UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer this week joined EU heads of government for a dinner in Brussels – the first British leader to do so since Brexit. On the menu: transatlantic relations and defence.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has further increased doubts about US commitment to European security and reignited European countries’ concerns about their ability to defend themselves. It has also complicated the response to these issues. Most EU countries rightfully want to keep the US engaged in European security. One way of doing so is by purchasing more American weapons. The other is by allowing third country participation in EU defence industrial programmes – something France broadly opposes.
Trump’s re-election has come at a particularly bad time for the European defence industrial base. European countries were just beginning to think more seriously about how to ensure they can defend their continent without dependencies on other countries.
As Trump demands that European nations increase defence spending or face Russia on their own, Europeans know that – given Trump’s transactional nature – purchasing US equipment would (temporarily) appease him. However, doing so would come at the expense of public money being spent in Europe, on European jobs in European companies.
This makes the context for Starmer’s trip to Brussels all the more complicated. Internally, EU countries are still building consensus on how much defence investment is needed, and through what means. Externally, this discussion is taking place in the context of the UK government’s UK–EU reset.
Getting the priorities right
The UK government wants a more ambitious trading relationship with the EU. It also wants a separate UK–EU security pact to cover security, defence and foreign policy cooperation, as well as migration and energy. The EU has also remained open to this: the EU Strategic Compass of 2022 says the EU is ‘open to a broad and ambitious security and defence engagement’ with the UK.
Yet so far, discussions seem to be stalling over EU access to fishing rights and a UK desire for a bespoke veterinary (i.e. trade) agreement. In a speech in Brussels this week, the UK’s European Union Relations Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds emphasized growth and trade, over deterring Russia and European defence. Given the geopolitical context, these are the wrong priorities on both sides.
On foreign policy, the focus so far has been on low-hanging fruit such as structured dialogues to discuss foreign policy issues. While such initiatives are important and valuable in their own right, they are unlikely to significantly move the needle in terms of ensuring Europe is adequately equipped to protect and defend itself.
What would have the most significant impact is deepening UK–EU defence industrial cooperation – although this is perhaps one of the most difficult areas in which to achieve stronger cooperation.
Europe’s challenge is two-fold. One, ensure Ukraine can negotiate from a position of strength by supplying it with financial and – more importantly – military aid. Two, restock its own supplies after stockpiles have been depleted as countries provided weaponry to Ukraine. Both are essential when it comes to deterring and protecting itself from possible future aggression – Russian or otherwise.
As it stands, European defence suffers from chronic underinvestment, fragmentation and duplication, thereby blocking interoperability. Better collaborative investment within the EU would save between €24.5 billion and €75.5 billion per year.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has made it clear that defence is one of her top priorities. She has appointed the first-ever European defence and space commissioner, launched a flurry of defence industrial programmes, and will publish a white paper on defence within the first 100 days of her second term, which will chiefly address defence financing and joint capability development. All this clearly signals that the European Commission is thinking seriously about defence – despite it legally being a member state competence.
While the Commission’s defence funding has so far been insufficient, the €1.5 billion allocated to the European Defence Industrial Programme for 2025-27 from the EU budget is intended as a gap filler and gives a clear indication of the direction of travel to address the second challenge.
The case for a European defence industrial base
Because EU security affects UK security, and vice versa, cooperating on defence industrial issues is essential. The UK’s assets in this area should also be considered: a strategic culture, vibrant defence industries, and a leadership role on European defence and security. The UK must therefore be allowed to contribute to building a genuine European – not EU – defence industrial base.
Enabling such cooperation is of course challenging. Third country participation is allowed in a range of EU defence mechanisms, but not all, and this is not without issues. The UK’s self-imposed red lines on not rejoining the single market or customs union complicate this further.
Perhaps more problematic, however, is the absence of a clearly communicated overarching strategic vision for UK–EU relations going forward in response to global challenges. Remarks by European Council President António Costa at the end of the leaders meeting in Brussels suggest more concrete steps on positive UK–EU relations and defence cooperation can be expected at the forthcoming UK-EU Summit in May.