m mentioning, and that’s the real threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic. That’s where the threat’s going to come from, it’s from those poor masses that are getting less and less. Inflation up 50%, essentially people are not able to meet basic needs of their daily lives, that’s the threat, and I think the regime is sleepwalking into a disaster on that front.

One can sit and make comparisons to where the Shah of Iran was, in the year 75/76, consolidating power, and we know what happened by 79. We’re seeing something similar here, and Khamenei’s attempt to pave the way for his succession he’s really just going down the path of no compromising, it’s my way or the highway. And he’s creating lots of enemies within the regime, and as we just heard, Tara explained the overall situation in Iran when it comes to public attitude, has been so angry for so long now.

Da’ish’s return, that was, I think the last question. Look, Da’ish is apparently, in some ways, already returning in parts of Syria, it operates in parts of Western Iraq, and we know for sure it’s in Afghanistan. Which, you know, takes me to a issue that Farzam mentioned. Farzam was talking about Iranian Strategist interested in a long-term game plan vis-à-vis the United States, so no war with the US today, but let’s bleed the Americans, let’s press them so much that eventually, they get tired and they leave. This has been a game that the regime in Tehran has been pursuing for some time. It’s a very, very risky proposition. In fact, you could make the argument the opposite is more likely to happen, the United States will return more to the region, particularly after 7 October, in context of the competition with China and so on.

And then, final point. I’d like to ask those Iranian Strategists in Tehran, “How did it work for you when the United States pulled out of Afghanistan? So, you got a symbolic win, the United States pulled out, but look what happened. You got five million Afghan refugees and immigrants right now. In pockets of Ira – in towns in Eastern Iran, there are literally clashes between Iranian citizens and Afghans fighting over jobs. Taliban is hardly a partner to count on. Drugs are going to start coming back into Iran, and you got” – so, I can go on and on. So, sometimes I wonder if in those Strategist, in this, sort of, autopilot mode that they’re in, “Just get the Americans out at any cost,” it doesn’t seem to me to always serve basic Iranian interest.

I would argue an Afghanistan today that was under what it was under before the Taliban, and it had huge problems, but it was still better for the Iranian national interest point of view than the situation they have today. So, again, my fundamental point is this, when you are ideological in how you see the region, it will always tie your hands, and I think the Islamic Republic suffers from that. Anyway, let me stop there, Sanam.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Alex, and, also, let’s not forget the water disputes that are also leading to further challenges for Iranians. Farzam, back to you, and a number of questions that I’m going to throw at you to pick up as you can. Neil Brown asks about “nuclear weapons and nuclear ambitions,” if you can pick that up, and, you know, consider Iran’s posture as a threshold state, we’re considering it a threshold state. Is it going to remain in ambiguity, or is it going in a direction that is more – even more dangerous?

A question about the Houthis, “Do we overstate Iran’s role in this, and discount Houthi agency?” How do you see dynamics, specifically in that context? And why hasn’t that threatened the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, dialogue continues, and both sides are still seeing each other, be it in Davos or in Beijing. So, what do we see there?

Let me throw one more in, if there is a ceasefire in Gaza tomorrow, is this all going to just miraculously end? You know, is all parts of the different symphony of the Axis of Resistance going to stop, or are they going to continue their activism, as well? And anything else you want to bring in, any final points, as we are getting to the end of our time, please feel free.

Dr Abdolrasool Divsallar

Sure. Look, let me start by the question on Houthis, which I think it’s an interesting one, especially when it considers the Iran-Saudi relationship. I think what Iran is doing is using this moment as a opportunity to shift Houthis threat perception. I mean, Houthis been, you know, a, kind of, military entrepreneurs, let’s put it like this, that their life is based on military operation. They don’t have anything else to do, and they don’t know what other business to follow. So, basically, in the context of conflicts, they can earn more either politically, financial or elsewhere. So, Iran needs to shift their threat perception, changing it from previously Saudi Arabia, now toward Israel and US. And this is happening while Tehran has now a direct channel of contact with Riyadh, which basically helps Tehran to transmit this, sort of, future use of Houthis. So, I think that’s the core, the reason why the Saudis are trying to not see that, at least on the public sphere, as a, sort of, threat.

