Tim Judah
Hello, my name is Tim Judah, and welcome to this session at Chatham House. I would like to, first of all, introduce the session and to say that, actually, we have a slightly misleading title, Bosnia: 25 Years on from Dayton. In fact, that’s just an excuse, as you’ve probably guessed, for talking about the wider Balkan region and especially the so-called Western Balkan 6 and where we are today.
I’m now going to introduce my panellists and to explain some other things, which have been slightly confusing. First of all, one of our panellists, advertised panellists, Edina Becirevic from Sarajevo, unfortunately, has not been able to make it, but luckily, my colleague, Denis Dzidic from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, who – he runs the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in Sarajevo, the Bosnian branch of it, has stepped in. Then we have Vlora Çitaku, who I should clarify, is the Former Ambassador of Kosovo to the United States, even though it’s labelling her here as Ambassador. But she has been Ambassador for six years, she’s certainly made her name as being Ambassador in the US, but I want to stress that she is no longer the Ambassador of Kosovo to the US and is back in Pristina. And finally, we have Sonja Biserko, who runs the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.
Now, if anybody has followed the region Serbia and the region, for the last 25 years or 30 years, everybody will know Sonja’s name. Sonja has been the most, for nationalists and for governments in Serbia, the most annoying thorn in their flesh, for the last 25 or 30 years, and is to be congratulated for that.
Okay, so, welcome to this webinar. I’m going to tell you that you are – I’ve been asked to tell you that you can tweet, using the hashtag – you – it says #CHEEvents. So, it’s actually – or CHEvents, as in Chatham House Events, and attendees can submit questions through the ‘Q&’A function, and then, depending on the time, I will be able to ask people to – I will ask for certain questions, if we have time, to be unmuted and then, those people will be able to ask a question. So, now, I think that we will go straight onto our panellists. Each panellist will start with a five-minute introduction, then we’ll have a, sort of, in – a, sort of, conversation period for about 20 minutes and then we will open the Q&A.
We’re going to start with Vlora Çitaku. For anybody who follows Serbia and Kosovo relations, especially, the last few years have been, well, quite, sort of, unusual, but actually, what was very interesting was that last night we had Miroslav Licek, the EU Special Envoy, and Matt Palmer, the US Special Envoy for the Western Balkans and for Serbia and Kosovo, actually speaking together on Kosovo TV, and re-establishing, this is why I’m mentioning it, it’s because it – they have, basically – they are clearly re-establishing the fact that Brussels and Washington are back on track. But, okay, I’m not going to ask you only about Serbia and Kosovo. I want – I hope you’re going to talk about a wider – you know, about the wider region, but tell us, from your experience of the last six years and from what you’ve seen recently, just tell us about how you expect US involvement and the Biden administration to change things, with regard to region? So, over to you.
Vlora Çitaku
Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Tim, and it’s a great pleasure to be with all of you today. Well, the new administration has a full plate, but it is committed, as you rightly pointed out, to reviving the transatlantic ties. But, within this context, the Western Balkans cannot become a scapegoat. The administration has clearly indicated its intention to address the Western Balkans in tandem with the European partners. However, it is essential for the US to remain engaged and in the driver’s seat. The EU and US are not competing influences in the region, they are complementary. It is crucial for the EU to understand the dynamic as such. The EU should take advantage of the new administration’s willingness to co-operate on these matters. The Biden administration is very well equipped with personalities, who know region very well, and have worked on the issues for a long time.
The record shows that every time US is absent, EU dropped the ball. Whether in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Kosovo, EU lacked both cohesion and consensus. It is important to emphasise that during the last few years, the absence of the UK has also left a notable gap in the European Union. My impression is that the EU is process-oriented, whereas US is goal-oriented. While process is necessary, it is only a tool, and it is – it cannot become a goal on itself. In the case of Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, for example, which has been going on for a decade now, the EU lacked clear timelines and objectives and more importantly, they lacked the ability to keep their end of the bargaining.
As someone who served as a Minister for European Integrations and the Ambassador in Washington, I’ve seen both capitals up close and I believe I know them well. While both capitals agree on the desirable result, they differ on the preferred pace. It is important for all of us to keep in mind that this is not 1995, it’s not 1999, it’s not 2008. This is 2021. The world has changed and there are different elements at play. We are faced with increasingly aggressive Russia, a more present China, and mix in this with COVID-19 pandemic, which has left us hanging by a thread economically, the situation is fragile.
Now, more than ever, we need clarity from Brussels and from Washington. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the status quo is not sustainable. The situation will either improve or implode. It’s in our hands to try to make it the former. Thank you.
Tim Judah
Ooh, sorry about that, sorry, great. Thank you very much. Well, that leads us onto Denis, from Balkan Investigative Reporting Network. Vlora Çitaku mentions there in passing, Russia and China. From your point of view in Sarajevo, how does it look? You’ve got – I mean, Bosnia’s always been the subject of, kind of, outside influences and as has the region, but Russia, people have been talking about as increasingly aggressive, as Vlora said, China’s influence has been increasing, Gulf Arabs, Turkey. Everybody’s – wants a piece of the action, so, how does it look from Sarajevo?
