British foreign policy and the Conservative leadership contest

John Kampfner

Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to this Chatham House digital event, looking at British Foreign Policy and the Conservative Party Leadership Contest. My name is John Kampfner. I’m the Executive Director of the, still fairly new, UK in the World Project at Chatham House, and we’re delighted to have you all onboard this afternoon at Chatham House.

I’ll introduce our speakers in a couple of seconds’ time, but first of all, just some quick, usual gambit through the House rules for this meeting. This is on the record, and it’s recorded. Please, when we come, at about halfway through, maybe shortly thereafter, to the chance for you to pose questions to our panel, or make your own observations, please use the Q&A function and not the chat function to alert me to the fact that you want to ask a question. And when you do that, I will assume – I will either take your question and just read it out, depending on the timeframe, or I will call you in and ask you to pose your question. If you don’t want to do that, then just note that in your question. If you want to make any other broader observations, do so please during – using the chat function, which you’re able to do.

So, this event is obviously focused on the, in UK parliamentary terms “dramatic events,” of the last month or so. The enforced resignation of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, and he will go on, or around, either the 5th or 6th of September, and the ensuing Conservative leadership contest, which started with 12 candidates, and which is now down to the final two. As you all know, the parliamentary party, having had its say, and people voted off, slice-by-slice, and now we are left with Liz Truss, current Foreign Secretary and Rishi Sunak, who was, until a few weeks’, or a few days, two days before Boris Johnson’s resignation, he was Chancellor.

So, that is the context for today. Delighted to have on our panel today Georgina Wright, from the Institut Montaigne who’s in Paris. Anand Menon, who runs UK in a Changing Europe in London, and Victoria Honeyman, Associate Professor of British Politics, who is in Leeds. I’m currently in Berlin, excuse me, where I’ve been chairing a really invigorating group of 40 or so young people, British and German, in an event called Young Königswinter, in which these issues have been absolutely front and centre.

So, let’s go to our panel. I’m just going to invite you to make some opening thoughts and remarks. So, Georgina, first of all, to you, in terms of from where you are sitting, how much attention is this British contest evoking, how much interest is it producing? What are people saying, both about Johnson’s record, but more pertinently for the future, about what difference will or will not be made by a change of leadership, and by the choice of leadership? Over to you.

Georgina Wright

Sorry, John, I don’t know why, we’ve been on Zoom for such a long time, and I still have a hard time finding the mute button, but thank you, John, and thank you to Chatham House, for this invitation. I am delighted to be with you this afternoon, albeit virtually from Paris. So, that’s a really – it’s a really good question, you know, how much attention is there to the leadership race? I think, not many people across Europe, are paying that close attention to it. But there has been some growing interest, and most of the coverage I’ve seen in France, at least, has been on, sort of, the process, the timeline, you know, when can we expect a new Prime Minister, what does Boris Johnson able to do right now? Does he just stop or, you know, will we see the UK continue, for example, take a very active role in Ukraine, and then, of course, some interest in the two remaining candidates. But, overall, not really and I think it’s partly because it’s their summer holidays coming, but also because there’s a lot going on in Europe right now.

I think everyone’s assuming, on foreign policy at least, that much will remain the same, and I think that’s for three reasons. The first is that the two remaining – well, all candidates, but mostly the two remaining candidates, are seen as closely aligned to Johnson’s foreign policy views. The view of UK foreign policy has actually been broadly good, I’d say, with some exceptions. Of course, there’s some who are hoping for an improvement, you know, with the relationship with the EU, but most are realistic that that might not happen. But there’s no real demand for change in UK foreign policy, and I hear this at, you know, in, sort of, France, but across Europe, there is a sense that the UK, you know, Boris Johnson when he was Foreign Secretary – in fact he was named Foreign Secretary when I participated in the Young Königswinter, back in the day, and he said, “you know, we’re leaving the EU, but the we’re not leaving Europe.” And he’s, kind of, held truth to that, that’s really a sense that he has demonstrated that the UK remains committed to European security, but also, it’s been active further afield. So, and then the third reason being that, not that many people are paying close attention to it. So, there is growing interest, but there’s no, sort of, real sense that British foreign policy will fundamentally change, under a new Prime Minister.

So, why has Johnson’s track record on foreign policy been good? I’ve, sort of, thought of a number of things that have gone down quite well. So, as I said, leaving the EU, but not Europe, as demonstrated by the UK’s commitment to Ukraine, so that’s particularly important in Central and Eastern Europe, but also, I’d say across Europe as a whole.

Openness to the rest of the world, you know, in the UK granted Hong Kong citizens UK citizenship, I think that was really important as well. The fact that there were many more commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, you know, there was the AUKUS deal in support of Australia. Now, that didn’t go down well in Paris, but I think, in the rest of the world it was, you know, another further sign that the UK was actually going to remain active, and not just in Europe, but in the rest of the world. The chairing of the G7 in 2021, then COP26 as well, the net zero commitment, you know, the UK is still seen as a country that wants to really tackle climate change, and has quite good, you know, proposals on how to do that. And then another of policy papers that have come out under the Johnson Government with, you know, integrated review, the defence command paper, the development strategy. I mean there are many, I think, governments that would quite like to see the same number of papers being produced as to what their foreign policy looked like, what are the priorities, and how to meet them.

Of course, not everything’s rosy, and Brexit is the big one, and I’m sure Anand will come back to that, Johnson is seen as continually wanting to pick a fight with the EU. The recent decision to, sort of, offshore the processing of asylum claims to Rwanda didn’t go down that well. But also, the fact that the UK lowered the aid budget, and that was a decision that was, you know, predominantly assigned to Rishi Sunak and people remember that. So, lowering from 0.7 to 0.5% of GDP. And then I said there’s still a little bit of confusion, we’ve got a lot – we’ve seen lots of ideas coming out of the UK, but it’s not always clear what the hierarchy in those priorities will be, and also, how the UK intends to meet the number of proposals and priorities it’s put forward.