But about the question that if Houthis are somehow – I mean, how is the level of this, or the depth of this connection? Well, I think I agree that there are complexities over the command structure. Basically, it’s not like the way that you put it, ‘WhatsApp’, sort of, command. It’s not, like, that it’s a button that Tehran pushes in Tehran and operates in Sanaa in the Houthis. But there are very dirank – direct and clear links, at least on trade levels. You know, there are very clear technological linkage between Tehran and Houthis, and that’s based on a idea that, you know, there is a huge gap between cost of defence and cost of offense. Means that you can impose a huge cost on the side that want to do a defend – do – operate as a defensive side, with cheap technologies.

And, you know, the advancement of UAE’s – the missiles, cruise missiles, and different autonomous weapons, which Iran deliberately proliferated across the region, has helped actually to expand this gap. Means that it will be a huge – there is no cost-effective option right now to tackle these sorts of technological advancement, and that’s exactly where Tehran is banking on. It means that proliferate on the basis of quantity, in order to coerce the enemy, which obviously, has the higher technology, but pays more for using that technology. This is very obvious in the case of using the Patriot systems, or other high-end system for very cheap drones. We saw that in Ukraine, and now we are seeing that across the region, too.

So, then the second line, I think, is what we are seeing a bit on the intelligence sharing. I think that’s quite important, that this practice was in place, at least, since Iran’s operation in Iraq for Da’ish or the IS, which basically created that, sort of, joint command structure, this is nothing new. Which basically, that command, sort of, structure, was not, again, using it as a, sort of, a giving the command, but it was basically more used as a mon – as a joint monitoring and intelligence sharing procedure, which there are very clear evidences that Tehran is also doing it right now. So, I think there are a lot of difficulties to claim that Iran is not directly, you know, involved in this. And as I said before, there are lots of strategic discussions that shows that this is the continuation of Iran’s way of thinking regarding the Houthis.

So, I mean, about the question that how that post-conflict, sort of, environment will look like, here I, again, want to borrow from what Alex said on the domestic side. You know, I believe that neither Iran, nor countries like Russia, they don’t have any idea of post-conflict environment. You know, they don’t have any plans for restoration or restabilisation. They – there are actors who operate, who are very well in operating across the disruptive environments, and there are actors who are skilled to operate to dis – to create the sort of disorder that – or that – or disrupt the order that they are not, let’s say, agreed upon. But the idea that how that should look like after the US led architecture in the Middle East, I think this is a question that if – even if you ask it from Iranians, they are very much without clear ideas on that. There are some, again, general principles, general concepts, but that when it comes to the practice, I think we are, basically, seeing nothing serious there.

Back to the issue of nuclear thing. I think, well, basically, the War in Gaza and continuation of what happened in Ukraine, both together somehow reinforce the strategic intent, or the value, the deterrent value of the nuclear devices. This, on a very, let’s say, strategic level, I think this we can observe. But on a tactical, or a, let’s say, operational side, I don’t see any change in a freeze for unfreeze, sort of, agreement that Iran and United States agreed in summer, which, basically, was based on freezing Iran’s stockpiling of highly enriched uraniums for unfreezing Iranian funds. We don’t see that, but what is new is, basically, a detoriation of a relation between Iran and IAEA, which, basically, is increa – or deepening the mistrust what Iran calls it with the IAEA, which, basically, is hampering the capacity of IAEA to monitor and have a precise assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme.

So, here comes to the core of the strategy, I think, again, and that’s based on three factors and, I think, how Tehran is trying to, let’s say, arrange the scene. First, it’s based on ambiguity, so, actually, less monitoring capacity of IAEA means that we have less capacity to understand the trends of the nuclear programme, and when that threshold – how long that threshold will lead to the next stage, which is the military side. And then, at the same time, keeping the ultra-latency capability means that a very short breakout time, and complement that with a passive defence measure, which, basically, means that you try to keep the capacity very protected, to keep it from the first strike capabilities.