Denis Dzidic
Yeah, thank you, Tim. Basically, the title of this meeting is, like, 25 years from Dayton and, obviously, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is, kind of, an internal joke for Bosnia is that everybody say, “It’s never been worse,” and it always keeps getting worse. And the situation today is that we are a state totally under political capture by, you know, three different nationalistic, rampant, you know, movements that are totally stalling all of the reform processes. And I’m not going to talk a lot about those, but the focus that I was asked to talk about is foreign influences, but before I move onto Russia and China and Turkey, let me just briefly say that, like, the most visible foreign influences that we have in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of this political capture nationalistic wise, is from Serbia and Croatia, and that’s definitely something that, obviously, Sonja will probably discuss, as well.
As for how it looks on the ground, related to Russia and China and Turkey, we – you have, you know, very, very clear influences that are happening on the ground. In relation to Russia, that’s probably most visible, in the political realm currently, because you have very, very clear, you know, messages from the Russian Ambassador, you have very, very open statements against the OHR from, you know, the Russian Ambassador, from within the Peace Implementation Council. You have very clear, you know, support to this extreme nationalist rhetoric from the leading Bosnian Serb political party. And then, on top of that, has been, you know, proved in several investigations, you have, also, very close connections to some other elements, you know, connected to Russia. For instance, the Night Wolves movement, the Night Wolves bike gang, which, you know, its leader in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Republika Srpska, one of Bosnia’s entities, is employed within the Bosnian Serb Government.
He’s a driver in the Ministry for Transport. He is involved in – you know, his company received concession worth €1½ million from the Bosnian Serb authorities, so there’s a very clear political connection to this, you know, pro-Russian movement and gang. Which is also always there, you know, when you have commemorations for – related to the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but then also, you know, in some meetings where foreign volunteers who fought – you know, well, Russian volunteers who fought in the Bosnian War are commemorated in Višegrad and also, people who have went from Republika Srpska and Serbia to fight in the Ukraine, are also commemorated. So, these are all very clear worrying trends.
When we talk about China, they’re not so openly political as of yet, but we have a very aggressive movement, in regards to economic influence. So, obviously, the BH Telecom signed an agreement with Huawei to afford – for developing a 5G. We also have other investments in the – in infrastructure sector, so building the thermal plant in Tuzla and other attempts to also be involved in the construction of the highways in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we have already seen that these economic influences come at the expense of, you know, a lack of transparency. So, when we had the Tuzla investment discussion in the Federal Parliament, you know, [inaudible – 14:44] was told by several members of the – by several lawmakers that, you know, people from the Chinese Embassy were also calling around, that there were possibilities there to make various deals that were connected to this and we couldn’t get a lot of information of what was happening exactly on the ground.
When we talk about Turkey, the most clear example on how much it exerts influence is when you talk about just one example, in relation to the judiciary and obviously, from how Bosnia is treating people who are coming – who are connected to the Gülen movement and so, Bosnia and Herzegovina was – prosecutors were really aggressively, you know, asking for Bosnia and Herzegovina to extradite these people from – to Turkey, despite the fact that it doesn’t recognise the Gülen movement as a terrorist organisation. So, those are just some of the examples that you are very clear on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are transferring in the political realm. I am going to stop there, because I was told to stop in five minutes, but if you want some other details, more than happy to answer questions.
Tim Judah
Well, perhaps you’d just like to say something about the Gulf Arabs, because their pre – economic presence is clearly visible in Sarajevo, but does that translate into any sort of political influence, or not really?
Denis Dzidic
Not as much on the, you know, on the everyday statements. There is obviously a lot of economic influence there, but I would say it’s quite close to Chinese in that sense. So, it’s not as political as of yet, but there’s a huge lack of transparency there. Obviously, with a lot of these investments, we don’t know who is standing behind them. There’s a lot of allegations that they’re connected politically to some leading members of the SDA, but we are not seeing, as of yet, a very, very strong, you know, political reality and political manifestations of these influences.
Tim Judah
Great, thank you. Okay, we’re now going to turn to Sonja Biserko. Sonja, one of the frustrating things for people who follow the region is that sometimes something happens or – and then people who used to follow it as Journalists or, kind of, Zen Analyst, then pop up to discuss things or make comments, and their frame of reference is where they last turned off. So, for example, with Serbia, it might’ve been, you know, the fall of Milošević and then they talk about Serbia as though – as it was when Milošević fell in 2000, but that was 21 years ago. Just tell us, like, how is Serbian – in terms of democratic gains and losses? And perhaps you could say a little bit about the rest of the region, as well, but please start by telling us about Serbia. Or – Sonja, you’re still muted. Go ahead.
Sonja Biserko
Ah, I think – thank you, Tim, and good day to everybody. I would like to just say that this is the right question to be addressed here in the region, especially in Serbia, because we can say that the Western Balkans are stuck and that democratic processes have not significantly taken root, and in the meantime, they have, I would say, stopped political elites in the region, are focused on ECA projects and no alternative liberal concept have been established. Communism has been suppressed by anti-Communism, itself degenerating through numerous radical phenomena.
When we talked about Serbia, I think the right question is to pose how do we understand democracy here? And I would say, democracy in Serbia is understood as people’s democracy, which means populism and nationalism. Since Slobodan Milošević came to power, Serbia is, in one way or the other, a very populist country. War propaganda mobilised the Serbian people for the war that followed, but as there was no political will to acknowledge new reality and new borders, none of the six countries in the Western Balkans is – are consolidated as states, and we have still border issues pending as the main, I would say, generator of nationalism in each of these states.
