Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Welcome to Chatham House and to our roundtable today on the US 2020 Elections – What to Watch. It is extraordinary, I think, for those of us who have been following the United States for the past – well, for a very long time, but especially for the past four years of Donald Trump’s Presidency, who’ve lived through the midterm elections, and who, over the past few months, have really been watching the campaign. It’s astonishing that we’re now six days away from that moment when the polls will begin to close, and we will begin to find out who the next President of the United States of America will be. Remember that 71 million Americans have already voted in the 2020 Presidential elections. This is an extraordinary number. We are on track for a turnout that we’ve never seen before in the United States, certainly not in this century, of perhaps around 150 million voters. That, of course, tells you that we have a lot more people who will be casting their votes in the days ahead and on election day. We’ve seen the very long lines, we’ve heard the stories about the mail-in ballots, and, suffice it to say that, even at the operational level, there’s so much to discuss in this election.
I’m Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas Programme here, and I am delighted to have a remarkable panel of experts and scholars and think tankers to discuss this with all of us today. We have Dr Brian Klaas, who is a Washington Post Columnist. He is an Associate Professor of International Relations at University College, London. He is a well-known Author, and he has a fabulous Twitter feed, so you should follow him. I certainly do.
We have Dr Elena Lazarou, who I like to say her most important title is that she’s an Associate Fellow on the US and Americas Programme. She is now also Acting Head of the External Policies Unit at the European Parliamentary Research Unit, so has a very good lens into transatlantic relations and, of course, is an expert on Latin America, and has spent many years in Brazil.
And we have Hans Kundnani, my colleague here at Chatham House, who is Senior Research Fellow on the Europe Programme, who has written extensively books and articles and blogs and everything on transatlantic relations, on the United States, especially on Germany and Europe, and has worked at the European Council on Foreign Relations and at the German Marshall Fund, as well as at Chatham House now. So, obviously, a huge amount of expertise, and three colleagues who are following the elections in the United States incredibly carefully, so this is very exciting.
As we know, the election doesn’t look close from the polls. It looks like it should be a very secure thing for Joe Biden. He’s up at around 7.9% in national polls. But we also know that national polls don’t translate automatically or even necessarily into an electoral victory, which, of course, requires 270 votes. So let me turn to you, Brian. It’s a complicated election. Some people are very worried. Others still think it’s going to be a landslide. We’re watching state-by-state. People have very different attitudes and different opinions about which state to watch, about how the vote is going to go, about what the day and the week after is going to look like. What are you watching? You have a tremendous influence, through multiple channels, not least your Twitter feed, and I think you’ve had, over the last four years, a huge impact on how a lot of people think about the United States and think about the election. What are you watching? When will you start watching? What should we be watching on the day and perhaps on the day or two afterwards?
Dr Brian Klaas
Thank you so much, Leslie, for that very kind introduction and very kind words. You know, I think this is something where you have to look into what is most possible and then, what is also plausible. So, right now, what is most possible and the most likely outcome is that we’ll actually know reasonably early that Joe Biden has been elected President. Now, if that were to happen, and that’s what the polls are saying, what it would look like is probably one of three states: North Carolina, Florida, or Texas declaring its results six to eight hours after polls close. And if Trump loses any of those three states, he will not be the President in 2021. So that’s the, sort of, most plausible way in which this resolves itself quickly. You still have to worry about what happens if he loses those three states or if they’re extremely close, and the reason for that is, of course, those mail-in ballots, which are going to be processed in the days after the election in some states, most notably Pennsylvania, where the Republican Legislature, the State Legislature has declined to start processing them earlier, thereby guaranteeing that this could drag on, and that is the indecisive state. It’s the most important state probably this year.
So I’m worried about what could happen in a scenario that some people call the ‘red mirage’ and the ‘blue shift’, which is the red mirage refers to Trump basically racking up some seriously impressive-looking vote totals from election day voters, which tend to be Republicans this year, and then’ the pendulum swinging towards Biden’ as the mail-in ballots get counted in the days after because those voters are all overwhelmingly Democrats. And that will create a really dangerous window, I think, for Trump where he can declare victory and try to really do things that no US President has done before, effectively trying to stop legally cast ballots from being counted via the courts. That is something I’m very worried about, and if it’s a close election, then Trump’s authoritarian impulses matter a heck of a lot. If it’s not a close election, Trump will be screaming into the wind, and no-one will care and no – I mean, there will still be potentially consequences from it, but the Republican Party will not follow suit.
And I think this leads to the third and final point, I’d say, which is the question of violence, and I think this is an unfortunate thing to have to talk about, but there is, I think, a serious risk of some form of political violence between election day and the transition or shortly after the transition because tensions are so incredibly high, because Trump has been inciting violence at various points throughout his Presidency, demonising opponents, and also because, and this is one of those worrying political risk metrics, we should pay attention to, gun sales are through the roof in the United States right now.
So, you know, all this is to say I think right now, the polls are telling us a clear picture. Anyone who, you know, went through 2016 doesn’t always automatically trust the polls completely, at least not blindly, and so there’s this, sort of, feeling of trepidation we all have that something could be different from what we expect. And this year, if things go not according to plan, it could be a serious issue, and those are the things that I’m really worried about.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And let me ask you one more question before we come to Elena. You know, Florida, Texas, and North Carolina, right now I believe that Nate Silver, FiveThirtyEight, has Florida .4% leaning towards Trump. Texas and North Carolina, you know, not states well-known for going to the Democrats. We know that there are things changing. But, you know, what – surely, it’s entirely plausible that Florida, Texas, and North Carolina do not go for Vice President Biden. So, you know, in the – a) you know, how – where’s your confidence coming from that we might see some, why, you know, what are you looking for?
Dr Brian Klaas
Sure.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And maybe you can say more about Florida. And if those three states don’t go to Vice President Biden, then what?
Dr Brian Klaas
Good question. So, in the FiveThirtyEight Snake, which US election watchers have gotten really familiar with, Florida and North Carolina are currently both blue, and Florida is currently projected to be about two and a half points in favour of Biden. Now, we all know Florida elections are often close, and everyone who lived through 2000 knows they can be extraordinarily close, and end up in the courts. So I’m not saying that this is going to be a walk in the park. These are going to be close states, and Texas even being in the mix, it shows you how difficult of a problem Trump has on his hands because there’s no path to the White House for any Republican President that doesn’t go through Texas. It’s – it has to fundamentally change the party if this becomes a state that’s genuinely a battleground state in the future.
