Europe is experiencing a second wave of nationalist populism, typically emanating from the far right. At national and European levels, these forces are shaping policy debates on a range of issues, from climate and migration to the economy and foreign affairs. Their growth constitutes one part of a triple threat to Europe, alongside Russia’s war in Ukraine and America’s retreat from its traditional alliances.
It is also no coincidence that these are the political forces Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump support. Yet Europe can, and hopefully will, counter the threat they represent. The initial wave of nationalist populism arose after the financial and migration crises in Europe. Hungary gave the first indication of its appeal to voters when Viktor Orbán was elected prime minister in 2010.
The prospect of another general election in April and Orbán’s campaign to extend his 16-year incumbency provides a timely moment to reflect on what is at stake for Europe if, as seems increasingly possible, nationalist populists win at the ballot box in other countries over the coming years.
In the past decade and a half, only the Covid pandemic temporarily halted the populists’ momentum. This increased again after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, fuelled by the energy crisis, the backlash against climate policies, renewed migration flows and Trump’s return to the White House. While part of a global nationalist phenomenon that has swept across Asia and Latin America, Europe remains at its epicentre.
Today, nationalist parties are in government in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. They lead or are performing well in opinion polls in several other European countries, notably the National Rally in France, AfD in Germany, PiS in Poland and Reform UK in Britain. On average, they command about a quarter of popular support across the continent.
Whether in office or not, the far right is increasingly influential in shaping European policy. In countries where far-right forces lead in opinion polls while remaining in opposition, mainstream governments have often adopted elements of their agendas, implementing severe migration policies and scaling back climate ambitions, despite scant evidence that such concessions win back voters.
In countries such as Austria, France, Italy and Britain, Christian democratic, liberal, conservative and centrist parties have moved to the right to claw back support. Nevertheless, election results have seen the growth of the far right continue, overtaking the centre right.
Diluting EU achievements
By mimicking a far-right agenda or breaching the ‘firewalls’ that discouraged cooperation, mainstream parties have normalized the extremes. At the EU level, the far right also exerts influence. It has significant representation in both the Council of the EU and the European Council. In the European Parliament, the far-right blocs, Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations, have proved crucial in passing legislation in coalition with the centre-right European People’s Party. Together, they represent an alternative majority to the traditional pro-European bloc.
Their work in November 2025 to push through the so-called omnibus package of laws appears innocuous, focusing on bureaucratic simplification. On closer inspection, however, its deregulatory intent – particularly in digital policy, climate and sustainability – is more concerning. Many of the EU’s hard-fought achievements to secure due diligence in climate reporting and sustainability were watered down or eliminated and rushed through parliament with little deliberation.
The ambition of these parties is no longer simply to leave the European Union. That was the strategy of the first wave of nationalist populism, epitomized by Britain’s 2016 referendum that led to its withdrawal from the EU. But as Brexit is widely seen as having failed to deliver on most of its promises, nationalist parties have now abandoned their ‘exit’ agenda, not least because of the economic gains that EU membership brings.
Anti-immigrant protesters during a demonstration organized by far-right groups in Gallarate, northern Italy. Photo: Andrea Carrubba/Anadolu via Getty Images.
For instance, Hungary and Italy have been net recipients of EU handouts, be they from agriculture and ‘cohesion’ funds, or payments from the one-off pandemic recovery fund NextGenerationEU. Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, was elected just as her country was granted €200 billion of the €800 billion post-pandemic fund. Taking Italy out of the EU would have been political suicide for her.
Instead, these far-right forces seek to win power within the EU, hollowing out the integration project. It is a more incremental approach but, as it unfolds under the radar, the effects have the potential to be powerful and enduring.
This is why these parties and governments enjoy the backing of Putin’s Russia and Trump’s America, whose antagonism towards the EU is long established. What binds them to Moscow and Washington in return is an ideological convergence around nationalist and socially conservative ideas: ‘cancel culture’, ‘remigration’, ‘anti-woke’ and climate scepticism or denial are all part of a shared political lexicon and agenda.
The financial and political links between the Hungarian government and the US Maga movement are well known. In February Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, travelled to Budapest after the Munich Security Conference to reiterate Trump’s support for Orbán ahead of April’s polls. The support of Trump and Putin is not driven solely by ideological sympathies, however. Each has a strategic intent.
Russia and the US appear determined to recreate their respective spheres of influence – the former in Eastern Europe, most obviously in its invasion of Ukraine but also in its influence in Georgia, Moldova and Romania, among other countries; the latter in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, as articulated in the US’s 2025 National Security Strategy which states: ‘Our goals for the Western Hemisphere can be summarized as Enlist and Expand.’
Dangerous dependencies
Europe is on the expansionist menu of both Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia. Yet when Europe is united – whether through formal institutional structures such as the EU or informal coalitions of the willing – such efforts can be countered. In the case of the US, Europe remains weaker in trade, technology and, especially, defence.
Nevertheless, it can still respond effectively. Signalling collective resolve, as Europe has done by securing significant loans for Ukraine and rallying around Greenland, has induced Washington to temper its unilateral instincts. In the case of Russia, a united Europe acting with courage would dwarf it on all counts – after 12 years of war, Moscow has managed to occupy only a fifth of Ukraine at extraordinary human and economic cost.
By contrast, a Europe where nationalist populist forces gain the upper hand would not just be different in political character, it would be weakened, perhaps fatally. It would be a Europe in which foreign policy consensus and defence cooperation fracture, starting with Ukraine; in which free trade agreements with global partners fall off the agenda; and in which the EU fails to advance economic integration, including completing the single market in key areas such as energy, technology and finance.
Such a fractured Europe led by squabbling nationalist governments would become easy prey for Moscow and Washington. Yet a Europe that restricts such forces to the margins has an opportunity to free itself from these dangerous dependencies.
Next year, France is due to hold a presidential election in the spring and Poland its parliamentary election; in 2029, Germany is expected to hold its federal election and Britain its general election. Some could come sooner. But domestic politics in Europe is messy, and nothing is set in stone.
Europe has seen far-right parties enter government only to then lose elections, as in Poland and the Netherlands, or top the polls but fail to form coalition governments, as in Austria. Hungary’s election is scheduled for April 2026. While Hungary is a small country, Orbán’s rule has long been a thorn in the side of the EU, not least over Ukraine. Should the Hungarian autocrat be ousted next month, it could signal the beginning of a wider shift back towards liberal democracy and European integration.
Exploiting inequalities
Transatlantic tensions are also evident. Trump’s championing of right-wing parties in Australia and Canada backfired. The president’s disdain for sovereignty, apparent in his efforts to acquire Greenland for the US, has made the National Rally in France, AfD in Germany and Brothers of Italy uncomfortable, pushing Jordan Bardella, National Rally’s president, and Meloni to speak out against Trump.