Then I would say Serbia is continuously conducting a propaganda war, which maintains all the stereotypes with which the war began, and that is detrimental to the democratisation of Serbia in the long run, but also to the regional relations. The essence of that populism doesn’t have a serious policy and strategy. It all comes down to phrases about serenity and nourishing the image of an idealised past. Vučić won power on the populist stage by a large majority, which enabled him to put most of the media under the control, to devalue institutions and politicalise and stand often fantasies, such as Belgrade on Waterfront, fountain on Slavia, several shopping malls and hotels and the present monument of Stefan Nemanja as a symbol of this idealised past.
And considering that the opposition has failed to consolidate and offer a meaningful vision of the future, reform of populism exercised by Vučić, is a serious threat for the European future of Serbia, but the region as well. And there is no political or economic philosophy behind that, it is paradoxical, but the government that has had a stable majority for so long, and he’s one of the leaders who enjoyed enormous support all these years, it’s paradoxical that he has not a stay – he was not able to initiate reforms in Serbia. And in the meantime, the international context has been changing and EU membership feel – seems far-fetched, which is really one of the major obstructions for the region as such, because local leaders are looking elsewhere. We have been witnessing, in the past few years, whether it’s Russia, China, Turkey or any other country, which is not providing any kind of criteria or norms, and everything is so untransparent, it’s much easier for the local corrupt political elites.
But one thing more, which is also important to say about Serbia is that Serbia is an unfinished state, like all the others in the region. But in Serbia, because the issue of its future has not been resolved, whether it is for the EU or not, and due to its territorial aspirations, that are still very strong, Serbia is unable to perform internal integration. And then, in this international vacuum, which has been there for some time, especially since 2008, I would say Serbian elites, who – which advocate Serbian world, which is a replacement for the unification of the Serbs, they are invited – encouraged to undertake geopolitical initiatives in the so-called Serbian lands, especially in Bosnia and now in Montenegro. And Kosovo has really been kept as the frozen conflict in order – expecting conversation, both in Bosnia and in Montenegro.
Trump ignorance on the Balkans gave freehand to Belgrade to feel that they can take very aggressive offensive nowadays in Montenegro and in Bosnia, since independence of Kosovo – since independence declaration of Kosovo. Since then, the – Dodik is very – came on the very aggressive policy against Bosnians’ integrity and he’s keeping open possibility of referendum in Bosnia for its – for the independence of the Republika Srpska, and this is a constant. This hasn’t changed for all these years, and I went – I wouldn’t – I’m afraid that Bosnia and Herzegovina state would – was always received as temporary and provisional, as well as its borders. And I think West shouldn’t underestimate this strong, I would say, focus of Serbia on the international changing context and the possibility to, sort of, achieve its aspirations in the region. That’s a very strong component of the political elite here – of the policy of political elite here in Serbia. Yeah, I can stop here, so that…
Tim Judah
Sonja…
Sonja Biserko
…you can continue through…
Tim Judah
…that’s fascinating. Thank you…
Sonja Biserko
…your questions but go on.
Tim Judah
…and you’re right to mention this expression, this, what was it, Serbian world? Was that the expression that’s being used?
Sonja Biserko
Sorry?
Tim Judah
You were right to exp – mention that expression, which is now being used, and more and more often…
Sonja Biserko
Yes.
Tim Judah
…Serbian world. I think is that the right expression?
Sonja Biserko
Well, it is, Serbian world, Srpska state.
Tim Judah
Serbian world. But then, let me just ask you this, I mean, yes, that is certainly the case for one audience, but actually, perhaps this is the case, an interesting question for Denis, as well, who also said that the biggest foreign interference in Bosnia was from Serbia and Croatia. Actually, the most interesting new story of the last 24 hours has been Mr Vučić on the airport in Sarajevo, delivering vaccines, saying, “Well, the EU are useless and so, we’re delivering the vaccines, and together we will do things.” And he was not delivering vaccines just to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Actually, he was delivering vaccines specifically to the Federation, i.e., to…
Sonja Biserko
Well…
Tim Judah
From Bosnia. How does this fit into this picture?
Sonja Biserko
Well, I think this is offensive of charm, which is – he’s now implementing in the region, especially by offering and donating vaccines. He’s a hero of the region and I would say of Europe as well. He’s the only one who managed to buy the vaccines, much before the vaccine was on the market, and it’s one – he’s boosting his leadership now in the region and in Europe, because we are the second country in Europe by a number of vaccinated people. And I would say it also is important to know that recently, as was mentioned here by Çitaku, that US and EU are becoming much more critical of Serbian leadership and Vučić especially. He enjoyed their support for far too long, especially during Trump era, they turned a blind eye to what was going on here and that encouraged them. And now, for the first time, he’s losing this, I would say, unconditional support and he’s now starting to behave as the leader of the region, giving – sort of, acting like a country, which is in solidarity with the others, but he didn’t donate vaccines to Kosovo. He tried to donate to the North of Kosovo, to Serbs, but not to Kosovans. So, this is – I would say, okay, I mean, people will say, “Well, we don’t have vaccines, you’re welcome to donate us,” but in fact, it has very strong political message, and I will say this fear of his losing real support of – from Germany and the United States. So, this is, yeah, so, this is the…
Tim Judah
Good, great. I mean, Denis, perhaps I could come to you. I mean, how does it look in Sarajevo with Mr Vučić on the airport of – on the runway of Sarajevo Airport, which, of course, has that kind of, very symbolic – it’s, kind of, symbolic, really, that the President of Serbia should be there, doing good, delivering vaccines. How does that look in Sarajevo?