So, what Tehran is trying to see as a, sort of, advantage in this, is that, you know, it sends a signal to its adversaries that if any sort of escalation leads to a direct strike against Tehran in a all-out war, there is this option that Tehran can move toward the nuclear – a nuclear front. But I don’t think that we see this before the very last stages of a full, sort of, breakout of the conflict across region, because the general calculus of the cost of this proliferation, I think, is still there. Which I know there’s a lack of the time, so I just stop here and I give it back to you, Sanam.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Farzam, and, Tara, over to you for two final questions, if you will. Firstly, how is the War in Gaza being interrupted inside Iran? You know, you do hear that some Iranians are, sort of, pro-Israel, because they, sort of, make these linkages that Israel has a long-term aim of, sort of, challenging the Islamic Republic. So, how do you, sort of, break apart these, sort of, narratives?

And, secondly, there’s a question from Adam that says, “It’s difficult to imagine the Iranian system surviving on their core supporters, perhaps less than 10%,” he suggests, “forever. Why haven’t they made more concessions to their population, to women on women rights, or improving the situation?”

Tara Sepheri Far

I mean, on the question about the War in Gaza, I think it’s correct that the dynamic might be a little different in Iran, versus what we see in other countries in the region, such as Egypt and Jordan, and others, where the civil society is much more united in voicing their condemnation of the Israeli conduct. But I would argue that the Iranian society is – even the opposition forces are diverse. You have unions and groups that belong to the leftist tradition, that their stance on Palestine comes from the historic understanding of it.

But for an average Iranian, the issue of the war in Gaza is understood through everything that we try to unpack, and the impact on their lives, therefore, as well as the daily struggles that they face as soon as they step out of the house, ranging from economic to repression. So, the proximity they have to their issues that is the direct result of the conduct of the Islamic Republic, versus the bigger – the further issue, kind of, drives their priority in that sense.

But I would argue that the effect of what we have been talking amongst ourselves forever, in terms of double standard, hypocrisy, complicity, lack of support and – on upholding laws of war and human rights norm in the conflict, is the same on Iranians, as well. And it’s that the lack of trust in the international system to stand by these principles and carry them through. The same thing that happened in the context of Iran, Western Foreign Ministers and leaders were rushing to make public statements about standing with Iranian people, and a year on, it’s difficult to find anyone who’s willing to make a comment about the situation inside the country. Unless it comes in an understanding of how it’s going to weaken or constrain the – Iran’s regional conduct, and I think that’s core of the problem. If we are interested in helping Iranian transition to right respecting society, maybe we should take a closer look, not just in terms of how the domestic situation constrains Iran, but how it can be empowered.

Very quickly, in response to the question of, how can they survive? It’s a question we ask every day, I think from 2018 to now. They have managed to alienate a significant portion of people, first, by the mass – the brutal, bloody repression of the protest that erupted after the gasoline crisis, the demographic that was lower middle-class by all account. Then the downing of the Ukrainian aeroplane happened, which was, like, a message to the middle-class, that even if you become a Doctor and go to Canada, you can still become a victim. And then, the co-management of the COVID crisis, and the confrontation with the West.

So, like, they’re coming off of three/four years of managing to send the message to every single component of the society that, “We don’t need you.” And it’s a question that we ask every day, like, for how long you can go on and make activists af – out of 15-year-old schoolgirls, who now understand their bodily autonomy, as a political issue. And I think I will end by that.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Tara. Thank you, again, for bringing it all together and reminding us of all of these, sort of, powerful events, very devastating, but also, empowering, in politicising and awakening so much of Iranian society. Thank you to all of you for giving us your time and your expertise. Alex, Farzam, Tara, I’m very grateful. We only really just skimmed the surface. I wanted to ask about Trump. I wanted to get to know your views on whether we’re in for a Israel-Iran confrontation in 2024. I wanted to talk more about Ali Khamenei. But we’ll have to do that again, either in person or in another one of these sessions on Zoom.

So, thank you from me, thank you from Chatham House, and thank you to everyone who’s joined us today. Have a good day wherever you are.