Aerial view of Lagos island and Lagos harbour, Nigeria, on 17 March 2016. Photo: Getty Images.
4. Towards Collective Action Against Corruption: Policy Approaches
The research conducted for this report finds that, within different contexts, powerful factors associated with cumbersome official procedures, inefficient institutions (political, government and law enforcement), overall weak governance, gendered norms of corruption and an ineffective local social contract influence the environment in which corrupt practices occur in Nigeria. While societal beliefs and expectations have an important role in shaping behaviours and choices about corruption, a governance environment persistently characterized by harmful norms and practices entrenches these negative responses and undermines the implementation of, and public support for, policies against corruption.
Combined with contextual drivers, the corrupt behaviours examined in this study are supported by social beliefs and expectations that must be addressed in order for collective change to take place.
The findings suggest the following policy approaches:
Changing incentives in contexts where corruption is a rational response or environmentally driven
The examination of collective practices through a behavioural approach shows that it is essential to employ a whole-system approach in assessing government procedures and seeing these from the point of view of the citizens. Such an approach makes it easier to pinpoint where interactions between government officials and other state employees and citizens are open to corruption, or where officials are tempted or pressured to engage in corrupt behaviour in the performance of their duties. In this way, it becomes much easier to design interventions that address the specific contexts and thereby increase the opportunities for people to act honestly.
Procedural and institutional changes are needed to remove administrative hurdles that create opportunities – or even the necessity – to engage in corrupt practices, in order to make abiding by the law less costly and more efficient.
In the case of petty bribery and extortion, the frequency of such behaviours reflects the nature of the interactions between law enforcement agents and citizens – an environment that is highly conducive to corruption because of the official procedures and practices of the institutions involved.
Across government, encouraging or sustaining positive behaviour by rethinking the routine functions of providing services to the public would go a long way in addressing the environment that encourages corruption in Nigeria. Behavioural insights suggest that individuals can be encouraged to engage in positive behaviour if procedures are simple, and are clear to respond to and comply with.
Corruption avoidance needs to be the practical option
Options for the settlement of fines should include well-developed and user-friendly online and mobile platforms,73 and individuals should be able to lodge complaints about disputed penalties as well as to report instances of soliciting for bribes and extorting behaviour without fear of reprisal. Where possible, non-material incentives should be developed to encourage the use of these platforms, such as by providing free-call numbers for mobile users. In the case of bribery and extortion by law enforcement agents, the procedure for complying with penalties for traffic violations is needlessly complicated, and penalties are sometimes unclear or open to dispute. Mobile technology can be a powerful tool for facilitating the reporting of corruption, the direct payment of fines, complaints handling and fines adjudication. Furthermore, information should be made widely available on how to formally report corrupt individuals, demands and activities, as well as on how to follow up on cases. Through such procedural changes, citizens who are issued with penalties or who have complaints would not need to travel long distances in order to pay a fine or dispute a penalty. Traffic and vehicle monitoring using technology can also reduce the frequency of direct human contact between motorists and agents, which tend to be susceptible to bribery demands. The goal should be to make it more convenient for people to pay fines, make complaints and settle disputes by providing numerous accessible means of doing so. The system of addressing complaints and disputes should also be transparent and widely available.
Reducing official fines so they are not easily undercut through bribery and extortion may serve as a disincentive to some corrupt practices. Interactions between motorists and law enforcement agents during vehicle and traffic checks that result in penalties tend to foster undue pressure in favour of corrupt exchanges and present hardly any incentives for corruption avoidance. To influence a change in behaviour, fines can be reduced to reflect the real income level and average living costs of most Nigerians. Currently, the minimum fine for a vehicle or traffic violation is ₦2,000, and the maximum – for dangerous driving – is ₦50,000.74 Clearly, there is a greater incentive for a motorist to pay a much lesser sum in the form of a bribe than to incur the monetary and time cost of an official fine.
