There can be no credible counterbalancing of Russia in the Black Sea without a Ukraine that has a Black Sea coastline. Therefore, the defence of Odesa should form the basis of any joint counterbalancing strategy aimed at preventing Russian domination of the Black Sea. With a reduced US focus in the region, cooperation among major EU members, the UK and Turkey is essential.
In the Russian worldview, multipolarity is not merely about the distribution of power among several global actors, but rather about the legitimacy of exclusive spheres of influence as the fundamental organizing principle of international politics. The existence of multiple centres of power and gravity in global affairs, from Moscow’s perspective, inherently means that each is entitled to its own geopolitical domain. Rather than promoting a universal and rules-based order, Russia envisions a world of ‘multi-ordering’, in which different power centres maintain their own normative and political ecosystems.
In the Russian lexicon, multipolarity and multi-ordering are effectively interchangeable. This worldview merges the 19th-century imperial logic of spheres of influence with the 20th-century Cold War-style ideological bifurcation, where there are two or more simultaneous systems of international governance. Russia does not simply seek a seat at the table of great powers – it seeks recognition of its own normative and geopolitical space. Within this framework, dominance over the Black Sea is viewed as essential for reconstituting Russia’s imperial sphere of influence, affirming its great power status, and enabling power projection into adjacent theatres such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond. Accordingly, Russia’s posture in the Black Sea encapsulates its concept of an imperial national identity, regional hegemony and global ambition.
Instead of envisioning a cooperative regional security system, Russia’s concept of regional order in the Black Sea hinges on a de facto condominium with Turkey along Cold War-era lines: Moscow controlling the north and Ankara the south. Central to this vision is the subordination of non-NATO regional states to Russian influence. In essence, Moscow’s security logic necessitates the insecurity of its neighbours – particularly those outside NATO’s protective umbrella – as Russia’s approach is rooted not in mutual security or regional ownership, but in domination. Regional ownership for Russia means keeping external actors outside of the Black Sea, and not constructing an order premised on the cooperation of sovereign, equal and independent littoral states. Even during the Cold War, when the regional system was split, the Soviet Union maintained overarching supremacy in the Black Sea.
This foundational outlook continues to inform Russia’s Black Sea strategy. Going forwards, Moscow is likely to deny agency to non-NATO littoral states, seek to reconstitute its regional power, assert strategic supremacy and use the Black Sea as a launchpad for influence into adjacent theatres. This hegemonic vision leaves no room for a genuinely cooperative regional architecture or inclusive security arrangements. In this context, strategies based on containment or counterbalancing – whether through hard power or softer-power mechanisms of deterrence and resilience – remain the most viable means to prevent Russian domination in the region.
Regional littoral states may pursue effective issue-based and time-bound cooperation or counterbalancing strategies vis-à-vis Russia – the demining taskforce between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria is a case in point. This framework could serve as a model for cooperation in other areas, including offshore energy exploration activities. Yet, Black Sea states are unlikely to agree on and maintain a long-lasting containment policy towards Moscow. Not least because Turkey and Russia appear set to remain committed to their shared position on keeping the non-littoral NATO presence out of the Black Sea.
Against the backdrop of these constraints, the following three policies are of utmost importance for the West: investment in military capabilities of the littoral states (including NATO engaging in more military capacity-building activities), the creation of new NATO strategies to boost its presence in the Black Sea beyond the maritime realm, and support for Ukraine that ensures it remains a Black Sea country with a formidable naval power. Given its demand for Ukraine’s demilitarization, Russia will strongly object to this last point. This might even trigger Moscow to make another bid to take over Odesa and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea completely. There can be no credible counterbalancing of Russia in the Black Sea without a Ukraine that has a Black Sea coastline. Therefore, the defence of Odesa should form the basis of any joint counterbalancing strategy aimed at preventing Russian domination of the Black Sea, both by the littoral states as well as by NATO/European powers.
At a time when the US has publicly stated its aims to downsize its security commitments in Europe, including in the Black Sea, cooperation among major EU members, the UK and Turkey is essential. The Trump administration has ruled out a NATO mission in Ukraine. Similarly, beyond the littoral member states, as indicated above, Ankara opposes an expanded NATO presence in the Black Sea while also rejecting the prospect of Russia’s dominance. Thus, Ankara’s strategic interests align with maintaining a balance of power, supporting Ukrainian capabilities and counterbalancing Russia’s bid for hegemony without escalating NATO involvement. Given the potential US withdrawal, there is a need to enhance foreign and security policy cooperation among NATO’s EU and non-EU members. A strong Ukraine, backed by European support and regional partnerships, is central to ensuring Black Sea security.
The emerging political divide between the US and European partners as well as disagreement over the Ukraine peace negotiations have created a perception of a growing rift in the transatlantic alliance, leading to speculation about the end of what Moscow calls the collective West.
For Europe and NATO to gain a better understanding of the implications of Russian policy in the Black Sea, it is critical to comprehend Russia’s consistency in its motives and vision for the Black Sea region and beyond. The war in Ukraine may have redefined Russia’s strategy and instruments, but not its fundamental objectives and vision. One of the main goals has been to prevent the integration of the Black Sea region into the European and Western domain. Consequently, Russia will probably be more hostile to Ukraine’s membership of the EU than Moscow’s rhetoric suggests. Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to offer credible and sustained commitments to Ukraine and other Black Sea countries.
For Russia, the war is a bid to remake its own neighbourhood, particularly the former Soviet republics, in its own image. If Moscow emerges victorious, or at least is perceived as such, it will have severe consequences for those countries in Russia’s so-called ‘near abroad’. Countries such as Armenia and Kazakhstan will have no choice but to toe the Russian line. The Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia are intimately interconnected in Russia’s emerging new neighbourhood strategy. This reality should also inform the European response, including that of the UK and Turkey, in both devising and interconnecting neighbourhood policies towards the same regions. In the long run, Moscow may also need to navigate China’s growing interests in the Black Sea, as Beijing expands its economic and strategic footprint in the region.
To summarize, the regional order around the Black Sea is becoming increasingly fragmented, dynamic and competitive. The balance of power is shifting rapidly in response to both local and global developments. With Russia’s resources stretched in Ukraine, Turkey’s rising ambitions, and growing interconnections between different theatres of geopolitical contestation, the Black Sea region is emerging as a microcosm of multipolarity. Russia is actively working to shape the new regional order in ways that serve its strategic interests and reinforce its global agenda. To achieve this, Moscow seeks to secure its territorial gains along Ukraine’s Black Sea coast; neutralize Ukraine’s capacity as a regional competitor; ensure Turkey’s cooperation premised on keeping extra-regional actors, including non-littoral NATO countries, outside of the maritime domain in the Black Sea – with an aim to return NATO’s presence there to its pre-2022 levels.
