National-level CSOs are slightly more positive about the quality of their engagement in planning recovery than their regional-level counterparts. Among national-level respondents, 49 per cent stated that they are ‘included’ or ‘very well included’. In the regions, this proportion was just 37 per cent.
Other studies confirm weak operational links between the state and civil society in general. According to the Zagoriy Foundation, only 18 per cent of non-profit organizations report regular engagement with local government and just 4 per cent with the national authorities. CSOs in larger cities (or oblast centres) appear to have experienced better cooperation, but this represents a minority of the country’s communities. Indeed, more than 1,000 communities representing small towns and villages lack recovery offices, active civil society or partner cities abroad.
Government- or personality-driven engagement
Our survey respondents complained that the process is often formalistic and that civil society recommendations are frequently ignored (see Annex, Q11). There is a tendency for authorities to engage only with groups perceived as ‘loyal’ – especially in smaller communities. At the national level, there are even instances of pressure being applied and discreditation campaigns conducted against regulators and investigative journalists.
Indeed, manipulation of engagement by the state is seen as the highest risk for civil society’s own participation; this could damage the CSO sector’s own reputation. A quarter of Chatham House survey respondents identified the risk of authorities manipulating cooperation processes by either co-opting participants or including only ‘pocket’ CSOs (see Annex, Q16). Respondents fear that groups affiliated with the government would have priority and that co-optation would take the place of genuine engagement.
Good cooperation is often personality-driven and not really a feature of the system. A case in point is arguably the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development, where inclusive governance seems to have weakened since a leadership change in July 2024. Only 10 per cent of Chatham House survey respondents nationwide in 2025 view cooperation with the agency as efficient (see Annex, Q10). Even under the previous leadership of Mustafa Nayyem, a former investigative journalist and activist, the figure reached only 14 per cent. The agency’s public council website still lists materials for 2021, for example, and has no list of its members publicly available. Overall, the main reason CSOs cite for the lack of improvement in engagement is the continued lack of political will at the top level of the Ukrainian government (see Annex, Q11).
At the local level, citizens and CSOs are impeded by vague national regulations covering their engagement in the recovery process. National regulations recommend, but do not mandate, CSO inclusion in the consultative/advisory council. The council could therefore be staffed by loyal groups, local executive bodies or state- and community-owned companies. The implications for the effectiveness of such arrangements are mixed: much appears to depends on personalities and leadership approaches at the local level. One survey respondent summed the situation up as follows:
New public investment management system
Given the urgent need to sustain critical services and keep the economy afloat, it is natural that the Ukrainian government and donors focus on rebuilding infrastructure. This dimension of recovery is developing quite well, but both civic oversight and detailed social impact assessments remain limited. The new Public Investment Management (PIM) concept of the government establishes a single pipeline for recovery projects and integrates this pipeline into the DREAM system. The pipeline currently lists over 700 projects, about 50 per cent of which have been submitted by regional administrations while the other 50 per cent have been submitted by central ministries and state agencies. Communities were not included in the first call for proposals.
At the local level, citizens and CSOs are impeded by vague national regulations covering their engagement in the recovery process.
Projects are selected by an intergovernmental commission, the Strategic Investment Council, based in Kyiv. The criteria for the selection of projects formally include support for basic and other social needs of groups affected by war (such as veterans, IDPs and children). However, it remains unclear whether regional authorities are consulting key stakeholders or assessing local needs when deciding on projects.
The European Code of Conduct on Partnership, which is the EU practice for stakeholder consultations for infrastructure finance, is not compulsory or even recommended for Ukraine at the moment. There is an understandable time pressure during the war and fear that lengthy consultations may jeopardize efforts to rapidly rebuild the country. But this omission may seriously damage trust in state-financed recovery projects.
The DREAM system, although considered important for transparency, is consistently rated as a poor instrument of engagement: only 11 per cent of CSOs in our 2025 survey agreed that it is an efficient tool, while an additional 39 per cent did not have a definite answer (see Annex, Q10). Citizens and CSOs can assess reconstruction projects in some detail via DREAM. The Kyiv region provides a case study, as some reconstruction already took place there in 2022. All reconstruction projects financed by the national budget were visible on DREAM, but civic monitoring still revealed many issues with delivery, such as non-competitive tenders, unclear criteria for the selection of projects, and a lack of strategic alignment of projects with the regional documentation.
Poor coordination between different levels of government
Another missing piece of the inclusive recovery picture is robust multi-level governance. At present, for example, national authorities approach local administrations for policy implementation, rather than regarding them as partners in development or as generators of ideas.