So, I’m not saying that he’s going to – Biden’s going to win those states, all three of them. I’m just saying that there are three plausible pathways in which the election is over three to four hours after the polls close. If those don’t happen, if Trump looks like he’s winning them or they’re too close to call, you still have a, sort of, I hesitate to call it a blue wall ‘cause it was used in that terminology in 2016, and the wall broke. But Trump has a problem in that there really are almost no states that Hillary Clinton won that Trump could plausibly win this time around. The only two that are possibly in the mix are my home state of Minnesota, which I would be shocked if it went to Trump, and also Nevada, which, again, it would be very, very surprising if that happened. Whereas Biden has all these different pathways, right?
I mean, if Florida and Texas and North Carolina don’t go for Biden, but Georgia does, well, that’s probably game over, right? If Ohio does, that’s game over. If Iowa plus Arizona, that’s game over, right? You just have all these different pathways. So it’s not to say that Trump is out, right? He could still win this election, but he has to win every single competitive state, more or less, whereas Biden just has to pick off one or two big ones, and that’s the ballgame. So, my point is not that this is going to be a walk in the park. I don’t think it will be, and I think it could be something that is prolonged for days. It’s just that there are multiple pathways by which the election is less of a, sort of, logistical disaster than we anticipate, and that’s currently looking like it’s plausible, based on the polling.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, that’s very helpful. It is interesting watching the President move around the country, trying to understand what his strategy is. He spent yesterday in my hometown, Omaha, Nebraska, which Nebraska’s one of two states that splits its Electoral College vote. He clearly isn’t happy that that one vote in any two might be – looks like it might be going to Biden. He was unhappy enough that he left thousands of people out in the cold, walking for hours after he left Eppley Airfield, and walking to buses, and 30 people ended up in the Emergency Room, so not a good showing, I would say.
Dr Lazarou, you’re based in Brussels. You have a very good lens into how Europe and Europeans are thinking about the election. What are people watching for? Are they thinking very much about, you know, the outcome in the medium to long-term, or is there a lot, you know, kind of, a focus on the immediate? I was very struck, two years ago, at how much Europeans were focused on the midterm elections, extraordinary focus and multiple talks. But what is the atmosphere now, and what are people concerned about?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Thank you, Leslie. In fact, I was also going to start by saying this, that I think the first thing that’s striking in Europe is how much, yeah, this election is being watched and commented on, and how much the issues, even the smaller issues, are mattering, and Europeans trying to really understand how the electoral system works. And, indeed, we saw this with the midterm as well. So I think that if one thing has happened during the Trump era is that Europeans are really, really watching how elections in the US are evolving.
Now, for me, being in Brussels, I think there’s really three things that I say really encapsulate what I’m looking at and where – what I’m trying to understand, in terms of how Europeans will react, but also what it will mean for Europe. And, of course, then there’s the long-term, but I think the reaction, the initial reaction, is really in the short-term.
The first thing that a lot of people seem to be talking about and thinking about is that, as this election approaches, it’s not just the previous sense that the Democrats and particularly with when compared to Trump were more aligned with what the EU was proclaiming, and what its interests and values are on the global level. But right now, as the election approaches, I think there’s more of a sense of thinking that both outcomes are possible, and then going further to the deeper question, is Europe equipped, is it ready for a Trump 2, is it ready for a Biden? Will a Biden Presidency be the same as an Obama 2, or will it be something different? And I think in the self-reflection process, a lot of Europeans, a lot of Brussels-based experts and policymakers acknowledge that 2020 is not 2016.
The EU has indeed progressed a lot in trying to assume what is described as strategic autonomy, trying to map its course in global security and global trade more autonomously. I wouldn’t say separately from the US. And, therefore, in the event of a Trump 2, it wouldn’t be 2016 where suddenly it has to come up with a whole new strategy. And, at the same time, people are being very, very reflective about the fact that that may have been a good thing for the EU, and that perhaps that would also facilitate creating a new relationship with a Biden administration than what it was under Trump where, even those initial step – sorry, under Obama, where even the initial pivot to Asia found Europe a bit unprepared for the move away of American interest.
The second thing I think is I’m looking at and I find very interesting is in what area – how do Europeans generally – how does public opinion feel about these elections? And it’s really interesting that a lot of polls indicate that Europeans generally disapprove of Trump in high numbers, but where they approve – disapprove most are the areas where Biden is likely to differ, and that’s really interesting ‘cause there’s a lot of – there may be a lot of continuity in some areas, like trade. Nut where Europeans are fundamentally against Trump policies, it’s in areas like climate and immigration and COVID handling, which are likely to change.
And then, personally, I think this election is very interesting to watch, in terms of what it means about democracy and populism, and I’m very concerned about the eventuality of violence because it may set a precedent for other parts of the world and here. It’s not just Europe. It’s Latin America where we see this kind of – this type of same leader as Trump is, and what happens when they have to give away or give up power, and how does this polarise society even more? So I’m really concerned about this, and I’m waiting to see what’s going to happen.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
It has been extraordinary to watch Crisis Group, the Brussels-based think tank, calling for international election, you know, for the United States to learn the international lessons of election monitors across the world that have been so vital and transitional – states transitioning away from authoritarianism to democracy, and they’ve really, you know, focused on the US. I have one more question for you before I come to Hans, which is how much time have Europeans actually invested in thinking, you know, you say they’re thinking about Biden or, you know, what a second Trump administration might be. But where would you put the distribution of their focus? How much focus has there been on clear thinking about a second Trump administration, or is most of the focus on, you know, what it would mean if we have a Biden Presidency?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Oh, Europeans is a very large category to, sort of, group all in one. But I’d say that on the policymaker level, COVID has been a fundamental factor why perhaps we’re not seeing as much of reflect – we are seeing the reflection, but not to the degree that I think that we would on the – who’s the next US President as we would if there was no COVID. Because, right now, dealing with the pandemic, getting through a budget for the EU that can help the recovery of the Union is, I think, priority number one. But, having said that, I think there’s a level on which there is a big process of thinking of, well, first of all, speaking about the European Union, do – are all member states on the same page on who’s going to be the next President? And on some issues, they are; on some issues, they’re not. So there’s that, and NATO would be one of them, for example, security perhaps. So I think it’s a lot of time invested in it. But I think COVID really has changed the priorities here. Then, again, no matter what issue you look at, be it internal, industry, trade, or China, any foreign policy issue right now, no European can think about these things, without making the consideration, who’s going to be the next US President.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. Hans, there was a headline this weekend in the Financial Times that said that, you know, Downing Street, Whitehall, the British Government are very worried. I’m exaggerating a little bit, but frankly not very much. They’re very worried that Vice President Biden might win because, you know, President Trump is, kind of, where they’ve put their eggs in that basket, in terms of the US-UK trade deal and all the rest of it and now they’re, sort of, frantically looking for somebody to talk to. We know that the Biden administration’s being very cautious about speaking to foreign governments during the campaign until or unless elected. But, you know, what are Britain’s interests? What’s your take on Europe? You have a very good lens also into the United States on these issues, so what are your reflections? What are you watching most? And you will have to unmute yourself before you begin speaking, but I’m very curious your – what you’re watching right now.
