Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race?

Dr Marion Messmer

Wow, hello, you are a very disciplined audience. I love how a hush just fell over the audience. Warm welcome, everyone, thank you so much for joining us tonight for this discussion about whether we can still head off a nuclear arms race. It’s fantastic to see so many of you here today. I’m Marion Messmer. I’m a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security Programme here at Chatham House, and I’m going to be your Chair for tonight’s event.

I assume you all are very aware of the various ways in which the nuclear environment has unfortunately, slowly deteriorated over the last few years. We’ve seen an acceleration of aggressive nuclear rhetoric and various challenges to the global nuclear order, which is something that has been on everyone’s minds since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, but it’s also something that, unfortunately, has been apparent much before that point in time. But it’s a dynamic that has, sort of, increased in pace, as well as in intensity, over the last several years.

So, today’s event will give us an opportunity to talk about whether we can still head off a new arms race, how we can react to some of the many challenges that different components of the global nuclear order are facing today. And I’m really pleased that we have three fantastic speakers with us tonight. We have – and I will introduce them all now and then they will give their remarks in turn. So, we will start tonight with Rose Gottemoeller, who is, of course, the Former Deputy General of NATO and she’s joining us online today. All of our speakers are incredibly accomplished and have really, really long biographies that I’m not going to read out in full, but if you want to find out more about them, then you can find their full biographies on our events website.

Our second speaker is going to be Dr Jamie Kwong, who is a Fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but luckily able to join us here in London. And then, finally, our third speaker is going to be Dr Patricia Lewis, who’s our own Research Director in the International Security Programme at Chatham House. So, we will hear from each of our speakers briefly and then I will ask a few questions just so that you can prepare any questions that you might have for our speakers.

And so, if you are in the room with us, if you want to ask a question, once I open the floor for questions, please just raise your hand and someone will bring a microphone to you. When you do ask your question, please introduce yourself, just briefly state your name and state the organisation that you are representing, if you are representing any organisation. And if you are joining us online, then I’ve got a laptop right next to me, and I’ll keep an eye on any questions that are coming in that way, and you’ll get to ask your question, whether it’s in the room or online. So, with that, that’s all I really have to say to all of you, and I’ll turn the floor over to Rose, who’s going to kick us off.

Rose Gottemoeller

Oh, thank you so very much, Marion, and thank you so much for this opportunity to be with you today online. I would much rather have been in the room, and I know many friends and colleagues are there today. So, my greetings from California. I apologise, our lawn team is here and so you will hear some noise of lawnmowers in the background. It is still growing season here in California, and Monday morning is their day to be here, but they will be finished very shortly, so I apologise for that.

What I wanted to say to begin with, many of you know that I served on the Strategic Posture Commission of the United States, a bipartisan group that completed its work one year ago, in October of 2023. And we did conclude that we may very well need to increase in numbers or change the structure of our strategic nuclear triad in order to address the threats emanating from the Russian Federation, well-known and understood. But also, now the new modernisation of the Chinese People’s Republic, where they are building up their nuclear warhead numbers, we fear to as many as 1,500 warheads by 2035, according to the Department of Defence. So, it is in that context that the Strategic Posture Commission saw a very serious challenge ahead for the United States and our strategic nuclear deterrence, but we also emphasised the necessity of continuing to look for opportunities to control nuclear weapons, and also to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In that regard, I also want to point to a conclusion that I outlined in a Financial Times opinion piece back on September 5th of this year. That is that the Strategic Posture Commission was very clear that we should not in any way reopen the programme of record that was agreed by President Obama back in 2016, to modernise the current triad of strategic nuclear forces. The key point about that modernisation programme is that it is to replace the current triad, to replace it, but not to increase it, and indeed, the modernisation is, and was, to take place under the limits of the New START Treaty, 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 delivery vehicles. Although Vladimir Putin has ceased implementation measures under the Treaty, Russia continues to abide by those limits, and the United States should abide – is abiding by those limits, as well, and I believe both countries should continue to abide by those limits as modernisation unfolds. As long as Russia does not begin building up, the United States should not build up, and vice versa.

That means the programme of record can continue to unfold as intended, without reopening it to impose new requirements on it, because the programme of record is so tightly scheduled that if it is piled with new requirements, then it is liable to stall and perhaps even to fail. And so, that means that we have a window of opportunity to continue to work on trying to get back to the negotiating table, both the negotiating table with the Russian Federation and with China. The programme of record will only be completed in the 2035 to 2045 time period, and therefore, we have some time to work on starting new negotiations.

So, I’d like to put that point out as a tiny bit of optimism in an otherwise quite dark environment, but I do think it’s worth discussing and bearing in mind that we don’t need to panic, we have time to work this problem. And with that, I will turn off my audio, so you don’t need to listen to the lawnmowers anymore. They should be finished very, very quickly. Thank you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much, Rose. Over to you, Jamie.

Dr Jamie Kwong

Great, so, that’s a very helpful set of remarks, Rose, and it’s great to see you again. I wanted to talk specifically about three key challenges that I think is facing the non-proliferation regime in particular, so picking up on Rose’s point about preventing future proliferation. So, let me walk you through the three and then hopefully, we’ll get into some policy options of what we can do about it.

So, first and foremost, I think the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the broader non-proliferation regime that it really props up is under significant stress. So, there’s some very real frustration by non-nuclear weapon states on the lack of disarmament progress by the P5, those nuclear states weap – recognised by the NPT. You know, essentially this concern that the P5 have failed to uphold their end of the grand bargain that’s really at the heart of the Treaty.

Moreover, you know, we’ve seen TPNW, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we’ve seen states in that forum really challenge the concept of deterrence itself, really interrogating the value of – the security value of nuclear weapons. And so, we’ve seen these stark divisions really play out in international forums, most especially, you know, at the NPT review cycle meetings, and I think that these divisions could prove increasingly untenable and are likely to only get worse if we do see the world, kind of, unfold into a full-fledged nuclear arms race. So, that’s challenge number one.