Sonja Biserko
Well, I mean, nobody really trusts him in Bosnia and also, here, people who understand what he’s doing, but most of the people are ordinary citizens. They see it as, you know, Serbian success story, I would say, and you know, we were so, you know, great, that we are even going to donate vaccines to the neighbourhood. And this is also propaganda in the region, but also, in the country, and I think he’s also preparing for his next Presidential elections. I think he’s going to win it, because he did few things, which are not – you’re – you cannot criticise him, from any point of view. Even if you can question where the money comes from for these vaccines, nothing is transparent. But yeah.
Tim Judah
But let me just ask – but go over to Denis now. Denis, how does it look in Sarajevo, how does that look? Is something new changing, or what?
Denis Dzidic
Yeah, no, I think that what Miss Biserko is saying is totally right, from the perspective of, you know – the Bosnian Serb position. It’s a very good, you know, charm offensive, it’s a very good representation of Serbia being this hero, this, you know, arms spread, we are going to help the Federation because it’s so incompetent and poor that it can’t get even 5,000 in the – in a few months. And then – but also, you know, when you look at it a bit from the, you know, from the, like – from the backend, which you’re, also, kind of, seeing this narrative developing, is that, you know, again, this just highlights how incompetent Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country is, and that is the constant of the Bosnian Serb…
Sonja Biserko
Yeah, right.
Denis Dzidic
…rhetoric, as Miss Biserko said, that, you know, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot function, it’s this failed state, it’s just put together by these assorted international influences and the US and EU are, you know, falsely, just pushing it together, and then, that really helps. It’s not something that Vučić is going to say, it’s not something that Dodik is going to say on the day, but they have mouthpieces, and you can see on the – you know, on social media, you can see on comments on articles, you know, all of these people from Sarajevo, from Tuzla, from Mostar, saying, “That’s just…
Sonja Biserko
Exactly.
Denis Dzidic
…horrible, you know, look how much we are degrading ourselves.” And you have these mouthpieces saying, “Yeah, but you were saved by Serbia, you know, this is – and you’re always criticising us, so, see,” and that really, it’s like, it’s a homerun, it’s vaccine diplomacy at its best.
Tim Judah
Great. I’m – Vlora Çitaku, I’m going to come to you now, because you, unfortunately, have to leave ten minutes early. Tell us a little bit more about how you see the kind of the US coming back into the region, or rather, perhaps that’s a – perhaps I’m mistaken to say coming back. I mean, a lot of people have said that in the last few years that the Russ – that the Americans and the US had, kind of, withdrawn. In fact, Mr Trump and his Envoy for the region, Rick Grenell, were extremely involved in the region and especially with Kosovo and Serbia, and you had a kind of, ringside seat to that. Perhaps you could tell us a little bit about that period and how it felt, but how you think that the things will go on now and will there be continuity? Will the Washington agreements, I’m not sure if agreement is the right word, but the pieces of paper signed in Washington at the end of last year in Mr Trump’s office, will they hold for the future? What’s going to happen, do you think? You’re muted.
Vlora Çitaku
Thank you very much, Tim. As I said, in my opening remarks, I really hope so that Western Balkans does not become a scapegoat of the renewed Transatlantic Alliance. What I mean by that is I hope EU is not going to knock on doors in Washington and say, “Hey, this is our problem,” because the truth is, Europe lacks consensus vis-à-vis the region, but State Kosovo, for example, we still have five EU members that have not recognised Kosovo. The same can be applied to Bosnia. There’s no consensus between capitals in the European Union on how to address the constitutional reform or whether there should be one at all, for that matter. So, we need US back, working together, hand-in-hand, with European capitals and Brussels, in order to anchor the process.
What I – I’m going to save the juicy details of my six years in Washington for my book, but I can say that very often, because there was clearly sense in Brussels that US was trying to hijack the process of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. I must say that sitting in Washington, I didn’t see it as such. I believe Washington saw an opening, an opportunity to get involved, because the process led by European Union was not going anywhere for over a decade. Secondly, it is very important for European Union to understand that enlargement is not an altruistic project. They view enlargement – they treat enlargement as altruistic, as a favour we’re doing to these poor European Western Balkan countries. No, enlargement is in the interest of European Union itself, because how can European Union be considered an honest broker internationally, and how can European Union be considered a geopolitical player if they fail to address issues at their own backyard?
Another very important element to have in mind, we need clear timelines. This cannot be an open-ended process, and I really hope that they use – that Brussels uses the momentum in Washington, with personalities who have known region for so long and very well to re-engage, and I hope they go and knock on doors in Washington, to say, “Please come and work with us.”