There is some degree of mistrust as to how well the community-based principle will be implemented as a result of this kind of approach. The financial deficit leads Kyiv to select only a small portion of recovery projects from the pipeline, which increases its influence over the process. Some community leaders and mayors have questioned the objectivity of the DREAM process and express concern that funding allocations could be driven by political considerations, rather than prioritized according to need.
The central allocation of funding is often disconnected from regional and community planning. This, plus the sheer volume of local planning documents and national strategies, makes it difficult to discern a coherent vision of Ukraine’s future. Ukraine has more than 30 different national strategic framework documents, compared to just 10 in Poland.
Furthermore, communities currently lack direct access to the public investment pool, to which claims can only be submitted by ministries or regional authorities. About 50 per cent of the projects on DREAM are submitted by regional administrations, with the other half submitted by the ministries and state agencies. The Fund for Regional Development, created in 2015, remains in limbo. It has approximately $24 million earmarked for community projects in 2025, but allocations have not yet begun and procedures for allocating funds remain unclear.
More importantly, the flow of resources downwards to communities is impeded by their low absorption capacity. By the first quarter of 2025, the Ministry of Development had used only 1 per cent of the planned annual budget for reconstruction, owing to procedural delays and the slow pace of project implementation.
By the first quarter of 2025, the Ministry of Development had used only 1 per cent of the planned annual budget for reconstruction, owing to procedural delays and the slow pace of project implementation.
Different regions are impacted by war in different ways, and this requires a specific policy to strengthen cohesion and the representation of each region. Seventy per cent of all damaged civilian infrastructure is located in the front-line regions. The voices of these affected communities must be better incorporated into the selection process if this damage is to be repaired and the communities improved. But this aspect is missing from the recovery process as it stands: for example, the Strategic Investment Council features no sub-regional government representation.
There are also gaps at the national level. For instance, there is no in-country coordination platform for recovery that brings together representatives of civil society, the private sector and sub-national authorities. The National Recovery Council proposed at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference is still not functioning. There is no other overarching facility or vehicle that enables key stakeholders to coordinate, develop cooperation, share knowledge and discuss bottlenecks. This kind of forum is especially relevant for urgent social issues, where state and non-state actors should reinforce each other and seek common solutions to deliver on newly adopted strategies.
Civil society’s own weaknesses
Civil society is aware of risks related to its own engagement in recovery. The sector has a variety of groups, many of which are not truly independent. Some seem to pursue the political, partisan or commercial agendas of their local sponsors. In fact, due to weak institutions in Ukraine, some groups overstep the line between party politics and civil society engagement. From the early days of his presidency, Zelenskyy’s administration was wary of the sector, as his teams perceived CSOs as being in opposition to his victory in 2019 and in support of former president Petro Poroshenko. There was pressure from various groups not to concede any key positions to Russia on Donbas or Crimea, and criticism about the lack of feedback and communication. Since the 2022 full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy has only met the leading CSOs working on foreign policy and advocacy abroad once, in October 2024. This legacy, combined with a lack of special high-level cooperation, has likely contributed to the perception among most CSOs that there is a lack of political will at the most senior level to engage (see Annex, Q11).
The CSOs surveyed by Chatham House in 2025 also highlight potential problems associated with manipulative engagement, insufficient knowledge among non-profit organizations, a lack of coordination, and the potential sidelining of groups that criticize the government or seek to expose significant corruption risks. Sixty-eight per cent of our respondents cited such problems, with a quarter fearing that local authorities would create and control their own CSOs, crowding out independent groups (see Annex, Q16). Respondents also referred to burn-out, bureaucratic hurdles for getting projects off the ground and personal security risks associated with working near the front lines, among other major risks (see Annex, Q16).
The burgeoning sector of CSOs serving veterans provides an example of the risks of an ad hoc approach. One of the leading veterans’ rights groups believes that CSOs should educate themselves more about the needs of this specific cohort. Understandably, people have been keen to help others out of goodwill, but tend to act without studying the specific needs of their communities. As a result, many are undertaking ‘copy-and-paste’ activities, such as setting up veterans’ hubs or IDP councils in each locality, but many lack clear data on which specific target groups these activities might serve.
Across the broader sector, CSOs also differ in the extent to which they are connected to citizens. Some have a deep and representative reach, high-quality governance structures and widespread membership. But some operate more as consultancies, with weak penetration in the community. The vast majority of CSOs work with fewer than 20 volunteers when implementing their projects.