Challenge number two, I think we’re seeing a fraying non-proliferation consensus. So, traditionally among the P5, but in particular the US and Russia, there’s been a broad recognition that non-proliferation is in their interests, right? Not only does it cement their primacy as nuclear powers, a status symbol, if you will, but it also helps enhance their security. Fewer nuclear states means fewer nuclear threats. It also avoids a problem of having smaller nuclear-armed allies getting involved in a conflict that could escalate to all-out nuclear war.

But today, we’re really seeing a fraying of this consensus, right? Historically, we’ve seen the US and Russia, in particular, or the Soviet Union, really seeing this common interest as a way to work on collaborative non-proliferation efforts, including the negotiation of the NPT. But now we see Russia, in particular, prioritising its diverging short-term interests, right? We see Russia blocking Iran and North Korea in the UN Security Council, and really prioritising the support those states are giving for its War on Ukraine. You know, I think it’s fair to say, on the flipside, Russia would point to US double standards in the non-proliferation regime, which we can get into, as well, during our discussion.

And then, finally, I think the third challenge we’re facing are really specific proliferation concerns, of which Iran is, of course, at the top of that list. You know, the concern that Tehran itself could weaponize, but then, also, that it might cause this proliferation domino in the region. So, we’ve seen Tehran make rapid advancements in its nuclear programme since 2019, not just in terms of technical developments and stockpiling highly enriched uranium, but, also, making irreversible knowledge gains, and that part, in particular, I think is most concerning.

This, of course, is exacerbated by its fraught co-operation with the IAEA, so the international monitoring system, and so, essentially, Iran, has really achieved what experts would call a ‘threshold status’. It has many of the components it would need to develop a nuclear weapon. It’s just missing a political decision to do so, and amidst the ongoing conflict with Israel, there’s more talk about making that political decision, potentially. You know, we’ve seen comments coming out of Tehran, really characterising nuclear weapons as imperatives for national security. And even short of that weaponisation decision, we’ve also seen discourse around, you know, a different policy option, of potentially withdrawing from the NPT. And full disclosure, a colleague and I recently wrote an article about this, so that’s why I bring it up, but happy to, again, elaborate that on our discussion.

But just to flag, as well, you know, in addition to Iran obviously being first and foremost, proliferation concern, I think from a US perspective and a UK perspective, we also need to be thinking about the possibility of allied proliferation. So, I’m thinking about South Korea, in particular, where we see growing mainstream discourse around, you know, nuclear weapons and the possibility of South Korea developing an independent programme. Fuelled by the North Korean nuclear threat, first and foremost, but also, concerns about the credibility and sustainability of US extended deterrence.

And there was a notable uptick in rhetoric, I think, last week, following the US election, but of course, this has been a debate that has been going on for at least as long as the North Korean programme has existed. And, you know, I’ll flag as well, another caveat here is the South Korean proliferation concern is certainly not as pressing as the Iranian concern. Not least because South Korea is completely adhering to its IAEA safeguards, you know, the official policy is still a full commitment to the NPT and, also, because South Korea doesn’t have all of the components it would actually need to proliferate, as Iran increasingly does.

But the prospect of South Korean proliferation, I think, will prompt a serious reckoning in Washington and other Western capitals about, you know, thinking about allied proliferation. It’s not an issue we’ve had to deal with in decades. So, that’s a bit dreary, but let me go ahead and stop there.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you, Jamie, and we can get into perhaps any options you see for policy responses later on. Patricia, over to you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah, thank you very much. So, you know, building on what Rose and Jamie said, I think where we are right now is probably the worst we’ve been for a long time, because, you know, at the end of the Cold War, we had an opportunity to build trust between the United States and Russia, but also the UK and France and China and others. And that was partly through the arms control process, the bilateral arms control process, partly through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, partly through negotiating the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and so on.

And we built up a system of trust, with checks and balances, verification measures, confidence building measures, and so on. It wasn’t perfect, but it did what it needed to do, in that it kept those channels open. It provided transparency, it meant that we understood each other better, we had better messaging, we understood the meaning of things, and it also gave us a much needed time for any military significant cheating. I mean, that’s what the whole purpose of it was. And, you know, it – that’s almost entirely gone. Bit by bit, it’s been, sort of, whittled away, and we’re now down to one bilateral treaty, and Rose rightly points out, we’ve got some time, and I completely agree that what we’ve got to do now is prepare for opportunity. That’s what luck is all about, preparation for opportunity, and we need a lot of luck, but we need to be ready should an opportunity arise.

But we, also, I think, need to reprioritise. So, arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation, just are really, really important. We’ve got to keep on with those throughout the treaty structures that still exist, but we’ve also got to think about something else, and that is to prevent use, because I think we’re in a very different environment now, and I would prioritise that more than anything else, and it’s very hard to do. So, we – in prioritising that these weapons should never be used again in conflict, how do we do that? We’ve lost our checks and balances. We’ve lost our relationships in which we can have these things easily. And even if we keep those relationships at the working level, at the diplomatic level, which is so vitally important, at the higher political level, it’s extremely difficult, and it was probably made more difficult with the recent US election.

So, it also very dramatically affects nuclear deterrence postures. Nuclear deterrence postures, if they work, work entirely through the messaging being clear, and I think this lack of communication and lack of knowledge about each other’s arsenals, etc., means that our messaging and our communication is very unclear and very muddied. And so, we really need arms control as the other side of nuclear deterrence postures, it’s absolutely vital.

So, how do we do – how do we strengthen the taboo of use? And there have been attempts to do this. Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev made a joint statement about how “Nuclear war could never be won and should never be fought,” and that has been reiterated by all five nuclear weapon states within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a good start. The trouble is, aft – very soon after the last reiteration of this, President Putin was making nuclear weapons threats in the most unnecessary set of circumstances. Right at the beginning, if you remember, at the – of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, days later, there were some threats coming out about, you know, how the – allowing the use at a lower level than the President would be enabled, and so on.

So, we very quickly went from zero to 60, if you like, in nuclear weapons’ use rhetoric, very early on in the War against Ukraine, and then, of course, later on that year, we had some evidence, it turns out we didn’t – most of us didn’t know this at the time, of mobilisation and real worry. But here was our – here’s my light, my light in the dark, and that was the response of China to this. So, when the fear was at its greatest, a number of countries, that I understand include the United States and Germany, talked with China and China made a direct intervention with Russia, with President Putin. India also spoke up, as well, which I think was very important, and said, “Do not use these weapons,” right? Because to use nuclear weapons is very different. To actually explode nuclear weapons, to cross that threshold, could set off an enormous set of cascading consequences.