And then, of course, I think it has been slightly overshadowed by the internal, domestic chaos, and chaos is the word that you would use about, sort of, the coverage of the UK over the past couple of months, if not the last year. Just, you know, what’s was happening in Number 10, Johnson’s popularity and that, sort of, has also been a key for it. So, not everything is rosy, but overall, I’d say fairly positive on British foreign policy.

I think it’s quite clear what a Liz Truss Prime Minister would look like, and what she would try to do, and what her foreign policy would look like. It’s not as clear for Rishi Sunak, and of course, I think we’ll come back to this, you know, foreign policy rarely features in the number one issue of leadership, campus or even elections. But that’s what, I think, the UK’s allies will be looking at, and in a sense it’s quite clear, given that Liz Truss is Foreign Secretary, what she stands for, it’s not so clear with Rishi Sunak. But I think who will win matters, it matters of course in the UK, but it matters abroad. Who will be the next Prime Minister representing the UK, you know, this post-Brexit Britain, at a time when the world faces multiple crises, and so a strong UK role, is both necessary and desirable, and, I think, countries are hoping that the UK can continue to be a partner that they can work with. So, I’ll stop there.

John Kampfner

Thank you very much indeed for setting that out Georgina. Anand, to you next, so picking up on that point, and looking a little bit more in-depth at relations with EU, both as an institution, and as with EU member states. What do you anticipate there being the possibility of a change in either tone or substance, and to what degree, were so many of the antagonisms and problems directly attributable to interpersonal relations, to Johnson’s character? Obviously, particularly poisonous relations with France and with Macron, frosty, but tolerated relations with Germany, and anyway, give us a tour, if you could, and an assessment, and a prediction of how, if at all, things may or may not change?

Professor Anand Menon

Thanks, John. I mean, I’ll start with your second question, and to try and link into what Georgie said. I think, that the first, and important, point is Brexit meant that we had to have a foreign policy, which sounds like a silly and superficial statement. But actually, I would argue that since the Syrian vote of 2013, we hadn’t really had a foreign policy, until we decided to leave the European Union. And from that moment, the onus was on the Brexiters to show that, despite Brexit, Britain remained a global player, and I think that has been the driving force behind a lot of the activism.

It has also been a driving force behind something that means that the slight competitiveness with Europe, that existed under Johnson, was not just a function of his personality. That pro-Brexit Politicians want to show that Brexit Britain does things better than others. We saw this over the vaccine, you see it with the tone over Ukraine, that, you know, briefings from the UK Government about appeasement or about being overly reliant on Russia, is all part of this same thing. That as a non-EU member state, we’re able to be more efficient, we’re able to be quicker, and I think because Brexit has become some totemic in the governing party, that’s not going to stop. I think, there’s going to be an element of that competitiveness, which, you know, people in other EU – in other European capitals find so irksome, I don’t think that’s going to stop.

On the protocol itself, I’d say a couple of – I mean, it’s important I think not to place too much emphasis simply on personality. I mean, what happens under a new Prime Minister, is there going to be a mixture of their own personal preferences, and what the party allows them to do. And let me start with the second one. I mean there are two, sort of, ideal type scenarios for September with the Conservative Party in Parliament.

The first is, we’ve got less than two years to an election, we’re behind in the polls, we’ve got a new Prime Minister, we need to swallow our differences, put on an appearance of unity, and focus doggedly on winning that next election, okay? The other ideal type is the various research groups, the various factions, say, “You know what? If you don’t do what we want, we’re going to hold you to ransom, and we’re going to start playing difficult in parliament, so you need to listen to us.”

And I’m not – I don’t think anyone knows which of those two models will turn out to be nearer to the truth, but it does strike me that there’s a paradox about the two candidates. I think Liz Truss is far less likely to be conciliatory towards the European Union, I mean, the Protocol Bill is her bill, after all. But paradoxically, she is the candidate who, if she decided to be more conciliatory, would have more chance of pulling this off with the Brexit ultras in the party. You know, this is a, kind of, only Nixon could go to China logic, that, you know, it takes a Brexiter to compromise on Brexit. And Sunak, bizarrely, as the person – I mean, it is, the whole thing is topsy-turvy in that Brexit was the one of the two who backed Brexit, but is now seen as a greater liability when it comes to Brexit.

I think he would be most likely to want to compromise with the EU, because we know that when, a year or so ago, the government was toying with triggering Article 16, it was Sunak who was saying, “Hang on a sec, we don’t want to trigger a trade war in the middle of an economic crisis.” So, I think he would be leary about the implications of the Bill, but politically less able to do anything about it, because the ERG, if he becomes leader, will be watching him carefully for any signs of what they would call betrayal.

So, it’s difficult. I mean, you know, there will be slightly different dynamics in each case, but I really can’t see how policy changes dramatically under either of them. Which is problematic because I can’t see either, circumstances into which – in which the UK would willingly and of its own volition enter a trade war with the European Union in a situation where inflation is 11%. So, all of which, was a very longwinded way, John, of saying I really don’t know what’s going to happen in September. But I do think that politics matter.

I think one other area in foreign policy, where the politics will matter, is China, because we have got indications that Rishi Sunak is slightly more moderate on China than some of his colleagues. But I just don’t think the parliamentary party is going to give him the space to make that into policy. I think the China Research Group has got that, pretty effectively, sewn up, not least because it’s support comes from across the breadth of the party. So – and I think a lot hinges on the mood within the parliamentary party, but actually, whatever that mood, I can’t see much scope for dramatic change going forward.

John Kampfner

Thank you very much for setting that out. I want to come back to several of those points, not least, how the politics of the, what will be an increasingly close pre-election period, plays out on foreign policy and the pressures that, whichever person wins. We’ll get to it, plus we’ll dig a bit deeper on China and Ukraine and relations with Russia as well.

Victoria to you, as somebody who has closely watched British politics, if you could give us a slightly historical perspective, on what changes of government do, and to what degree foreign policy is institutionalised, or the leavers can be manoeuvred, in quite a radical way, by both the Prime Minister. And of course, we need to think about who that new Prime Minister will choose as their Foreign Secretary as well, and the other outward facing departments, not least the Defence Secretary. But first of all, just – well, if you could consider that, but my more immediate question is, does it matter what any of the candidates say over the next five weeks, or six weeks?

