The Trump administration should build on Biden’s sanctions to disrupt the networks feeding the war in Sudan

Biden’s sanctions may close the door on US mediation between the RSF and SAF. But Trump could build on them to bring about an inflection point in the war.

Expert comment Updated 22 January 2025 4 minute READ

13 days before the end of its term, the administration of President Joe Biden imposed sanctions on Mohammed ‘Hemedti’ Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the factions in Sudan’s civil war. The US Department of Treasury simultaneously sanctioned seven UAE-based companies believed to be funnelling arms, finances, and support to the RSF. This action was coupled with a statement which concluded that the RSF was committing genocide in its strongholds, alongside grave human rights violations.

Just a few days later, the US announced sanctions on Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the other key faction in Sudan’s conflict. Burhan and the SAF were accused of committing lethal attacks against civilians, undermining the goal of a democratic transition, and choosing war over negotiation. The Sudanese Foreign Ministry condemned these sanctions, labelling them as ‘lacking justice and objectivity’.

These sanctions represent the most significant international intervention to date in a brutal conflict that has displaced 11 million Sudanese. However, the true impact of these sanctions depends on if and how the Trump administration chooses to build on them: if it works with partners in the region, the new administration could leverage the impact of Biden’s sanctions to bring about a much-needed ceasefire.

The impact of sanctions on the ground

For the RSF, the sanctions and subsequent genocide determination will surely thwart Hemedti’s plan to develop a civilian administration in his strongholds. Civilian politicians who entertained the idea of joining this government may well distance themselves for fear of being affiliated with a group accused of genocide. 

Although these sanctions might close the door on US mediation, they can present a critical opportunity.

Preventing the RSF developing a parallel government will in turn make it harder to partition Sudan any such fragmentation would exacerbate the country’s fundamental issues and gravely threaten regional security. 

The political legitimacy of SAF will also be impacted. Burhan has benefited from his position as the de facto leader of Sudan, able to represent the country on the world stage. With US sanctions imposed on both him and Hemedti, his status will appear reduced.

But SAF morale is high, having recently claimed significant victories, including the capture of Wad-Madani in Al Jazeera. In their response to the sanctions, they claimed that the Biden administration’s actions sought to sabotage them in ‘the hour of victory’, indicating that the sanctions may only harden their resolve.

Biden likely took a strong stance in an effort to leave a convincing legacy on Sudan, particularly after previous mediation efforts failed. But that might make things more difficult for the Trump administration. The likely immediate impact of these sanctions is that they will sour both sides to any future US mediation efforts, and prompt them to look elsewhere for political legitimacy. 

Although these sanctions might close the door on US mediation, they can present a critical opportunity if they are utilized to target the financial networks and political recognition that have sustained the fighting in Sudan. 

Sanctioning the seven identified companies will deal a blow to the RSF, but will probably not be sufficient alone: it is unclear how many additional shell companies the RSF have established since 2013. 

Ultimately, because Sudan’s conflict is built on illicit financial flows, any meaningful attempt to end the fighting must focus on further disrupting these networks.

External players remain crucial to a solution 

The war in Sudan is not happening in a vacuum. The conflict persists in part because external players have either actively abetted the fighting or turned a blind eye. Egypt and Qatar have lent their support to SAF, while the UAE has been the key supporter of the RSF. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia claims neutrality. 

For now, Trump has given no clear indication of his Africa strategy, or his policy towards Sudan.

The sanctions on UAE-based companies underscores a question with significant regional implications: will the US become more assertive with its Middle Eastern allies who maintain close ties to Sudan’s rival factions? For now, Trump has given no clear indication of his Africa strategy, or his policy towards Sudan.

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Within the Republican Party, there is support for more coherent action. Republican Senator Jim Risch has long called for a genocide determination and an end to the war. Senator Marco Rubio, set to be the next of secretary of state, spoke of the need to end the war in his January US Senate hearing making mention of the involvement of external actors, particularly the UAE.

Coordinated response

Regardless, it is up to the Trump administration to determine whether Biden’s sanctions will be purely punitive or part of a broader vision to achieve an end to Sudan’s crisis. 

With both warring parties’ political legitimacy weak, there is a real opportunity to build on Biden’s significant intervention through stepping up coordinated international pressure. 

To force a ceasefire, Trump should move to further disrupt financial networks feeding the conflict. That could involve setting clear benchmarks for compliance with Middle Eastern allies, tying US arms sales and broader investment incentives to verifiable actions that halt the flow of weaponry and financial backing to Sudanese factions.

These benchmarks must be reinforced through dedicated bilateral channels with partners, making future cooperation contingent upon adherence.

If the goal is to claim both leaders unfit for political rule, then efforts to empower and include civilian coalitions in Sudan’s political future should be supported. 

Regardless of where Sudan ranks in Trump’s foreign policy priorities, it remains a crucial question for many US partners in the Middle East.

That could see the US backing the consolidation of negotiation tracks to a single, inclusive framework that is driven by Sudan’s anti-war civilian coalitions and grassroots groups. A wider more detailed agenda that addresses security reform should also be supported, so that civilian involvement can build to greater leverage in Sudan’s political future. 

In an ideal world, both efforts should be pursued. But neither will be achieved without coordination from the US and those of its allies closely tied up with the warring parties.

Regardless of where Sudan ranks in Trump’s foreign policy priorities, it remains a crucial question for many US partners in the Middle East and thus will need to be dealt with either directly or indirectly. In his inauguration speech, Trump reemphasized his commitment to end all wars. Bringing a halt to the truly devastating conflict in Sudan will be essential to fully realizing that ambition.