China is gradually and cautiously expanding its presence in the Black Sea region. Beijing and Moscow share a strategic objective in seeking to push back Western influence, with China emerging as one of the key enablers of Russia’s war effort.However, their relationship may become more competitive, as Black Sea littoral states increasingly welcome Chinese economic engagement.
China plays a role in the Black Sea region that constitutes both an advantage and a potential long-term challenge for Russia. The two countries have a shared desire to reduce the US hegemony and push back against the promotion of Western democracy, with the aim of limiting interference in their domestic affairs. They reinforce each other’s narratives on the need to ‘democratize’ the international order, protect state sovereignty and respect each other’s interests in their respective spheres of influence. Despite China’s unease about forceful revision of borders and disruption of supply chains, Beijing has thrown a lifeline to Russia in its war against Ukraine. China’s support has significantly undermined both the intent and the impact of the Western sanctions regime, providing Russia with more than 80 per cent of dual-use goods to sustain its war machinery. While respecting Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Black Sea, China’s economic footprint is steadily growing and is largely welcomed by the states in the region.
One of China’s key advantages over Russia is its lack of historical baggage in the region. Unlike Moscow, which is often viewed with suspicion due to its imperial legacy, China is generally perceived as a politically neutral and non-threatening actor, offering attractive investments, particularly in infrastructure and economic development. Like Russia, China does not concern itself with domestic governance models or human rights standards. Its loans and investments come with few strings attached and no standard requirements in contrast to European financing. Unlike Russia, however, China is not associated with territorial ambitions, making it more widely welcomed by populations across Black Sea states. In Romania, for instance, positive interactions with China during the Ceaușescu era – particularly the president’s role in Sino-US normalization – continue to shape favourable public perceptions of China. Even in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s open support for Russia in the war, there has been relatively little anti-Chinese sentiment. Although the attitude may be changing after the revelations of Chinese soldiers fighting in Ukraine, many Ukrainians had hoped that China could play a constructive role in securing a lasting peace.
Ukraine has welcomed China’s Belt and Road Initiative and attracted Chinese investments in infrastructure projects, deepening cooperation even after the annexation of Crimea, which China does not officially recognize. China is interested in Ukraine as a destination for Chinese goods and for its rail and maritime links. In a move for greater diversification and to try to reduce its reliance on Russia, China became one of the main importers of Ukrainian agricultural goods. Ukraine’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU, which came into force in 2017 became one of the main attractions for Chinese investments looking for access to the EU market. Despite China’s support for Russia in the war, there are discussions about involving Chinese companies in Ukraine’s reconstruction, potentially as a means of deterring Russia’s continued aggression and hybrid operations.
For smaller states such as Georgia, China serves as an attractive counterbalance to both Russia and the West, providing leverage for political bargaining. China also offers an alternative source of investment and economic partnership, helping to mitigate anti-Russian sentiment domestically. The Georgian government has deepened its ties with China through a strategic partnership agreement, bringing Chinese investments into key infrastructure projects – including the deep-sea port at Anaklia. The decision to select a Sino-Singaporean consortium for Anaklia’s construction, despite objections from the US and the EU, was partly framed as an insurance policy against potential Russian subversion. Georgian officials argued that Chinese investment in the project would serve as a stronger deterrent against Russian interference than European involvement, as Moscow would be less likely to challenge an initiative backed by China.
For China, Georgia is attractive as an investment destination due to its geographic location and connectivity potential. The port of Anaklia would provide Beijing with a major strategic entry point to the Black Sea and an asset in the Middle Corridor linking China to Europe. Moscow probably dislikes such a strategic footprint from Beijing in the Black Sea, but it does not view this as posing a security threat or an immediate challenge. For Russia, the main struggle is with the West. For this reason, Beijing remains a partner, as it has proven to be in the Ukraine War. Moreover, Russia is reassured by a shared attitude towards the West and growing political and ideological alignment with China.
Likewise, Beijing–Ankara relations are gaining new momentum. Turkey plays a pivotal role in the Middle Corridor and is becoming an increasingly important trade partner for China. Chinese car manufacturers are establishing major production facilities in Turkey, taking advantage of its skilled workforce, strategic geographic location and customs union with the European Union. However, despite growing economic ties, Turkey–China relations still lack strategic depth. The significant presence of the Uyghur community in Turkey and the strong public sympathy for their plight mean that the potential for a deeper relationship between Beijing and Ankara is likely to be limited.
China is gradually and cautiously expanding its presence in the Black Sea region, ensuring that its actions do not directly challenge Russian interests. Some states, such as Romania, maintain cordial relations with China, yet remain cautious about allowing Chinese investment in critical infrastructure. Bucharest, in particular, has aligned closely with the US position on China and has exercised restraint in deepening economic ties. In Bulgaria, China has signalled its interest in port infrastructure, although significant investments have yet to materialize. In the long run, China could pose a challenge to Russian influence in the region. Growing power asymmetry between the two countries and evident interest from the Black Sea states in the potential for Chinese economic cooperation may bring about more competition between Moscow and Beijing. For states in the Black Sea region, China offers more attractive economic opportunities than Russia without being associated with Moscow’s neo-imperial agenda. For China, Russia’s anti-Western posture is more important than its anti-Ukraine policy. It is the global consideration and the logic of great power competition that bring Beijing and Moscow closer together, not each side’s policies towards their extended neighbourhood. This latter point is likely to induce more strains in the two countries’ relations. Moreover, China’s strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity reassures Black Sea states, many of which have experienced Russian violations of these very principles.
