Russia’s drive to dominate the Black Sea is a core component of its broader global agenda. The region serves as a critical hub for East–West connectivity and a strategic launchpad for Russian power projection into the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. However, two wartime constraints have tempered Russia’s ambitions: Ukraine’s unexpected naval successes and Ankara’s closure of the Turkish Straits in accordance with the Montreux Convention.
The capacity to project power across multiple regional theatres beyond one’s immediate neighbourhood is a defining feature of a great power – something that distinguishes global players from regional ones. For Russia, the Black Sea is not merely a natural sphere of influence and domination; it is a strategic platform essential to its global ambitions. A prime example is the Mediterranean. Over the past decade, Russia’s increased involvement in the Middle East – particularly in Syria – has marked a significant expansion of its presence in the Mediterranean, fulfilling long-standing geopolitical aspirations of securing access to warm waters. This enhanced posture has allowed Moscow to challenge European security from both the eastern and southern flanks, forming a key component of its broader confrontation with the West. Crucially, Russia’s maritime reach in the Mediterranean is heavily reliant on the operational strength of its Black Sea Fleet, which serves as a logistical and strategic backbone for deployments beyond the region.
Additionally, Russia’s quest to dominate the Black Sea and elevate its status in the Mediterranean occurred simultaneously. Beyond its naval modernization and buildup after the 2000s, fuelled by an influx of oil and gas revenue, Moscow sought to assert control over the Black Sea during the Georgia War in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Ukraine War in 2022. Likewise, in 2013, Russia established its Mediterranean squadron. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria, influencing the trajectory of this civil war until the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024. The former Syrian regime rewarded Russia for its military support by allowing the expansion of Moscow’s previously modest Tartus naval base into a more significant facility, which accommodated two Russian submarines (until the fall of Assad) and provided maintenance services for Russia’s Mediterranean squadron. This arrangement enabled the Russian navy to remain in the region longer without having to return to the Black Sea for maintenance. This base was a crucial access hub for the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa (particularly Sudan), Libya and West Africa. Furthermore, as an added benefit of its intervention in Syria, Russia acquired the coastal Hmeimim Airbase, which has proven vital for its operations in Syria and the broader Middle East and served as a transit hub for Moscow’s power projection and activities in Africa. A Turkish scholar, illustrating how interconnected these various arenas are in the West–Russia confrontation, asserted that Russia played a role in fomenting anti-French coups in the Sahel – in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – partially in response to French policy regarding the Ukraine War.
Over the last decade, Moscow has not only gained momentum in the Mediterranean, Sahel and Africa, but it has also experienced a significant boost in its relations with the broader Middle East, particularly with the Gulf states. Russia has invested in improving relations with Middle Eastern countries and the Global South more broadly as a means to avoid international isolation, to circumvent international sanctions and to put additional pressure on the West. For instance, in 2017, the current Saudi King became the first-ever Saudi monarch to visit Moscow. In relation to growing global multipolarity, many regional actors have begun to view Moscow, especially in matters of security and geopolitics, as a pole that complements the new multipolar Middle East.
Such perceptions of Russia have reshaped these regional actors’ policies towards Moscow and the West. Russia’s role in regional security and its perception among regional elites partially accounts for Middle Eastern states’ neutrality regarding the Ukraine War, despite Western lobbying for these states to adopt a more pro-Ukraine stance. Additionally, to incentivize these states to maintain their neutrality, Moscow permitted them to assume various roles in the Ukraine War, from humanitarian to diplomatic. For example, in August 2023, Saudi Arabia convened a peace summit on the Ukraine War in Jeddah. On 18 February 2025, US secretary of state Marco Rubio and Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov met in Riyadh. It should be added, however, that after the Trump administration assumed power in the US, it also permitted these countries to play these convening roles.
Two countries that will be particularly vulnerable to developments in the Black Sea are Georgia and Armenia. The future of regional (dis)order in the Black Sea will directly impact the domestic political order in these two countries and their geopolitical identity.
The Black Sea is also a stepping stone into the geopolitics of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, enabling Russia to directly challenge European security. In this context, Moldova is particularly vulnerable, due to its proximity to Odesa, if Russia succeeds in its aspiration to take over Odesa and cut off Ukraine (and by extension Moldova) from the Black Sea. Not only will this put the future of Ukraine’s statehood in grave danger, but it will also have profound ripple effects on the security of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Similarly, the Black Sea has intimate linkages with the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Two countries that will be particularly vulnerable to developments in the Black Sea are Georgia and Armenia. The future of regional (dis)order in the Black Sea will directly impact the domestic political order in these two countries and their geopolitical identity.
