Russia–Turkey relations are complex and do not fit neatly into categories of friends versus foes. Instead, the relationship is defined by compartmentalization and transactionalism. Despite the relatively close relations between the two nations, Russia is increasingly wary about Turkey’s improving ties
with the West.
Russia–Turkey relations have traditionally followed a predictable pattern. The two countries are inherently competitive, if not adversarial, though they cooperate when needed. This conventional dynamic shifted between 2016 and 2022, when collaboration in relatively non-sensitive sectors – such as energy, tourism and trade – extended into more strategic domains, including regional conflict management and defence cooperation. A notable example is Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system, which caused a significant rift with America and resulted in the US sanctioning a fellow NATO member. Both Turkey and Russia at times also adopted a similar narrative in rejecting the ‘unfair, unrepresentative, and Western-centric nature of the prevailing global order’. Turkey’s disillusionment with the West played a key role in drawing Ankara closer to Moscow. Additionally, the personal rapport between presidents Erdogan and Putin was instrumental in sustaining the bilateral relationship through various crises.
This unique period in relations has largely come to an end, particularly since the start of the Ukraine war. Subsequently, Ankara defied expectations by not pursuing the purchase of another item of sophisticated defence equipment from Moscow. Furthermore, the management of opposing interests in regional conflicts has also lost its relative significance, such as in Syria where Turkey-aligned groups toppled the former regime that was supported by Russia and Iran. Nonetheless, Russia–Turkey relations remain complex and do not fit neatly into categories of friends versus foes or partners versus rivals. Instead, the relationship is defined by compartmentalization and transactionalism. Despite its fragility, strong leadership diplomacy and pragmatic flexibility have enabled the continuation of ties, tested by a series of grave crises.
Although engagement between the two countries spans several regional theatres, the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula have historically been at the heart of their rivalry, making the region a microcosm of broader bilateral dynamics. In the Black Sea, Ankara has adopted a strategy that utilizes both counterbalancing and cooperation. Turkey maintains close relations with all Black Sea littoral states – while cautiously ensuring that its regional outreach is not perceived by Moscow as containment, which could provoke a hostile response. Measures to counterbalance Russian domination involve deeper cooperation with fellow littoral NATO members, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as NATO itself, through capacity-building efforts. Indeed, a former Turkish diplomat noted that NATO is becoming stronger in this region through its littoral member states. As long as these states remain protected by NATO’s Article 5 (the collective security article), Russia is unlikely to directly challenge their security.
Conversely, cooperation with Russia has traditionally included limiting access to the Black Sea for non-littoral actors, consistent with Turkey’s erstwhile notion of regional ownership. However, this form of cooperation has become increasingly untenable in light of Russia’s aggression and expansionist aims.
Despite the relatively close relations between the two nations, Russia is increasingly wary about Turkey’s improving ties with the West, particularly in the realms of security and geopolitics, as well as Turkey’s rising influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Plus, as pro-Turkey groups have overthrown the Russian-aligned Assad regime in Syria, there is greater potential for Turkey and the US to find common ground in Syria and beyond. Moreover, Turkey and Europe are likely to enhance their cooperation in foreign and security policy, with Ankara potentially serving as one of the key pillars of any emerging European security architecture. Russia is likely to view these developments with suspicion and concern.
In addition, Turkey is deepening its foothold in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which Russia perceives as areas of its traditional hegemony. What Turkey regards as the Turkic world, Russia views as its so-called ‘near abroad’. Again, Russia is highly sensitive about Ankara’s growing ties with countries in this area. For Russia, these developments collectively indicate that the special period in Russia–Turkey relations, which involved regional conflict management and defence cooperation, and was underpinned by a shared discontent with the West, has reached its limits. Going forwards, the competitive – at times adversarial – nature of Russia–Turkey relations is likely to become more conspicuous.
Despite this, Russia will strive to maintain close working relationships with Turkey for three main reasons. First, despite the latter’s NATO membership and EU candidacy, Moscow does not view Turkey as a Western country, which is valuable at a time when Russia sees itself engaged in a prolonged confrontation with the West. Second, in spite of deepening ties with the West, Moscow sees Turkey as an autonomous actor. This independence from the West is something that Moscow values.
Third, Moscow appreciates Turkey’s unique international position. It is a NATO member that could purchase the Russian S-400 missile system, refrain from joining Western sanctions, and maintain close relations with Moscow. Russia believes that this demonstrates a model or approach for other European states in the future.