Procedural changes should be complemented by interventions designed to encourage social norms that foster integrity and honesty within law enforcement agencies
There must be clear and enforceable negative sanctions for corrupt behaviour, and equally clear and meaningful positive sanctions and rewards for not engaging in corruption. Norms, old and new, do not enforce themselves; rather, it is the system of incentives and sanctions in place that does so. With a focus on preventing negative behaviour, campaigns targeting social norms within this sector – traffic law specifically, and law enforcement more broadly – should present a realistic and clear vision of the new norms that agents will be expected to follow. These expectations can be further reinforced by a large-scale effort to identify and call out high- and low-ranking officers found to be engaging in corruption. This effort must be broad and impartial enough to avoid accusations of witch-hunting.
However, the ‘naming and shaming’ and punishment of those who engage in corruption should not overshadow the more sustainable and consensus-building approach whereby positive behaviour is acknowledged and rewarded. In most instances, highlighting and incentivizing positive behaviour may be more socially impactful and sustainable than are punishments for negative behaviour.
Targeting sectors and communities with critical information on the human costs of corruption
More effective communication regarding the actual costs and casualties of corruption is necessary. Specific information concerning the aggregate costs of corrupt interactions to the under- and unserved in terms of public services can generate a sense of local responsibility and incentivize collective action. If the reality of the costs of corruption remains vague or impersonal, people are likely to struggle to connect with the issues. Cynicism and apathy can also further complicate the challenge of making anti-corruption relevant and actionable. Clear and targeted communication can be used to create a shared sense of the harmful consequences, and thus form the basis of collective action. This approach can reorient an issue that has previously been considered vague and unsolvable so that comes to be perceived as an urgent challenge requiring a collective response.
Instead of generic and unfocused communications, messages about the costs of corruption are more likely to be effective if they are understood by a specific audience to be relevant and salient
Many interviewees commented on problems of accessing information on public funds. One, for example, expressed the view that, generally: ‘Citizens don’t have the critical information to hold [the] government accountable. They do not know what their rights or entitlements are.’ Another stated: ‘Citizens don’t expect that projects would actually get done. People are not informed. They are left in suspense by the government.’75
Anti-corruption campaign messages can be reframed to resonate in affected communities, contexts or sectors, using pertinent and positive norms, values and expectations. Showing how these are undermined by corruption may help to make the underlying behaviours of a culture of corruption socially unacceptable. Instead of generic and unfocused communications, messages about the costs of corruption are more likely to be effective if they are understood by a specific audience to be relevant and salient. More personalized statements using credible and relatable evidence can therefore be more effective in incentivizing a community to act.
Local design and applicability is key. Respected local figures – such as religious and community leaders – who are able to exert social influence can also help to convince people to accept evidence of the cost of corruption and overturn notions that a corrupt route is a more efficient way of doing things. For example, the community action organization Follow the Money collects, publishes and visualizes data with the aim of supporting communities in tracking government expenditure against results on the ground. The organization leverages traditional and social media networks, including by translating findings into local languages and communicating with communities with poor internet access via SMS.76 Tracka77 is another community action project developed by BudgIT,78 a civic tech organization, which provides a project tracking tool that is currently used in 17 federal states. These projects provide social platforms powered by digital and social media technology to support citizen-led tracking of budgets and public developmental projects. Tracka and Follow the Money are examples of how social media and traditional networks can be leveraged to inform citizens about projects in their communities and empower them to monitor public-service delivery.
This type of advocacy for public-sector transparency can promote greater financial literacy at the grassroots level, and may likely generate the kind of momentum necessary for reinforcing efforts to counter corruption. Consistent and reliable information on public sector finances contributes to building public trust and addressing perceptions of secrecy, as expressed by one interviewee in Enugu State:
Information on public funds [controlled by the state or local governments] is not available, so people don’t know what to expect from the government. The feeling is that whatever they get from government, is what they get. It’s their luck.79
Targeting young people may help to instil a low tolerance of corruption in the next generation. Anti-corruption messaging can be made more effective through targeting a specific segment of population, such as young people or a particular community, either by highlighting how the behaviour affects people like them, or by referencing their local area. Such communications should, however, be simultaneously rolled out via community media networks to maximize their reach.