Hans Kundnani
Well, so there’s so much to watch, so I, sort of, feel like I’m slightly being pulled in two directions. One is to think about some of the things that Brian was talking about, in terms of what might happen, you know, immediately during, you know, the election, and the immediate aftermath in the United States. And, on the other hand, thinking slightly beyond that, in terms of what a second Trump term or a Biden administration would mean for Europeans. And, sort of, broadly on that, I broadly agree with what Elena said. I think it’s right that – or, at least, my impression was, until the coronavirus came along, I almost had this sense that a lot Europeans, particularly Continental Europeans, seemed to have convinced themselves that Trump would win a second term. You know, in other words, there was a bit of a mood swing where I think, initially, after the election of Trump in 2016, Europeans couldn’t quite wrap their heads around it, and then they, sort of, almost accepted it as the new normal, and expected him to win again. And, now, it’s, kind of, come full circle because of his handling of the coronavirus. So, I think it’s true that Europeans, in general, have been thinking more about the possibility of a second Biden term. And, on that, I suppose I’m a little bit more sceptical than Elena that Europeans are prepared for that. I think, actually, there’s a huge number of challenges that there’ll be if Biden is elected for Europeans as well. And some of those have to do with, I think, the structural shifts that are taking place in US foreign policy, particularly the way that strategic competition with China is becoming the, kind of, central, organising principle of US foreign policy and that, I think, puts Europeans in a really difficulty position. I’m not quite sure that they are prepared for that. Maybe we can come back to that later on.
But the other thing I’ve been thinking about, in the last few weeks especially is, kind of, what Brian said about the, sort of, partly the, sort of, transitional period from the election until the inauguration, but also beyond that. Basically, assuming that Biden does win, I guess, what I’ve been thinking about is what resistance looks like in that situation. You know, we’ve talked a lot about resistance to Trump during the last four years. But, I think, if Biden becomes President, there’s going to be a kind of a right-wing resistance as well, and, yeah, that, kind of, worries me. I can remember on – in the days before the election in 2016, I was living in DC at the time, I remember a friend of mine who was from Alaska talking about something else that Brian mentioned, you know, the 350 million guns, I think it is, in America. And he was expecting Hillary to win, like most of us were, and, you know, he had this, kind of – you know, he was talking about scenarios involving, sort of, armed resistance essentially to Hillary, particularly drawing on this standoff at the nature reserve in Oregon that had happened, you know, shortly before that.
It feels to me as if that scenario may now, or some version of it, may now happen if Biden is elected, that you have, you know, on the one hand, you know, all of these groups, I’m thinking of, you know, the Proud Boys and the Boogaloo movement, which I’ve become fascinated with in the last couple of weeks. But then also you have the Supreme Court in the middle of this too, right? I mean, it seems to me that, one way or the other, there is going to be a battle between a Biden administration and the Supreme Court. Now, how quickly that happens, I’m not sure, and over what, I’m not sure, whether it’s about, you know, Obamacare or about the election itself, or about, you know, the question of reforming the Supreme Court.
Yesterday, Leslie, you and I were on a webinar with Larry Diamond where he was talking about introducing term limits for Supreme Court Justices, as an alternative to packing the Court. But it seems to me – and a less radical alternative than packing the Court. But it seems to me even that, it seems to me, would have the potential, at least, to lead to all kinds of resistance. The thing I’m not quite sure about is to what extent all these different groups and individuals, who all have different perspective, and it’s all very, kind of, complicated, to what extent that actually coheres into some, kind of, unified resistance movement, or whether it just remains individual, kind of, groups trying to challenge the Biden administration in a variety of different ways, you know, some on the streets, some in the courts and so on. I don’t quite have a sense of that, but that’s what I’ve increasingly been trying to wrap my head around is, what does the resistance look like to a Biden administration?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, and that’s a really great comment. I have heard it said by people on the left that an election of Vice President Biden to the Presidency wouldn’t be good for the left either, in terms of resistance because it would take some of the fuel out of the fire. So it’s an interesting question, possibly on both sides.
I want to come back to you, Brian, on this question of transition. I mean, which part are you most concerned about, you know, if we don’t have the scenario where the outcome is very clear very quickly? We’ve obviously heard a lot about, you know, is the Supreme Court going to come into this? Is it going to kick up to Congress? You know, what’s the President going to do? What are you – you know, what should we be watching in that period? How worried are you? And I also want to throw in another slightly big question, you know, whichever party loses in the end is going to have a lot of thinking to do when they’re outside of obvious – outside of office, the White House. Whether it’s the Democrats losing this race when the numbers are so high and, yeah, they’ve got a lot of divides in their party, or the Republicans losing when they’ve, sort of, coalesced around the President and his agenda. You know, maybe choose one of those. Which party do you think – which party are you most curious about how they reconstitute themselves, if and when they are out of power?
Dr Brian Klaas
Good question. So I think the first point about the transition is, you know, I’ve been arguing that Trump’s authoritarian streak is dangerous for US democracy for five years now, and I think what’s been tragically vindicating is that I was, you know, I was viewed as an alarmist, I would say, five years ago, and I think far fewer people think that now, which is, I guess, good for me and bad for the country. But, you know, this is one of those things where it’s – the writing was on the wall five years ago. We knew what this person was like, from the moment where he started to scapegoat minorities, call to ban Muslims, attack the press, etc.