We have, at the moment, an opportunity to look at that. In the UN in 1988, so towards the end of the Cold War, there was a study done on the long-term impacts of nuclear weapons. We have learned so much since then, there is so much more scientific evidence about the long-term impacts of radiation, for example. It takes decades for all of that information to come through, because of – they’re very long-term, so, the hibakusha of Japan from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the down windows in nuclear test sites, indigenous peoples who’ve been subjected to nuclear radiation from atmospheric testing, and so on, all of that data has been coming through in recent years. So, this is new in terms of the impact.

We also now have very new understanding of our climate, thanks to climate modelling, which, by the way, was originally developed for nuclear weapons modelling, so just, you know, that irony. So, the computer modelling for the climate, we now understand so much more about inters – interhemispheric mixing, and so on. So, what we do know now is that the use of a much lower number of nuclear weapons in cities, where a lot of carbon would go into the atmosphere, could end up creating global famine and terrible growing conditions for about a decade.

We need to do more research on this, but the – that research is very clear, and I think very – is well accepted, but not everybody understands that. People today, because nuclear weapons haven’t been in their consciousness for so long, confuse the accident at Chernobyl or the accident at Fukushima, with nuclear weapons explosions, and they’re nothing like each other, at all. You know, people don’t understand the full-scale set of impacts. I’m sure that the Scientists in nuclear weapon states understand them, but people who have to make decisions, ordinary people, about their lives, don’t understand it.

So, we have now a resolution that’s just been adopted in the UN General Assembly, and it means that a new study will take place, looking at the long-term impacts. It was a scientific study and Scientists will be appointed to it, and I think this will help people understand why it’s so important to prevent their use, and why it’s so important to re-establish arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament measures.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. I think that gives us a good set of introductions. I’m about to open the floor for the Q&A, so please ask on – think of any questions that you might want to ask. But in the meantime, while you think about your questions, and I can see we’ve already had a lot of good questions come in online, I’ll – I have two questions for each of you. So, the first question is, given that we now know the outcome of the US election and we are going to go into a second Trump presidency in January 2025, is there anything that we can observe from the things that the first Trump administration did in the nuclear realm that can tell us something about what they might prioritise doing in 2025, or perhaps beyond, if you can foresee any – anything that might happen beyond 2025?

And then, secondly, I know some of you have already mentioned a few different policy options that we’ve got, but just because Jamie in particular was asking for an opportunity to spread a bit more cheer, I wanted to ask you all, what do you think we can do about the challenges that we face? Do you see any obvious solutions that perhaps aren’t being taken? Are there any changes that we could make that would be fairly easy, which could reduce nuclear risks or which could bring parties back to the negotiating table? You know, for example, I saw someone ask in the chat already about the AI agreement that we heard about today, where President Xi and President Biden agreed on not giving AI systems any control over nuclear weapons. Is this something that we could expand upon? Essentially do you – what, kind of, silver linings do you see?

Why don’t we go in orders of speakers? So, I’ll start with Rose again and then Jamie and Patricia, and feel free to pick and choose from my questions what you want to answer. Rose, over to you.

Rose Gottemoeller

Thank you very much, and yes, thank you for that great introduction, because I did want to make note of the Xi agreement with President Biden over the weekend. And so important, if you look at the White House statement, it talks about the two countries having basically, agreed to sponsor each other’s resolutions in the UN General Assembly, and I think – on AI and AI constraints. And I think, you know, we’re so discouraged these days about what’s happening in the UN Security Council, that to see a bright spot of this kind in the United States and China agreeing to work the AI problem together in the UN General Assembly, I think that this is a great step forward, first of all.

But I think it also bespeaks an area where we all need to be paying more attention. We have long accustomed ourselves to controlling hardware, missiles, bombers, submarines, nuclear warheads, but we haven’t really been able to do much, so far, about the emergence of new technologies that are software based, not hardware based. And there’s going to be a huge challenge in ensuring that we are controlling these kinds of systems, in some way, or at least building mutual confidence about their applications, because I think that they will have a profound implication for the stability of deterrence going forward. This too, is an area that requires more study.

So, I just want to say, I think the Biden-Xi meeting over the weekend had a very solid, positive message to it about the resolve of these two countries, China and the United States, to try to get arms around the problem of how artificial intelligence, and perhaps other new technologies, will affect the stability of nuclear deterrence going forward. So, let’s hold that thought and see how we expand on it. It’s a huge area for new study, and I think we’re really going to have to spend some considerable time and intellectual capital figuring out what to do to get some mutual predictability in this arena. So, that’s the first comment I’d like to make.

The second comment I would like to make is with regard to what to expect from President Trump in this second administration. You know, first time round, he had some big ambitions, like, a nuclear agreement with the DPRK. And that basically stumbled over demands, I think, placed on Kim Jong Un, that simply were not – he was not able to fulfil. Perhaps too much of a heavy lift for him in his domestic setting. We won’t go into that in too much detail today. But I do want to note that Trump, if there’s anything we know about Trump, he likes to be the big dealmaker, right? The big dealmaker, with a lot of attention on the world stage. He wants to be a big peacemaker, and I think that’s what’s driving his urge to resolve the War in Ukraine in ‘24 hours’, as he famously promised during his election campaign.

I know there is some intention to try to get moving quickly on some, kind of, resolution. I don’t know exactly what that means, but as I wrote in a piece, again in the Financial Times last Friday, I think this is an opportunity for us to really make it clear that, you know, Putin can’t have a negotiation that is a zero-sum game here. That’s not something that that Trump’s going to stand for. You know, winner take all, Putin gets all, deals out a crushing defeat to Ukraine, to NATO and the United States of America. Trump’s not going to go for that. And so, for that reason, there’s going to have to be some balance of concessions, and one of the concessions that I’ve laid out would be for Putin to agree to come back to the negotiating table, to talk about a future arms control deal and nuclear stability, as well as to restore the implementation of the New START Treaty.

