US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman on 19 May in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to put the finishing touches on a major US-Saudi deal, according to reports. The deal proposes enhanced bilateral cooperation on defence, civilian nuclear energy, and future technologies.
Sullivan’s visit is the latest step in a year-long process meant to promote what US President Joe Biden views as a transformational plan for the Middle East: a Saudi-Israeli normalization accord that obliges Israel to commit to the creation of an independent Palestinian state and grants Saudi Arabia official US security guarantees.
US–Saudi negotiations have made headway, but the Israel leg of this deal has fallen flat. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to oppose the Palestinians’ right to a state of their own, and therefore his country’s obligations toward the three-way deal.
Netanyahu is not alone in his position. Earlier this year, a poll showed that most Israelis are against the creation of a Palestinian state, following Hamas’s terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October.
If Israel’s failure to commit persists, there will be no Saudi-Israeli normalization. As a result, the US Congress will not endorse a US–Saudi defence pact (the US Senate’s role in ratifying formal defence pacts between the US and foreign countries is indispensable). Indeed, in a rare moment of bipartisan consensus, Democrats and Republicans have agreed to move forward with a US–Saudi pact only if Saudi Arabia officially embraces Israel.
What can be achieved without Israel?
The question now is: how far might Washington and Riyadh be willing to go without Israel? If the Saudis and the Americans have explicitly tied any bilateral deal to Israeli cooperation, then their latest progress means little.
But if they decide that there is too much opportunity to be held up by Israeli domestic politics, they might go on their own. Several weeks ago, there were rumblings that a more limited US–Saudi deal, without Israel, might be an option.
Whether it is a limited US–Saudi deal – whereby the US may not formally ally itself with but still extend security guarantees to Saudi Arabia – or a full-fledged one, the biggest concern, all along, is that neither option has benefited from a serious US debate.
Opportunities
There is both risk and opportunity in a US–Saudi deal. For the Saudis, it would offer a powerful deterrent against attacks by adversaries – most notably, Iran. It would also provide an opportunity for the Saudi armed forces to receive more regular advice from and systematic interaction with the US military.
Politically, a solidified relationship with the US would catapult Saudi Arabia’s position in Washington. The kingdom would receive the close attention of the most senior US officials, including the president, who would instruct the US bureaucracy, and especially the Pentagon, to attend to the needs and concerns of the alliance.
The security benefits may not be as substantial for the US – which is normal given the massive power disparity between the two. But they are not small, either. Saudi Arabia would be obligated to provide the US military with enhanced access to its skies and territory, which would be helpful for strategic planners in the Pentagon working on global posture. The more dispersed the US military presence in the Middle East, the safer it is.
A deal would also lead to better Saudi cooperation on counterterrorism and energy policy. As the world’s second largest producer of oil, with more than 11 million barrels per day and an 11 percent share of total world oil production, Riyadh’s influence on global energy markets is huge.
Saudi Arabia would be expected to keep pumping oil at acceptable levels not only to keep US inflation at bay but also to challenge the ability of Russia, a major oil producer, to sustain its war against Ukraine.
Finally, Riyadh will be asked to do everything in its power to distance itself strategically from China. That means no major Saudi investments in China (and vice versa), and no Saudi cooperation on high-end technology and defence.
The risks
Yet as promising as an upgraded US-Saudi defence relationship might be, it is not without risks. If its costly military intervention in Yemen in 2015-2022 is any guide, Saudi Arabia may not be able to meet its defence obligations toward the US any time soon, or support it militarily should it be attacked.
Any pact could also undermine Washington’s goal of reducing Saudi Arabia’s security dependency on the US. Indeed, why should the Saudis undertake serious defence reforms and do all the hard work of military development if the US can guarantee their security?
A pact could be an enabler just as much as it could be an inhibitor to more effective and sustainable US security cooperation in the region, a longstanding US goal.
