Back-to-back BRICS and Quad meetings highlight India’s increasingly difficult balancing act

India’s balancing act between the West and the Global South demonstrates the agility of its foreign policy. But this act is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in a fragmented global order.

Expert comment Published 4 July 2025 4 minute READ

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee

Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, Asia-Pacific Programme

Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar attended the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington on 1 July, just days before Prime Minister Narendra Modi is due to attend the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro on 6–7 July. While this demonstrates the agility of New Delhi’s foreign policy, it also highlights the challenges it faces in maintaining strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable and fragmented international system.

A voice of the Global South

The leaders of China and Russia, two BRICS founding members, are due to miss this week’s summit. One the one hand, this suggests a potentially lower-profile meeting. On the other, it could facilitate a summit that is more aligned with India’s values and worldview – and where it has a greater voice.

India and Brazil both see BRICS primarily as an economic rather than a geopolitical grouping (unlike China and Russia). While all BRICS members want to facilitate economic development and expand the voice of emerging economies in key rule-making institutions, they have different views on how to achieve this.

For example, BRICS members have voiced concerns about the weaponization of the US dollar following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but they disagree on how to address this issue. While India supports the settlement of bilateral trade within BRICS in their national currencies, it is not a strong advocate of the emerging de-dollarization narrative and discussions about replacing a US dollar-denominated international system with one based on the Chinese renminbi. India has also been somewhat lukewarm about BRICS expansion, believing it could dilute its voice withing the grouping.

India fears that China is using BRICS to expand its global influence and promote its own worldview, particularly in the context of the Chinese government’s global initiatives on development, security and civilization. Relations between the two countries have improved following a border agreement in October 2024. But Chinese President Xi Jinping’s absence from the Rio summit is a missed opportunity for a face-to-face meeting between Modi and Xi, which would have helped to fuel their nascent rapprochement.

At the Rio summit, a priority for India will be to ensure tough language on terrorism in the leaders’ declaration following the recent terrorist attack in Kashmir. The degree to which this language is watered down by China (given its close relationship with Pakistan) will be a key watchpoint. During the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence ministers’ meeting, India refused to endorse the joint statement as it did not make reference to the Kashmir attack.  

India’s also distanced itself from the SCO statement condemning Israeli military action against Iran. These developments illustrate how India is somewhat out of sync with the views of other countries in the Global South. However, this will not deter its ambitions to become a voice of the Global South. Modi’s trip to Brazil for the BRICS summit is part of a five-nation tour that will also include visits to Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina and Namibia.

Engagement with the West amid US tensions

India is also making efforts to deepen relations with the West. Modi attended the recent G7 summit, while India’s commitment to the Quad – comprising Asia’s four major maritime democracies; Australia, India, Japan and the US – has grown in recent years. As relations with China soured following border clashes in 2020, New Delhi became more willing to participate in initiatives that might offend Beijing. India is also often more aligned with its Western partners than countries in the Global South, illustrated by the fact that the joint statement of the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting included a condemnation of the Pahalgam attack (unlike the SCO statement).

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In conversation with Dr S. Jaishankar, external affairs minister of India.

India will be hosting the Quad summit for the first time this year during US President Trump’s visit to the country. The challenge for India is maintaining this engagement at a time when US commitment to upholding the rules-based international order is uncertain.

The fact that Quad foreign ministers met a day after Trump’s inauguration in January indicates that the initiative remains a priority for the US. However, there have also been questions about whether Trump is seeking to pivot the Quad away from a broader agenda that gained traction under the Biden administration, towards a renewed focus on its maritime roots and a security focus. The joint statement of the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting announced the launch of several initiatives aimed at expanding cooperation in maritime law enforcement, economic security and supply-chain resilience. However, there was no mention of climate or health, two of the Quad’s six working groups.

But any attempt to move the Quad in a direction that resembles a formal military alliance is likely to be resisted by New Delhi, given its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy. In fact, India’s apprehension was one of the reasons the first iteration of the Quad failed in 2007. India is the only Quad member that does not have a formal military alliance with any of the group’s other members.

The India–US relationship has also been tested by Washington’s position during the recent India–Pakistan hostilities. Trump claimed to have brokered the ceasefire, which was denied by New Delhi. This claim was accompanied by statements that the ceasefire came about after the US applied economic pressure on both parties, which offended New Delhi by suggesting equivalence between India and Pakistan’s actions. US offers to mediate on the Kashmir issue – which New Delhi regards as an internal issue – further tested relations. Adding insult to injury, Trump hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, at the White House in June.

The sometimes volatile relationship between New Delhi and Washington has reaffirmed the necessity of India’s commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy.

But the US and India continue to see each other as important strategic partners in the context of a long-term rivalry with China, and these developments will not undermine the relationship. Both sides are seeking to conclude an interim trade agreement ahead of a 9 July deadline when a 90-day reprieve on Trump’s so-called reciprocal tariffs are due to expire (with the threat of 26 per cent tariffs on India).

However, the sometimes volatile relationship between New Delhi and Washington has reaffirmed the necessity of India’s commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. It means avoiding an over-dependence on any one country (including the US) and maintaining engagement with all major poles of influence in the international system. Forums like BRICS are important for India as it seeks to balance its role as a reformist power with ambitions to become a voice of the Global South, with its efforts to maintain the status quo and uphold the rules-based international order.