Poor professional skills could further weaken the prospects for genuine partnership. Forty-seven per cent of CSOs surveyed by Chatham House in 2025 reported a lack of opportunity to gain the new skills needed for recovery (see Annex, Q20). Thirty-two per cent nationwide reported having received training from other CSOs, making the sector the main provider of training as well as its main recipient. Despite the apparent lack of opportunity, the demand for learning and growth exists (see Annex, Q19). CSOs are especially keen to gain skills and knowledge in the following areas: how to develop proposals for EU institutional funding (47 per cent nationwide); how to use artificial intelligence (AI) platforms to support missions (47 per cent); how to prepare projects for the DREAM platform (41 per cent); modern fundraising methods (41 per cent); social entrepreneurship (40 per cent); and methodologies for preparing local recovery plans (39 per cent).
Alienation and disillusionment within the sector present additional risks to an inclusive recovery. If national and local governments fail to construct an effective system for inclusion, some CSOs and their leaders could potentially position themselves in opposition to the state and its authorities, which would be hugely detrimental to Ukraine’s long-term recovery, resilience, political reform and stability.
Donors’ bypassing of local CSOs
One of the main donor-driven deficiencies is the weak localization of foreign aid in Ukraine. Many donors are allocating funding via international NGOs or UN agencies. Foreign funding is the second largest source of finance for community recovery projects, and the primary source for CSO interventions. The original Grand Bargain Framework includes a commitment to allocate around 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local organizations. Despite a slight increase in 2024, however, less than 1 per cent of the nearly $10 billion of humanitarian funding monitored by the UN has gone directly to Ukrainian CSOs. Most of the assistance is instead provided to the population in the form of cash and vouchers via intermediary INGOs – a practice which Ukrainian CSOs see as ‘giving people fish rather than a fishing rod’.
Many local actors have developed significant capacity, demonstrated integrity and shown commitment to comply with international standards, but international agencies continue to dominate provision.
Many local actors have developed significant capacity, demonstrated integrity and shown commitment to comply with international standards, but international agencies continue to dominate provision. This tendency to bypass local and national CSOs could be attributed to excessive compliance requirements for access to external funding – particularly the demand for audits, due diligence and reporting. Local groups struggle to build operational capacity for complex compliance procedures, when circumstances force them to focus on getting aid to as many people in need as possible, as fast as possible. Few international funders provide institutional support for fulfilling these administrative functions – either through direct assistance or training.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of funders, extra time and effort are required to find viable local partners and build relationships. Direct provision can be a simpler option. The EU is notable for recognizing the importance of local partnerships at the policy level. It operates a pilot scheme through which the EU can financially support local and national NGOs as directly as possible by promoting their participation in country-level mechanisms. But this practice currently seems an exception rather than a rule among external donors, especially those in the humanitarian field.
Another weakness is a lack of coordination, especially on recovery. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs coordinates humanitarian ‘clusters’ on crisis response. Within the humanitarian sector, 90 per cent of CSOs reported cooperation with other local organizations, indicating good coordination in crisis response. However, the recovery sector lacks a permanent cluster system or vehicle for coordination. Overall, CSOs interact with a small number of groups. Sixty-two per cent of those surveyed by the Zagoriy Foundation say they lack platforms for cooperation.
What is more important to note is that the humanitarian and recovery communities co-exist in parallel, rather than working together. A viable ‘community of practice’ will be vital for social change to take place at scale. Regional voices want and need to be heard in Kyiv. For this reason, Rise of Ukraine plans to open an office in the capital to facilitate better access to policymakers and closer connections to other groups advocating at the national level.
Initiatives like this are worth exploring, but they reflect the fact that other avenues for collaboration are not delivering. The main Ukraine Donor Platform (UDP), for example, remains an exclusively intergovernmental body, although the UDP convenes small meetings with representatives of civil society alongside six-monthly steering committee meetings. The civil society sector lacks permanent formal cooperation, in contrast with the business sector. The business council at the UDP was created last year to allow for private sector contributions to recovery. Proposals for a similar civil society council have not been taken forward, despite 35 per cent of Chatham House survey respondents nationwide supporting the idea (see Annex, Q12).
![Figure 6. Satisfaction levels among CSOs have changed little since 2022 (Question: How would you rate the inclusion of civil society in planning recovery to date? [Choose one; figure shows only ‘included’ and ‘very well included’])](https://www.chathamhouse.org/system/files/styles/reader_large/private/reader-content/publication-36670/file-62200/OEBPS/image/REP-103-cso-inclusion-satisfaction.png?itok=tAZvb9YN)
