Russia is actively seeking to project influence among NATO’s Black Sea littoral states, with the aim of diminishing the alliance’s presence in the region and disrupting coordination among its coastal allies.
Of the three NATO littoral states in the Black Sea, Russia perceives Romania as a particular challenge to its position. This perception stems from Romania’s strong commitment to NATO and its persistent efforts to enhance the alliance’s presence in the region. Bucharest has actively pushed to elevate Black Sea security as a strategic priority for the US, NATO and the EU, advocating for a ‘comprehensive approach’ that extends beyond military considerations to include economic connectivity, environmental and energy security, and resilience-building. Since the annexation of Crimea – and especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – Romania’s threat perception of Russia has intensified. The proximity of active military operations and concerns over a potential spillover, whether through an accidental attack on Romanian territory (for example, the incident with the Russian drone that struck a Danube port), the flow of refugees, or a deliberate escalation, have heightened Bucharest’s security anxieties. Russia’s attempts at the start of the invasion to capture Snake Island and destroy the Zatoka Bridge (the only road link between Romania and Odesa) have reinforced fears that Moscow remains intent on capturing Odesa. If successful, this could enable Russia to reconnect with Transnistria (the landlocked region that is trying to break away from Moldova), creating a direct land border with Romania – an increasingly concerning prospect for Bucharest. While Russia’s capture of Odesa appears unlikely for the time being, Bucharest is worried about such a prospect, describing it as a ‘nightmare scenario’ for Romania.
Moscow, in turn, is also suspicious of what it views as Romania’s expansionist agenda – specifically, its alleged aspirations to incorporate Moldova (potentially including Transnistria) and extend its influence into Ukraine’s Odesa and Chernivtsi regions by leveraging Romanian-speaking minorities. Although the idea of Moldovan unification with Romania has largely lost traction – particularly after Romania acceded to the EU and NATO – Russia continues to invoke the myth of ‘Greater Romania’ as a persistent strategic objective of Bucharest. As one Russian publication put it, ‘Russia stands in the way of Romania pursuing its expansionist agenda’. Accordingly, Moscow views Bucharest’s close cooperation with Washington and its active role in Black Sea security initiatives as part of a strategy aimed at advancing Romanian interests at Russia’s expense.
In an effort to weaken Romania’s pro-NATO and pro-US consensus, Russia employs hybrid tactics, including election interference, disinformation operations and support for anti-liberal political groups and figures. As in other parts of Eastern Europe, Romania is experiencing a surge in conservative populism, driven by an anti-globalist and anti-liberal agenda – an ideological shift that Moscow seeks to exploit to further its strategic interests.
In an effort to weaken Romania’s pro-NATO and pro-US consensus, Russia employs hybrid tactics, including election interference, disinformation operations and support for anti-liberal political groups and figures.
Despite Romania’s substantial benefits from EU and NATO membership, nationalist sentiment with anti-Western overtones has been growing. This trend is fuelled by several factors: perceptions of Romania’s marginalization within the Euro-Atlantic community; resistance to rapid globalization and liberal norms perceived as a threat to traditional values; and anxiety over potential spillover effects from the war in Ukraine. Russia capitalizes on these sentiments, amplifying both anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives to foster public resentment towards Romania’s support for Ukraine. The meteoric rise of a previously unknown presidential candidate Calin Georgescu in 2024 is widely viewed as a product of Russia’s hybrid operations. However, his success also reflects a broader societal trend: the increasing appeal of strong, authoritarian-leaning personalities with nationalist and anti-Western agendas. Persistent economic disparities as well as an inequality of opportunities generated by European integration also fuel resentment and increase support for anti-establishment, populist leaders. This trend, however, coexists with a strong pro-European and pro-Western sentiment in society, especially among the urban youth, leading to deepening societal polarization.
Romania has had a complicated relationship with Ukraine, often shaped by disputes over Romanian minorities. One of Romania’s long-standing grievances has been what it perceives as an artificial division between Romanian and Moldovan communities in Ukraine. However, despite these historical tensions, Romanian authorities have chosen to set aside bilateral disputes and extend strong, albeit often underreported, support to Ukraine. The two governments signed a defence cooperation agreement in 2020 and have begun conducting regular exercises on the Danube.
