Much of the UK election campaign has focused on domestic issues, but security and defence have also been on the pre-election agenda. Keir Starmer’s Labour Party have centred the idea that the median voter feels insecure. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s Conservatives have sought to portray themselves as guarantors of the nation’s security – and queried Labour’s commitment to defence.
But in the campaign, these important issues have often been covered via narrow competitive rhetoric on defence spending and the UK’s nuclear weapons system.
Even before the campaign began, Sunak accused Labour of making the UK ‘less safe’ for not committing to spend 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence by 2030.
Labour – who say they will spend 2.5 per cent when circumstances allow – attacked the Conservatives for hollowing out the armed forces. The Liberal Democrats also promised to spend 2.5 per cent ‘at least’ and bring the Army up to 100,000 troops.
Spending and traditional capabilities are important, but this focus misses some important questions about UK defence – especially about what contributes to wider security and resilience, and what deterrence means.
Deterrence is not just about weapons
Politicians compete to sound tough on nuclear weapons. They have little choice in the current UK political system. But the issue is more complex than the ‘would you push the button?’ questions suggest.
The use of nuclear weapons would have devastating impacts, creating casualties on an unimaginable scale, both from the initial blasts and for decades afterwards through radiation, radioactive fallout and (depending on the numbers used and locations) global famine.
Nuclear weapons today are not intended to be used – only to deter. That is why world leaders have been so angered by overt nuclear threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Late last year, serious concerns were escalating that Russia might have been about to deploy short-range nuclear weapons. The US and Germany worked with China to intervene quickly and halted – for the time being – Russian notions on nuclear use. The US and China have also begun fresh arms control talks, a vital aspect in preventing nuclear war.
However, the election debate has omitted a wider discussion on deterrence. Military postures and doctrines – whether conventional, cyber or nuclear – can only deter if they are useable, credible and the adversary is understood well enough to know what might deter them. But like any form of prevention, knowledge of what worked in the past, works now and may work in future is full of uncertainty.
Since the Cold War, Western countries have been relying heavily on a mix of deterrence postures with the intention to reduce defence spending and reduce risks of war. But what actually deters hostile actors and states from attacking others needs rethinking.
The problem with relying on nuclear weapons as a backstop, is that the threat to use them has to be believed by the adversary. In today’s world, it is autocratic leaders, caring little for the devastating impact on their citizens, neighbours and the rest of the world, who would credibly threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Leaders who care about their countries will not make such threats.
A new UK government should urgently focus on what might prevent a major, wider European war. The UK, as part of NATO, has focused on new force-multiplying technology-enabled equipment and platforms. It has also devoted resources to specialist areas including the Joint Expeditionary Force in the High North, North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea Region.
But it has yet to invest sufficiently in its people. Recruitment remains inadequate in the active forces and in the reserve. Some of this might be fixed by investing more in those currently serving – such as in housing and training – and expanding successful initiatives which include civilian experts in technical roles such as cyber security.
But a new approach to deterrence and prevention should come in the form of whole-of-society preparedness.
Defence is not only about the armed forces
The UK will need to consider spending more on its armed forces to counter security threats in Europe, address budget gaps, and account for the prospect of a second-term Trump presidency in the US.
But focusing too narrowly on spending risks avoiding other critical issues. Given the prevalence of non-military attacks, including cyber and hybrid activities, wider societal resilience is also crucial for UK security.
Recent cyberattacks on NHS hospitals illustrate that ordinary people are more and more at the frontline in protecting their organizations and managing the consequences of national security threats.
Societal resilience is an effective form of deterrence by denial – a country whose citizens are prepared for a range of threats is stronger and less likely to be an attractive target.
As others have recommended, investing in resilience should include structures for managing and predicting society-wide risks, and ensuring that businesses, local organizations, and ordinary people understand their roles during emergencies.
The UK government has acted on this issue. The 2021 Integrated Review, written during the COVID-19 pandemic, emphasized the importance of resilience, and the government later outlined the UK’s Resilience Framework.
But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has understandably turned attention towards conventional defence readiness – improving ammunition stocks, troop numbers and production capacity. However, this creates a risk that the importance of wider resilience is neglected.
Thinking differently about national service
One idea floated during the UK election campaign could have some application to societal resilience: national service for young people.
The Conservatives’ proposal on this at the beginning of the campaign lacked clarity on the practicalities, and was criticized by some voluntary organizations while some military voices questioned how it would work. But national service as a concept should not necessarily be dismissed – it exists in a range of countries and is worthy of consideration.