Of course, this is my proposal. It has nothing to do with what the incoming Trump team or the Biden administration is thinking at the moment, but I do think we need to bear in mind that there can be an opportunity in the dynamics of this upcoming period, and in the dynamics of an upcoming negotiation, which I believe will take shape over the War in Ukraine. So, again, let’s think about opportunities going forward and see if we can make lemonade out of lemons. Thank you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. Jamie?

Dr Jamie Kwong

Yeah, so, jumping off of Rose’s points on the Trump administration, I think zooming out a little bit from specific issues, I think the most that we can expect is a lot of uncertainty, right? And that’s partially because we’re waiting to see who staffs up the nuclear file, alright? We’ve seen a lot of high-level appointments at the Cabinet and Secretary level, but there’s still a lot of open questions on who’s going to serve in these key positions in DoD, in state, what have you, on nuclear issues, and I think that plays a key role. Also, you know, to Rose’s point, I think Trump, as a whole, there’s a lot of unpredictability that we saw in the first administration. I was going to point out North Korea, as well, in 2017, where you see the “fire and fury” remarks, versus 2018, you see Trump shaking hands with Kim at the Singapore Summit. So, I think unpredictability is probably something to expect. Whether we can leverage that as an opportunity, I hope we can.

You know, I think, in particular, on the extended deterrence question, you know, being sat in the UK and the broader European context, I think there’s some very legitimate concerns and questions from allies around Trump’s continued commitment to it, given a lot of the comments around burden sharing, what played out in the first administration, on the election trail, what have you. I think we’ve seen some very important efforts in the Biden administration to, kind of, institutionalise, some reassurance efforts. Obviously, reassurance being key to extended deterrence. If you think in the South Korea context, for example, standing up for NCG, the Nuclear Consultative Group, and so we’ll see how that plays out in terms of, you know, does that help to provide some insulation in what might be a turbulent time?

Dr Marion Messmer

Hmmm.

Dr Jamie Kwong

And then shifting to policy recommendations, I feel like maybe I over-characterised it as being a little bit more optimistic than I probably am, but just to pick up on that AI statement, as well, to flag one additional point. China is currently the Chairman of the P5 process, and so, you know, is this an opportunity for China to characterise getting a win, by bringing this type of statement to the P5, and, you know, being able to present at the upcoming RevCon, or the PrepCom in April, that the P5 collectively agree to a statement like this and can encourage one another on that? That feels like a good opportunity to me, that can help address some of the challenges I drew out in the NPT, that first challenge. Especially because, you know, there’s a lot of calls for risk reduction measures, but the P5 arguably haven’t been showing up, right? There haven’t been very many tangible measures coming out of the P5 process, in particular.

On the non-proliferation consensus challenge, as a whole, you know, I think it’s generally hard to see a lot of room for progress as we continue to see Russia, and increasingly China, unwilling to compartmentalise the nuclear issue, as we historically did during the Cold War. But, you know, to the extent in the US context that there’s questions around, kind of, the Trump administration’s policies and whether competition might be prioritised over some traditional policies, like, non-proliferation policies, I think there’s a lot of work that civil society actors can do to make a lot of arguments, and security arguments, about the value of non-proliferation. And I’m hopeful that will kickstart a lot of that work.

And then, finally, just to touch briefly on the proliferation challenges. I think we need to do a lot of homework on how we can revisit and update our non-proliferation toolkit, thinking about how we need different tools to deter, or different types of proliferation, right? The US is not going to implement the same types of tools in an Iranian context, as a South Korean context. And then we also need to be creative about who’s implementing these tools. You know, in a lot of ways, because of that non-proliferation consensus challenge, maybe nuclear states aren’t best fit for this as much anymore, and we need to really draw on non-traditional actors, if you will, to play a key role here. So, maybe that’s a little bit of hope.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you. Patricia?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah, that’s a great last idea, and I’m thinking very much of the UK-Norwegian verification project…

Dr Jamie Kwong

Yeah, absolutely.

Dr Patricia Lewis

…which has been replicated around the world, and building up that expertise in non-nuclear weapon states, but who have enough knowledge to be able to do it. I think that’s a great idea. I think, as well, you know, exploring potential discussions with countries like China, India, and how they have, you know, have – China and India both have not only a policy of no use against non-nuclear weapon states and no first use against nuclear weapon states, but they also had, until recently, they mig – you might argue they still have, but it’s fast changing unfortunately, because of submarines, but they had a physical posture where they de-mated the warheads from the missiles, and so, you actually could see this in real life. So, what sort of confidence building measures could we look at like that? What sort of mechanisms could we develop? Have we left it too late for that? Quite possibly.

Dr Marion Messmer

Hmmm.

Dr Patricia Lewis

It may not be 100% perfect, but we don’t need perfection in everything, but we do need to ratchet down the tension and build that confidence. The problem that I have, I think – you know, when we started discussions and negotiations with Gorbachev, and it was very exciting, there was a new – end of the Cold War, there was the new administration in Russia, and then the confidence built. Now, trust has been broken, and as everyone knows in every relationship they’ve ever had, once you’ve broken trust with somebody, unless there’s something you’ve fundamentally misunderstood and can recast your misunderstanding so that you can, kind of, make amends with each other, it’s so hard to re-establish trust, ‘cause you can never fully trust each other again. And the idea of re-establishing trust is almost insurmountable. You will never fully trust them.

So, my view is let’s stop trying to worry about trust and almost go back to the pre-end of the Cold War, or the pre-Gorbachev years, to think how we – you know, it was “Trust but verify” was always Reagan’s approach. And in a way, let’s weatherproof, and let’s learn from this experience and weatherproof any agreements we have going forward, so that they aren’t just negotiated when times are good and people are getting on with each other, but that they’re negotiated to withstand the stormy weather of really difficult politics.

