Most analysts downplayed the likelihood of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine based partly on the conviction that such an invasion would make no political sense – that the risks for Vladimir Putin’s regime were surely too high due to the domestic and international backlash.
A bloody invasion could not serve Russia’s long-term aim of holding Ukraine within the ‘Russian world’ as this vision requires at least the pretence of ‘brotherly’ relations. But the tragedy of the invasion has forced a reassessment of the logic underlying Putin’s decision-making.
It raises questions about the significance of public opinion in his calculations such as whether Putin cares at all about how audiences across Russia and Ukraine judge his actions. If he does not care, is he correct to believe a public opinion backlash is no major obstacle to his plans? If he does care, but believes public opinion can be ‘managed’ is he right to be so confident or has he badly miscalculated?
‘Pro-Russian’ Ukrainians will not acquiesce to Ukraine’s destruction
The most obvious miscalculation which Putin has made relates to public opinion in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians in recent years have felt disillusioned about their government but that does not mean they are in any way apathetic about Ukraine’s statehood or about their own Ukrainian identity.
Putin seems to be operating on the assumption that significant numbers of ‘pro-Russian’, anti-Western, Russian-speaking Ukrainians will tolerate and even welcome Russian forces as they attempt regime change at gunpoint. But even in the regions of Ukraine where ‘pro-Russian sentiment’ has traditionally been highest, that ‘pro-Russian sentiment’ mainly comprises support for Russian language rights, for the Russian Orthodox Church, and a reluctance to see Russia as the enemy.
The notion that the current Russian violence against Ukraine’s people and government could enjoy support or acceptance from substantial numbers of Ukrainians is delusional, and resistance from Ukraine’s committed armed forces and mobilized population is already costing Putin more in Russian lives than he expected.
That resistance and those costs will not end if Russia attempts a long-term occupation because, despite Russia’s reputation for waging effective information wars, the Russian propaganda machine’s ability to ‘win hearts and minds’ in Ukraine has been failing for years and is now negligible.
The main strength of Russian propaganda lay in its ability to amplify the grievances which Ukrainians felt about their political leadership by constantly emphasising the country’s failings. But now the entire Ukrainian population shares the same grievance, which overrides all others – that Russia has invaded and is shelling innocent Ukrainians in their homes.
Russian disinformation may be able to generate confusion about what is happening during the conflict, but no amount of it will ever secure Ukrainian public acquiescence to the destruction and takeover of their country.
Anti-war sentiment cannot be extinguished
Within Russia itself, Putin’s propaganda machine is more effective and – sadly – most Russian citizens will not care enough to look beyond the state-controlled news sources which continue to deny any invasion of Ukraine is even taking place. But some Russians – it is difficult to estimate how many – are clearly refusing to believe the lies on state TV, and some are even brave enough to take to the streets to protest the war.
The war does present a substantial challenge for Putin’s control over domestic public opinion, not least because the Russian authorities have no effective way to block information from Ukraine flowing into Russia via networks of friends and family.
Survey data shows roughly 15 per cent of the residents of Kyiv city and region have family and friends in Russia with whom they regularly communicate – and cross-border family connections are even more numerous in other Ukrainian regions. Even if Russia cut access to social media, there will still be phone calls between families and, if Russians become unable to reach their Ukrainian friends and relatives, that is likely to generate even more distress and anger.
In the short term, anti-war sentiment among the Russian public will probably have little political impact because the Russian authorities excel at suppressing protest. Experience shows mass public protest generally only poses a real threat to an entrenched authoritarian regime if there is division within the elite as well, and a faction within it becomes willing to challenge and oust the incumbent with public support.
Many are now hoping for a ‘palace coup’ in Russia but it is impossible to estimate the likelihood of such an event. However, even if no coup is imminent, it does seem likely that over the longer term, fractures will emerge within the more influential sections of Russian society which sustain the Putin regime as the human and economic costs of the disaster in Ukraine mount up.
Sanctions are essential, even if their effect on Russian behaviour is not immediate. So far, sanctions have targeted the Russian economy and high-profile allies of Putin, but must now extend further to impose personal costs on Russians at lower levels who are complicit in supporting the invasion.