I mean, foreign policy is very much second or third fiddle at the moment, it’s all about tax and how little you can tax people. In spite of an economy that is in dire trouble, second lowest performing economy in the OECD, above only Russia, although many of the wider difficulties faced by everyone. So, we’ve got that question, which is foreign policy isn’t playing so much, but obviously when it comes to Europe, and when it comes to other issues, they will be very – they will be playing to a very specific niche gallery, the below 200,000, largely elderly Conservative voters. So, a little bit about the politics of the campaign, and then if you could also just answer those first points that I raised to you?

Dr Victoria Honeyman

I’ll try my best. So, essentially, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak are speaking to the Conservative Party, they’re not really speaking to anybody else. Although inevitably their messages do go out to a wider audience. So, they are tempering them slightly, but I think that they’re throwing red meat to the Conservatives primarily, in what they’re doing, and I don’t think that comes as any surprise.

I was trying to think this morning, about what I thought were the main differences between the candidates, about, you know, in foreign policy terms, in bigger terms, you know, what could I think of, that was actually fundamentally different about these two individual members of the Conservative Party. And other than the tax issue, which you already mentioned, John, it’s quite niche. You’re trying to, kind of, put a piece of paper in-between two people, who aren’t actually all that different. This isn’t a Labour-Conservative race or even a Conservative-Lib Dem race, or event the One Nation Conservatives versus the other wing of the party.

These are individuals where there are differences, but they are quite niche differences. And therefore, on foreign policy, I think that the big difference, and Anand sort of alluded to it, in his much better answer than mine, but he mentioned this idea about, kind of, tone about the things that they’d be able to say. And I think it is the posturing that is different.

I think that Liz Truss has – a friend of mine’s dad used to work for Vickers, the tank factory, and he used to tell tales about when Mrs Thatcher used to come to – they had a big assault course and she liked to be pictured in the Challenger 2 tanks. And this very masculine, kind of visioning, of foreign policy, I can so imagine Liz Truss having one of her photo opportunities like this. It’s very macho, you know, real, kind of, alpha male posturing, and it isn’t that I don’t think that Rishi Sunak would be able to get in a tank, but I just don’t think that the message would be quite as masculine, even if the message itself is very, very similar. And I think that that’s part of why Liz Truss is slightly more trusted as a Brexiter, because she’s almost your, kind of, the evangelical convert to Brexit. So, I think it is a lot about tone, rather than them actually being big differences between them.

Now you mentioned about the changes in government, and realistically in foreign policy, if you want to talk about it in, kind of, very big terms, the big shift in foreign policy has been between the, kind of, you know, liberal interventionism, Blair “lets get out there and do something for the good of someone, and it depends who the someone is, as to what we’re going to be doing.” Through to liberal Conservatism under David Cameron, which was a slightly more toned-down version of that, but certainly underpinned things like Syria, Libya, certainly played into the Theresa May, kind of, years. And it was Boris Johnson, who essentially said, “We’re not going to do that anymore.” There was discussion of it under Theresa May, but it’s essentially that, kind of, move into a more overtly self-interested foreign policy. And I say overtly, because there’s arguments that actually, liberal interventionism has always had, you know, Britain’s best interests at heart, so it might just be a, kind of, marketing presence.

But I don’t anticipate that that will change particularly, and I don’t really anticipate that we’d get much movement on many of those big issues. I don’t necessarily see that much would change, in terms of Ukraine, in terms of the support for the United King – that the United Kingdom is giving to Ukraine, the amount of weaponry that is being delivered. Perhaps there might be some variations, but I don’t think it’d be a question of having the tap turned off entirely by either candidate.

I don’t think that they’d necessarily be a big shift in relations with the United States, although they might potentially slightly improve. The stories are that the Biden administration has some very serious problems with Johnson. It would be interesting to see whether those problems then extended to Sunak and Truss, possibly. I think development aid is probably one area that needs a little bit more attention.

We’ve had this shift down to 0.5%, there has been discussion of it going back up to 0.7. It’s not – I mean, it is a large amount of money, it’s more than most of us will ever see in our entire lifetimes, but it’s not a large amount of money, in terms of the amount of money that Britain actually spends on all sorts of different things. But the difference that it makes, in terms of our standing in the world, those kind of things that Georgina talked about, in terms of, you know, Ukraine, Russia, China, kind of, the international identity of Britain, it counts there. And if you’re looking for new markets, if you’re looking for a post-Brexit, big world identity, big world role, those kind of things can make a difference.

Now, is foreign policy institutionalised? Does it, you know, does it not matter who’s really got their hand on the tiller, or is it basically going in the same direction? I’m not entirely sure about that. There is an argument that poor Ministers always blame their Civil Servants, they always argue that, you know, they’re basically being driven by their institutionalisation. But I do think that what is probably true, is that there is a lack of space for anything else. Your choices are reduced.

Now, you could argue that that’s being reduced by the Civil Servants who you might argue that the Civil Service are just very aware of the fact that there is that limitation in the scope of exercise of what you can do. But I would argue that very little will change, but it’ll be the presentation of that change, of that foreign policy, of Britain’s role internationally, that would vary depending on if it was Sunak or Truss.

John Kampfner

Thank you. On that point of tone, can we just stick with that for a second, that Victoria has been talking about, so to either of you two, to what degree does it matter? I’m mean, Johnson is personified as the ultimate performative Politician, if you are a critic, you will call it buffoonery, if you are not, you will say it’s charisma. There’s certainly a huge amount of bombast. Anand’s talked about the post-Brexit natural competitiveness that arises from having an independent foreign policy, that you have to constantly be seen to be proving to have worked, or to be working. So, to what degree does that removal of those Johnson characteristics, in terms of the bilateral relations with other counterparts matter, or to what degree do the – let’s assume for a second it is Liz Truss, and the polls are suggesting it’s quite strongly in her favour, but there’s still five weeks to go, to what degree does her type of character – is that going to make a difference or not? Which one of you would like to respond on that [pause]? Georgina.