And I just want to touch upon what Sonja was saying earlier. He also lacked imagination when it came to the Western Balkans. The entire relationship with Kosovo and Serbia was reduced to dialogue, and I believe that this was unfortunate. There is beyond – there is a relationship between Serbia and EU, Kosovo and EU, that should go beyond dialogue, that should be focused on reforms, on progress, on countries’ abilities to transform themselves and become members of the European Union. Dialogue is one of the pillars of the relationship, but it should not be the only one. Mr Vučić was allowed, by Brussels and by the international community overall, for a very long time, to conduct a very bipolar foreign policy. They were Europeans in Brussels, but extremely anti-European in the region. We just concluded elections in Kosovo in February. Elections were impeccable, with the exception of the areas with Serbian majority population, where Serbian political parties that have had – and individuals who have had guts to think independently from Belgrade, have been targeted and have been subjects of harassment. So, I hope that Brussels and Washington will sit together and have more of a holistic approach towards the region, which is not reduced only on dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.
Tim Judah
Okay, thank you very much. Now, we have actually, really, quite a lot of questions coming in and so, I thought I would start to bring in some of those people. One of the first we’ve got is from Denis MacShane, a Former British Minister for Europe. Perhaps Denis MacShane could be unmuted, so that he can make his point and ask his question.
Denis MacShane
Yes.
Tim Judah
Hello.
Denis MacShane
Am I unmuted?
Tim Judah
Yes, you are, but Denis, please go ahead.
Denis MacShane
Lovely. Well, brilliant. I mean, enormously enjoyable seminar. Well done for putting it together and really great points, too. My point has been consistent for a number of years that we should simply stop talking about something called the EU, with reference to the West Balkans or Kosovo. They are individual national capitals. As Vlora said, they are the five non-recognised, just start with. I mean, I’ve written articles in El Pais, in Kathimerini, urging recognition, blah, blah, blah, but it needs a proper concerted effort, and I have to say, Vlora, brilliant as you were in Washington, that frankly, the obsession of, hmmm, many of my friends in Kosovo with only doing things in Washington, I think was misplaced.
You have to invest in the key capitals, not all of them, build community of knowledge, support, send people like Tim and Denis and Sonja round to give lots of talks in Berlin and Paris and so on, and that’s the most important thing. And, frankly, I’m delighted Biden is back. I thought that the Trump-Grenell thing was more about Trump grandstanding in recognition of Israel, frankly, to win a few votes, wasn’t really a contribution to solving many problems in the West Balkans, but that’s maybe ‘cause I’m anti-Trump, I’ve no idea why.
So, that’s my real point, stop talking about a thing called the EU, stop hoping that the foreign – the High Representative, whether [Cassi – 37:34] or Federica Mogherini, now Josep Borrell, is going to pull rabbits out of the hat for you. Kosovo has to learn how to sell itself much better in key EU capitals.
Tim Judah
Great, thank you very much. I mean, do – would you like to respond to that, Vlora?
Vlora Çitaku
No, no, it’s fine.
Tim Judah
I mean, I think that that would – actually is a type of question which – or kind of a comment which actually could apply to other countries as well. Okay, we’ve got a question here from a Mr Simon Webb. Could you unmute him, so that Simon Webb could ask his question?
Simon Webb
Yes, thank you very much. I was involved on the policy side of the Ministry of Defence, particularly in 1999 and indeed, I think I was responsible for the Macedonia stabilisation month in 2001. And I just think it’s always important to come back to, you know, why did people like us put an enormous amount of effort, and the UK Armed Forces, put a lot of effort into this for getting on for ten years? And it was because – not because we didn’t know how to stabilise this place, but what we did know was that we weren’t going to have atrocities and that we would try and provide enough stability for the locals to learn to live together. And I just think that every time anybody comes back to thinking this is, sort of, some sub-play on international intervention, and this is the point that what the rest of the world would really like is these countries to live together. We know perfectly well that, you know, the Russians have been interfering there, you know, for at least 150 years, the Turks for 1,000 years. We know perfectly well about the – you know, all the Blackbirds and the atrocities of the past, but what we really wanted was for these countries to settle down, despite all the history and difficulty and ethnic problems, and live together. And I was amongst those who said, you know, “If you will do that and you’ll take your criminals off – let us take your criminals off to the ICTY, then, you know, we, you know, we will eventually back your admission to the US – to the Western institutions,” and some of that has obviously happened in some places.
And I just – it really worries me that the local attention keeps coming back to actually dodging the local reconciliation issues, ‘cause it’s easier to talk about who’s influencing what at the moment. China will invest it all over the place, but I have grave doubts about whether they really want to dominate these countries.
So, I just wanted to – hope that you’re friends and I really learned to like being in Bosnia and I went visiting all the countries and I really liked – love the people in many ways, but, you know, what can we do to get reconciliation back on the agenda? It – now, that’s my question.
Tim Judah
Okay, well, quite, that’s a good question, but okay…
Vlora Çitaku
I’ll…
Tim Judah
…Vlora to start off.
Vlora Çitaku
I’ll…
Tim Judah
Make sure you unmute yourself, yes, again there, again.
Vlora Çitaku
And I’ll be very, very brief. There cannot be sustainable peace, if we hide the major issues under the rug. There cannot be real reconciliation, if we don’t address the elephant in the room. I said previously, on my remarks, status quo is not sustainable, and we cannot replace status quo with a new status quo. Hard decisions will have to be made and the only way to anchor the region towards European Union is to finish the unfinished business, as Sonja initially indicated. And that is to have mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia, and – which would, hopefully, and eventually, lead to the recognition of Kosovo by the rest of the EU member states. But the current status quo is at – goes in favour of Russia, China, and all other state and non-state factors who do not want to see the Western Balkans joining the European family.