What’s worrying to me is that whenever you look at authoritarian-style leaders around the world, the most dangerous period is when they’re cornered. And when Trump is in a period where he knows that he has to leave office, if he loses the election, by January 20th of 2021, but he has, you know, between, say, November 5th/6th, whenever it becomes crystal clear that he’s lost, between that period and January 20th of 2021, there’s a lot he can do, right? I mean, there can be structural manipulations where he tries to politicise justice in an even more egregious way, pardons for a series of people who should be probably prosecuted and are in the process of being prosecuted or are currently in jail that are very close to the President, you know, attempts to declassify issues that are potentially damaging to political rivals, selective declassification that could hurt national security. There’s lots of things he can do, not to mention that he’s still the Commander-in-Chief, right?
I mean, I think one thing that we have all learned, regardless of your political affiliations or political views, is that things that are unexpected can become routine or normal very, very quickly. And I think that during this period, some really wildcard scenarios are possible, not to mention that transitions are fraught during the best of times. They’re difficult, and one party has to come up to speed very, very quickly. Of course, Biden has the advantage that he was in the White House previously but, still, you know, Trump can try to sabotage a lot of the transition elements in a way that fundamentally weakens Biden on the point that he takes office, if that were to be the case. So all that’s really worrying.
The question you asked about the party responses, I’m going to pick the Republicans, and the reason for that is because there’s two scenarios by which they could respond to a Trump defeat, and they depend on, I think, the margin of defeat if it happens. So I think that a landslide defeat will cause the intelligentsia of the party to say, “We can’t go down this path again. We have to change the party. We have to win over suburban voters. We can’t just win a rural-based-only strategy. We can’t live in a fantasy world. We can’t spread conspiracy theories and lies and all this stuff.” But there is also a built-in structural problem the Republican Party has, which is that its primaries encourage exactly that, kind of, politics, right? And this is where you have the optimism versus the death spiral. So the optimism is, you know, you get a massive defeat, a blue wave or a blue tsunami comes through, and the party changes. That’s the optimistic view. The death spiral view is that Trump has fundamentally convinced people in the Republican Party that that’s what they want because the base is more fired up about him, at least the rural base, than they have been about any Politician for a very long time. And, therefore, to win in those Republican primaries, in gerrymandered districts where they’re by design not competitive, you actually have to be Trump 2.0.
So there will be a fight in the party between, I think, the intelligentsia, which will realise that if they go down the Trump 2.0 path, it’s a minority-majority party for a very long time where they can stay in power in certain pockets like occasionally winning the Electoral College while losing the popular vote, or winning the Senate because they have Senate demographics that are fundamentally favourable to rural Republican states, or they try to say, “You know, we just simply can’t write off every big city and suburb in the country because the demographics will cause us to be constantly out of power.” So that will be the big battle if Trump loses, and it will be hinging, to a large degree, on whether this is a narrow Biden victory or a landslide, in my opinion.
Hans Kundnani
Leslie, can I something to that?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Sorry, Hans?
Hans Kundnani
Can I add something to that?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes, yeah, let me come to you next, Hans, on that. What is your view of what happens?
Hans Kundnani
We haven’t so far talked about the coronavirus itself very much, and it seems to be, like, is a big factor. And in particular during the transition, this will be potentially the worst period of the, sort of, next – I’m not sure if it’s the second or third wave. But, you know, and then also, you know, part of the reason I was worried about resistance, as I say, is because presumably given that, you know, Biden has run so much on, you know, “I can handle the coronavirus better,” he will presumably very quickly introduce all, kinds of, new measures that I’m guessing would go further, in terms of restrictions than Trump has done that will then, in turn, cause a backlash.
But on the Republican Party question that you were just talking about, Brian, is there not a, in a way, I suppose, what I’ve been a bit worried about is that Biden wins the election, but for the wrong reasons. In other words, that there isn’t a rejection of Trumpism by the American people; that Biden wins just because Trump screwed up handling the coronavirus. Now, in that scenario, you know, is there not a possible scenario where, you know, even if Trump is defeated quite badly, the general interpretation will be that was purely because of the coronavirus, and then, you know, the Republican Party doesn’t exactly reject Trumpism and go back to that, sort of, 2012, kind of, moment, rethinking immigration and everything else. But it just says, you know, we need to do Trumpism, but be able to handle pandemics better [laughs].
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
You know, Hans, there’s another way of framing that and, to be honest, it’s a way I’ve seen it. I’m going – now, I want to come to Elena with a very specific question related to this. But you could argue that the only reason that certain voters stayed with Donald Trump was because the economy was strong. So it’s not that it’s arguably if he does lose or even just explaining where the national polls are now, regardless of the electoral outcome, and the drop is, “Well, you weren’t delivering a number of things that we wanted, not least a certain style of leadership, but you gave us the economy. Now that’s not there, it’s just not enough.” So, I think you could frame the COVID question in very different ways, depending on who you speak to, but you asked the right question. I will give you my little bit of anecdote from my home state, right?
There are a lot of people who are not clearly in the Democratic set of voters who are not pleased with the style of the Presidency, right? They did not want to vote for Hillary Clinton. They’re not – you know, they like Joe Biden, but they’re not Democrats, but they are not happy. So I think that we’ve got to be a little bit cautious about this assumption that the base is just, you know, irredeemably fixed on the President for any number of reasons. It might be for a smaller number of reasons. That requires a lot of investigation and interrogation, I think.
But, Elena, I want to come to you because in addition to your work on Europe, you’re obviously a very – you have deep expertise on Latin America. You’ve lived in Brazil. You’ve followed authoritarian leaders. You’ve followed transition, difficult transitions. How is this election seen from the point of view of transitional politics, Latin America, questions of democracy and values? What is, you know, what is the take from Latin America? And I want to hear from you, and then, if the audience can just be prepared because we will come to you after this question, and allow you to ask your questions, as well as write them, but ideally to ask them. Elena?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Thanks, Leslie, I’m glad you asked this because I was thinking, as Hans and Brian were speaking, and yourself, and so my take on this, and then it does also connect to, particularly, to Brazil, is that we have not seen the full spectrum of the Trump playbook, and we are not at the end of the Trumpism story. Because what we have not seen is how this, kind of, ideology works when, a) as I said before, it loses power, it’s no longer in government, how it transitions out, how it works as an opposition because we cannot assume that Trumpism is going away. It may remain in the Republican Party. So, to me, this is all, you know, new ground in – for the US. And there’s a lot to see there that may really affect the way politics and policy develop following this election, even if Republicans are in the opposition. We don’t know how – and we also still don’t know for sure how the House and the Senate will go, and how they will swing. So all this could hinge a lot on the extent to which Trumpism remains, and how it evolves when it’s not the President’s party.
