With elections due in both the US and the UK this year, there are two key asks that the next US administration – whether under Biden or Trump – will make of the next UK government.
First, the US will want the UK to play a central and expensive role in European security. Second, it will want the UK’s support for a vision of economic security that prioritizes close relations among allies and denial of a growing set of technologies and markets to Beijing.
These two asks are also reflected in the issues that look set to dominate this week’s G7 summit. One area of focus will be support for Ukraine, where G7 members will try to move ahead a plan to use interest from frozen Russian funds to help Ukraine pay for its defence. The second is economic rivalry with China, where G7 countries will build on their 2023 commitments to act together to promote economic security and resilience and defend against economic coercion.
The framing of these two challenges is closely linked to the strength and limitations of US global leadership. The Biden administration – election anxieties notwithstanding– continues to move steadily forward on its vision of knitting allies’ economic decision-making closer together while creating space and resilience from adversaries.
However, the G7 plan to use Russian funds to bridge potential gaps in Ukraine war funding reflect concerns over a recalcitrant US Congress, or potentially a disinclined Trump administration, driven by growing grumbles from segments of the US electorate. And Washington, despite its enviably dynamic and fast-growing economy, cannot achieve its de-risking and economic security aims vis-à-vis Beijing without much deeper cooperation from allies than it has achieved thus far.
These weaknesses in US global leadership stem from increasing polarization and political paralysis within the US. They also translate into two key foreign policy requests from Washington for the next UK government, regardless of who next takes up residence in the White House. And they will be made insistently to the next resident of 10 Downing Street.
Ukraine, European security and NATO
The next US president will surely push the next UK prime minister to continue to play a leadership role – and perhaps an even bigger one – in NATO and on Ukraine.
Although Trump’s threats not to defend NATO members who fail to meet defence spending targets and his eagerness to wrap up the war in Ukraine reflect his unique worldview, it would be a mistake to view his stance as one half of a binary choice rather than one end of a spectrum.
This week two moderate Republicans, well-respected in bipartisan defence policy circles, published a call for Washington to renew its pivot to Asia – as a part of which, ‘stronger European allies should allow the redeployment of US air and naval assets to Asia’. Furthermore, the members of Congress who held up the latest tranche of aid for Ukraine are unrepentant and expected to do the same under the next president.
Therefore, the headline Ukraine initiative at the G7 summit is born out of worry, not only that Trump would not want to fund further military aid to Ukraine, but that Biden might be unable to.
Although a bigger role in European security will cost money, and demand a level of ambition that the next UK government may be hard-pressed to provide, it may be the easier assignment.
A balancing act on China policy
The second priority that any US administration will want to see from the next UK government is on China policy. It wants a partner who is willing to align more and more on economic security, in the face of pressure from Beijing and Brussels alike.
The Biden administration shows no signs of slowing down its economic security focus and its efforts to achieve more allied alignment across a range of sectors, including export controls on electric vehicles (EVs), hampering Chinese exports to Russia, and coordinating procurement of critical minerals.
Washington tends to expect London to be closer to US views than Brussels. This sets a significant challenge for any UK prime minister, who will have to balance making peace with the EU on the one hand, with Washington’s industrial policy on the other.
While the Biden administration has framed its economic agenda with the UK – from artificial intelligence to regional trade agreements – through a lens of economic security, resilience and worker-centrism, Trump’s ask of the next UK government may be bigger – and blunter. The much-discussed Republican policy blueprint Project 2025 frames the goal of transatlantic trade policy as preventing the UK from ‘slip[ping] back into the embrace of the EU’.
The good news for the UK is that Americans across party lines continue to view the country favourably and see it as Washington’s most important foreign policy partner. As evidenced by recent US MLB baseball matches in London and cricket matches in the US, cultural ties – and the economic ties that follow – look to be in excellent shape.