For example, using social media to disseminate social norm messages can be part of a strategy to target people from the ages of 15 to 35 in Nigeria80 in order to influence opinions and attitudes among younger people as regards corruption. With more than half of the population aged under 30,81 Nigeria’s youth population is considered a prime audience for citizen engagement against corruption. Traditional broadcast media (television and radio),82 online platforms and social media campaigns can all highlight the real or potential human and moral costs of corruption to young people’s futures and life chances. Social media can also provide a platform for analysing and advocating for anti-corruption policies, strategies and measures as well as information gathering and crowd-sourcing. For example, the BudgIT platform compiles infographics with the aim of simplifying public budgets and spending to support public engagement on transparency and accountability in government. Equally critical are age-appropriate interventions targeting the school-age population under 15 that can be integrated within citizenship and civic education programmes in primary and secondary schools nationwide.83
It should be noted, however, that the outcomes when young audiences are targeted for such social messaging can be unpredictable, particularly as heightened awareness may lead to protests against political impunity, abuses of power and government secrecy. The potential for heated collective action against corruption – particularly corruption in the public sector – is high if the government’s anti-corruption efforts are not perceived to be sincere and self-examining.
Reframing the approach to anti-corruption messaging and interventions
Research suggests that the way in which messages about problematic behaviours are framed may also be important to anti-corruption campaigns. Fear-based messaging,84 which is common in campaigns against smoking and drink-driving, for example, may command popular attention at first, but over time this approach can provoke resistance and reinforce the negative behaviour it is intended to counter.85
Sensationalist and extreme language surrounding corruption seems to mischaracterize the nature of corrupt behaviour. The research for this report suggests that in many cases corrupt behaviour stems from citizens responding to a system of incentives or conforming to particular norms. The difficulty in changing a particular behaviour is partly due to collective beliefs – specifically the beliefs that people have about the beliefs of others. Overly tough and extreme language is unlikely to bring about behavioural change if citizens do not think that the recommended behaviour will result in a reduction in corruption. Instead, overly sensational language may be a cause of apathy in the target population.86
There is evidence that repeated exposure to extreme language or messaging results in the desensitization of the public in certain contexts.87 Desensitization through overexposure to sensationalist anti-corruption messaging makes it hard to induce behavioural change, as the public becomes apathetic and habituated to prevention campaigns.88 This may unintentionally lead to the normalization of corrupt practices.89 To avoid habituation and desensitization, anti-corruption messaging must be carefully crafted to balance exposure while continuing to communicate effectively the negative impacts of corrupt behaviour.90 The normalization of corrupt practices further adds to the difficulty of fostering collective action to reduce corrupt behaviour.
For example, a pilot study in Indonesia tested whether different anti-corruption messages influenced people’s views about corruption and about anti-corruption efforts.91 The survey sample of 1,500 households in Jakarta were randomly assigned to five groups. Four groups received and read a different awareness-raising message on corruption, while the fifth – the control group – received no message. Two of the messages were positive: the first described the government’s successes in fighting corruption, while the second focused on how easily ordinary citizens could report and be involved in tackling corruption. The other two messages were more negative: one focusing on sensational grand corruption cases, and the other on statistics about widespread petty corruption in Indonesia. Initial analysis of the survey data suggests that both the positive and negative messages heightened respondents’ anxieties about the impacts of corruption on development in Indonesia; reduced confidence in the government’s efforts; and, perhaps most significantly, reduced their belief that ordinary citizens could stand up to corruption. This finding shows that getting the messaging right on anti-corruption is a delicate process, particularly in societies where people already think corruption is an insurmountable challenge. In the context of anti-corruption messaging in Nigeria, it is important to safeguard against anti-corruption messages backfiring or having no impact; and to ensure that the processes of drafting and disseminating messages are empirically tested for effectiveness.