Georgina Wright

Great, well, good question. I mean, I focused on purpose, just on foreign policy. I’m looking at what Johnson had achieved as, you know, a Prime Minister and his foreign policy leadership. Because, of course, in reality when you look at bilateral relations and the UKs partnerships with countries around the world, it’s not just about foreign policy, and tone does really matter. And, I think, that’s where, particularly for European partners, it’s been problematic and difficult working with the UK, because the UK has shown that it’s committed to European security. It’s acted, if nothing else, it’s in NATO and the G7, but then for France, for example, ‘cause that’s the country where I’m based, Johnson’s comments about the EU, always, and you’re right Anand, are showing that the UK was more “flexible” outside of the EU, able to act quickly and with efficiency. And you look at the Europeans and they’re not able to do that, that really did anger Macron, but he wasn’t alone. And the sense was “you’re doing really good stuff on foreign policy, why are you undermining that with tone and a confrontational – and in a sense, that’s the kind of the era. I think Johnson’s politics will be remembered abroad as that, as this attempt to constantly glorify the UK, and sometimes it comes across as a little bit desperate. Like, you don’t need to constantly be beef up what you’re doing, if what you’re doing is actually quite good.

Is there optimism that that might change? I’m not so sure. I mean, I think Liz Truss has shown that she’s also very keen to, kind of, completely – constantly underline what the UK is doing. I think in Paris there is a sense, you know, that they’re sort of waiting to see. You can’t judge before the new Prime Minister is in post, but there’s, sort of, no expectation that it will radically change. They’re hoping, but they’re remaining realistic.

But I think the Ukraine war has shown that actually, the UK remains a vital partner and that, you know, France, with other countries, will have to work with the UK, regardless of the tone. And so, the question is, how far can you do that and what’s the right equilibrium between working together, but also trying to fostering a greater, kind of, environment? Because that trust is so essential is you want to do more. So, they’re learning to work with it. They hope it will change, but they’re under no illusions that it might not.

John Kampfner

And on that score, Anand, I mean, if the institution, the organisation in which Britain is increasingly seeing as almost a new best friend, having diverged and given the EU a good kicking, is the Commonwealth. But at the recent Commonwealth Summit, Johnson tried various things, not least removing Patricia Scotland and failed, and didn’t go down a treat with a lot of Commonwealth countries, and we saw in the UN General Assembly votes, several major Commonwealth countries, and other nonaligned countries, did not vote to endorse the West’s policy towards Ukraine. How do you see that, and the, sort of, the wider world and this change of personality and change of tone or not, developing in the next few months?

Professor Anand Menon

I think – I mean, firstly in this, I think politics has always been performative, and foreign policy has always been more performative. You know, I’m old enough to remember Tony Blair on his bike at the Amsterdam Summit. You know, there’s always been that, sort of, element of performance about particularly foreign policy, and I think we’ll continue to see that. I think our new found close links with the Commonwealth, will take the form of TRIPS and statements and declarations, rather than massive amounts of substance.

Whatever we do with the Commonwealth, we are condemned to having to work closely with the Europeans, because whatever else might change, geography won’t. And so, in a sense, whatever the, sort of, the performance our Politicians are putting on, what will be of more interest, and more importance, will be what’s happening behind the scenes in their conversations with other European leaders. And there – I mean, the one – I suppose the one salutary warning is, it is quite often the candidate perceived as more moderate, who has to make the more eye-catching pledges to get elected. I mean, think back to David Cameron, the more Europhile of the two candidates in 2005, who suddenly pulled out of his hat the EP – the decision to leave the EPP, and there are signs that Sunak is doing the same thing.

I mean, this idea that we are going to get rid of all retained EU law, is a nonsense. I mean, it’s a nonsense in regulatory terms, it’s a nonsense in practical terms. I think if you run a business, you’d come up with a stronger word than nonsense, in terms of the uncertainty this would cause. But sometimes, you’ve got to make those promises if you’re seen as weak. So, one of the things to watch for during the campaign, I think, will be how much Sunak tries to out-Brexit Truss. But I think, yeah, I mean, there will be a lot of talk about Global Britain going forward, because a Brexit supporting government is bound into that. But actually, behind those headlines, the key thing will be, what conversations go on with the French about military co-operation. What happens in the Joint Expeditionary Force and things like that. Which, actually, and curiously, some of the most substantive parts of policy, will be the parts of policy that the government is least keen to publicise.

John Kampfner

Thank you. To people watching, and we’ll talk for another five minutes or so, but now’s the time to start registering your questions on the Q&A function. Please don’t put them on the chat function. Victoria, coming to you, one point that we had touched upon, but time’s developed, is the politics of the next year and half, assuming there is a general election in 2024, most likely in the spring, obviously there could be one next autumn, depends how events transpire. Keir Starmer has set out his stall on Europe. He hasn’t yet really developed other foreign policy approaches. But given that the last general election was focused on “getting Brexit done,” to what degree do you anticipate the next general election, and often political parties make the mistake of always fighting that last one, to what degree do you expect the next general election to be focused on Europe and other foreign policy issues, or not at all, and there will just be a huge amount, obviously, on the economy and other issues? And to what degree, if it is – if Europe is going to continue to play a role, how does that work over the next 18 months, and we were taking about the pressures of the ERG and the other ultras in the Conservative Party? So, give us a sort of parliamentary sense.

Dr Victoria Honeyman

It’s a good question, and it’s a big question, and I preface it by saying that, you know, a week is a long time in politics, so 18 months is absolutely enormous, anything could happen. But having said all of that, I think that there’s a number of different things. I think that the Labour Party will have – they have set out a bit of their stall on Europe, but I think that they’re going to have to make a better case for who they are. People won’t simply vote for them because they’re not the Tories, so they will have to lay out a better case of who they are, and that will include on things like, Europe. But Europe is a – I mean, Europe’s always been a slightly odd issue, I suppose, in that regard, but there’s kind of the shrouding as Europe going on, which is kind of doing the rounds on Twitter, you know, we’ve both completed it and not yet completed it. And there is a sense in which people will need to talk about it, but don’t want to talk about it.