And that brings me then to, funnily enough, President Trump, and, you know, I think he might well be much more emboldened this time, a) he has a much greater mandate, in terms of from the people of the United States, b) he – it’s his second term. You know, he’s been round the block once, he’s been thinking about it in that gap, in those – the gap years of President Biden, for him. That’s how he’ll think about it. He’ll – he’s been thinking about what he would have done, what he could have done differently, what he might do next. And, you know, one of the things that – if we look at what’s happened with Iran since October the 7th last year, you know, Iran has put itself into a really difficult position in the Middle East, where it – you know, it’s been – it’s proxy, so it’s been supporting Hamas and Hezbollah have been routed by Israel. But it’s going to be much harder, I think, to engage Iran, and President Trump never really wanted to. President Trump wanted to, kind of, beat them into a different position. So, what will happen there, we don’t know.

And the other, of course, is this miss – completely not understood relationship between President Trump and President Putin. We do not know what that relationship is. They had a meeting when President Trump was in office as President, which there were no notes, nothing. We still don’t know what was in that meeting, and apparently, they have been talking ever since. So, what is this relationship? Is it something that, in fact, Trump will build on and make something out of that will, perhaps, you know, lead to the end of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What that will look like, we don’t know. Or is it something else? And I think that this is one of my big concerns about going forward, that we – it’s very hard for us to understand what the parameters of that relationship might be.

Dr Marion Messmer

Hmmm, thank you very much. Okay, now it’s over to all of you to ask whichever questions you might have. I’m just waiting to see where we’ve got the microphones. I’ve already seen a few hands. So, we’ve got one hand in the middle here, second row from the front, in a beige jumper [pause].

Thomas Apostolou

Thank you, Thomas Apostolou, I’m a undergraduate international relations student, at the School of Oriental and African Studies. I had the privilege of representing Cyprus at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva this summer, which Dr Messmer was actually at, representing Chatham House, at a side event. This was my first UN experience, and I have to say that this – and it was an NPT PrepCom, it was nothing short of a shouting match between the nuclear weapon holding states.

And I just wanted to ask the panel if they believe that the UN is still the relevant organisation to be discussing disarmament and non-proliferation issues? And whether the – wha – whether they can see any successes coming down the line for the NPT, especially considering that it’s so closely tied to the UN, which is in the middle of this liquidity crisis, which is genuinely crippling the ability of Diplomats to actually do effective diplomacy in New York and Geneva and Vienna and other places? So, yes, my question is just pertaining to how the UN can better foster fruitful dialogue surrounding the NPT and disarmament. Thank you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. I’ll take three questions, so we had another one, third row from the front, on the – on your left. Yeah, thank you.

Kyle Tucker

Hi, excuse me, thanks so much for speaking with us. My name is Kyle Tucker, and I’m a master’s student at King’s College London, doing security studies. Dr Lewis, I was interested you brought up the UN General Assembly resolution on the effects of nuclear war, and something that I noticed that was quite fascinating was how the P5 members voted on that resolution. Russia, France and the UK voted against setting up this study, while the US and China abstained. I was curious if you or others would like to comment on maybe the logic of the P5 members there, especially the UK and France, on their decision to vote solidly against it.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you, and then we had a final question in the very front. Thank you very much.

Hussain Murad

Hello, I’m Hussain Murad, I’m doing European politics at King’s College London. And I was wondering how does the inexperience of individuals such as Peter Hegseth and the ultranationalist sentiments of individuals, such as, Shoigu – Gerasimov in Russia impact the implementation of non-proliferation treaties, in generally?

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. Great, so we’ve got three great questions, and shall we go in opposite order this, kind of, time, starting with Patricia? Sorry about that. I will basically switch back and forth, so you can mentally prepare yourself that you’ll be…

Dr Jamie Kwong

I’m in the best spot.

Dr Marion Messmer

You’ll – you’re…

Dr Jamie Kwong

Right in the middle.

Dr Marion Messmer

It will be your turn, as well, Jamie, don’t worry, I’ll mix it up so that everyone goes first, but yeah, Patricia, why don’t you start, and just pick whichever questions you’d want to answer?

Dr Patricia Lewis

Thank you. So, is the UN still the right place? Yes, of course. You know, the UN is the member states, and then there’s the Secretariat. So, the Secretariat does a very good job at, you know, servicing all of the big treaty negotiations, the meetings, the Preparatory Committees, etc., etc. And then the member states do a terrible job of agreeing, and – but that’s – they’re the member states, right? They’re sovereign governments and that’s their job, they know what they’re doing. So, it’s not the UN as such that’s the problem, it’s the member states, right, who are not finding agreement.

There are some structures in the UN that I would change, though, and I would certainly change the Conference on Disarmament, because we’ve bound ourselves into a consensus. I mean, I used to joke when I was there that, you know, you practically needed consensus to ask to go to the bathroom, and it is, it’s got ridiculous. You can’t even, sort of, get your – repeat your agenda from last year. You have to go through all these shenanigans all the time, and it hasn’t actually achieved anything since the negotiation of the Nuclear Test Ban in 1996, and even that hasn’t been fully entered into force yet. So, it’s – that’s the kind of thing – I’m a great believer in achieving consensus via the threat of the vote, yeah. When you’ve got – when you know you’ve got to get consensus, then you can veto, if you wish, right? Whereas if you know you’re going to be – vote and be exposed, then you might find consensus, and we’ve seen that time and time again. We certainly see it in the UN General Assembly, which brings me to the UN General Assembly resolution.

So, yeah, it was very strange, and by the way, there’s still another chance for this vote, because that was in the first committee of the UN General Assembly, which is the Security Committee, and there’s an actual vote that’s coming up of the resolution in the actual General Assembly, so it’s an opportunity to fix this. For me, Russia – I mean, France and the UK voting with Russia, which they did last year on another resolution, as well, which is all about the clean-up of nuclear testing and the impact on indigenous peoples, and so on, I think it’s a really bad look. It’s a bad look for France and the UK, and it was an opportunity to, if you like, let Russia stand by itself on this. I can’t see what’s wrong in a scientific study to look at the impact of nuclear weapons. I think people need to know that, I think it’s educational, it allows better decisions.

