|
|
|
|
|
Political/diplomatic
|
- Authoritarian/hybrid regimes
- Anti-establishment/nationalist/pro-Russian parties
- Elite capture and strategic corruption
- Election interference
- Protracted conflicts/occupation regimes
- Divergent threat perceptions among NATO allies
- Turkey’s previous discontent with the West and its hedging strategy
- Russia-led regional integration projects
- Potential US withdrawal from Europe/transatlantic rift
- Chinese support
|
- Attraction to EU/NATO
- Enduring trust in NATO deterrence
- Local pro-democracy sentiment/resistance movements
- Turkey’s support for Ukraine
- China’s dual role/growing local attraction to China
- Failure of Russian-led projects
- Increasing convergence around the Russian threat
- Cost of supporting de facto statelets.
|
|
Informational/ideological
|
- Anti-liberalism/threat to traditional values narrative
- Rising anti-Western nationalism
- Orthodox Church, especially in Bulgaria and Georgia
- Media influence/information laundering (the surfacing of content created by Russia in the mainstream media)
- Historical narratives
- Information operations/fake news
|
- Growing awareness/resilience to Russian malign influence
- Negative historical memories/Russian imperialism
- Consolidation of Ukrainian national identity
- Ideological competition/convergence with Trump-era US
- Restrictions on Russian media
|
|
Military/security
|
- Black Sea Fleet; naval bases; regional troop presence/‘peacekeeping’/military bases
- NATO’s naval restrictions
- Investment in and modernization of the military
- Expanding military-industrial complex
- Lessons from Ukraine/battle-trained army
|
- Weakened Black Sea Fleet
- More effective Ukrainian drones and military innovation
- Loss of Tartus base, Syria
- Military-technological advantages
- Rising European defence investments
- Improved cybersecurity
|
|
Economic
|
- Civil ports
- Energy infrastructure
- Trade and energy dependencies
- Grain exports and energy flows
- Legacy economic/business ties
- Control of critical infrastructure
|
- EU integration prospects; increased trade
- Middle Corridor
- Underwater electricity cable
- Connectivity projects
- China’s growing interest/investments
|
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Table 1 illustrates that while Russia has amassed significant leverage for power projection, it also faces substantial constraints. However, Moscow has demonstrated a greater ability to capitalize on its strengths and opportunities to advance its interests. As a centralized, authoritarian state with minimal domestic accountability, Russia can formulate and pursue its objectives with greater clarity and determination. In contrast, the constraints Russia faces are primarily imposed by a less efficient, fragmented coalition of states and multilateral organizations, such as NATO and the EU, which often struggle with coordination and a unified strategic vision. For example, there is still no NATO Black Sea strategy even though the strategic relevance of the Black Sea for the alliance is no longer in doubt.
After years of strategic neglect, the EU unveiled its Black Sea strategy in May 2025. Central to the plan is the creation of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, aimed at providing enhanced monitoring and early warning of emerging threats and malign activities in the region. The hub may also play a role in overseeing the implementation of any future ceasefire or peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. In addition, the strategy outlines investments in regional infrastructure to improve military mobility and strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture. If effectively implemented, the initiative could constrain Russia’s subversive activities and foster a more coordinated response among EU member states. However, key operational details remain unresolved – including the location of the security hub and the mechanisms by which early warning will trigger timely and credible action.
Furthermore, different members of the Euro-Atlantic community have traditionally had contrasting and varying threat perceptions of Russia, limiting the effectiveness of their collective response. While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to an unprecedented level of alignment – solidifying a shared view that Russia is Europe’s principal threat – there is a strong likelihood that divisions will resurface once hostilities subside. Differing perspectives on how to re-engage with Russia may lead to renewed fractures within the Euro-Atlantic community, weakening its long-term strategic coherence.