Moreover, the Black Sea is not only a gateway to other regions, but it is also a crucial hub for East–West connectivity projects. The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), serves as a prime example. Connectivity and major infrastructure projects are new arenas in great power competition. They are reshaping global trade and supply chains, thereby redefining geopolitics.
The Middle Corridor connects the Chinese market to that of Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Turkey. It represents the shortest route for cargo shipments between Western China and Europe. However, this route still accounts for only a fraction of cargo shipments that traverse the more established routes: the northern route (via Russia and Belarus) and the maritime route (via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal).
In recent years, this corridor has gained additional attention and cargo shipments have increased. Firstly, the Ukraine war led European nations to impose sanctions on Russia, significantly decreasing cargo shipments between China and Europe via the northern route. With Russia–Europe tensions expected to continue for an extended period, this route is likely to be fraught with geopolitical uncertainty.
Secondly, the current conflict in Gaza and the Yemeni Houthis’ attacks on ships have increased the security risks along the maritime route. This has caused delays or rerouting of cargo shipments between China, East Asia and Europe. Given the ongoing conflict and crises in the Middle East, it is reasonable to assume that the geopolitical and security risks for the maritime route connecting East Asia and Europe will persist in the years to come.
The Black Sea is crucial for Russia to maintain its influence over the connectivity between Europe and East Asia, hinder the logistical and supply chain integration of Russia’s neighbourhood with Europe, and undermine connectivity projects that exclude Russia.
As a result, these factors have significantly boosted the volume of cargo shipments through the Middle Corridor route. Amid escalating tensions between Europe and Russia, a major advantage of this route is that it circumvents Russian territory and enhances logistical and supply chain connections between Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region – in other words, between Europe and Russia’s neighbourhood. These regions are rich in critical raw materials and energy resources vital to the European economy. The Middle Corridor links Europe primarily through two key points: the Black Sea route (by sea) and Turkey (by land). Should Russia assert dominance in the Black Sea or reposition its Black Sea Fleet there, it could pose a significant security threat to these connectivity projects. Thus, the Black Sea is crucial for Russia to maintain its influence over the connectivity between Europe and East Asia, hinder the logistical and supply chain integration of Russia’s neighbourhood with Europe, and undermine connectivity projects that exclude Russia.
Russia’s wartime challenges in the Black Sea
Two factors currently constrain Russia in the Black Sea. Despite its limited comparative size and capacities, Ukraine’s effective naval campaign has destroyed roughly one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and forced Russian vessels to retreat from Sevastopol in the southwest of Crimea. Furthermore, Turkey’s strict enforcement of the Montreux Convention has blocked the movement of belligerent military vessels through the Bosphorus Strait during the war. While this has limited NATO’s access to the Black Sea, it has also prevented Russia from reinforcing its fleet and curbed its offensive capabilities.
Russia has traditionally supported Turkey’s strict interpretation and application of the Montreux Convention, consistently warning against any attempts to revise it under pressure from NATO allies. In the context of the war in Ukraine, both Russia and Ukraine found Turkey’s closure of the straits to be in their strategic interest. For Russia, the move limited NATO’s naval operations in the Black Sea, restricting the deployment of additional allied vessels and helping to contain Western military influence in the region. For Ukraine, it prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet, thereby allowing Kyiv to degrade Russian naval capabilities and effectively neutralize the threat of large-scale amphibious assaults. With limited options for naval reinforcement, Moscow prioritized the preservation of its remaining fleet, reducing its operational aggression at sea.
Russia, therefore, would benefit more than Ukraine from a proposed ceasefire at sea, which would impose limitations on Ukraine’s military capabilities, while simultaneously pressuring Ankara to open the straits. The Russian Navy operates four main fleets – the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific – alongside the Caspian Flotilla. Of these, the Black Sea and Baltic fleets are currently under the greatest strain. The Black Sea Fleet has been significantly degraded by the war in Ukraine, while the Baltic Fleet now faces heightened pressure following Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, which has dramatically reduced Russia’s strategic depth in the region.
Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia had six submarines assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, with four based in the Black Sea and two stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean, operating out of Tartus, Syria. Since the war began: one submarine in the Black Sea has been sunk, three remain but are reportedly poorly maintained, and the two in Syria were forced to withdraw due to the collapse of the Assad regime with limited prospect of return – a major blow to Russia’s Eastern Mediterranean posture. However, these submarines cannot return to the Black Sea, as long as the straits remain closed per the Montreux Convention. A ceasefire would provide Russia with the opportunity to demand that Ankara reopen the straits for Russian ships, allowing them to replenish and reinforce its weakened fleet. If Turkey were to succumb to such pressure, it is unlikely that the country would shift its position on restricting NATO operations in the Black Sea.
As ceasefire negotiations gain momentum, international efforts must prioritize the restoration and long-term security of Ukraine’s export capacity via the Black Sea.