If you’re a deterrence – a pro-deterrence, a nuclear deterrence person – we’re all pro-deterrence, of course, but if you’re – if you think nuclear weapons deter, then it would strengthen your case. So, I don’t see the problem there. It’s a very odd thing, and I think that the US and China’s decision to abstain was much better. And the US, in fact, I think, you know, made it quite – I understood they made it quite clear to NATO allies that it was fine for people to vote in favour of the resolution, or abstain if they wished, or whatever. They weren’t, like, putting any pressure on. So, it was a very odd decision, and I think people were really disappointed in the UK, particularly, because of course, it’s a new government, they thought maybe this would be a fresh start. So, goodness knows what the real reason behind it is, but I think there may be a misunderstanding somewhere at the heart of it, and I would love the chance to explore further with those making the decision, about how we could maybe modify that a bit.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you. Jamie?

Dr Jamie Kwong

Great. So, I think I’ll leave the P5 vote there. I think that was a great response. On the first question, let me dive specifically into the NPT space, which, of course, sits within the broader UN construct, as Patricia outlined, in terms of treaties. You know, I think it’s an irreplaceable place, right? Not only is the NPT nearly universal, but because of that, it means that all states have a voice, and of course, there’s an imbalance, right? You know, you see a lot of coverage and weight and attention given to the P5, and in particular, their allies, as well, but I think we absolutely need to preserve that space, because it does give an opportunity for all member states to have a voice. And, you know, there’s ways to strengthen their voice, through regional coalitions, or coalitions built out of mutual interests, what have you. But I think that’s absolutely something we need to work towards, right? And a lot of us on the stage have been involved in a lot of the NPT civil society efforts to try to work towards that.

And then, finally, on the question around individuals’ impacts. You know, I think, in terms of thinking about non-proliferation treaties and the regime as a whole, I think there is some resilience built into the architecture. Again, as I said, the NPT is nearly universal, which is a good thing. You know, there’s a lot of other follow-on things that come out of that, so there is some resilience there. That said, I think on a positive side of things, we can see the positive impact that individuals can have, and I might, you know, put our Chair on the spot here, but, you know, I think, in particular, we’ve seen historically, some individuals really being the key drivers behind arms control agreements, Marion did a whole PhD on this, Rose was a US Negotiator on New START and really drove the process. I think that, kind of, exemplifies how individuals can play a very positive and impactful role. So, there’s my optimism for you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you, Jamie. Rose, over to you.

Dr Patricia Lewis

And read Rose’s book I would say.

Dr Marion Messmer

Yes, definitely.

Dr Jamie Kwong

Yes, absolutely, yeah.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah.

Dr Marion Messmer

I mean, I’m really happy for all of you to plug your various articles. We already heard about Rose’s FT articles, and Jamie, of course, just wrote something, as well, and then there’s Rose’s amazing book on “Negotiating the New START.” So, if you haven’t read that yet, you definitely should, but Rose, what did you think about the questions?

Rose Gottemoeller

Well, thank you, all very good questions and I absolutely – I wanted to foot stomp Patricia’s response about the value of stepping away from consensus sometimes, and moving to the – at least the threat of a vote. It does wondrous things for getting countries to step out from behind where they’re hiding. They might be hiding behind another country, because they absolutely have to stand and express their opinion, in one way or another. I’ve also seen – and people will argue with this, but in recent years, in another major organisation supporting an international regime, the OPCW, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has stepped away from consensus decision making, toward voting in certain circumstances, and I think it has been highly valuable. I know that some countries would argue with that, but I think it has been highly valuable. So, that is really what I wanted to say.

On the notion of – the one question about individuals seem to be focused on people like Shoigu and Gerasimov, who are serving, obviously, in the military policymaking arena of an autocratic state, now the Russian Federation, you know, we know from history that whenever the leader decides to move in a certain direction, everyone stands and salutes. So, I don’t worry so much about their, I would say, breaking function. It’s up to Putin to decide when he wants to return to the negot – the nuclear negotiating table, and he’s the most influential, I would say, character in that particular political setting. And so, people ask all the time, “Is the system going to prevent it?” Well, I think in the case of those kinds of regimes, it’s the individual leader who can prevent it, but once that individual changes his mind, then away we go, we’re back in business again, for good or for ill.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. And in the meantime, I selected three questions from our online audience, and Jamie, this time I’ll start with you. I’ll give you the warning ahead of time, just so that it’s fair on Rose and Patricia. So, the first question is, “Should there be greater population resilience for nuclear war, given all of the threats we’ve been talking about and the rising risks?” The second question is, “What has happened to no first use policies?” I – so I think this person asked that question in the context of it being a talking point during the Biden presidential campaign, but I think it can also be broadened out for any opportunities on this from the P5, perhaps, in connection with Patricia’s point on statements that leaders could make. And then finally, “How can we bring non-NPT nuclear-armed states into dialogue or arms control agreements?” So, I think we have a lot there to get into, and Jamie, let’s start with you, and feel free to pick whichever questions you want to pick up.

Dr Jamie Kwong

Perfect, yeah. So, let me draw on that “no first use policies” questions, first and foremost. So, I think you’re referring to, kind of, the Biden administration. As Vice President Biden was leaving office, he actually gave a speech at the Carnegie Endowment, long before my time, where he was talking about ‘sole purpose’. So, this concept of changing – potentially changing US nuclear posture, so that, you know, there was a clear statement that nuclear weapons would only be used in nuclear conflicts. And, you know, a lot of people were hopeful that when Vice President Biden became President Biden that he would adopt this posture. He didn’t in the end. There’s a lot of consistency across administrations, as we’ve seen, US NPRs released, Nuclear Posture Reviews released.

The specific no first use policy is slightly different than a sole purpose. No first use is as it sounds, right? That a state declares not to use nuclear weapons first, and, you know, China currently maintains a no first use policy. I believe India and Pakistan – India, okay, have their no first use policies. I think, you know, a lot of folks in Washington, probably in London, as well, question the credibility of China’s no first use policy, in particular, as we’re seeing this expansion effort, as Rose, kind of, outlined in her remarks.

But I think what we can draw in here, and where there is a potential opportunity. Again, I mentioned that China is currently chairing the P5 process. Within that forum, it has put forward a proposal to discuss a no first use treaty among the P5. A lot of people think that might be a non-starter, in particular, in Washington, but I think that could be a starter for dialogue. You know, an opportunity to help actually dive into some of the misunderstandings that we’ve been outlining on this stage tonight, and really use it as an opportunity to better understand, why does China think we all need a new no first use policy? What are the risks that they see in US policy? And, kind of, dive into the particulars, and maybe that’s in in-ramp, if you will, to get towards that.