*And, to me, this is very concerning because I was also watching Larry Diamond’s talk yesterday, and he said – he talked about a couple of examples of countries that have experienced anti-establishment leaders or parties in Government during democracy, and that some of them overcame that, and then they returned to what he called normalcy, so the established parties. But they were all quite small, and they were all quite, you know, they were not the United States, and they were not even Brazil. So we still haven’t seen how a leader like Trump, potentially like Bolsonaro in Brazil, transitions out, what that means for society, what that means for the polarisation that remains, what that means for the parts of civil society that have been suppressed, and Latin America’s much more important than in the US obviously.
But how does all of that rebounce, and does it rebounce to the, kind of, sort of, values-based pluralistic democracy that we had before to the degree that was there before? How does it work with, you know, the – in congressional politics because both Brazil and the US, they have, you know, they have very, very, very powerful Congresses? How does it work in the Judiciary, especially in the case where, of course, the Supreme Court is – has already been formed the way it has? And I think all these questions are, of course, relevant for the US. They will really have a strong impact, in my opinion, in how specific countries in Latin America transition out perhaps, or if they do transition out of these non-illiberal democratic, let’s say, or more populist authoritarian leaders that they have currently. And I’m very concerned about that. I’m very concerned about, sort of, how the US example will then affect a region, ‘cause you mentioned Latin America in which democracy is already in decline, and in which a lot of the dedication to democratic values and to electoral processes is based on, sort of, using the United States and Europe as an example, as something to look to. So I think there’s a lot to watch and to see what’s coming in that region as well, which may hinge on this.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. I appreciate that, and it does remind me that Hans slipped a big comment in there that it’s not especially radical to have term limits in the Supreme Court relative to adding more seats. I don’t know. I, kind of, think it’s pretty radical to have term limits, but that’s a side point. But I think you raised some really important points about civil society, about what, you know, the lack of cohesiveness regardless the result.
Let’s turn to the questions now. Please raise your hand if you’d like to ask a question, but I’ll go ahead and turn now to Michael Dunn. Ideally, you would ask your question. If you’re with us and you’d like to unmute and ask your question, that would be great, Michael Dunn? [Pause] Okay, let me read out Michael’s question then, and then we’ll go to Jeremy Ross. Michael writes, “Is this”…?
Michael Dunn
Have you got…?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Sorry? Oh, great, Michael, go ahead.
Michael Dunn
Have you got me now?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Michael Dunn
Very simple to the point, but I’d like to congratulate the panel on the answers. Very, very informative, the best discussion I’ve heard so far. I simply ask is this the most dangerous period in American history since 1860?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
That’s a great question, that. Who would like to take that? Brian, do you want to give a crack at that or…?
Dr Brian Klaas
Yeah, I mean, it’s a [laughs] – as an American, this is a depressing question to even have on the table. But I agree with the premise of it that we should be discussing this. I think there’s, sort of, a few periods that are obviously, you know, potentially worse between 1860 and now. One of them would be, of course, World War II, and then the other one would be the late 1960s and the, sort of, sense that this is – everything’s falling apart.
I think we’re in that period where I would not be surprised if things fell apart in a worse way, and the reason for this is ‘cause when you game out these scenarios, it’s just hard to see where this ends, right? I mean, it’s – there’s this ratcheting effect that’s happening in US politics where things are getting not just more extreme where parties are playing more constitutional hardball right now. I think the Republicans are playing much more violation-of-norm hardball than the Democrats. But the Democrats are certainly going to have pressure from within the party to do exactly the same. And I think, more to the point, this is also a situation that’s unprecedented, and 1860 was unlike this, where reality is not shared by the two parties.
I think this is something that’s fundamentally different in the 21st century is that if you are a Trump voter and a Biden voter, what you think is happening in the country right now is fundamentally different, and I don’t even mean spin on existing events. I mean that you think that different events are happening. And that’s something that social media polarisation is causing basic fundamental reality to fray. And when you think about, you know, what democracy is, theorists of democracy talk about the idea of, you know, a shared sense of reality being fundamental to compromise, which is really what the point of democracy is, right, that we can have shared existence, and alternate power. And I think both parts of that are under threat, right? The, sort of, shared existence where we think it’s legitimate that the other party has power, I think that’s gone. And I think the, sort of, idea of compromise has completely gone. I think the idea that Biden is going to work with Republicans, despite what he says, is going to be very hard for the left to stomach. And people who do work with Republicans in the Democratic Party could face primary challenges because they feel like they’ve had their four years out of power, it’s time to play, you know, play dirty the way that the Republicans have. That’s a very common view in the Democratic Party right now.
So, you know, I think that the possibilities of this being one of the most perilous periods in American history are certainly there. I hope that a landslide Biden victory would bring the country back to its senses and back from the brink, and say, okay, look, there’s been a decisive cry for normalcy, and a decisive cry for just decent leadership, regardless of what you think of taxes and healthcare. And that could at least stem the tide for a bit. But the fundamental structural problems that exist in the country are not going to be solved in the next five years. They are long-standing and deep-seated, and they are fundamentally tied to the fact that the demographics of the US are not set up for the systems where you may have, you know, 14 Senators representing half the country in about 20 years. So things are going to have to give, one way or another, and structural reform is necessary to avoid the worst-case scenario.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hans, did you want to add to that?
Hans Kundnani
I find it quite difficult to give a short answer to this, but I’ve been thinking…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Oh, you’re going to have to though [laughs].
Hans Kundnani
Alright, I’m going to have to. So, yes, I mean, I get – ‘cause, basically, this question gets to, you know, is there some, kind of, civil war, you know, about to happen, already happening in America? And I think it’s a fascinating question. I’ve been thinking about this a lot for the last four years, and it does seem somehow analogous in various ways. At the same time, it’s obviously completely different than the Civil War in the 1860s, not least because this isn’t really a sectional conflict in the same way as in the 1860s. It cuts across, you know, the North and South, and so, you know, and there are very interesting, you know – you know, if there is something like a civil war, kind of, in the current situation, I mean, I think you can also get into are we in the pre-civil war moment or the post-civil war moment?