The Ukraine War has been a watershed moment for Turkey’s relations with both Russia and the West. Initially, Turkey adopted a multi-layered, cautious approach: supporting Ukraine without overtly antagonizing Russia in a delicate balancing act between Moscow and the West. Once the war began, Ankara was among the first countries to deliver military items to Ukraine, but at the same time Turkey maintained close ties with Moscow. Arguably, Turkey’s decision to not join the West on sanctions against Russia, facilitated Ankara’s ability to play multiple roles in the war: diplomatic, humanitarian and geopolitical.
At the diplomatic level, Turkey convened Russian and Ukrainian delegations, including hosting the trilateral meeting of Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on 10 March 2022 in Turkey’s southern coastal city of Antalya. Ankara also facilitated the draft Istanbul Protocol, which was negotiated between Ukraine and Russia at the end of March 2022. While the draft agreement was ultimately rejected – by Ukraine but particularly by its Western partners, who saw it as capitulation – Turkey remains poised to revive its role should new diplomatic initiatives arise.
At a humanitarian level, in July 2022, Turkey, in collaboration with the UN, brokered a grain deal between Moscow and Kyiv. Considering that approximately 30 per cent of global grain exports traverse the Black Sea, this deal was crucial for international food security. In a similar vein, in January 2024, Turkey and other NATO littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania, established a taskforce to demine the Black Sea, which, among other benefits, enabled Ukraine to export its grain. Furthermore, on 1 August 2024, Turkish intelligence facilitated one of the largest prisoner swap deals between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.
While still avoiding open hostility towards Moscow, Turkey is increasingly aligning with Europe on matters of security and is becoming an integral part of the emerging European security architecture.
Geopolitically, Ankara’s closure of the Turkish Straits has significantly restricted Russia’s naval mobility, complicating efforts to rebuild its degraded Black Sea Fleet. Ankara’s ability to maintain positive relations with all major stakeholders – Ukraine, Russia, the US and Europe – enables it to play a multifaceted role. While still avoiding open hostility towards Moscow, Turkey is increasingly aligning with Europe on matters of security and is becoming an integral part of the emerging European security architecture.
Moreover, the war is redefining broader Turkey–Russia relations, shifting the power dynamics between the two. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow held supremacy in the Black Sea. However, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has lost its naval hegemony in the region, allowing the Turkish navy to gain more prominence there. After 2000, as revenues from the energy sector (oil and gas) began to flow in, Russia invested more in its navy, regained dominance and became more assertive. Additionally, the Georgia War of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 contributed to Russia’s consolidation of power in the Black Sea, though not to the levels during the Cold War. Meanwhile, in the last two decades, Turkey’s navy in the region was relatively modest and dispersed over a wide area, indicating that Ankara does not see Russia as an imminent threat, especially as long as the war in Ukraine continues.
The question of (inter)dependency in relations has also changed dynamically with each major new development. For instance, before the latest Nagorny Karabakh war (2020) or not least the Ukraine war, Moscow was the ultimate arbiter in the South Caucasus compared to Turkey, held a more dominant position in Syria and wielded significant influence in Libya. During this period, Russia was present on Turkey’s northern, southern and eastern borders, leaving Ankara feeling geopolitically squeezed and encircled. Cumulatively, these factors rendered Ankara more dependent and vulnerable in various conflicts and regional settings where both actors were operating. However, a series of recent developments – the Nagorny Karabakh war (2020), the Ukraine war (2022) and the downfall of the Assad regime (2024) – has strengthened Turkey. Consequently, Moscow is no longer reluctant to treat Turkey as an equal in the Black Sea.
Overall, the competitive aspect of Turkey–Russia relations has intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine. While Turkey’s ties with the West have improved, Russia’s relative strategic value to Ankara has declined. Growing concerns about Russian revisionism have elevated the perceived threat from Moscow. Preventing Russian domination of the Black Sea remains a key priority for Ankara. In line with this goal, in 2024 Ankara delivered two navy corvettes – a small class of warship – to Ukraine, and it is likely that more are under construction.
The reconfiguration of Europe’s security architecture, catalysed by the Ukraine war and potentially marked by reduced US engagement, has given Turkey a central role. The future of the Black Sea and Ukraine will be pivotal in this new order, and both are already subjects of dialogue between Turkey, Europe and the UK. While Moscow once exploited Turkey’s estrangement from the West, increasing cooperation between Ankara and Europe, alongside Turkish unease over Russian ambitions, is likely to push Turkey closer to the West.