And I think that we’re seeing a little bit of that in the Conservative Party leadership race, in that, there are big questions that need answers. The biggest one perhaps being Northern Ireland, and what’s going to happen with the Northern Irish Protocol and yet, nobody really wants to talk about it for a whole variety of reasons. It could be that they don’t know the answer to the questions, it could be that they don’t think that the people will like the answers that they’ve got, or it could be that they actually think that the British electorate is tired of talking about it. And I think that there’s probably a certain amount of accuracy in all three of those elements.

In terms of wider foreign policy beyond Europe, and I don’t doubt that Europe will be a big issue at that election, whether it be because it’s being driven by internal party division, as Anand said, that was one of the potential, kind of, fallouts of a new leader, if you went with door number two, rather than door number one where they coalesce together. Either way they will have to talk about it, because people will need to talk about it, but it’s also an area where the Conservative Party think they’ve got it sewn up. They essentially think that this is a really good area for them, because they can appeal to Brexit voters, and it will play well for them, perhaps better than some of the other things that they’ve got going on.

In wider foreign policy terms, Ukraine will probably still be a big issue. It’s looking like everyone’s getting stuck in for the long haul there, although fingers crossed, it isn’t still running in 18 months’ time, but I think it probably will. There will still be inevitably other big issues, so trade deals will inevitably come up. Countries like – you mentioned about the Commonwealth with Anand, India will continue to be a big issue.

You know, India has taken a different stance on the Ukraine, it is a member of the Commonwealth, but it’s – you know, the biggest member of the Commonwealth, in many regards, it’s a huge country. It’s not looking to Britain to determine its foreign policy in that regard. So, I think that those kind of issues about influence, partnerships, and trade deals will all come up.

Obviously, China is going to be another massive issue. But the question is, how much do the public really want to know about this stuff? How much is there clear blue water between the two parties on this kind of stuff? Because if you’re not making big political points, where you look distinct, it may well be that the parties will just dodge around them entirely, and focus their attention on the places that they do think they can win in, which might be economic policy or transport policy or levelling up or whatever it may be.

So, I think while all of these issues will still be running, it will really be on the parties as to whether or not they think that it’s beneficial to them to discuss it. If they’ve got a brilliant idea on the Northern Irish Protocol, although if they had one I assume it would have come up before now, but if they do, then I think that they’ll want to talk about it unendingly. But I have a feeling that they might just want to quietly park a lot of this, because there’s simply very little that they say that they believe can win them votes.

John Kampfner

Anand, and arising from that, in pure foreign policy terms, could be a Northern Ireland Protocol issue can’t be ducked, and it is there, it is the giant elephant or whatever we want to call it, in the room in relation to Europe. To what degree, leaving aside what the candidates say in the next five weeks, one of them will become Prime Minister, they will then have to take this on, as you say Liz Truss is the author of it. To what degree are there votes in it, in having another enormous bust up with Europe?

Professor Anand Menon

Well, when you say votes, I suppose it depends on votes where. There are votes in parliament over it, maybe not votes among the people, but I think, you know, the one thing the ERG have shown us, time and time again, is that they are willing to bring the house down to defend their principles. Party unity, party electoral success, whatever it might be.

You know, one of the interesting phenomena during the, sort of, Brexit wars in parliament, was that it was the ERG that were more willing to risk the danger of the Corbyn Government, than the so-called One-nation Conservatives, because they made it clear, if we don’t get what we want, we tear this down. Those votes matter a lot, because they matter in terms of the ability of a Prime Minister to get to the next election. You’re absolutely right, in broader political terms, I don’t think that the English people care one way or the other. I mean, levels of interest in Northern Ireland are very, very low.

There is also, of course, the other issue of politics within Northern Ireland itself, and of course this is what makes the protocol so tricky, is in its – on the surface, impossible to find a solution to Northern Ireland that pleases the EU, pleases the ERG, and pleases the DUP, and that’s the problem. I mean, that’s why, you know, I think the thing to look for – if you’re looking for one thing to look for, if the protocol is mentioned before September, or when it is debated again in September, it is whether our new Prime Minister talks about the protocol, in terms of practical operational issues around the border, in which case there is a solution to be had, or whether they talk about the protocol, in terms of the role of the European Court of Justice and the need to rewrite the document as a whole.

In which case, I don’t think there’s a solution to be had, and I think that will be the clue, because everything changed when David Frost produced that command paper, that suddenly introduced the need to rewrite the whole settlement. At which point the EU went, “Well, there’s no point negotiating on this. This simply can’t happen.” So, I think, the Lords are scheduled to debate the Protocol Bill, either the first or second day back, so we’ll find out quite quickly, I think.

I mean, there’s going to be quite an inbox for the new Prime Minister, if you think of that, plus what’s happening in Scotland with the Supreme Court, I mean, plus Ukraine, I mean, it’s going to be a busy first 48 hours for whoever wins this job.

John Kampfner

We’ve got some good questions, Anand. I’m actually going to read them out, because it will save time. There’s one very short one, actually, from Fraser Cameron and I’ll give it to you Georgina, ‘cause it’s very simple, “Who would Macron prefer to deal with?” And actually, let’s extend that out and throw in a bit of – let’s throw in Biden, Putin and Scholz as well. Who – which of the two candidates, would they – potential Prime Ministers would they prefer to deal with?

Georgina Wright

I’m going to go with Macron first and see how I go, because I can talk about Macron for a very long time, and I might let my co-panellist’s answer for the others. So, this is going to sound like a copout answer, but it’s not, because I genuinely believe this. I think Macron will deal with whoever is in power, but whoever is in power, so whether that’s Rishi Sunak or Liz Truss, will have to make three key changes. And these three key changes will be essential to improve the relationship because now it is in quite a bad state.