A new opportunity for Russia is growing tension in the transatlantic relationship itself and the credibility of US commitments to European security. While there are ongoing efforts to strengthen NATO’s European pillar and enhance Europe’s defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US, forging a consensus on how the EU can step up as an independent centre of power remains a long-term challenge. Many European states, particularly those in the territorial vicinity of Russia, such as Poland and the Baltic states, continue to prioritize the transatlantic link and remain sceptical of Europe’s potential to become an autonomous security actor. However, the Trump administration has signalled a reduced interest in maintaining previous levels of commitment to European security and has been reluctant to provide clear security guarantees for Ukraine or support a US backstop for a potential European peacekeeping mission. This has weakened NATO’s deterrence posture and raises doubts about the credibility of Article 5, potentially incentivizing Russia to test the alliance’s resolve and advance its long-standing objective of undermining NATO. A potential flashpoint for direct Russia–NATO confrontation remains in the Black Sea – where strategic tensions are already high, and the risk of escalation persists.
Thus far, Russia has welcomed signals from the Trump administration, particularly its reluctance to offer unconditional support for Ukraine and its moves to scale back democracy promotion programmes – initiatives that Moscow has long perceived as direct threats to its interests. The closure of programmes funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has had a devastating impact on civil society organizations across the Black Sea region, weakening domestic resistance to authoritarian tendencies and expanding opportunities for Russian influence projection. Moreover, the emerging political divide between the US and European partners as well as disagreement over the Ukraine peace negotiations have created the perception of a growing rift in the transatlantic alliance, leading to speculation about the end of what Moscow calls the collective West. For Russia, this would be a major gain and a step towards realizing its vision of a multipolar non-Western world.
The emerging political divide between the US and European partners as well as disagreement over the Ukraine peace negotiations have created the perception of a growing rift in the transatlantic alliance, leading to speculation about the end of what Moscow calls the collective West.
However, Trump’s embrace of an anti-woke agenda – including criticism of what is perceived as excessively liberal societal norms – has paradoxically blunted one of Russia’s key ideological tools. By adopting a similar stance on social conservatism, the Trump administration has challenged Russia’s monopoly on anti-liberalism, making it more difficult for Moscow to frame opposition to liberal values as inherently anti-Western or anti-US. Additionally, various conservative political actors across the Black Sea region – who previously aligned their interests and political identities with Russia – have increasingly gravitated towards the Trump administration, eager to secure its favour. This shift has introduced a new dimension to ideological competition, complicating Russia’s efforts to position itself as the principal defender of traditional values against Western liberalism.
The above example demonstrates that certain opportunities or advantages identified in Table 1 can function simultaneously as vulnerabilities and vice versa. In another example, while Russia has expanded its military bases in unrecognized breakaway entities in the Black Sea region and taken advantage of them for its military and political purposes, sustaining these facilities over the long term is costly. Financially, they represent an increasing burden, while politically, managing local regimes has become more challenging. Since the 2008 war with Georgia, Russia has invested considerable diplomatic capital in seeking international recognition for Abkhazia’s independence. Yet its strategy of effectively buying recognition has largely failed, securing support only from small island states and dependent partners: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Assad’s Syria, Vanuatu and Nauru. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has abandoned efforts to advance Abkhazia’s recognition and has instead focused on consolidating control over the region through political pressure and economic means. However, this has faced strong resistance from the local population, civil society and opposition political parties. Russia’s financial and political priorities have shifted towards developing Crimea and other annexed Ukrainian territories, leaving Abkhazia with diminished support and rising local discontent. Abkhazia’s geopolitical utility as leverage over Georgia is reaching its limits, while the political and financial liabilities for Moscow are growing.
A similar pattern is emerging in Transnistria (Moldova), where Russia’s support for the separatist regime has been dwindling, as its focus on Ukraine has trumped other priorities. Although Russia still maintains troops there – reportedly numbering around 1,000–1,500 after a recent troop reduction from a high of 5,500–6,000, with only 200–300 actual Russian peacekeepers – most of the force consists of locally recruited Transnistrian personnel. Transnistria lacks a direct border with Russia, yet it functions as leverage over Moldova and Romania, which would increase significantly if Russia were to seize Odesa and become an immediate neighbour of Moldova. At present, this is not a realistic prospect. However, Odesa holds immense strategic value for Russia. Should an opportunity to seize it arise, Moscow would be unlikely to let it pass. The city is not only deeply embedded in Russia’s neo-imperial imagination, but it also represents a critical asset that could significantly enhance Russia’s global economic influence.