On involving non-NPT nuclear states in arms control in some of these discussions, that’s a real challenge, right? And I think it’s something that, you know, we’ve been struggling with for quite some time. Let me focus particularly on North Korea, which is a unique state in this sense for having been a member of the NPT and then having withdrawn and developed a nuclear programme. You know, because of that history, the US in particular, and South Korea, have a policy of, you know, working towards denuclearisation, right? They want North Korea to disarm, they don’t recognise North Korea as a nuclear-armed state because they violated the NPT. There’s some legalities within that.

But, you know, I think there’s a question now, given, kind of, the real world that we’re living in in 2024, with the size of North Korea’s arsenal, it’s growing in advanced delivery capabilities, you know, is North Korea really a proliferation problem anymore, or is it really a risk reduction issue that we have to deal with? And I sit a little bit more in the latter camp, that we need to shake up the status quo approach. You know, Pyongyang is never going to come to a negotiation table where denuclearisation is at the top of the list. Surely it would be more impactful to work from a very base mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war, and what are the measures and steps that we can take to do that? So, maybe a broader response to this question would be taking in efforts to meet some states where they are in order to make progress.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. Patricia, what do you think?

Dr Patricia Lewis

So, in terms of the no use policies and sole purpose, I think that we need to, sort of, step back from behind that to see what the purpose of those are. And, for me, it’s about – you know, it’s a measure to try to build confidence and to message that they’re not a threat. That’s the idea, you know, we have these weapons. So, you know, I wanted to just for a minute, as well, recognise how much brilliant work has been done since the end of the Cold War. You know, in the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, which was such a dangerous time, when we had a number of near misses of nuclear weapons, which we haven’t gone into in this discussion, but you can read it in various Chatham House publications, where, you know, we – we have a joke in the non-proliferation, disarmament, nuclear deterrence community, that there’s more evidence for God than there is for nuclear deterrence, right? And the hand of God seems to have applied on a number of occasions. I’m not talking about a footballer.

So, it’s a really – it’s – it was really dangerous – these are really dangerous weapons. They are – they’re really – they’re in a class of their own, they’re not like conventional weapons, they’re nothing like it. And, you know, we’ve gone from 60,000 weapons in the 1980s to 10,000 today, worldwide. So, that’s 5,000 each, really, in US and Russia, and the rest are, sort of, loose change, you know. So, China’s at 500 at the moment, is the best estimate, growing, but nonetheless, a tenth, and, you know, the UK’s 225, France is around 290, and then as you go down, much fewer weapons. So, let’s just understand the problem here, it’s really a bilateral treaty, and thanks to people like Rose and her team, you know, we’ve really brought those numbers down. So, it can be done, and it can be done again, but it’s going to be much harder second time around, I think, in part of because of what’s going on now.

So, no use policies, no first use policies, declaratory. You can do things to reinforce your postures, like I said by de-mating warheads and so on, but you can also do other things. You can begin discussions to, again, communicate that you’re not – that you want partnership rather than threat. So, you know, China has always said, “We won’t join arms control negotiations until we’re at the same level.” So, the – I think everyone always thought, you know, the US and Russia would bring theirs down and then there’d be about, you know, 300 each and then China – well, it looks like China’s going the other way to meet them, which is – would be such pity. And I think that there’s better ways for China to think about this, you know, in terms of stabilisation, in terms of building good relationships and communicating intent, because that’s really important in this. That’s something that China could do and that’s join in negotiations with the United States and others.

I think, as well, India and Pakistan, as two countries that are nuclear-armed from outside the NPT, have had bilateral treaties in the past which have worked well. They have set up a set of confidence building measures, which, you know, have – did work for a while and then didn’t, failed. They were called the cricket CBMs when they were going to each other’s cricket matches and so on. And I think that, you know, there’s real opportunity there. There is – there’s no interest for either of those two countries in having a nuclear war, right? It would be disastrous. So, you know, there’s – there should be some real interest there in developing a different discussion that should be between them. India always looks to China, of course, which makes it difficult, but if China were perhaps in a different bilateral – set of discussions as well, that might help.

Because, you know, when I talked about the UN, one of the things I forgot to mention was that it’s not just about multilateral, it’s also about bilateral. These things are not either/or, they’re both, and they’re both really important. And bilateral isn’t just the US and Russia. It could be number of other bilaterals too. So, I’ll leave it there, and I realise that none of us is answering the first question.

Dr Marion Messmer

No. Rose, how about you? You – which is not to say you have to answer the first question, but if you wanted to…

Rose Gottemoeller

You…

Dr Marion Messmer

…that would be okay.

Rose Gottemoeller

Please give me a brief reminder of the first question.

Dr Marion Messmer

So, the first question was, “Should there be greater population resilience for nuclear war, given all the risks that we face at the moment?”

Rose Gottemoeller

Yes, I did want to state that I just noted this morning, and reading my newsfeed from NATO, that, in fact, Finland and Sweden are upping their guidance to their populations about preparations for war as a whole, and not just nuclear war. I don’t advise a return to the, kind of, steps we had with, you know, civil defence exercises, and God knows Patricia will remember hiding under desks, and so forth, as children back in the 60s.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Didn’t do that here, Rose.

Rose Gottemoeller

I don’t advocate returning to nuclear war specific resilience measures, but I do think it’s useful to have awareness of civil defence and implications for populations of war and aggression breaking out. And I think in the NATO alliance, anyway, Sweden and Finland have taken the lead in highlighting these measures and essentially, conveying them to their own populations. And I think that’s a remarkable leadership role they’ve already assumed in the NATO alliance, which I welcome very much.