At the same time, Romania harbours some concerns about Ukraine’s growing military strength, particularly the prospect of it becoming the largest, battle-hardened army in the Black Sea region after Russia. Nevertheless, Bucharest remains a firm supporter of Ukraine’s NATO membership, recognizing its strategic importance in countering Russian influence. Romania also fears that if Russia achieves its war objectives, a post-war Ukrainian regime could emerge that is nationalist, anti-Western and closely aligned with Moscow. Additionally, there are concerns over the potential infiltration of organized crime and large-scale refugee movements, both of which could destabilize Romania – creating vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit.
In Bulgaria, Russia maintains strong ties with local political and business elites, with one of its most effective tools being political influence. This is further reinforced by well-executed information operations that shape public perception in Russia’s favour. Unlike in other Eastern European states, there is little resentment towards Russia among the wider Bulgarian public, nor is there a strong perception of Russia as a direct threat to Bulgaria. Instead, Russia is often seen as a liberator against Turkish regional dominance, with a prevalence of positive historical narratives that cultivate pro-Russian sentiment. Both left-wing and nationalist political parties, along with influential public figures, frequently express sympathy for Russia and advocate against Western military aid to Ukraine, arguing that it only prolongs the conflict. The Kremlin’s portrayal of the war as a Western-provoked proxy war is widely echoed in the Bulgarian media, reinforcing the narrative that Moscow has a legitimate right to defend itself against NATO expansion.
As a result, Bulgaria’s participation in any coalition of the willing or peacekeeping operation in Ukraine is highly unlikely. Increasing defence spending remains one of the most contentious domestic issues, often weaponized as part of an anti-Western, pro-Russian discourse. Despite these dynamics, the Bulgarian government views Russia as an aggressive, revisionist power that poses a direct threat to Black Sea security. However, Bulgaria lacks the military capabilities to counter such threats effectively. Its naval capabilities are both weak and outdated. Sofia remains particularly concerned with the secondary risks associated with the war – such as floating mines, violations of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the activities of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, and the broader environmental impact on the Black Sea.
The success of Russian interference in Black Sea littoral states relies on three key foundations: a well-established reach into domestic areas, the strategic manipulation of existing vulnerabilities, and the cultivation of influential local proxies whose interests align with Moscow’s.
The success of Russian interference in Black Sea littoral states relies on three key foundations: a well-established reach into domestic areas (political, informational and economic), the strategic manipulation of existing vulnerabilities (social, ethnic and economic), and the cultivation of influential local proxies whose interests align with Moscow’s – whether or not they are explicitly pro-Russian. In some cases, such as Georgia, these proxies include ruling parties, while in others – like Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova – they are found within opposition forces. Some of these actors openly advocate for pro-Russian positions, while others do not. Yet, both serve Moscow’s interests, particularly in efforts to push back against Western influence in the region. Depending on circumstances, Russia’s interference can be overt or covert.
Russia exploits the principles of open competition, freedom of expression and media pluralism in target countries, leveraging these freedoms to conduct unhindered and highly effective information operations. A key feature of its strategy is the use of context-sensitive themes that resonate strongly with specific domestic audiences, often playing on fears, national pride and societal grievances. These narratives are further amplified by the interconnectedness of Kremlin-sponsored digital and social media content with mainstream media platforms. A study conducted by the Democracy Centre in Sofia revealed the most common themes used for manipulating public opinion in both Romania and Bulgaria, including: 1) accession to Schengen as humiliating and dangerous; 2) Ukrainian agricultural imports as cheap and threatening to domestic agricultural sector; 3) the inevitability of Russian victory and Ukraine being split up between Russia and neighbouring EU members; 4) oppression of Bulgarian and Romanian minorities by Kyiv; 5) Western-imposed ideology of liberalism and LGBTQ rights as threats to national sovereignty and traditional values.
Beyond these country-specific themes, Russia’s information operations across the broader Black Sea region frequently emphasize: the fear of war and the probability of spillovers into neighbouring states; NATO expansion as the root cause of the conflict; the EU as a force undermining national sovereignty; Western liberalism as a threat to national culture, religion and traditions; and the unreliability of the West as a security and economic partner. These narratives often originate on Kremlin-affiliated digital and social media platforms before being amplified by mainstream media. The extent of this interconnection varies across countries – appearing particularly strong in Bulgaria and Georgia, but less so in Romania. However, in all cases, this media ecosystem makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between legitimate reporting and information manipulation, effectively laundering Kremlin-backed narratives through different sources.