I mean, Henry Louis Gates, for example, draws these parallels between, you know, what happened after the end of Reconstruction, and what’s happened now as a, kind of, you know, reaction to Obama. So, in a sense, that’s the optimistic scenario because it suggests [laughs] that the Civil War is, kind of, behind us. The more darker, the darker version is that the Civil War is, kind of, ahead of us still.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
But, of course, as we know, you know, violence doesn’t take place in the same forms that it used to. So there are all sorts of ways of being divided and being polarised and having conflict that aren’t necessarily about, you know, picking up arms and picking up weapons.
Hans Kundnani
Exactly.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
So, yeah, Elena, did you want to add to this before we come back to Jeremy and Nicholas?
Dr Elena Lazarou
I wasn’t planning to but, I guess, I’m thinking about it. This is a really big question and complex. And, in a way, you know, this is not just happening in the US, so I find it very – we have to be very cautious just to parallelise it with the – with US history. It’s happening around the world. That’s what I was thinking about, that this phenomena are now everywhere, this polarisation, and the way polarisation is, it’s really fundamentally hard for the democratic system of the – that this, the Western world, has in place to work with such degrees of polarisation. And I think, essentially, that’s what we’re seeing, that maybe the system has to adapt to a polarisation to the degree we have it, or something, policies must address the polarisation so that we get to a point where democracy can function again in ways that are more efficient and less obstructive, and bring about less of this, kind of, violent reactions in society. But that’s what I was thinking. It was not exactly directly related to the question.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
A very quick one line, Hans, before I come to Jeremy, Nicholas, and then Don?
Hans Kundnani
I just wanted to slightly disagree with that. I think actually what’s happening in the US is completely different certainly than what’s happening in Europe. I can’t speak to South America, but it seems to me, actually, there’s almost the opposite problem in Europe, which is that we’ve had convergence rather than polarisation. And, certainly, if you think about the culture wars in America, and Brian’s talked a bit about this, this feels to me entirely unrecognisable compared to what’s happening in Europe. So I think there is a very specific American problem here that has a lot to do with the very particular history around race in America. That also, to me, is one of the things that links the Civil War with the current moment.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, that – there was a lot there, and I know that some of it’s going to be in a forthcoming article in the Journal of Democracy, written by Hans and his colleagues, so watch out for that in January. Jeremy, I’m going to read out Jeremy’s question. But, Nicholas, if you can unmute yourself, and be ready to ask your question now that Jeremy doesn’t have the right connection. So I’ll read out his questions. Jeremy writes, “With a Supreme Court with a conservative majority, will its judgment be seen as legitimate by either side, and also how can representative democracy be revitalised to allow conflict to be mediated?” Those are really tough questions. I’m next going to turn to – if you hold on, don’t answer that yet. I’ll come to Nicholas – to Mary Dejevsky to ask your question. But, Nicholas, if you go ahead and ask your question, and then to Mary.
Nicholas
Okay. It could be argued that for the Democrats, 2016 was a failure of organisation rather than a failure of politics, given that Clinton won the election but lost the presidency. Is there any evidence that the Democrats are better organised in 2020 in the key states?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
You do ask the tough questions. So we’ll come to Mary next, and then to Don.
Mary Dejevsky
Okay, can you hear me alright?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yes.
Mary Dejevsky
I just wondered, looking across the panel, whether any of you would be quite so worried about a civil war scenario and talking about culture wars if you had a personal memory of the Civil Rights Era, the Vietnam Era, the campus unrest? People were getting shot dead on campuses, and I just wonder whether some of this has actually been taken out of proportion, that it’s in a rather different dimension?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Okay, great question. I mean, it’s a very intelligent way of asking the question. I think it’s been asked in different forms for a little while about the comparison to the late ’60s, although you also refer to earlier ’60s. Yeah, there’s a lot to mind there. Let’s take those three questions first, and then I’ll come to Don.
Elena, why don’t we begin with you, if I may? I don’t know which one you want to take, whether it’s about legitimacy of decisions coming out of a very – a Supreme Court that looks like it’s leaning one way rather than another. Or there was a question about legitimacy of the last appointment. And, for many people, there was a question around Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation as well. Or whether you want to take this question by Mary or the question about whether the Democrats are organised. It’s up to you. You choose.
Dr Elena Lazarou
Thank you, but I think even though I study the US, I think the other panellists are more – there’s a – expert on the internal politics, so maybe I will leave a couple of things. I mean, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court is something I’ve been thinking about a lot, particularly because we have the precedent before the Trump election, and the Judge Kavanaugh case, and – but I think on judging whether – how that will be perceived, we’ll have to wait to be – to see and – but what I wanted to perhaps put in, sort of, contribute on this coming from another continent is that I think this issue of Judiciaries and, you know, the non – the, sort of, interference of the Executive in the Judiciaries is becoming an issue in several countries. And I know we’re seeing it in Europe as well, so I think it goes back to my point. I think a lot of things that – of these things are global trends, and I maybe disagree with Hans on this. But I find I see very much of the way the similar phenomena are happening in different ways across different countries. But maybe that’s my view.
I did want to come in on the how can democracy work in the face of such conflict and such clashes that was the second question of the person who asked about the Supreme Court, because I think this is a – it’s – it is essentially what I said before. I think, and I’ve been saying this for a while, for four years at least, that we are really at a point where our established categories of political parties at least are not really representatives of the cleavages in society. So, inevitably, when these types – when the clashes, let’s call them that, or the conflicts in society cannot be addressed on the political level by the existing parties, we see several different, sort of, loci of conflict, we see a lot of societal violence, and it’s because, I feel at least, the established politics are just not addressing the groups that have different demands, and the way that it’s not a reflection anymore. Political parties are no longer a reflection of the structure of society.