As key trendsetters, political actors and other government officials must measure up to higher standards of integrity, honesty and transparency
Highlighting and/or empowering (real or fictional) trendsetters to drive behavioural change
Leadership on anti-corruption can only be successful if it is by example. The behaviours and actions of Nigerian political actors play a major role in setting social trends, building public trust and inspiring positive behaviour. This was reflected in the view of an academic in Calabar who argued:
Corruption is a top-to-bottom matter in Nigeria. The actions of the people at the top matter a lot to how the people at the bottom behave.92
As key trendsetters, political actors and other government officials must measure up to higher standards of integrity, honesty and transparency in areas such as personal asset and income disclosure, public finances, procurement and service delivery, in order to send a powerful signal of the government’s commitment to changing negative governance norms and rebuilding public trust.
Trendsetters typically exhibit at least two behavioural traits that make them more likely to violate norms. First, trendsetters tend to show high levels of autonomy, which sends a message that they are willing to disregard customs and norms, despite widespread conformity in a community, because they perceive themselves to be free from the influence of others.93 For instance, a police officer may be willing not to engage in bribery in an environment in which there are widespread social norms of corruption whereby an officer would be expected to go along with an embedded culture like the rest of the department. This individual will typically display high levels of autonomy and independence from the expectations of others – reflecting, for example, a strong sense of moral obligation, justice and fairness that shapes his or her sensitivity to the norm. Trendsetters can also be fictional – such as characters in popular radio and television shows.
Trendsetters are also likely to have strong beliefs in their own ability to succeed in specific tasks. These kinds of beliefs are closely related to the perceptions that individuals hold about how influential their own actions are.94 What typically drives ‘first movers’ is the belief that behavioural change will lead to benefits that accrue personally or across a community and which may lead others to adopt similar behaviours. Police officers and other law enforcement agents who have strong personal normative beliefs against corrupt practices are more likely to resist corrupt practices. They may also believe that they are setting an example for others to follow.
In cases where negative norms are widespread but people believe that different practices would leave everyone better off, first movers or trendsetters help shift people’s behaviour in beneficial directions. Although most people complying with a norm will not be willing to bear the cost of being the trendsetter, for fear that they will find themselves in the minority by violating the norm, there are nonetheless trendsetters who, for a host of reasons, will take the risk of violating norms and can drive behaviours that change practices for the better.
Where potential trendsetters can be successfully identified in a community, behavioural interventions should be targeted towards them since they represent the highest likelihood that a particular practice will be abandoned. If trendsetters cannot be identified, or do not exist within a community, successful interventions can make use of community media to exemplify alternative lifestyles and behaviours to encourage behavioural change.
In India, for example, exposure to cable television and soap operas in which characters are seen to lead liberal lifestyles is associated with higher levels of autonomy for women and girls, and lower tolerance of spousal abuse.95 Moreover, educational entertainment (so-called ‘edutainment’) has been used by international organizations and governments to promote behavioural changes and disseminate information.96 For example, the Peruvian television soap opera Simplemente María, about a young maid who learns to read and becomes successful through hard work, led to increased enrolment at adult literacy classes and a rise in the social status of maids in Peru and neighbouring countries.97 And in a notable case in India, people in the village of Lutsaan, in Uttar Pradesh, were so affected by a radio soap opera intended to encourage gender equality that 184 villagers signed a large poster petition stating: ‘Listening to Tinka Tinka Sukh has benefited all listeners of our village, especially the women … Our village now actively opposes the practice of dowry – they neither give nor receive dowry.’98
From Nigeria, an example of edutainment as a tool for promoting positive behaviour change is the television soap opera Shuga, developed by MTV Staying Alive Foundation. The drama, which is filmed in Nigeria and broadcast by MTV in over 70 countries, raises awareness among young people about the health dangers of risky sexual behaviour and spreads knowledge about HIV. An impact study found that, among 5,000 participants, those who watched the show in community screenings over a six-month period were twice as likely to get HIV-tested.99 According to the same study, within the participant group, chlamydia infection rates dropped by 58 per cent among women, and people were less likely to have multiple sex partners. These findings provide further evidence that edutainment can potentially be more impactful and cost-effective than traditional behavioural change campaigns.