Tim Judah
Okay, Denis, reconciliation or should we not worry about that? I mean, Bosnia, there’s not much reconciliation, but every year for 25 years, since Dayton, there’ve been predictions that Bosnia’s going back to war, it will all collapse, and it never does. It’s not fine, but, okay, fine, people just get on with the rest of their lives and perhaps that’s the best that can be hoped for. Should we worry about this word of reconciliation, or should we forget about it?
Denis Dzidic
I think we should worry about it. I think that without reconciliation, without building a sort of, minimum trust and a minimum truth of what happened during the war, you can’t really build on a state from that position onward. And any kind of economic development is not going to be sustainable, without building this building block of the state.
Now, in relation to the question, “Well, should we worry about the money coming in?” We should be worrying about local reconciliation, the money’s not a problem. The influence that comes with the money is the problem, and Russia is not only, you know, giving money, in fact, it’s giving very little money, but what it exercise, in terms of power, is very – is hindering reconciliation actively. So, as an example, we have, you know, the situation before the UN, when they stopped a declaration that winter, criticised the genocide in Srebrenica because of the word ‘genocide’.
In relation to China, hypothetically, you can also make – not hypothetically, but you can make a case that because of their influences, the criticism in media, in relation to the Uighur crimes, have been very little in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, obviously, our media is not hugely important, but it tells you that there is a price to pay, in terms of truth in these influences and what it actually happens on the ground is that you have a failure to implement a bear minimum of transitional justice mechanisms, which would, potentially, you know, build some kind of semblance of reconciliation, however you want to define it. So, I would say that these influences are hugely important, in the terms of reconciliation and, yeah, and this is what’s hindering it.
Tim Judah
Okay, great, thank you. Sonja, I’m going to ask you something else. We’re going to come to a question from Othon Anastasakis, academic here in Britain, who’s got a question specifically for you.
Sonja Biserko
Yes, can I hear it?
Tim Judah
Yes, Othon, can you hear, can you ask your question please? Let me have a look. Whoops, Othon, can you ask your question? I think you may be muted? Okay, I’ll – we can’t hear you, Othon, so I’m going to read your question. Sonja, I’m going to read his question. “It’s a paradox of how popular Vučić continues to be in Serbia, given the fact he’s conducting an undemocratic authority. What is the opposition in Serbia doing wrong and what needs to be done?” That’s specifically for you, Sonja.
Sonja Biserko
Ha-ha, a good question, really, because opposition didn’t come up with any convincing alternative programme, based on the European vision. They are trying to compete with Vučić on nationalism, let’s say on Kosovo. They’re more radical on Kosovo than Vučić is. We don’t know whether he will give up on Kosovo, but – we don’t know that. But on the other side, opposition would never allow that. Serbian Orthodox Church is also playing that game. So, even if you decide to give up Kosovo, he would have the problem with these institutions. So, I’m afraid Serbia is very unfortunate not having the proper opposition and it’s not only the problem that we confront now, it was throughout the last 40 years, because – and after 2000, you had the so-called Democratic Government, which, in fact, was also very nationalistic. It was more decent, it was more, let’s say, sort of, open to EU. At that point, the EU had this transformative impact, but it lasted only a few years, because if you remember, they were also unwillingly transferring war criminals and so on.
The problem here, when we talk about reconciliation, what will we reconcile on? Because the war in Bosnia, here is perceived as liberation war of Serbs. How do we reconcile that? Genocide is attributed to Republika Srpska army, who is the – who is responsible for that? Not only Serbia, which organised that, but also, Western community, which didn’t react, already in 92/93. Ambassador Arria was talking about creeping genocide in 93 at the Security Council. So – and despite all misunderstandings and unwillingness of the West to interfere timely, what do we do with that today? How do you convince Serbian elites to acknowledge its responsibility for the war in Bosnia, later in Kosovo, and before that, in Croatia?
So, we have a reconciliation, which has to start with Serbia, inside Serbia, and to acknowledge certain responsibilities. You are talking about, usually about regional reconciliation. Why should Kosovo reconcile with Croatia or Macedonia? It’s Serbia, which was taking – which was conducting four wars and if we don’t come to some terms, there is no reconciliation, and especially because Serbia is continuing focused on this project of unification of Serbian lands. So, this is – this has to be stopped, Serbian ideology, yeah.
Tim Judah
Okay. I’m going to go onto another question by Naman Habtom. This is really for you, I think, Vlora, before you have to leave.
Naman Habtom
Hi.
Tim Judah
Naman Habtom, would you like to come in, because this is, kind of, broadening it out from the region, of talking about itself, to talking about the rest of the world and the region, so please go ahead.
Naman Habtom
Yes, I’m curious if the recognition of Kosovo by individual EU member states and the US and their allies complicates their ability to engage on other issues. So, unlike 2008, there are now issues like regarding Crimea, Catalonia and how do they deal with that, even potentially a Bosnian-Serbian referendum in the future, as in Kos – the recognition of Kosovo pre-emptively before any actual solution on the ground complicated their positions?
Vlora Çitaku
[Pause] Thank – yes?
Tim Judah
Go ahead.
Vlora Çitaku
Thank you.
Tim Judah
You’re a Diplomat, that’s a tricky question, sorry.
Vlora Çitaku
No, not at all, not at all.
Tim Judah
Go ahead.