The first is Brexit, and they want to see improvements on the Northern Ireland Protocol. If the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill gets passed, it will be very difficult for Macron to deal with either of them, more than he does already. So, I think that’s going to be essential and to a less extent the tone. Stop the EU bashing, I think, if the next UK Prime Minister did less EU bashing, that might help. And in a way it’s quite ironic, ‘cause if you think back to 2017, Macron was very keen to try and divide and separate the UK, you know, Brexit negotiations from the Franco-British relationship. And say, “Well, if negotiations become toxic, we want to make sure that that doesn’t bleed into the bilateral relationship.”

It did for a number of reasons, and there are faults on both sides, but now it’s, kind of, come to the point where it’s very difficult to see how Franco-British relations could be significantly improved without a resolution found for the Northern Ireland Protocol. So, I think Brexit – someone who can resolve Brexit, Macron would prefer to deal with them.

Two, on Calais, and we don’t talk about it much, but I think technical co-operation between the British and the French Government is actually quite good, but the politics around it has been quite bad. And I think you’ll remember, the Prime Minister wrote a letter to Macron that was published on Twitter and I think in the Daily Mail, and the French Government said, you know, “We saw it first on Twitter and in the Daily Mail before we actually received the letter,” and that just went down like a lead balloon. And there’s a real sense that there’s no trust within the government when they have met, when Johnson and Macron did meet, the next day there were bits of Macron’s, kind of, conversations that were leaked into the British press, and taken out of context. So, someone who can improve that, kind of, confidence by just treating each other like allies, and trying not to – and the same can be said a bit on the French side as well. But can we – he would want to deal with someone who he can make sure that the next day, what he said is not in the press.

And thirdly, of course, the trust. So, I would say Brexit, Calais and trust. So, he will deal with whoever, but he would really quite like someone who could deal with those three things. And I say this, and I’ll end on this, because you’ve heard the British Government call – or several members of the British Government say it would be quite nice to see a Franco-British Summit. The last one was in 2017, it’s high time that we – and my sense, in Paris, is that they’re not willing to go there until these things have been resolved. So, that would, kind of, be a pre-condition for a big summit. That doesn’t mean they can’t work together and improve and find ways that they can work more strongly together, and they have done since the war in Ukraine. But I think it’s far off, the summit is still far off and there are still things that need to significantly change. So, he’ll deal with whoever, but it would be nice if those things improved.

Professor Anand Menon

Can I just chip in very quickly there, John?

John Kampfner

Hmmm, yeah.

Professor Anand Menon

Because I think an important point around this, is the shear volatility and unpredictability of our electoral politics. We have a government that has seen being at a state of a tension with the European Union as a good thing, because Boris Johnson essentially put together a leave coalition in December 2019. You know, the thing that held the Conservative vote together was a shared commitment to leaving the European Union, to Brexit. And this, to an extent, replaced the traditional divide of British politics, between left and right, which was based on economics.

Now, the one thing that you might think might reassert that second divide, is a massive economic crisis, and guess what? We’re about to walk into the teeth of a massive economic crisis. And it might well be that as we experience this cost of living crisis, and the salience of economic issues increases, politics starts to rebuild itself slightly. We already see that a little bit with, you know, 50-60% of the public thinking that Brexit is responsible for some of the economic pain we’re feeling. For more and more people saying that the government is handling Brexit badly.

If Brexit comes to be seen as an economic issue rather than a culture issue, which is conceivable, though actually does hinge a little bit on how effective the Labour Party is, which might give us pause for thought, then I think the politics of Brexit, and the amenability of Brexit to be, sort of, rolled out by the government when they’re struggling a bit, let’s have a quick fight with the European Union, that might become less effective. I’m not saying it will happen, I’m just saying it’s a moment of real unpredictability about where our electoral politics goes from here.

John Kampfner

And to you Victoria, and Biden, Putin, others, who would they prefer to deal with? And on Georgina’s point about trust, sort of, whatever they say they will do, and they won’t be continually breaking international law, and not doing what they say, is there any evidence that one of the two candidates is more likely to be more mainstream in that regard? Anand, y0u go first.

Professor Anand Menon

It’s hard. I mean, I’m sort of – I just want to sort of repeat Georgie’s answer about Macron for all of this, to be perfectly honest. I mean, you know, people deal with who they have to deal with, and I’m not sure it makes a massive amount of difference. I think, certainly on Ukraine, if you’re talking about Putin, it makes not the least bit of difference, because of course that’s a matter of faith now, both within the Conservative Party and across parties.

I do wonder, I mean, you know, again talking about the cost of living crisis, how much salience foreign policy is going to have by the time we get into the autumn. Absolutely it will, because of Ukraine, but whether other stuff, whether we want to see our Politicians going around the world doing summits, when people can’t afford to feed their kids or heat their homes, I think that will be a big challenge. And I suspect, we’ll probably be talking less about foreign policy into the autumn, than we have been to date, simply because of the scale of that crisis.

John Kampfner

Victoria, to you.

Dr Victoria Honeyman

I was just going to say, I absolutely agree with that. I don’t think that it makes even a vague iota of difference to Putin. I’m not convinced the Biden administration really cared that much. I was really interested when Georgie started speaking, ‘cause she gave quite a, kind of, upbeat view of British foreign policy. I would argue, it’s a bit more downbeat than that, and I think that it doesn’t really matter whether it’s Truss or Sunak or Johnson or, you know, whether it had been Suella Braverman, or it’s all the same, as far as they’re concerned. The differences are relatively salami small, so I don’t think it really makes that much of a difference really. Sorry, John.

John Kampfner

No, that’s – you’re all saying we – I mean, it’s true, obviously, every country deals with whoever they have to deal with. But that doesn’t mean they won’t privately express a preference, of who they might want to deal with, but they’ll be far too diplomatic ever to let that be known. Well, in the case of Obama, that was – certainly on the Brexit referendum, that was pretty clear.

Back to you Victoria, a question from Heidi Fisher, and it’s again a straightforward one. “Of the two candidates, which one will appoint whom to Foreign Secretary, and what difference will that make?”

