Europe needs to make its own plan for peace in Ukraine – and rouse its people to the threat from Russia

President Trump refuses to commit the US to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe must agree how to fill the vacuum to have a hope of influencing negotiations with Putin.

Expert comment Updated 7 March 2025 4 minute READ

Armida van Rij

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

President Donald Trump’s comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos last month provided brief respite from fears he might sell out Ukraine to Russia. The president had seemed to place responsibility for opening negotiations to end the war in Ukraine on Russian President Vladimir Putin, rather than Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy. That suggested that perhaps he was on Ukraine’s side after all.

The past week has stripped away any such illusions. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined US policy towards Ukraine (changed 24 hours later) at a NATO defence ministerial. Hegseth proposed to concede territory to Russia, keep Ukraine out of NATO, and exclude US troops from guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. Then, President Trump revealed he has opened direct communications with Putin.

Making matters worse, these developments were chaotically communicated: The defence secretary and the president made contradictory remarks in less than a few hours of each other. Backtracking, ‘clarifying’ and changing views is already a hallmark of Trump’s second administration.

Reducing European commitments…aligns with Elon Musk’s stated plans to rein in US defence spending, which he says is not sustainable.

Moscow will be delighted. Following the Trump-Putin call, the Kremlin suggested there will be two parallel negotiation tracks: first a US–Russia track, and a second including Ukraine. Bilateral negotiations with the US could be advantageous for Russia as Putin will hope to manipulate Trump without European or Ukrainian interference. The Kremlin would be forgiven for thinking that Ukraine’s friends are in disarray.

There is naked self-interest in the US position. Hegseth’s comments made it clear that the US is moving from burden-sharing on European defence to burden-shifting (bar the US nuclear umbrella), to free up resources for the US border and interests in the Indo-Pacific. Reducing European commitments also aligns with Elon Musk’s stated plans to rein in US defence spending, which he says is not sustainable.

Yet, at the same time, the US plans to continue selling weapons to Europe in an ‘expedited’ fashion, thereby ensuring Europe’s continued reliance.

What security guarantees can Europe provide Ukraine?

Rather than wasting time and resources trying to understand the nuances of a shifting and inconsistent US policy, Europeans should focus on their own position. Europe must put a clear and tangible offer on the table that cuts it into negotiations on the war.

The challenge is that there is no clear consensus – even among the coalition of the willing – on what contributions Europe can make to Ukraine’s security.

First, there is a discussion about the role European troops would have in Ukraine: would they operate as a ceasefire monitoring force, a ‘tripwire’, or a deterrent? That could have big implications if – and likely when – Russia breaks the terms of a ceasefire or other agreement, and direct conflict erupts between European and Russian forces. Taking away the Article 5 protection of these troops, as Hegseth seemed to do, weakens the deterrent effect of any European troops and therefore increases the likelihood of direct confrontation.

The purpose of the force will also determine its required size and composition. In Davos, Zelenskyy said 200,000 foreign troops would be required to safeguard any new demarcation line, later revised downwards to 100,000-150,000. Discussing numbers without first deciding on a clear purpose is perhaps arbitrary, but with practicalities like leave and rotation schedules it is clear it will need to be a significant number.

For comparison, in NATO’s eastern flank there are 40,000 troops under NATO command. The US has approximately 100,000 troops deployed to Europe – but is excluding contributing them to any force guaranteeing Ukraine’s security.

Even for some of Ukraine’s staunchest allies, providing troops on a long-term basis would be difficult. Poland has the largest land forces in Europe, but currently rules out sending troops to Ukraine over fears for its own defence. Finland has a conscription based – rather than a professional – army. The Baltic states’ total regular armed forces amount to only 30,200 troops, though it can be swelled by an additional 135,000 by adding active reserves, volunteer forces, and the national guard.

Such frontline states face a real reckoning: they are Ukraine’s staunchest allies, but they are also those with the most transatlantic outlook and desire to keep the US engaged in European security. The idea that may change will be a very hard pill to swallow. 

The UK would be expected to make a leading contribution to Ukraine’s security. It would be fair to assume France would also contribute given President Emmanuel Macron was the first world leader to call for European troops on the ground in Ukraine – at least for as long as he is president, which will be for another 2.5 years at most. Given the ceasefire on the Korean peninsula has been enforced by US troops for 73 years, this is not reassuring.

Europe’s next steps

In the short term, besides developing a common position on security guarantees for Kyiv, a coalition of the willing must also arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will likely involve buying off the shelf American weapon systems (Ukraine cannot afford to wait for European production to ramp up), maximizing EU mechanisms like the European Peace Facility – and paradoxically, also mollifying Trump and potentially reducing the EU–US trade deficit at the same time.

Europe needs to become much better at careful public messaging – without sowing panic – about the sustained Russian threat to European security.

Beyond positioning itself so it is included in any negotiations, Europe should continue close coordination with Ukraine and the presidential office. The meeting between European Commission President Von der Leyen, European Council President Costa and Zelenskyy on Friday morning in Munich may be largely symbolic, but will have been an important signal after a relentless week for Ukraine. The leverage European leaders have is that ultimately, they will need to implement any agreement. Doing so, or not, is a sovereign decision no one other than individual European states can make.

At the same time, Europe needs to become much better at careful public messaging – without sowing panic – about the sustained Russian threat to European security. Any ceasefire or peace deal is unlikely to bring a lasting peace in Europe. Russia will likely regard it as merely a new phase in the war. This means publics in Europe have to understand the necessary trade-offs involved in raising defence spending and other preparedness requirements.

In the medium-term to long-term, the EU should use Eurobonds – and the fiscal space created by relaxing EU fiscal rules announced in Munich – to help raise defence spending. It should look to build a European defence industry which relies on the US only in a small part, and prioritize its capability developments on strategic enablers, such as transport aircraft, strategic airlift, and ISR capabilities – where it is most dependent on the US.

European allies also need to take a hard look at NATO, and engage proactively in discussions with the US about gradually transferring key roles and positions to European military and civilian staff. The latter will be deeply uncomfortable for Europeans. But the reality is that it must be done in a planned, coordinated manner. The alternative is chaotic, disruptive - and extremely dangerous.

None of the above is new or unexpected, of course. In Munich, Von der Leyen spoke of the need for urgency. Europe has dithered away so much time that it is left with few options.