So I do feel that democracy can address the problems of societies that are divided, but there needs to be a, sort of, adaptation of the reflection of societal interests on the political level, because it is called representative democracy for a reason. So you have to have representation of the issues at the political level, and they have to be addressed. Otherwise, they are going to erupt in different formats, particularly at a time like ours where there’s social media, there’s ways to go on the streets on several issues because, thankfully, it’s democracy, so you can go out and protest. But it does become complicated when you have, you know, unlimited non-control – non-gun-control and then things can get out of hand. So I think that’s what I want to contribute to this set of questions.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, and I’m glad you pointed to the significance of, you know, the street and the role of civil society. You know, democracy’s very complicated. It’s not just political parties. But if you don’t get that very robust civil society, and people on the street pushing parties in a particular direction, I think it becomes very complicated. Brian, I’m going to come to you next. There was a lot of questions that you’ll have, I imagine, quite a lot to say about, so your turn.
Dr Brian Klaas
Well, I’ll keep it as brief as I can. I’ll weigh in on the question by Mary first, and then go on to the, sort of, structural questions about democracy. So I think I would push back on that view that Mary presented of this is, sort of, overly hysterical, and the reason for that is twofold. One is, I think, we’ve forgotten some of the scale of the violence that’s happened. I mean, we had in Wisconsin during the protests, you know, a person who was – two people were shot dead. You have a recent foiled kidnap – kidnapping plot of Governor Whitmer of Michigan where extremists who were responding to Trump saying, “We need to get out of her – get her out of here,” and calling in all capital letters to liberate Michigan from public health guidelines that his own White House advanced, tried to violently kidnap her, and were only stopped because the FBI stopped them. There was, of course, the shooting of Hispanic people in Texas a little while ago in which, you know, a hate manifesto that echoed a lot of the rhetoric from President Trump was used in that.
And I think the big difference here that makes me actually more negative and more pessimistic is that these acts of violence are becoming not just something where everybody recoils in horror but only half the country recoils in horror. So with Governor Whitmer, Trump yesterday said, “Maybe this is a problem. Maybe it’s not.” And that’s literally what his quote was. I mean, this was a Governor of a major American state who nearly got kidnapped by violent extremists, and the President says, “We don’t know if that’s a big deal.” I mean, that is a fundamentally different style of political rhetoric than the US has had around violence, not to mention that the – Kyle Rittenhouse, the person who murdered two people in Wisconsin, was celebrated at a Republican Party dinner. His mum was given a standing ovation for driving him to the protest where he shot two people. I mean, the scale of this stuff is really worrying, and I think that it’s not a leap to say that when that is the political culture that the future looks very, very dark if that continues. And that’s what I’m worried about. I’m not saying it’s worse than it was then now. But I think it has every possibility that it will become much more extreme.
On the reform question, I think there’s a few issues. One is how can you have a party that is going to govern, you know, obtain power through minority votes consistently, and that’s what’s likely to happen through Republican Party through about the Senate and the Electoral College? The reform that I think could solve both of them potentially, there’s two ideas. They both, I think, have some merit. One is to expand the number of seats in the House. This is a proposal. There’s no fixed number. It could be, you know, bigger or smaller. But we have 650 MPs in the Parliament in the UK for one-fifth the people, and there’s 435 Members of the House. If you expand the House, the Electoral College in balance becomes much less pronounced because the overrepresentation of the Senators, two seats per – two Senators per state, becomes less important.
The other way of doing this, which would abolish the Electoral College without requiring a constitutional amendment, is the Interstate Electoral College National Popular Vote Pact, which basically says that the states would agree to cast their electoral votes to whoever won more votes nationally. And the Interstate Compacts have existed in other areas of public life. This wouldn’t require a constitutional amendment, and it would effectively ensure that whoever won the popular vote would win the presidency, which can go a really, really long way enforcing both parties to compete in places where they normally lose. And I think that would be a very, very big positive of effectively nullifying or neutralising the effect of the Electoral College. So I think my main point here is that there is an unsustainable path we’re on in which, you know, half the country is going to have way less representation in multiple bodies, whether it’s the Supreme Court or the Senate, and that’s just not a recipe for consensus-based democracy. So something is going to have to give over the next, you know, ten, 15, 20 years.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, and Hans?
Hans Kundnani
It’s quite interesting how this has, kind of, slightly evolved from a discussion about the United States into a discussion about democracy and democratic dysfunctionality. So I’ll try and answer Mary’s question. I very much agree with what Brian said. I don’t think this is, you know, exaggerating that the, sort of, how bad the situation is or how dangerous the situation is. But I’ll try and answer Mary’s question in a slightly different way. Going back to the 1960s, ‘cause I thought it was interesting that Mary brought up the 1960s, for me, what’s interesting about that, you know, it’s true that America was polarised at that time. But it seems to me it’s a very different, kind of, polarisation than at the moment, and this relates to something that Elena said as well because, you know, to some extent, there was a generational conflict, there was a left-right conflict. But, actually, it wasn’t reflected in the party-political system in the United States.
In fact, though, what’s happened, and it’s precisely since the 1960s and above all, as I understand it, since the Voting Rights Act, and the realignment that happened as a consequence of the Voting Rights Act. In other words, as a consequence of civil rights, there’s been this polarisation which has continued and, you know, reached its most extreme form now where the two political parties, you know, this is the culture wars again, you know, represent such different views of reality, as Brian was saying. Whereas back in the ’60s before this realignment took place, actually, there was, you know, some people have talked about a four-party system in the United States with Northern Democrats, and Northern Republicans, and Southern Democrats, and Southern Republicans. In many ways, the Northern Democrats had nothing, you know, completely different from the Southern Democrat.
That all changes with the debate around race and about civil rights to the point where you now have these two mega identities, as some political scientists have called it. And what’s interesting about that to me is, you know, that is threatening American democracy, but not because the parties don’t represent people, as you were suggesting, Elena, it’s the opposite. It’s precisely because they do represent people so well, and that you have these blocs. So this is why, again, I think it’s a slightly different problem that in some other parts of the world, particularly in Europe, in some ways you could almost say that the current situation in America where, you know, whether you’re a Conversative or a Liberal or a Democrat or a Republican, it’s your entire identity now. That actually is remarkable similar, I think, to, kind of, the golden age of democracy in Europe when, you know, you were born a German Social Democrat, and that was your entire identity too.
