Ruto’s state visit spotlights Kenya’s centrality to Africa–US relations

President Joe Biden’s choice of Kenya for a first African state visit in more than 15 years is no coincidence, but both countries must be clear on what is driving this increasing strategic dependence.

Expert comment Published 22 May 2024 3 minute READ

Kenyan President William Ruto’s arrival in Washington on 22 May ends a historic drought. No African leader has made a state visit to the US since John Kufuor of Ghana in 2008 – three times longer than the previous record gap, but a period that has also seen three US Africa Strategies (2012, 2018 and 2022) and two US–Africa Leaders’ Summits (2014 and 2022).

In Ruto, Biden is welcoming an increasingly assertive international operator, with a track record of promoting African solidarity.

The latest of these strategic resets in 2022 encouraged a somewhat more engaged US administration, reflected in an uptick of visits by officials to the continent. 

Yet competing international priorities and the looming US elections risk Washington slipping back into a status quo of complacency on Africa – illustrated by Joe Biden’s failure to make a promised trip to the continent in 2023.

In Ruto, Biden is welcoming an increasingly assertive international operator, with a track record of promoting African solidarity and a keen awareness of the new partnerships possible in a multipolar world. 

The state visit offers an opportunity to US policymakers and to Kenya alike to strengthen foundations for long-term partnership – but discussion must be founded in recognition of mutual need.

Trade and investment negotiations

Ruto’s main priority for the trip lies in securing financial opportunities for a Kenyan economy that is suffering under a heavy debt burden and a cost of living crisis. 

The Trump administration had floated the prospect of a full free trade deal between Kenya and the US, and talks began officially in July 2020. This was downgraded to a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP), launched in July 2022, with negotiations instead focused on addressing non-tariff barriers to investment and trade. 

Ruto’s hope is to secure a complementary deal later this year before the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) expires in 2025 – though a new bill has been introduced for its renewal to 2041. Kenya has been one of Africa’s largest beneficiaries of AGOA trade, with more than 70 per cent of Kenyan exports to the US falling under its terms.

The US needs more agile mechanisms for economic cooperation with strategic African partners, beyond AGOA renewal or broad-brush support for the African Continental Free Trade Area. But with Ruto forging an increasingly assertive approach to other players, Washington is in danger of being outpaced. 

Kenya and the EU signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2023, mirroring most of the terms of a deal with the UK from 2020, and it finalized negotiations for a trade deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in February this year. Ruto can equally ill-afford to turn his back on China given the pressures of that creditor relationship, with bilateral debt of around $6 billion.

The US must seize opportunities to advance partnership on shared values and interests with Kenya, providing a model for broader Africa relations.

Kenya’s EU trade deal notably included supplementary terms relating to commitments on human rights, workers’ freedoms and climate policy. 

US officials too have heaped praise on Kenya’s credentials as the foremost democracy in East Africa and as a leader on renewable energy. 

With neighbouring states Uganda suspended from, and Rwanda partly ineligible for, the AGOA, the US must seize opportunities to advance partnership on shared values and interests with Kenya, providing a model for broader Africa relations that goes beyond policing areas of divergence.  

Kenya’s regional and global role

The US looks to Kenya for more than just a model of economic partnership. As Ruto arrives in Washington, a first deployment of Kenyan police is set to land in Haiti to lead a long-awaited multinational peacekeeping mission, enabled by US financial and training support given its ties to pre-election immigration priorities – but complicated by public scepticism and legal challenges in Kenya.

Additional impetus for the US relationship comes from Kenya’s statements and voting record in the UN Security Council, and its carefully calibrated approach to the Gaza conflict – denoting its status as one of Israel’s closest African partners. There is also an established security relationship that includes the Manda Bay base in Kenya. 

The US is shifting from direct influence in Africa in favour of increasingly outsourcing aspects of engagement – particularly on the Horn of Africa – to regional partners.

The regional picture in East Africa and the Horn adds further incentive. The US is among several countries hoping that Kenya can fill a leadership vacuum created by Ethiopia’s internal struggles, the fall from grace of Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s entanglement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 

This deepening reliance highlights a wider trend in which the US is shifting from direct influence in Africa in favour of increasingly outsourcing aspects of engagement – particularly on the Horn of Africa – to regional partners, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Doubts exist in Western capitals, however, over Kenya’s bandwidth to address the full range of crises facing the region. Nairobi hosted early mediation talks between rival groups from South Sudan in recent weeks and sought to ease Ethiopia–Somalia tensions. 

But accusations of personal bias impeded Ruto’s early efforts in the war in Sudan (though Kenya’s support to Sudanese civilians is notable). Relations with the DRC remain strained, despite the withdrawal of a regional force from eastern DRC in late 2023.

With the Kenyan political veteran Raila Odinga the current frontrunner for the African Union Commission chairperson from 2025 – the latest of many candidates endorsed by Nairobi for multilateral leadership roles – Kenya’s importance may yet increase in wider continental affairs.

Looking ahead

Both US and Kenyan officials are mindful of the critical ongoing role of IMF disbursements in avoiding Kenyan debt default. Endorsement of Ruto’s programme of economic reform, despite domestic backlash in Kenya, reflects a US view that Kenya is too big to fail. 

The implications for Africa of a potential Trump presidency from 2025 remain unclear but could also plausibly sharpen reliance on Kenya, even amid a likely wider decline in US engagement with the continent. 

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In this context, Washington should be acutely aware of Kenyan agency and diverse international partnerships. Years of ruthless manoeuvring in Kenyan domestic politics have conditioned Ruto not to waste opportunities, and his US visit is the latest extension of this political cunning to the international stage. 

For Kenya this visit offers a chance to reinforce its status as a key strategic interlocutor.

Ruto’s assertiveness around causes of African solidarity in global institutions and on issues such as climate change and debt financing offer useful points of entry, which he must continue to push while in Washington.

It is clear that the US wants to reset its policy on Africa. It is less clear that it knows how to do so. For Kenya this visit offers a chance to reinforce its status as a key strategic interlocutor – and to shape the emerging model for future US engagements in Africa.