It’s not too late for the US to back Ukraine – for its own benefit

To the Trump administration, pleasing Russia looks like it solves major problems. But experience shows that those who try, live to regret it.

Expert comment Updated 7 March 2025 4 minute READ

James Nixey

Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme

In a world where President Donald Trump is calling Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a dictator, and prefers an economic relationship with Russia to Canada, it’s easy to despair.

Trump and his administration seem inclined to double down on their more outrageous utterances, making it hard to see how the very public and personal dispute with Zelenskyy can be repaired. On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the US–Ukraine relationship seems badly undermined to some – especially when Trump clearly believes the threat from China takes precedence. 

The Kremlin’s foreign policy is defined in large part by its opposition to US interests.

But Ukraine is not lost. Contrary to appearances, nor is its relationship with the US: the Trump administration may not be averse to a U-turn, if it perceives a course of action is self-defeating. 

America-first reasons for helping Ukraine remain compelling, and worth re-stating: Deterring Russia in Ukraine and the rest of Europe helps to stymie Chinese ambition; the US defence industry stands to make billions; refusing to give Russia all it wants will demonstrate strength; and the US would be heroes to many (and Trump, potentially a Nobel prize winner). Most of all, defending Ukraine’s sovereignty enhances US security.

The Russia factor

It is often said that the best way to get along with Russia is to capitulate to it. That may be true (albeit unwise) for Ukraine, but it doesn’t work for the US. America’s foreign policy shift over the last few weeks has delighted the Russians, but it would be a mistake to think that they now consider America an ally. The Kremlin’s foreign policy is defined in large part by its opposition to US interests, casting Moscow as a ‘significant other’ and independent pole in world politics.

Time and again, for the past quarter century, Western leaders have thought they could handle Putin. German Chancellor Angela Merkel sought to drag Russia into reasonable statecraft through mutual energy interests like the Nord Stream pipeline projects. President Barack Obama attempted a ‘reset’ in US–Russia relations at the start of his administration, looking for cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran and nuclear proliferation.

All such strategies failed: partly perhaps out of naivety or arrogance but mainly because Russia made it impossible to foster good relations: Russia worked against the Obama administration in Syria; Putin undermined US and European security with its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

It is true, of course, that Trump is a very different Western world leader from anything seen before. He seems closer in mentality to Putin, not least in his belief that the world should essentially be run by two or three great powers. This suggests to some, that if anyone can compel Russia to abide by the terms of an agreement, Trump can. This logic is flawed, not in its analysis of Trump, or even of Putin, but in its analysis of the Russian state and Russian foreign policy.

For now, Putin and his team are playing Trump carefully. That makes sense for the Kremlin in the short term: negotiating bilaterally with the US helps neutralize Ukraine, boosts the economy (however temporarily) and divides the rest of Europe. 

But it can’t last – Russia has spent years building up the US as enemy number one. Also, Russia’s war is driving its economy; and the Kremlin is afraid of the return of its veterans – seeing them as a potential threat to regime stability. 

A temporary warming of relations will be just that: a pause to allow Moscow to consolidate, reconstitute its military and patch up its economy before renewing hostilities in some form.

Since the Munich Security Conference, the common refrain is that…nothing is as it was. That is incorrect: Russia is exactly what it was.

Continued US–Russia animosity also suggests that if Trump is looking to delink Russia from China, it is unlikely to work. Instead, it will leave the US facing China alone – as Europe will be less likely to help.

In the weeks since the Munich Security Conference, the common refrain is that the world has turned upside down. Nothing is as it was. That is incorrect: Russia is exactly what it was. It will look to hasten America’s decline, even if much of the rest of the world thinks Trump is doing that nicely by himself.

Reasons to be cheerful

It follows then that US security officials should be thinking how to identify, prevent and combat continued Russian efforts to undermine the United States. 

Presenting Trump with evidence of Russian duplicity will surely be a good first step. But the obvious way to deal with an implacable enemy is to weaken it; and the best way to do that is to keep up the pressure with full support for Kyiv. Ukraine has done an extraordinary job over the last three years of degrading the Russian military and economy. 

Putin and Trump are not alike in their ambitions: Putin’s obsession is control of others – the restoration of an empire. Greenland, Panama and even Canada remarks aside, Trump does not have the same overriding ambition. His priority is wealth – his own and America’s – and competing with China.

Selling weapons to Ukraine and Europe, as well as restricting Russia’s own economy through sanctions, will enrich America and neutralize the Russia threat. That represents a good, long-term investment. 

Renewing support for Ukraine on the battlefield, and in negotiations, will counter Beijing’s narrative that the US is an unreliable and unpredictable partner, and reassure America’s Pacific allies of their own security agreements. 

History has taught that the Russian leopard does not change its spots. Trump should not be more like the Biden administration in its approach to Russia, but more like Reagan: approaching Putin with nothing but a self-interested and cold assessment of an intractable and devious opponent.