Trendsetting individuals will flout standing social norms in order to adopt alternative lifestyles, whether they came to know about alternative ways of behaving through carefully crafted media, or because they decided independently to abandon a practice.
Uncovering false beliefs around what other people believe about corrupt practices and developing communication strategies to make this known
In cases in which people believe a practice should be changed but hold false beliefs about how other people feel about the same practice, trendsetters can also be key to driving behavioural change. This is because they are willing to incur the cost of moving first and violating a norm, which then signals to others that they are not alone in believing a norm should be abandoned. Trendsetters are able to provide valuable information to fellow community members about the beliefs of others and the possibility of moving away from seemingly entrenched practices, and the information signalled by their actions can influence other individuals to recognize the illusion that others feel differently from them.
There is significant evidence from norm-based interventions to show that behavioural change is possible where there is enough coordination for collective action to overturn practices that almost all but a small minority consider harmful.100 Trendsetters can be key actors in coordinating collective actions.
Even if there is widespread dissatisfaction with corrupt behaviour in Nigerian society, influential and audacious individuals or groups will need to move first to show what sort of governance will be acceptable.
A national social contract must be enforced by social sanctions that signal that corrupt governance will not be tolerated
Trendsetters will be key in shifting communities from local social contracts to a national social contract by signalling new expectations based on values such as fairness and equality. A national social contract whereby the distribution of public goods and services is not based on personal or social relationships requires normative constraints on the actions of individuals with the power to abuse their position.101 In other words, a national social contract must be enforced by social sanctions that signal that corrupt governance will not be tolerated. The research for this report shows that in many instances in Nigeria, people already think that corrupt behaviour is morally unacceptable. Trendsetters will be critical in helping to coordinate collective action that translates into effective social sanctions to curb corrupt practices.102
This type of scenario underscores the role social marketing can play in the context of informing the public about shared personal beliefs and thereby reinforcing the negative moral judgment for corrupt practices, prompting awareness about the cost of corruption in terms of poor services from government institutions, and raising popular understanding of the drivers and consequences of corruption with a view to influencing behavioural change.
Social marketing strategies103 built around urging people to act in keeping with their personal beliefs and aversion to corruption have the potential to form a critical component of anti-corruption education in Nigeria, and can drive public approval for an idea or initiative and generate critical mass support for social change. Such interventions can be effective in establishing new norms of behaviour over time by strategically prompting a collective rejection of negative behaviour and encouraging social sanctioning of the rejected behaviour. Social marketing interventions can also raise public awareness of the laws that should be guiding the behaviour of enforcement agents and their responsibilities towards citizens. And social marketing can also publicize accountability channels for public complaints and safe reporting – such as via a confidential text-message hotline – of corrupt acts by offending officials.
73 While this report was being compiled, Nigeria’s Federal Road Safety Corp launched an online portal for payments for traffic offences, driving licences, vehicle number plates, etc. Mobile phone platforms are critical particularly in rural areas, where many people do not have conventional computer and internet access.
74 Nigeria’s Federal Road Safety Corp lists 37 traffic offences. All of them carry a monetary penalty in addition to licence points for 34 offences. Seven offences variously carry fines of ₦2,000 and ₦5,000 fines, 10 offences fines of ₦3,000, five offences fines of ₦10,000, and two offences fines of ₦20,000. The maximum penalty fine of ₦50,000 also applies to the offences of inadequate construction warning, and medical personnel or hospital rejection of road accident victims. For a full list of traffic offences and penalties in Nigeria, see http://frsc.gov.ng/offences-and-penalties (accessed 6 Apr. 2017).
75 Authors’ interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Adamawa and Enugu, July–August 2016.
76 For more on how Follow the Money tracks, visualizes and advocates for transparency in government spending in rural communities in Nigeria, see http://followthemoneyng.org.