Vlora Çitaku
Putin and Dodik are going to be problematic, even if Kosovo ceases to exist today. So, the bottom line is, Kosovo’s independence is not a product of a successionist movement. Kosovo’s independence is a product of unconsensual dissolution of Yugoslavia. There was a very lengthy international process, mediated by United Nations Special Envoy, Mr President Ahtissaari, who, after a very lengthy process, recommended Kosovo’s independence.
We, in Kosovo – I remember I was one of the elected representatives of the people who declared independence. We didn’t just wake up on February 17th 2008, and all of a sudden, decided to declare independence. There was a long process that led to Kosovo’s independence, but most importantly and most fundamentally, Kosovo’s independence is a product of dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Sonja Biserko
Have noted.
Vlora Çitaku
Saying it is – it can be said for Croatia or Bosnia, or Macedonia or Montenegro. Kosovo had its borders long before it had statehood. So, there is absolutely no comparison and the ruling of the International Court of Justice, upon Serbia’s request, was very clear and very unambiguous that Kosovo was within its rights when it declared independence in 2008 and that it did not breach any international law.
Tim Judah
Okay, but before you go, Vlora, we had this original title: 25 Years Since the Dayton Accords,” let’s completely dump that and before you go, where’s Kosovo and the region going to be in 25 years? And Sonja and Denis, I’m going to ask you the same thing, but how – where’s Kosovo going to be in 25 years? Will we be fighting the same problems? Will you be part of a joint state with Albania? Will you – will Kosovo be a prosperous member of the EU? Will it be the same? Where do you think Kosovo and the region are going to be in 25 years?
Vlora Çitaku
Well, I’ll be very brief. Kosovo does not exist in a vacuum, we are interdependent as a region, but also as a European community. So, our – even if we do everything right, we will not succeed if we all don’t succeed. I hope that, as I said initially, we will use this new momentum and manage to anchor the entire region in the European Union and, hopefully, who knows, my successor will be Secretary-General of NATO in 25 years.
Tim Judah
In other words, Kosovo will be fully independent, fully recognised state in 25 years, it won’t be part of Albania, or rather, sort of, united with Albania, or anything like that? So, that’s your vision in 25 years?
Vlora Çitaku
Kosovo is not a temporary project.
Tim Judah
Okay, that’s very…
Vlora Çitaku
I hope it’s [inaudible – 51:42].
Tim Judah
…clear, thank you. Sonja…
Sonja Biserko
Hello.
Tim Judah
…where was – are you off, Vlora?
Sonja Biserko
No, no.
Vlora Çitaku
No, no.
Tim Judah
Goodbye. Thank you so much…
Sonja Biserko
Bye. Bye.
Tim Judah
…for being with us.
Vlora Çitaku
Thank you.
Tim Judah
Sonja…
Sonja Biserko
Yeah, yeah, well, I…
Tim Judah
…25 years’ time, where will Serbia and the region be?
Sonja Biserko
Well, very much depends on the international context, where Russia will be, whether EU will manage to broker deal with Russia or agreement, or some kind of co-operation, not only in our region, but also in Middle East, North Africa. So, that will very much depend on this relation, because United States, despite this, the clarity of how should say, support for the region, it’s quite unsure how they’re – how much they will be able to engage here. They will certainly support EU and the European countries in their policy towards the region, but I think Serbia will keep Kosovo open as long as it thinks that it can get partition. So, Serbia is the biggest advocate of great Albania, because this is justifying unification of Serbian land, so I hope that EU will understand and stick to the borders existing and recognise the borders and not allow this kind of scenario, which was already in place since 1915/16, the international lobby, which was very much helpful in this sort of – a deal between Vučić, Thaçi and Rama, and it was very dangerous and it’s only Germany, which stopped this deal. So, I hope it won’t come back on the agenda, because otherwise, the whole region will blow up again, because ethnic states are not only a danger for the Balkans, but for whole of Eastern Europe and elsewhere. So, I think this is really about European values, concept from the States, and what they really advocate and how much they will be able to engage along such projects in the Balkans.
Tim Judah
Okay. Denis, Bosnia in 25 years’ time?
Denis Dzidic
Yeah, and I’ll very short, because unfortunately, after Miss Biserko and Vlora, it’s difficult to say something new. It’s definitely going to depend on the international context. It’s very difficult to presume that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a huge amount of autonomy in this regard. What we are seeing currently, and we have been seeing for the last decade, is nationalistic parties in power, with, you know, the constitutional arrangement of the countries, such that it really, you know, highli – it needs nationalistic parties. It’s built in such a way that it fosters them and so – and all of these parties have no interest whatsoever in anything moving forward, because this is the status quo, it’s just perfect for them. The corruption, the money is there, you know, all of these things, it’s just fine, it’s lovely. So, I can see a situation in which things remain pretty calm and we are still, two decades from now, kind of, still seeing the same things and the parties here, the leading parties in Bosnia will be very, very happy with that. But again, it’s going to depend on the international context.
Tim Judah
Okay, thank you. I’m going to go back. We haven’t got much time left, but we’ve got time for some very quick questions. I’m – it says Rober Moreland, but I’m – perhaps that’s Robert, wants to ask a question, it’s related to Kosovo. I, kind of, think that Vlora Çitaku has already answered it, but go ahead, ask your question.
