The TikTok transfer raises worrying questions for allies like the UK

The US takeover may allay fears of Chinese influence. But it sends a worrying signal to allies who are increasingly dependent on US technology.

Expert comment

Published 3 October 2025 — 4 minute READ

Image — US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent during a press conference following trade talks with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on 15 September 2025. (Photo by THOMAS COEX/AFP via Getty Images)

Isabella Wilkinson

Research Fellow, Digital Society Programme

Rowan Wilkinson

Research Associate, Digital Society Programme

Social media app TikTok has secured a lifeline in the United States after years of hearings, regulatory battles and high-level talks between US and Chinese officials. A complex restructuring that transfers majority control to US is underway, with investors including technology company Oracle, investment firm Silver Lake, and Rupert Murdoch’s Fox Corp. 

President Donald Trump’s executive order certified the pending agreement as a ‘qualified divestiture’, legalizing the social media platform again by removing it from foreign adversary control (in this case, China).

The deal, led by US tech giant, Oracle, gives American companies approximately 65 per cent ownership of TikTok’s US operations, while ByteDance and other Chinese investors retain less than 20 per cent. As part of the new group of owners, Oracle will provide US cloud services and data storage in the US, and apparently receive a licensed copy of the app’s algorithm.

This US transfer is a significant shift in the company’s operations and an on-paper win for President Trump’s White House. But the optics mask a harsher truth.

Deeply rooted issues

Imposing majority US ownership – and going ‘American-operated all the way’ – is a big step. But it is by no means a silver bullet to address the threats TikTok, and similar platforms, present to US democracy and national security.

The deal has been framed as a major win for US technology sovereignty. Operating a US-licensed algorithm and storing user data on American soil might allay anxieties about potential Chinese Communist Party influence over the app’s American users. But long-standing problems remain.

The recommendation algorithms of social media platforms have political power. Research indicates that their design can result in polarization by creating echo chambers. This can limit political dialogue and a diversity of views. 

TikTok’s ‘For You’ function provides hyper-personalized content that is highly effective in maximizing user engagement. That has been good for business: the US firm will be valued at approximately $14 billion, with 63 per cent of US teenagers reporting use of the platform. 

Meanwhile 1 in 5 American adults regularly get their news from TikTok – a leap from 2020. The new US owners are unlikely to fundamentally change how TikTok’s recommendation algorithm works. The truth is an uncomfortable one, but long-known: what is bad for inclusive and secure online information spaces is often good for business. 

For years, experts and policymakers have warned that TikTok could be weaponized as a political tool. That risk assessment initially focused on claims about China’s access to TikTok user data, and the possibility the platform could be manipulated to spread disinformation and for political interference. 

Now the lens has shifted to focus on TikTok’s potential manipulation by US political actors. Announcing the deal, President Trump himself said ‘if I could, I’d make it 100 per cent MAGA-related’, though he went on to add that every group would be treated fairly.    

Regardless, it is unclear how the Trump administration will work with the seven members of US TikTok’s new board of directors. And it remains to be seen if and how the board will address the widely used platform’s existing flaws: TikTok is already a hotbed for mis- and disinformation, and not just in the US. 

US control over TikTok is not a fix-all for vulnerabilities in its fragile and divisive information environment.

The app’s new US owners may consider changes to US TikTok’s content moderation policies. But that could also be cause for concern. There is a risk that sidelining or deprioritizing efforts to moderate problematic content would further pollute an already volatile information space. Changes to rework content moderation on Twitter, now X, since Elon Musk’s takeover have been the subject of much criticism.

Whatever happens, US control over TikTok is not a fix-all for vulnerabilities in its fragile and divisive information environment.

Beyond TikTok

Trump’s executive order was released following US–China talks in which control over TikTok has been leveraged as part of broader national security, economic and trade negotiations. 

Having previously indicated that no deal was possible, China implied it felt coerced into deal-making in view of looming US tariffs. China’s top trade negotiator, Li Chenggang cited concerns of ‘unilateral bullying’, although some commentators have pointed out that China might draw out the approval timeline for the deal, using the delay to gain advantage.

US–China talks are tense at the best of times. But the deal aside, the TikTok ‘deal’ points to a degradation in diplomatic practice. Trump’s announcement was characteristically early and over-confident.

China’s formal announcements were careful and conditional, and still fall short of confirming whether the deal has been officially approved. Beyond the talks, both sides traded retaliatory measures, on export controls (US against a list of Chinese firms) and semiconductor chips (China against Nvidia). 

The Trump administration’s approach – using tariffs to demand concessions on technological governance issues – sends a worrying signal to allies already struggling to respond to the new tariff regime.

The view from London

The Trump administration’s America-First policies carry consequences for technology companies owned and operated by US rivals. But looking at the TikTok deal, US allies will also worry they could be forced into unequal deals that endanger their sovereignty and competitiveness. The new ownership structure testifies to the aligning interests of US technology giants and political power in Washington.

The UK’s approach to the second Trump administration has been one of flattery diplomacy, greater alignment and concessions. But even the ‘special relationship’ isn’t immune from the implications of the TikTok transfer.

The US–UK Technology Prosperity Deal, announced during the president’s state visit and including partnerships with companies like OpenAI, Nvidia, and Blackstone, moves the UK closer to a powerful group of US technology companies. Oracle’s involvement – having committed $5 billion to expand UK AI infrastructure – is a point of interest.

This convergence raises hard questions about the power of US-run companies embedded in UK technology infrastructure – whether data centres or social media – and what happens if their commercial and political interests are misaligned (at best) or detrimental (at worst) to UK interests.

Despite the Tech Prosperity Deal’s optics, UK–US technology tensions continue to simmer, particularly on online content. Prominent US Republicans have openly criticized UK regulation (namely, the Online Safety Act) as a threat to free speech. Were a dispute between the UK government and a US technology firm to escalate, it is increasingly difficult to predict how Washington would react. 

What functions as a viable commercial partnership today can become a political pressure point tomorrow.

This is a known risk resulting from comprehensive US investment in UK infrastructure. While it may improve competitiveness, it deepens dependence on a single country. 

The TikTok deal is a timely reminder that who provides technology infrastructure is inescapably a geopolitical question. What functions as a viable commercial partnership today can become a political pressure point tomorrow: particularly when a country is technologically dependent on another for services, and veto power potentially lies overseas. 

As the UK attempts technology sovereignty – through its industrial strategy, Online Safety Act and tech plans – policymakers seem yet to grasp the urgency of a more comprehensive approach to developing and securing UK technology capabilities. That is essential for ensuring autonomy and building secure infrastructure at home.