Dr Victoria Honeyman

I learnt many years ago never to make any predictions. I’m not Jon Tonge from Liverpool, I never get anything right. So – and I never put any money on it. I think it’s very difficult. I’m not entirely sure whether Rishi Sunak would want to serve as Foreign Secretary, not that I don’t think he’d be capable, I don’t know whether he’d be interested in it. He has a very economic background, Chancellor of the Exchequer, seemed the most obvious position for him to have in his rather, kind of, meteoric rise. He, you know, clearly is very well briefed on lots of other issues, so I’m not saying he couldn’t do it, I’m not sure he’d want to do it, but he might. There wouldn’t be another really good job for him in Cabinet, I don’t think. I think it would be Foreign Secretary, Chancellor or nothing, but he might not want the job.

I don’t know if Liz Truss would want to serve under Rishi Sunak. You know, at the moment they’re all playing relatively nicely with each other, but as anyone whose got children knows, it only takes a couple of minutes and they can be knocking, you know, each other about a bit. So, it’s not entirely clear to me who’s going to be the next Foreign Secretary, it could be either of them, I guess.

I’m not necessarily sure that either way it makes a huge amount of difference, in that regard. As I say, Liz Truss has attempted to have quite a, kind of, not aggressive, but quite assertive, kind of, presentation of foreign policy. The next person in the job may well have a slightly less assertive vision of it, but I don’t think it fundamentally changes it at all. And as Anand said, it may well be that foreign policy is the, kind of, the chugging along policy.

I know that it’s not chugging along, there’s huge issues to be dealt with, but if you look at, like, Liz Truss when Boris Johnson’s Premiership was falling apart, she was I think in South Korea, South-East Asia somewhere. There is a sense in which there’s the day-to-day business of it, and the big, kind of, movers and shakers will be in defence policy or economic policy at the Treasury. So, my answer, like all good Political Scientists is, well, it could be one or the other, or it could be neither.

John Kampfner

We’re all sitting magnificently on the fence. But in terms of foreign policy, I mean, you talk about chugging along, but the – certainly the people I’ve spoken to in Number 10 and the Foreign Office, see it as very, very different. Now, I don’t know if they are over-egging it or not. But the term they love to advertise is ‘disruptive’. Britain is a disruptive power, that it doesn’t do mainstream, it wont sit happily in some UN gathering for four hours and say nothing, and just follow the herd.

This whole point, which goes back to Anand’s earlier point about, sort of, advertising the fact that Britain has an independent foreign policy for the first time, but it is always, sort of, trying to ruffle feathers, and do things differently. I mean, Liz Truss’ Mansion House speech, was very much that. This sort of nimble, agile, doing things differently approach. Georgina, is that spin, or is it – is there evidence that it really is disruptive, and that this disruptiveness is now acknowledged, and in some respects is respected?

Georgina Wright

I mean, I’ve heard that before, and to be honest it’s, kind of, linked to what I was saying earlier, which is sometimes it sounds a bit desperate. It’s like you’re trying so hard to show how differently you’re doing things, that you, sort of, over-egg slightly what you’re able to do. But – ‘cause if you look what the UK has done with Ukraine, you know, one of the first countries was the United States to say that it thought an attack was imminent. Other European countries, you know, Germany and France, weren’t convinced that that was going to happen. But actually, it’s worked a lot within NATO, it’s worked with groups of countries, it hasn’t decided everything alone.

And if you look at what Liz Truss has been saying as Foreign Secretary, she says, you know, “We need to strengthen NATO, NATO needs to do more to counter the Russian threat, but it needs to do more in the Indo-Pacific, we need to make the G7 an economic NATO.” So again, in this sense, sanctions, co-ordination was very good and so can we make the G7 a more effective body, to make, kind of, binding decisions?

Now you can imagine how France, Germany, Italy and, you know, countries feel about that, and they say, “Well, can you just” – and like France says, you know, “Can you just imagine, we’re already criticised now for making decisions on behalf of the EU, imagine if we took decisions at the G7 and came back to Brussel’s and said they were binding,” it’s not possible. But, you know, all – that example just shows that the UK’s acting within multilateral bodies. It’s not acting completely alone. So I think it’s slight exaggeration, and I think, you know, when I was rather upbeat, I think it’s because on paper, if you look at – there was a real fear, particularly from the European partners, that Brexit meant that the UK would either look completely inwards, or it that would look completely beyond Europe. And actually, it’s shown that it can do both, and so, on paper it’s a good assessment. But there is the problem of tone, there is the problem of combative approach, and there is the problem slightly, that you exaggerate what you’re able to do.

In fact, some people say the UK would have been able to do much of what it has been doing already, had it still been a member of the EU. So, I think slight exaggeration, perhaps.

John Kampfner

Somebody who is not sitting on the fence, is a member of the audience, Andrea Knowles who predicts “Wouldn’t Truss bring in James Cleverly, her former Deputy at the Foreign Office, and might Sunak bring back,” gosh you heard it here first, “Liam Fox as Foreign Secretary, as an early backer?” So, that’s one observation. Another observation from Mary Dejevsky, “I don’t agree about Putin, I think he would vastly prefer Sunak, who would come across as more of a technocrat,” as she describes Truss’ dealings with Moscow as catastrophic and dogmatic and other things besides. Which actually…

Professor Anand Menon

Can I just say on that, John, in response to Mary that I’m not sure, Sunak, if he wins, will be allowed to govern as Sunak. I don’t think he’ll be allowed to govern as a technocrat. I think that’s part of the problem, is that, you know, the knives will be out for him. He will be under tremendous pressure from within his own party. And, yeah, I mean, it’s what I said on China, I think he would like to be more moderate on China, than the view of many in his party. Whether or not he can do so, without facing a backlash, I think is the big question, and I suspect not to be honest.

John Kampfner

Which you’ve brilliantly answered a question posed by James Tudor-White, which was exactly on Sunak and China policy. A question from Ellie MacMillan-Fox and this is a really good one, which leads us to our, sort of, closing thoughts. “How would the panel describe, a) or you could say the, Johnson doctrine?” So, given that he thinks that he has been a roaring success and “hasta la vista, baby,” and everything is fine as he leaves to a standing ovation. “What has the Johnson doctrine been on Foreign Policy?” You’re all going to answer this, so which one of you would like to go first?