I did want to pile on a bit on no first use, and it’s because this is an opportunity, speaking to an audience in the UK, with many from the rest of Europe presence. I hope that if the P5 gets into a discussion about no first use, I agree with Jamie 100%, this is an opportunity to find out what the heck China is up to, if they are going to talk about their plans and their programmes in the context of how it is, you know, going to support a no first use pledge. Because it looks at the moment like what they’re doing is actually contradicting no first use, Patricia made this point earlier. So, if this is an opportunity to get them to try to explain that conundrum, let’s take it and let’s not panic. I was frankly very perturbed in the previous period, when the ‘sole purpose’ proposal that President Biden was proposing, kind of, got into European capitals and caused a general panic, also among US-NATO – I’m sorry, US-Asian allies.

So, let’s take this as an opportunity to talk to China, to figure out what their goals and objectives are, and, oh, by the way, in the end of the day, I think that a no first use pledge among the P5 would be really no different than the, kind of, pledge we make on de-targeting. It’s a confidence building and predictability measure, it’s declaratory policy, just as Patricia said, it’s no first use in peacetime. When wartime comes, of course, we’ll address our national security interests and those of our allies, as we must, no matter what our declaratory policy is. So, I’m only just pleading that if we can have a discussion on this with China and in the P5, I think it could be highly valuable.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much. We’ve got a few minutes left only, so let’s perhaps take one last question from the audience, and let’s do a very quick fire round, and we’ve got someone in the first row here, on your right-hand side, yeah.

Helen Blanc

Thank you, my name is Helen Blanc, I – simple membership of Chatham House, and I could say I a political expert, in retirement now. My question is, usually let’s say the nuclear rhetoric is men’s rhetoric, but today here are mostly women, have a deal with solving pretended nuclear threats. And from my point of view, it’s very symbolic, that’s why my question is to you, Patricia. What is your opinion? Today, there are many central of influence that try to talk and discuss about peace, about remove tension, reduce – reduction the nuclear threats, etc., but obviously, that they not achieve in this purpose. Question is, what do you think? Should appear the new centre of influence, and what is parameter of this central of influencer? Who can take responsibility for negotiation and make reduction this nuclear threats, make reduction this global tension? What is the parameter how this centre should declaration, manifestation, in new environment and in the globe? It’s my question.

Dr Marion Messmer

Could you try stating your question a little shorter, and maybe a little more loudly? It’s a little hard to hear you on stage. I’m really sorry.

Dr Patricia Lewis

It’s really har – I’m not fully understanding what you’re asking.

Helen Blanc

Today, how decide – how solving this problem with threats, global threats, that’s now obviously – because there are many national and global central who try to do it, but without successfully, what do you think should be the new central of impact? Because we are talking about new balances in the new environment and new globe world, it’s simple.

Dr Marion Messmer

So, essentially, how could we bring new voices into solving…

Helen Blanc

Yes.

Dr Marion Messmer

…this problem?

Helen Blanc

Yes, yeah.

Dr Marion Messmer

Yeah, great.

Helen Blanc

How – and how its voices should sound.

Dr Marion Messmer

Great, thank you very much for that question. I think that’s a nice one to end on.

Dr Patricia Lewis

Yeah.

Dr Marion Messmer

It was asked directly to Patricia, but I think it’s also something that Jamie and Rose might want to answer. So, why don’t we go, Patricia, Jamie, Rose? And if you want to fold any closing thoughts into that, then please do so.

Dr Patricia Lewis

I mean, you know, this is something that I’ve been grappling with my whole career, but these new voices, you know, every generation, every new era needs these new voices. We have knowledge from the past that we could pass on, but one of the things that I think we really need to do is challenge the very notion that nuclear weapons deter. So, that’s very controversial, but I think it’s really important to challenge. And the reason I say that is because if you think about what the devastating impact of nuclear weapons are, who would use them in the types of conflicts that we’re seeing? The sorts of leaders who care, the governments who care about their citizens, would never want to risk the use of nuclear weapons, right? Governments that care about human rights, governments that care about healthcare for their population, they will never want to risk this.

Governments who don’t give a damn about their citizens, or anyone else’s citizens, they’ll threaten all they like, right? And who knows? They might even decide to use them, even though it might be – end up in their own destruction. Because, you know, we’ve seen some really crazy decisions come from some of these leaders, which is what’s making us all so very worried now, because, you know, you might say, “Well, they’d never do that because it would be suicide for them,” but, you know what? They have been doing some very near suicidal actions themselves. Invading other countries, for example, against all international law, using chemical weapons on the soil of other countries. I could go on, assassination programmes, I mean, there’s – really riding roughshod over all international law, and whereas all the countries that are upholding international law would never dream of using them.

And so, I do think that this challenge needs to be had, and it needs to be made, and it needs to be discussed, without just going back in time. It needs to be discussed for the future, because I think it’s a very different future from the past. I don’t know if that helps you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thanks. Jamie?

Dr Jamie Kwong

Yeah, I’ll just quickly build on that. You know, I completely agree, I think we’re facing new paradigms, new challenges, and because of that, we need to be open to new solutions and a new willingness to work the problem in different ways and be creative about that. And I think there’s a lot of benefit in the nuclear space for folks like Patricia and Rose and Marion, to welcome new voices into the space, to try to think differently about these really hard issues.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thanks, Jamie. Rose, any final comments from you?

Rose Gottemoeller

Yes, it’s really been a pleasure to appear with all of you, and I take note of our questioner’s remark that this is an all-woman panel. I do think, first of all, and I’ve long thought, that there is a special role for women in negotiations of all kinds. We know from a lot of research that peace negotiations that have women involved have a tendency to stick longer, because women are so oftentimes the link back to the grassroots, to, well, we could say ‘home and hearth’. That’s a bit of a cliché, but they also are very well tied into their communities oftentimes, and so, they can deliver for all stakeholders.

So, I would like to end on that positive note, by also saying that I have really valued the opportunity to work for all these years with Patricia Lewis. I know this is not a farewell for her, but I know this is probably the last time I’ll be in a venue where we are speaking together. So, just a big thank you to Patricia Lewis for all the work that she has done over the years to ensure that all voices are heard. So, thank you for that and Marion, back over to you.

Dr Marion Messmer

Thank you very much, what a wonderful note to close on. Thank you to all of you in the audience, both here at Chatham House and online. Thanks so much for joining us, and please join me in thanking our speakers for their excellent remarks.