China’s military build-up indicates it is serious about taking Taiwan

The more the US dithers in its response, the more the strategic balance shifts in China’s favour.

Expert comment Published 28 March 2025 Updated 16 April 2025

William Matthews

Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

There is a storm brewing across the Taiwan Strait. China has increased its military activity around Taiwan and deployed new landing barges in the South China Sea, while the counter-influence policies of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and shifts in US rhetoric are viewed as provocations by Beijing – fuelling a vicious circle of tensions. 

Beijing has long hoped for the ‘peaceful reunification’ of Taiwan with mainland China, but has repeatedly stated that it will not renounce the use of force to achieve unification if necessary. While Beijing’s ideal long-term strategy is to pressure Taiwan to unify without the need for conflict, the emerging pattern of its actions suggests that it increasingly believes that forceful intervention could be necessary. 

Perceived provocation by Taiwan and the US

Beijing has made clear that it considers Taiwan a red line in the context of China–US relations – ‘the core of China’s core interests’. Beijing also set out several conditions under which a red line would be crossed over Taiwan in its 2005 Anti-Secession Law.

A formal declaration of independence is unlikely – Taiwan is de facto independent and this would bring little material gain. The real risk is that Beijing sees peaceful reunification as no longer possible due to a decisive shift in political sentiment in Taiwan, or if the US takes pre-emptive actions which would make future unification challenging, militarily or politically.

Given the importance Beijing attaches to reunification and how explicit it has been about its red lines, failure to act would be a major blow to China’s credibility. It should therefore be assumed that China is willing to use force if it believes a red line has been crossed. 

From Beijing’s perspective, the actions of President Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are moving towards those red lines, if not yet crossing them. While Beijing has long viewed the DPP as separatist, it views Lai with particular hostility due to his outspoken criticism of China and perceived ‘pro-independence’ agenda. Lai’s efforts to crack down on Chinese infiltration and influence operations, including his labelling of China as a ‘hostile foreign force’, has been met with condemnation, warnings and heightened Chinese military activity around the island.

Given the importance Beijing attaches to reunification and how explicit it has been about its red lines, failure to act would be a major blow to China’s credibility. 

This is compounded by recent shifts in US language which have similarly angered Beijing. The US State Department removed language stating that it does not support Taiwanese independence from its website, and a recent G7 statement omitted the typical iteration of support for a ‘one China policy’, a diplomatic acknowledgment of Beijing’s position that Taiwan is not an independent country. 

These shifts could contribute to a perception in Beijing that the US is moving away from its policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – not committing explicitly to the island’s defence in the hope of containing both Chinese aggression and Taiwanese pursuit of formal independence. The apparent lack of consensus on Taiwan within the Trump administration presents a risk – if Beijing thinks decisive US commitment to Taiwan is on the cards, but not yet explicit, it may perceive a limited window in which it can act before the US adopts a clear policy.

Chinese military preparations

Beijing has long sought the capacity to conquer Taiwan militarily if necessary; the guiding principle of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization has been to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan involving the United States. 

China’s development of material capabilities such as the new D-Day-style landing barges, and the PLA’s focus on interoperability between the navy, air force and rocket force, are part of this modernization – although they do not in themselves indicate that war is imminent.

What is concerning is the frequency and intensity of PLA actions in the context of a shift in Taiwanese political opinion and a US position of ambiguity which is of diminishing strategic value. Perceived provocations by Lai and the US are now routinely met with actions such as exercises, unannounced live fire drills and undersea cable cutting. 

China is normalizing PLA activity around the island, including joint combat patrols designed to improve coordination between the different armed services. While this forms part of Beijing’s greyzone strategy, their increasing frequency puts pressure on Taiwan to respond, which in turn prompts a stronger Chinese response. In this context, the risk of escalation to actual conflict is heightened.

The role of the US remains the decisive challenge for Beijing

Beijing’s preparations indicate that it still takes the possibility of US involvement in a conflict seriously. The new barges expand the range of plausible sites for an amphibious landing, complicating Taiwanese and US defence planning. New cable-cutting technology would enhance Beijing’s ability to cut communications to and from the island. Meanwhile, the trend towards continuous Chinese air and naval activity around the island means the PLA is in a position to rapidly switch from greyzone actions to a genuine blockade or preparations for an invasion. 

This all suggests China is moving to a state of readiness to rapidly capture Taiwan and dominate its surrounding waters and airspace in the event of a conflict. Beijing’s aim would likely be to do this before the US can effectively mobilize a response – the normalization of patrols could make it more difficult to identify when greyzone activity has shifted to full-scale conflict.

This would also help China deter US involvement. Militarily, running an established Chinese blockade backed by PLA air superiority would be difficult. A subsequent successful Chinese landing on Taiwan would shift the task of the US from preventing an invasion to one of liberating the island. Were China to act quickly, such actions would be far harder to sell politically in Washington.

Moving on from ‘strategic ambiguity’

Once China is confident that it can take Taiwan or establish sufficient naval and air superiority to prevent timely intervention by the US, strategic ambiguity will lose its value – it would make sense for China to take the gamble knowing it would likely succeed. If the US is serious about defending Taiwan and deterring a Chinese attack, it should discard strategic ambiguity and make that explicit.

If the US is serious about defending Taiwan and deterring a Chinese attack, it should discard strategic ambiguity and make that explicit.

This would at least make Beijing reconsider. However, it would need to be backed up by credible deterrence. The balance of power is shifting in China’s favour due to its proximity to Taiwan, its enormous shipbuilding capacity and the advantages that would bring in a protracted conflict, and its increasingly sophisticated weapon systems.

Serious US deterrence therefore requires a demonstrable ability to move adequate forces to the region, backed up by an industrial strategy that can close the ‘ship gap’. These are steep requirements. The ultimate question is whether Washington cares as much about Taiwan as Beijing does.