Robert Moreland
Well, I think you’re right, in that I was surprised at – my question is really the same as what was asked before, which is really where is Kosoko – Kosovo going? And particularly as its landlocked, it – there seems to be no question of alignment with Albania. So, you know, I think we all – I’ve been there with the former members of the European Parliament. We all asked this question, “Where are you going?” and I think they don’t know. Can I also throw in, you haven’t mentioned Macedonia, which is getting a bit knocked about by some member states, particularly Bulgaria, etc., but you haven’t touched on it.
Tim Judah
That’s true, but we don’t have anybody, unfortunately, from North Macedonia here. But I think that Vlora Çitaku, kind of, answered that question about where it’s going, as far as she’s concerned. I’m not quite sure of the relevance of being landlocked. I mean, we don’t ask where Switzerland is going, but, I mean, would you like…?
Sonja Biserko
And Hungary and Austria.
Tim Judah
I’m sorry? And Serbia…
Sonja Biserko
And…
Tim Judah
…also is…
Sonja Biserko
No, Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, they’re all landlocked.
Tim Judah
But it is true that the issue of uniting with Albania was raised by the incoming Prime Minister the other day, when he mentioned that if there was a referendum on unification, that he would vote for it. There’s a very quick question, I think, for Denis. It’s from Kurt Bosuna. Kurt, go ahead. I mean, it is quite a nerdy question, so this is really for Bosnia specialists, but now’s your chance to ask Denis quickly this – your question.
Kurt Bosuna
Okay, yeah, and it’s a nerdy question, but it’s an important one, ‘cause it follows on what Vlora Çitaku and Sonja were talking about, this, sort of, make a deal, any deal. We saw this with Kosovo-Serbia, particularly pursued by the United States. It seems the same formula is being pursued regarding Dragan Ĉović’s push for election reform, to cut a deal between the HDZ and SDA. I’m curious how that’s playing with the neighbours that you talked about being engaged and the Russian agendas that you mentioned at the beginning of your talk.
Denis Dzidic
Yeah, well, what we are seeing is that the leading Bosnian Croat party, HDZ, is really, you know, pushing for this election reform. Obviously, the reason for those, not as nerdy, is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are having, for the second time now, a situation where Bosniak votes are voting for the Croat – Bosnian Croat member of the Presidency. And so, what the Bosnian Croats want is an election law, which is going to stop that, so they will have, kind of, like, an ethnically clean voting system, so their own representatives, which they call the only legal representatives, are – can come into power.
For the first time, in more than a decade, we had local election in Mostar a few months back and that’s a result of, kind of, an agreement between the EU, the US and these nationalistic parties. And there were, you know, areas, voting areas, which many criticised because they were, you know, represented in such a way that, you know, predominantly Croat voters were in one area and Bosniaks and then – were in others. So, what we are seeing now is the continuous push by the HDZ, which is fully supported from Croatia to get this election law reform, so that they will forever be able to run pretty much uncontested. So, the HDZ doesn’t have any kind of serious or non-serious opposition within the Bosnian Croat voting body.
And as for your question about, yeah, influences, Russia is, kind of, almost openly supporting this. We have had – I just Googled it to see – I Googled the Russian Ambassador’s name, seeing your question, and election law, and I saw, like, 15 hits on meetings where the Former Russian Ambassador Vorontsov was visiting various HDZ members and they were talking about the importance of a new election law, which is going to, you know, support the spirit of Dayton and these are all, you know, these nationalistic narratives that we are seeing time and time again, which are totally against what the EU should stand for, in the terms of allowing, you know, a civic state, and totally against what the [inaudible – 59:56] ruling by the International Court of Human Rights says that everybody should be free to run and that people, others, and Bosnians and whatever people, should be able to vote for their own representatives. So, what their nationalistic parties and especially HDZ, is pushing for, is totally against that.
Tim Judah
Great. Well, thank you very much. I’m afraid we’ve still got some other questions, but we’ve, unfortunately run out of time, so I’m very sorry that if you’ve asked a question and we haven’t managed to get to it. Actually, we have actually covered really quite a remarkable amount of ground, in such a short time. I would just like to make one final remark, is that unfortunately, I haven’t been able to talk about my favourite subject for the region, which is that in 25 years’ time, unless all of these issues are – so, all of these issues talked about are resolved and we have prosperous or – countries, there won’t be many people left in the Western Balkan 6, because they are countries with populations already shrinking, because people are emigrating, they’re not having children, they have no immigration. And so, actually, if Politicians in the region were serious, they would be talking about these questions and how to avoid having small countries, small in terms of truly populations, with elderly people and not enough people of working age to pay their pensions. But I think that’s a subject for another time, but I would just like to underline that, as far as I’m concerned, that’s the real big issue for the future.
So, thank you very much to Chatham House. Thank you very much to Vlora Çitaku, to Denis Dzidic and to Sonja Biserko and thank you very much for everybody who asked questions and those – and I’m sorry to those who didn’t get to ask their questions. And I’m very glad that Chatham House is – has come back to the region, and I’m sorry, there was one other question we didn’t have time to ask, but perhaps is a time for, perhaps, a suggestion for another panel, it is about, “Where is – where – since Chatham House is a British institution, does Britain still have a role post-Brexit in the Western Balkans?” So, that’s suggestions for the future, a demography of the Western Balkans and does Britain have a role to play? But those are for the future and thank you very much, and goodbye.
Sonja Biserko
Thank you, bye. Bye team.