77 See http://tracka.ng/impact/.
78 See http://yourbudgit.com.
79 Authors’ interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Enugu, August 2016.
80 Nigeria’s 2009 national youth policy defines the country’s youth population as citizens aged between 18 and 35 years. ‘Nigeria: Country Factsheet’, http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/nigeria/.
81 National Population Commission (2017), ‘Nigeria’s population now 182 million’, http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/80-publications/216-nigeria-s-population-now-182-million-dg-npopc (accessed 6 Apr. 2017).
82 This can include community media talk shows and drama series as well as phone-in programmes.
83 According to the National Population Commission, over 40 per cent of Nigeria’s population are under the age of 14: Nigeria Population Commission (2017), ‘Nigeria’s population now 182 million’.
84 Mann, C. (2011), Behaviour changing campaigns: success and failure factors, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Transparency International and Chr. Michelsen Institute, 21 February 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ab140f0b652dd000854/expert-helpdesk-270.pdf (accessed 9 Apr. 2017).
85 UK Cabinet Office (2012), Applying behavioural insights to reduce fraud, error and debt, http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf (accessed 30 Mar. 2017).
86 Eagle, L. (2009). ‘Social marketing ethics’, National Social Marketing Centre, http://www. nsmcentre. org.uk/component/remository/NSMC-Publications/Social-Marketing-Ethics (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).
87 Cho, H., and Salmon, C. T. (2007), ‘Unintended Effects of Health Communication Campaigns’, Journal of Communication, 57(2), p. 303.
88 Messerlian, C., and Derevensky, J. (2006), ‘Social marketing campaigns for youth gambling prevention: Lessons learned from youth’, International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 4(4), p. 303.
89 Ashforth, B. E. and Anand, V. (2003), ‘The normalization of corruption in organizations’, Research in organizational behavior, 25, pp. 1–52.
90 Ibid.
91 Peiffer, C. (2017), Message received? How messages about corruption shape perceptions, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Development Leadership Program, March 2017, http://publications.dlprog.org/Peiffer_Messages.pdf (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).
92 Authors’ interview under the Chatham House Rule in Calabar, August 2016.
93 Bicchieri, C. (2016), Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms, New York: Oxford University Press.
94 Ibid. Self-efficacy may be defined as the ‘perceived capacity to exercise control over oneself and the events in one’s life’.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. See also Singhal, A., Obregon, R. and Rogers, E. M. (1995), ‘Reconstructing the story of Simplemente María, the most popular telenovela in Latin America of all time’, International Communication Gazette, 54(1), 54(1), doi:10.1177/001654929505400101 (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).
98 Ibid. See also Singhal, A. and Rogers, E. M. (1991), ‘Hum Log story from concept to after-effects’, in Indian Institute of Mass Communication (1991), Communication 2000 AD: Silver Jubilee Commemorative Volume, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Mass Communication.
99 Banarjee, A., La Ferrara, E. and Orozco-Olvera, H. (2016), ‘Experimental Evaluation of MTV Shuga: Changing Social Norms and Behaviors with Entertainment Education’, World Bank, Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Development Research Group, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/438421467236362785/Entertainment-Edu-workshop-Flyer-6-3-16.pdf (accessed 29 Feb. 2017).
100 Bicchieri, C. (2016), Norms in the Wild.
101 Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), ‘Controlling corruption through collective action’.
102 This is similar to what Alina Mungiu-Pippidi refers to as ‘ethical universalism in governance’. See Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015), The quest for good governance: how societies develop control of corruption, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
103 For an in-depth discussion of the role of social marketing strategies in tackling norms of corruption, see Kindra, G. S. and Stapenhurst, R. (1998), Social Marketing Strategies to Fight Corruption, Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/590511468762008812/pdf/multi-page.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2017). See also World Bank (2015), World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior, pp. 42–73, Washington DC: World Bank, doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0342-0 (accessed 21 Apr. 2017).