Turkey, however, has strong grounds to resist such a request. It can – and arguably should – maintain that a ceasefire, particularly a temporary or tactical one, does not constitute the end of hostilities, and therefore does not meet the legal criteria for reopening the straits. Until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached, reopening the straits would risk enabling Russia to rebuild its naval power in the Black Sea and prepare for the next phase of the conflict. Moreover, with new assets at its disposal, Russia would be positioned to reassert control over trade flows, threatening Ukraine’s economic viability. Having failed to seize Odesa and choke off Ukraine, Moscow is likely to continue its efforts by other means, including forms of economic blockade. As ceasefire negotiations gain momentum, international efforts must prioritize the restoration and long-term security of Ukraine’s export capacity via the Black Sea. As the latest RUSI report aptly states, ‘there is no security guarantee for Ukraine to hold if the country’s economic lifeline through the Black Sea region cannot be guaranteed.’ Ultimately, the balance of power between Ankara and Moscow in the Black Sea remains fluid and dynamic, shaped by broader developments in the war, regional alignments and shifting naval capabilities.
With Sweden and Finland becoming NATO members, Russia now finds itself increasingly squeezed in the Baltic Sea, further boosting the strategic importance of the region. Under pressure from Ukrainian drone attacks, Moscow has sought to establish a more secure base for parts of its fleet, initiating the construction of a naval base in Ochamchire, off the coast of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia. However, transforming this small, shallow port into a major fleet base requires significant investment and infrastructure development, delaying Russia’s goal of making it operational by the end of 2024.
Despite its current limitations, Ochamchire could still play a strategic role in the modernization of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as naval warfare evolves. Russia has been drawing lessons from its setbacks in the Black Sea and has already begun producing its own uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) and naval drones. Given the vulnerabilities exposed by the loss of the Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, and the difficulty of replacing large warships, Moscow is likely to prioritize a fleet composed of smaller, more agile vessels rather than relying on traditional ships susceptible to drone attacks. The Ochamchire naval base would be well-suited for housing and deploying such smaller vessels, making it an asset for Russia’s future maritime strategy. Additionally, Ochamchire’s proximity to the Georgian coast – particularly to Anaklia port, a key hub along the Middle Corridor – enhances Russia’s leverage not only over Georgia but also over regional energy and transport infrastructure. This positioning allows Moscow to exert greater influence on trade routes that are critical for connecting Europe and Central Asia, further embedding its strategic interests in the region. Russia’s broader naval modernization efforts, however, hinge on regaining secure access to Black Sea ports – a goal that depends on an end to the war and the reopening of maritime passage by Turkey.
For Russia, keeping the Black Sea free from extra-regional actors – particularly the US and other NATO allies – is of paramount strategic importance. This is one area where Russian and Turkish interests converge, aligning with Turkey’s long-standing concept of a regional order based on shared ownership. Despite the war in Ukraine, Ankara and Moscow have remained committed to this policy. As a result, growing calls from Western policymakers urging Turkey to reinterpret the Montreux Convention – in order to facilitate greater Western or NATO access to the Black Sea – are unlikely to succeed. Ankara is expected to maintain its current interpretation of the convention, continuing to restrict the presence of non-littoral states in the Black Sea and uphold the balance it has sought to preserve.
Moscow is also wary of expanding cooperation among NATO’s Black Sea littoral states, as it has thus far benefited from divergent threat perceptions of Russia and approaches to Black Sea security. For example, Russia viewed with suspicion the demining initiative led by three NATO littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), not necessarily because of its immediate effectiveness, but due to concerns that it could set a precedent for broader regional cooperation. Given the differing security priorities and threat perceptions among Black Sea littoral states, such initiatives have historically been difficult to sustain. The demining effort represents the first concrete partnership involving the three NATO countries in the Black Sea region and could serve as a model for future cooperation.
Romania, however, remains cautious about such ‘minilateral’ arrangements, fearing they could lead to a broader reduction of NATO’s engagement in the Black Sea. Instead, Romania prioritizes securing a stronger US presence – if not directly in the Black Sea, then at least through land-based deployments on Romanian territory. Russian interference in the most recent elections in Romania indicates that Moscow is willing to engineer political change in the country, as Russia considers Bucharest’s insistence on a greater US/NATO presence as a direct challenge to Moscow’s strategic interests and has issued warnings against it. Kremlin aide Nikolai Patrushev has asserted that Western powers are seeking to turn the Black Sea into an ‘internal NATO sea’, akin to the Baltic. Russia, he has vowed, ‘will not allow this to happen and will respond proportionally… [to a] direct security threat’. Beyond regional security concerns, Russia sees NATO’s growing interest in the Black Sea as part of a broader strategy to restrict Russia and curb its influence not only in the wider Black Sea region but also in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.
