Russian expansionism in the Arctic is increasingly becoming a key security challenge for Europe. Despite much of Russia’s resources being used for the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has continued to invest heavily in building out its presence and revamping its existing bases in the Arctic. The region is becoming a hotbed for hybrid activity. Russia sealed off large swathes of the Barents Sea, including parts of Norway’s exclusive economic zone, for its most recent Zapad-2025 exercises with Belarus, and practised cruise missile launches over the Arctic.
European countries and their NATO allies have started to push back more forcefully. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO means that the alliance now counts seven of the eight traditional Arctic states as members – a development Moscow has described as a ‘hostile encirclement’. Over the past few months, NATO ships have repeatedly patrolled deep into the Barents Sea – near the home of Russia’s Northern Fleet and key nuclear submarine base. And, like Russia, NATO too is investing in rebuilding and updating military infrastructures in the region.
But security in the Arctic is about more than naval presence and counting submarines. Military and economic objectives are becoming increasingly intertwined as the thawing Arctic’s geostrategic importance grows and competing powers scramble to seize its resources and benefit from new commercial trade routes. As European NATO members grow their military presence in the Arctic and try to bolster their geostrategic heft in the region, they must also become more strategic about growing their wider economic footprint.
Presence equals sovereignty
‘The EU’s self-sufficiency and independence from Russia and China will begin in the [Arctic] mine’, said Sweden’s then-energy minister Ebba Busch in 2023, while hosting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in the Arctic town of Kiruna – home to Europe’s largest known deposit of iron ore as well as significant rare earth supplies.
The Arctic may well hold part of the answer to Europe’s quest to reduce its external resource dependencies. But Europe has so far been slow to develop these opportunities and investment has been lagging. While some of this hesitation reflects extremely valid concerns – exploiting the Arctic must not come at an environmental cost or undermine indigenous rights – it has helped open the door to actors with fewer scruples, such as China.
And it is not just about economic opportunity costs: in the sparsely populated Arctic, physical presence equals control and sovereignty. This also carries serious security risks. Infrastructure roll-out in the Arctic is by virtue almost always dual-use, which allows the countries that own these assets to also increase their security position in this highly strategic region.
China has used research collaboration – including with European countries – and investments in things like Arctic research stations and space infrastructure to add credibility to its claim that it is a near-Arctic power (despite its most northernmost provincial capital, Harbin, being as far from the Arctic as Venice). European countries have only recently woken up to not just the geopolitical influence that such arrangements can afford Beijing – but also their security implications.
A polar silk road
Another such example is the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), connecting Asia and Europe by way of Russia. As the thawing Arctic becomes more accessible for commercial traffic, the NSR – which could reduce shipping time by as much as half – could become a new nerve centre of global trade. While many practical hurdles remain, Russia and China are both bent on seizing the economic opportunity these new routes have to offer.
The current (still modest) use of the route is primarily used for crude oil and LNG shipments from Russia to China, especially since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But Beijing’s bigger and longer-term ambition is centred around new shipping routes for its goods to Europe – that provides Europe with leverage and the ability to have a say in how these new routes should develop.
Europe must use this leverage and not allow Russia to develop the NSR on its (and Beijing’s) terms. The Russian Arctic is already becoming a hotbed for shadow fleet activity, used to evade Western oil sanctions. Moscow’s ambition to control the NSR has also increasingly taken on a military dimension.
In the longer term, the increased navigability of the NSR will present an important litmus test for how Europe wants to handle (and exploit potential fractures in) the China–Russia partnership, as well as its own evolving security and economic relationship with China.
Greater presence also equals new targets
Europe is also building its own new connections to Asia. The European Commission is supporting the scoping of a what would be the first major undersea communications cable through the Arctic, connecting Europe to North America and East Asia. This could reduce internet traffic travel time by as much as 40 per cent compared to the currently dominant – but much longer and increasingly insecure – Red Sea cable routes. The project is intended to bring more diversity and security to Europe’s communications links and help Europe bolster its presence in the Arctic.
This highly ambitious project is a good example of how security and economic concerns intersect. The cable would have a significant dual-use utility and could help bring high-speed, high-capacity connectivity to power NATO’s military infrastructure and space-based assets in the High North. It would however also create another target for possible attacks.