Professor Anand Menon

I can have a stab. I mean, you know, activism and boosterism, a real energy to foreign policy that had been lacking. But behind the scenes, a pretty sensible, integrated review. Some silly and unnecessary spats with Europe, that were political rather than substantive, but have harmed our relationship with the European Union, and we’ll need to do something about that going forward. But in the main, you know, people criticise the Indo-Pacific tilt, you know, what the hell is Britain doing having an Indo – everyone’s having an Indo-Pacific tilt. The French are having one, the Germans are having one, we’re having one. And actually we’ve got something out of ours, which is AUKUS. So, I think Johnsonism is about showing that post-Brexit Britain wants to make a mark in international politics. It’s about showing that we take foreign policy seriously, as much as it is about any particular bit of substance in that foreign policy, I would say.

John Kampfner

Thank you. Victoria, how about you?

Dr Victoria Honeyman

I do agree with a lot of what Anand’s said. I suppose for me I would want to separate out what has happened while Johnson has been Prime Minister, with Johnson himself, and perhaps Johnson as Foreign Secretary. And if I were to tackle Johnson as Foreign Secretary, and Johnson – and the things that Johnson has been directly involved with, I would argue that it has been self-interest to a massive degree and I do mean Johnson’s self-interest in himself.

Under normal circumstances, I like to think that as a Political Scientist I can look at individuals of either party, and even if I don’t agree with them, I can see where they are coming from. I can see where that fits into their ideology or their principles and I can see how that works. But for Johnson, there does seem to have been a sense, to me at least, that he’s driven by his own self-interest, and that he pursues things that he’s interested in, things that he thinks are beneficial to him and his position.

Now, he may well have underpinning that, a sense of morality of what is right and wrong. I think he feels strongly about what is happening in Ukraine, and I think he feels very strongly that he wants to participate in what he sees as being the good fight against Russia. It’s also hugely politically convenient for him, and I don’t think that that is lost on him. So, it’s not that I think that he doesn’t have a moral compass, but it’s that I think that he works best when that suits his own personal aims and objectives. So, I think it’s a very, very self-interested foreign policy from Johnson.

I think the British Government will widely, under Johnson, have done many of the things that Anand is talking about. They’re looking outside of the world; they’ve looked to try and, kind of, pivot Britain in a direction, and he, as the person at the helm of that, has had some contribution to make to that, but I don’t think that it is necessarily as big a contribution, as he would wish to claim.

John Kampfner

Which leads me onto Georgina, for you for the final thoughts. I mean, Johnson’s only been in office for just over three years, he would like to have been there much, much longer. He leaves furious at his defenestration. Three years is regarded as a short period, and usually a footnote in historical records, will it be like that, or will the fact that he pushed through Brexit, and the strength of his personality, will he leave a much bigger foreign policy footprint?

Georgina Wright

I guess a lot depends on the legacy, you know. Is there a continuation of what, you know, Prime Minister Johnson has attempted to do on foreign policy? Is that carried on by his successor, or will there be a radical change? ‘Cause if there is a radical change, then it might just be seen as a footnote, but if there’s a continuation, then when Historians looks back they’ll say, “Well, actually, a lot of it happened – the initial thinking happened under Prime Minister Johnson.” So, I think he will be, you know, at the moment when you think of his legacy in foreign policy, it’s someone who’s incredibly ambitious, who wanted to place the UK on the map, ironically that wanted to have a foreign policy that was no longer framed by Brexit, but this is where the tension happens. Actually, a lot of what – there’s still a lot of the tone around British foreign policy is still very much framed by Brexit. So, even if there was an attempt to move beyond, the fact that the UK Government still has – is quite critical of the EU, always wants to show that it’s doing better than the EU. The fact that there are still Brexit problems, that in a sense has, I think, overshadowed slightly the ambition. And there’s still, as I said at the very beginning, a bit of confusion, you know, there are lots of priorities, lots of great papers, but what’s the hierarchy in these, what is going to be the number one, two three things, that Johnson will be remembered for, and his successor? And I think that starts with rebuilding partnerships with those allies, you know, I think of France, but I think of others, where there has been a dent, over the past couple of years, because you can say that you want to be a leading partner, that you want to play a global role. But partnerships matter, and you can’t do that if you continue to criticise your partners. Of course, it takes two to tango, it’s not just the UK Government, but I think the legacy will be really important, and that will matter, when judging what Johnson was able to achieve as Prime Minister, in foreign policy.

John Kampfner

Well, thank you all very much indeed, we’re bang on the hour, which is always a good way to end. Just a couple of things to say to audience members. I’m sorry we didn’t get to all of your questions, and they were all very good, and thank you for your attention and your interest. I forgot to say at the beginning, if you wanted to tweet, so you can still tweet your concluding thoughts at Chatham House, or Chatham House Events or any of us four participants as well.

We are going to be back in person form, in the first week of September, date to be determined, but obviously, from the announcement of the successor on the 5th, the assumption that Johnson will leave Downing Street on the 6th, and that successor will walk in that day and all the announcements that will follow in a flurry. We’re still trying to work out whether we should do it on the 5th, 6th, 7th or 8th, depending on people’s attention spans at that time. But you will be told as soon as we know.

Do pay attention to work that we’re doing at the UK in the World on Chatham House website. I did a couple of pieces, one on Johnson’s legacy and one on midway through the campaign, also an earlier one on the UK’s role in the – and responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And much more besides, we’ve got a whole series of events coming up. Particularly looking at the way the world looks at the UK, what does the world expect from the UK, talking to a lot of non-British experts about that? Something that the Brits are not particularly good at, which is listening to others rather than tell others what they should think of Britain. We’re going to be on a giant listening exercise in the autumn of 2022 as part of our work.

But it leaves me just to thank all three of our really excellent guests today: Victoria, Anand, and Georgina. Thanks to Tom and the Events Team at Chatham House. Have a very good weekend, and thank you all for taking part and for participating. Have a good afternoon.

Professor Anand Menon

Thank you, John.