India will host the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12–13 September at a time when the rest of the world is increasingly seeking to emulate its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy.
The Ukraine and Iran wars, continuing US–China rivalry, and the second administration of President Donald Trump have made New Delhi’s long-held commitment to strategic hedging and middle power diplomacy seem wise, if not urgent underpinnings for modern international relations.
However, even though the world may better reflect India’s worldview, New Delhi has found it difficult to apply its foreign policy approach to its BRICS chairmanship.
Strain with Washington, reengagement with Moscow and Beijing
Recent Indian government actions confirm India’s continuing commitment to strategic hedging. New Delhi secured a string of resource deals during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visits to Australia, Indonesia and Uzbekistan. And it has agreed a number of trade deals, with nine in-progress or concluded since 2021 – including with the United Kingdom and European Union.
Trade negotiations with the United States continue, but relations with the second Trump administration have undoubtedly been strained, causing India to reinvest in other relationships.
Only a few years ago, India was distancing itself from the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): New Delhi hosted a low-key virtual summit in 2023. And Modi was absent from the summit in 2024. But more recently India has renewed its interest in the grouping and sought to improve relations with China and Russia. At this year’s SCO summit, Modi joined President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin in signing the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned US-Israeli military attacks on Iran.
India’s BRICS agenda
India has consistently sought to be a ‘voice’ of the Global South, often by using its prominent position in platforms like the G20 (which it chaired in 2023) and the AI Impact Summit (which it hosted earlier this year).
Its BRICS chairmanship has continued these efforts. In August a joint declaration, the ‘Chennai Consensus’ made a commitment to collaborative research and innovation among developing countries on emerging technologies. The same month, BRICS trade ministers advocated preserving and revitalizing the multilateral trading system – a move likely aimed at the Trump administration’s disruptive tariff policies. And in June, BRICS agriculture ministers issued a food security declaration focused on the needs of developing countries.
The challenge for New Delhi is that it wishes to promote this worldview in a way that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. To that end, it has sought to downplay some of the more controversial elements of the BRICS agenda. That includes a de-dollarization narrative championed by countries such as Brazil and Russia – an idea which last year caused President Trump to threaten to slap ten per cent tariffs on the BRICS in response.
New Delhi emphasized that BRICS is not seeking to create a separate reserve currency to compete with the US dollar. It has instead reframed this as an effort to settle bilateral trade in national currencies and use digital payments to reduce transaction costs for cross-border trade.
India has also promoted a more benign worldview, reflected in the BRICS slogan of ‘Humanity First’ and the theme of ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’. But this seems increasingly outdated given recent geopolitical developments, in particular US military action against Venezuela and Iran.
India’s position can appear out of sync in a forum whose membership includes countries with more overtly anti-Western agendas, including China, Russia and Iran. And two other BRICS countries, South Africa and Brazil, have suffered high profile diplomatic disputes with the US.
A key watchpoint at this summit will therefore be how New Delhi reconciles its efforts to stay on good terms with Washington with calls by BRICS member states to voice opposition to US actions. As Chair and host of BRICS, India’s actions will be more scrutinized, and it will be reluctant to oversee the production of a statement similar to Bishkek.
Multilateral symbolism
These tensions are exacerbated by the broader challenges of maintaining cohesion among the 11 BRICS member states. Tensions between Iran and the UAE, for instance, are high as a result of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Relations between Addis Ababa and Cairo have been strained by Ethiopia’s Nile dam project. Saudi and UAE interests conflict on relations with Israel and other issues. And India has its own longstanding frictions with China to manage, although there have been signs of improvement over the last two years.
Additionally, among the founding member states – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – there is still no consensus on what the BRICS stands for. Brazil and India see it primarily as an economic-driven initiative. China and Russia see it through more of a geopolitical lens. Beijing in particular is increasingly using forums like the BRICS to promote its own worldviews through its Global Development, Security, Civilization and Governance Initiatives. Meanwhile, Moscow has used the BRICS to seek alignment with the Global South as it is ostracized by the West following its invasion of Ukraine.
From New Delhi’s perspective, BRICS has been moving in the wrong direction. BRICS was established as a reaction to calls for a greater voice for the Global South in multilateral institutions, with a focus on development and governance. India would like to build on the organization’s earlier achievements, including the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2015.
The difficulties BRICS has speaking with one voice could affect its future. In the two decades since the BRICS was formed, newer groupings have emerged, such as the recent defence pact between Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. There is a possibility that such regional, exclusive groupings may become more important actors than expansive and inclusive groupings like BRICS.
Such factors mean that BRICS expansion is likely to take a backseat for the foreseeable future. Instead, the focus will probably be on socializing new members into the organization.
Efforts to expand the BRICS mandate will likely be limited to engagement with other forums in the Global South. However, even this is challenging. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rehman – whose country holds the chair of BIMSTEC, a South and Southeast Asian regional forum – has not yet accepted an invitation amid tensions with India.
Bilateral substance
The real action at the BRICS Summit will take place on its sidelines with a series of bilateral meetings. In particular, the meeting between Modi and Xi is likely to further advance the ongoing reset in bilateral relations and build confidence. A meeting in August between the Chinese foreign minister and Indian national security advisor made notable progress on their longstanding border dispute. And Xi’s upcoming visit to India – his first since 2019 – will reportedly include a 400-person delegation.
In this context, the recent accomplishments of BRICS have come from its convening power. It was a Modi–Xi meeting at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Russia that set the ball rolling on resetting the relationship.
Ultimately, the Global South remains an amorphous concept. There remains little clarity on what advocating its interests actually means, beyond making vague calls for a more equitable distribution of power in a multipolar global order. The BRICS summits needs to move behind platitudes and statements towards more substantive outcomes if it is to be seen as a real contender in global governance.
At the summit, New Delhi will seek to return BRICS to its original development-focused agenda, as reflected in its Economic Partnership Strategy 2030. However, this threatens to be hijacked by fissures among its members and calls for another statement condemning US attacks on Iran. But the group needs more than opposition to the US to define a better vision for the Global South. This entails moving beyond what it stands against to what it stands for.