So, you know, in other words, this is a little bit complicated. Polarisation is not always a bad thing. It’s particularly bad, it seems to me, when it’s around these toxic culture war issues; less so when it’s around economic questions. And so, for me, the crucial thing actually is not to say, well, look, the cleavages in our politics have changed, and we should adapt our system to reflect that. Because then I think you end up like the United States where you have, you know, basically two parties that differentiate themselves in cultural terms. What I think we need to do is resist that temptation, and go – try to go back to a system where our polarisation is around economic questions, not around cultural questions. And then I think you can go back again to having a, kind of, healthy polarisation in democracy, rather than one which undermines it.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
There was a lot in that answer, and not least is it really the case that polarisation around economic issues is less troubling? I’m not so sure that the people that are sitting in America waiting for fiscal stimulus to be passed who are in the lower income brackets or in racial minority categories that have been really hard, you know, heavily impacted by COVID, I’m not so sure that they would necessarily agree with you that the polarisation on economic issues isn’t as problematic. But I know you’re getting at a lot of things, but it, you know, there’s – that was a great answer, but there’s a lot in there.
I just want to read out one more question before we finish because it had a couple of likes, and it’s an important question. It could prove to be an incredibly important question. I’m sure we have – all have a view, but I think it’s worth addressing, by Oliver Wilson, who writes, “Could the panellists perhaps discuss the potential issues surrounding a Biden victory, perhaps commenting on his age and some very worrying interview performances and mental slips during debates?” I think it’s entirely legitimate to talk about age. We know that we have a Speaker of the House, and two presidential candidates, none of whom are especially young. And there are any number of questions in a context where young Americans are losing out in terms of economic opportunities and educational opportunities, age is a really big issue in the United States. You’ve asked it in light of Vice President Biden. So perhaps, in closing, I’ll give each of you a round. But maybe you could tackle the age question in general, but also Vice President Biden, and anything else you’d like to say in closing. And let me start with you, Elena.
Dr Elena Lazarou
Thank you, I was hoping you would because I really need to respond to what Hans said because I disagree very much. I think we allow ourselves to fall in a trap when we convince ourselves that because the parties are so – are going so much to the extreme or so polarised that that’s what society looks like. In fact, it’s inconsistent with what we keep saying, that a lot of people are voting for Biden just because they don’t want to vote for Trump, which means they are not represented, you know. They don’t know who to vote for. So that’s not – it’s either/or, you know, it can’t be both. It can’t be that society is so the extremes in terms of identity that they’re just aligned with one of the two parties that are polarised, or that people don’t know who to vote for. So I truly believe that media and really the headlines make us think that way, but I do not believe that it is the case that, you know, those parties and those – and we’re talking about the very polarised extreme views represent the way society is exactly. Society is polarised, but that doesn’t mean that it’s finding its outlet to politics through the existing mechanisms. At least that’s my view.
On the age thing, I find it very appropriate that we were asked that after we were told that none of us remembers the 1960s. So there’s two ways to look at that. I think young people do not feel represented when they look at someone that does not look like them. But I think there’s a way for – we’re talking a lot, in this panel included, about how history seems to be repeating itself on some level and some issues, including on culture, on civil rights. Not exactly the same but, to some extent, there are parallelisms. So it’s not ideal that politicians should be, on average, so much older than the society and parts of society. But at least the hope is that they can use the experience of the past to, sort of, address some of the issues that seem to reverberate themes that we’ve already been there, but perhaps forgotten to do – forgotten about. So it’s not that I think it’s the best-case scenario, but I do see the value of experience, and I hope that can come into play.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hans?
Dr Elena Lazarou
And thank you for being…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Sorry?
Dr Elena Lazarou
And thank you, since it’s my closing remarks.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Oh, yeah, and thank you. Hans, age?
Hans Kundnani
Yeah, I don’t have much to add. I mean, I share the question as, kind of, feeling about this. I did find myself thinking the other day, when did America become such a gerontocracy? And, yeah, I think it’s a shame, but here we are.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Brian?
Dr Brian Klaas
Yeah, I mean, I think the mental acuity question is one where it’s amusing to me that it’s often brought up with Biden after the last four years because I think the mental acuity on display from Trump has also been very troubling. I will say that I don’t think that Biden’s debate performances were significantly different from Biden’s debate performances when he’s previously ran for President. He’s never been known as the Obama smooth operator who’s the rhetorical genius and I think that that is – that’s something where there’s not a significant change from the past.
That being said, I think that regardless of your political party or your view on the candidates that one thing that the US does have as a norm that’s a positive one is regular health screenings of the President, and this has become more, you know, contentious with Trump’s COVID diagnosis. And I think given the progress that has happened in the world of recognising mental health being an important part of health is that there should be regular mental health checks of anyone who’s in that position of power, and they should be made public. And I think that should be something that all parties commit to as a way of trying to ensure that these questions are not worrying people because I think at the point where you’re at that level of office, you deserve that scrutiny. So, I think that there should be significant scrutiny of President Biden’s health, during the time he’s in office, and I also think the one thing that is positive is that he has signalled that he is not planning to pursue two terms. So I don’t think we’ll have, you know, an 87-year-old or 86-year-old President Biden come 2024. So, with that, I’ll say that I hope that this has been not the most bleak talk you’ve listened to because I think we’re all very worried, but thank you for having me, and I appreciate you moderating, Leslie.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you. That was a wonderful set of comments and interventions, especially from the panellists, but also from the audience. The other thing I guess we could say about Vice President Biden or President Trump is that nobody rules alone, certainly not in a democracy, and certainly not in the United States. So, watch the President, watch the Vice President, watch the Cabinet, watch the Executive Branch, watch the use of Presidential appointments. This tells you a lot about the President, but it also tells you how things are really – what’s really going to drive policy and across any number of dimensions.
So six days to go. I’m sure that we’ll all be talking to each other a lot over the next six days, formally and informally. But we will also be reconvening on November 4th, which feels like it’s on the other side of this very large divide. Robin Niblett, I believe, is chairing a discussion with many of us. I’m sure that you will see Brian on the media. I’m sure you’ll be reading his writing. If you’re not following him on Twitter, you should ‘cause he’s really great to follow on Twitter, and Hans and Elena will remain with us, so thank you for joining us today. Thank you so much, Brian, for joining us at Chatham House.
Dr Brian Klaas
Thanks very much.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And stay engaged because there’s a lot to follow, thank you [pause]. Thanks so much, Brian.
Dr Brian Klaas
Thanks for having me.
