13 days before the end of its term, the administration of President Joe Biden imposed sanctions on Mohammed ‘Hemedti’ Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the factions in Sudan’s civil war. The US Department of Treasury simultaneously sanctioned seven UAE-based companies believed to be funnelling arms, finances, and support to the RSF. This action was coupled with a statement which concluded that the RSF was committing genocide in its strongholds, alongside grave human rights violations.
Just a few days later, the US announced sanctions on Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the other key faction in Sudan’s conflict. Burhan and the SAF were accused of committing lethal attacks against civilians, undermining the goal of a democratic transition, and choosing war over negotiation. The Sudanese Foreign Ministry condemned these sanctions, labelling them as ‘lacking justice and objectivity’.
These sanctions represent the most significant international intervention to date in a brutal conflict that has displaced 11 million Sudanese. However, the true impact of these sanctions depends on if and how the Trump administration chooses to build on them: if it works with partners in the region, the new administration could leverage the impact of Biden’s sanctions to bring about a much-needed ceasefire.
The impact of sanctions on the ground
For the RSF, the sanctions and subsequent genocide determination will surely thwart Hemedti’s plan to develop a civilian administration in his strongholds. Civilian politicians who entertained the idea of joining this government may well distance themselves for fear of being affiliated with a group accused of genocide.
Preventing the RSF developing a parallel government will in turn make it harder to partition Sudan – any such fragmentation would exacerbate the country’s fundamental issues and gravely threaten regional security.
The political legitimacy of SAF will also be impacted. Burhan has benefited from his position as the de facto leader of Sudan, able to represent the country on the world stage. With US sanctions imposed on both him and Hemedti, his status will appear reduced.
But SAF morale is high, having recently claimed significant victories, including the capture of Wad-Madani in Al Jazeera. In their response to the sanctions, they claimed that the Biden administration’s actions sought to sabotage them in ‘the hour of victory’, indicating that the sanctions may only harden their resolve.
Biden likely took a strong stance in an effort to leave a convincing legacy on Sudan, particularly after previous mediation efforts failed. But that might make things more difficult for the Trump administration. The likely immediate impact of these sanctions is that they will sour both sides to any future US mediation efforts, and prompt them to look elsewhere for political legitimacy.
Although these sanctions might close the door on US mediation, they can present a critical opportunity – if they are utilized to target the financial networks and political recognition that have sustained the fighting in Sudan.
Sanctioning the seven identified companies will deal a blow to the RSF, but will probably not be sufficient alone: it is unclear how many additional shell companies the RSF have established since 2013.
Ultimately, because Sudan’s conflict is built on illicit financial flows, any meaningful attempt to end the fighting must focus on further disrupting these networks.
External players remain crucial to a solution
The war in Sudan is not happening in a vacuum. The conflict persists in part because external players have either actively abetted the fighting or turned a blind eye. Egypt and Qatar have lent their support to SAF, while the UAE has been the key supporter of the RSF. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia claims neutrality.
The sanctions on UAE-based companies underscores a question with significant regional implications: will the US become more assertive with its Middle Eastern allies who maintain close ties to Sudan’s rival factions? For now, Trump has given no clear indication of his Africa strategy, or his policy towards Sudan.